REESE  LIBRARY.- 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Class 


AMERICAN   CRISIS   BIOGRAPHIES 

Edited  by 

Ellis  Paxson  Oberholtzer,  Ph.  D. 


amertcan  Crisis 

Edited  by  Ellis  Paxson  Oberholtzer,  Ph.D.  With  the 
counsel  and  advice  of  Professor  John  B.  McMaster,  of 
the  University  of  Pennsylvania. 

Each  i2mo,  cloth,  with  frontispiece  portrait.  Price 
$1.25  net;  by  mail,  $1.37. 

These  biographies  will  constitute  a  complete  and  comprehensive 
history  of  the  great  American  sectional  struggle  in  the  form  of  readable 
and  authoritative  biography.  The  editor  has  enlisted  the  co-operation 
of  many  competent  writers,  as  will  be  noted  from  the  list  given  below. 
An  interesting  feature  of  trie  undertaking  is  that  the  series  is  to  be  im 
partial,  Southern  writers  having  been  assigned  to  Southern  subjects  and 
Northern  writers  to  Northern  subjects,  but  all  will  belong  to  the  younger 
generation  of  writers,  thus  assuring  freedom  from  any  suspicion  of  war 
time  prejudice.  The  Civil  War  will  not  be  treated  as  a  rebellion,  but  as 
the  great  event  in  the  history  of  our  nation,  which,  after  forty  years,  it 
is  now  clearly  recognized  to  have  been. 

Now  ready : 

Abraham  Lincoln.     By  ELLIS  PAXSON  OBERHOLTZER. 
Thomas  H.  Benton.     By  JOSEPH  M.  ROGERS. 
David  G.  Farragut.     By  JOHN  R.  SPEARS. 
William  T.  Sherman.     By  EDWARD  ROBINS. 
Frederick  Douglass.     By  BOOKER  T.  WASHINGTON. 
Judah  P.  Benjamin.     By  PIERCE  BUTLER. 
Robert  E.  Lee.     By  PHILIP  ALEXANDER  BRUCE. 
Jefferson  Davis.     By  PROF.  W.  E.  DODD. 
Alexander  H.  Stephens.     BY  Louis  PENDLETON. 
John  C.  Calhoun.     By  GAILLARD  HUNT. 
"  Stonewall"  Jackson.     By  HENRY  ALEXANDER  WHITE. 
John  Brown.     By  W.  E.  BURGHARDT  DUBOIS. 
Charles  Sumner.     By  PROF.  GEORGE  H.  HAYNES. 
Henry  Clay.     By  THOMAS  H.  CLAY. 
William  H.  Seward.     By  EDWARD  EVERETT  HALE,  Jr. 
Stephen  A.  Douglas.     By  PROF.  HENRY  PARKER  WILLIS. 

In  preparation : 

Daniel  Webster.     By  PROF.  FREDERIC  A.  OGG. 
William  Lloyd  Garrison.     By  LINDSAY  SWIFT. 
Thaddeus  Stevens.     By  PROF.  J.  A.  WOODBURN. 
Andrew  Johnson.      By  PROF.  WALTER  L.  FLEMING. 
Ulysses  S.  Grant.     By  PROF.  FRANKLIN  S.  EDMONDS. 
Edwin  M.  Stanton.     By  EDWARD  S.  CORWIN. 
Robert  Toombs.     By  PROF.  U.  B.  PHILLIPS. 
Jay  Cooke.     By  ELLIS  PAXSON  OBERHOLTZER. 


AMERICAN  CRISIS  BIOGRAPHIES 

STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

by 
HENRY  PARKER  WILLIS,  Ph.D. 


PHILADELPHIA 
GEORGE  W.  JACOBS  &  COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 


COPYRIGHT,  1910,  BY 
GEORGE  W.  JACOBS  &  COMPANY 
Published  December^ 


All  rights  reserved 
Printed  in  U.  S.  A. 


To  my  Mother 


236316 


PREFACE 

THE  interest  in  the  Civil  War,  so  long  superior  to 
that  excited  by  any  other  period  in  American  his 
tory,  has  for  some  time  past  evidently  been  super 
seded  by  a  closer  attention  to  the  more  or  less  im 
mediate  causes  which  contributed  to  bring  on  the 
struggle.  This  is  the  natural  sequence  of  the  pas 
sage  of  years  and  the  sinking  of  the  contest  itself 
and  of  its  heroic  figures  in  the  larger  movement  of 
which  it  was  merely  the  result.  The  most  signifi 
cant  epoch  in  American  history  is  not  that  of  the 
war  itself  but  of  the  fifteen  years  preceding.  In 
spite,  therefore,  of  the  care  with  which  the  ground 
has  already  been  covered,  there  will  be  continued  a 
vivid  interest  not  merely  in  matter,  even  of  the 
slightest,  which  will  contribute  to  the  knowledge  of 
American  conditions  during  those  troubled  years, 
but  also  in  such  critical  discussions  as  may  throw 
the  events  and  personalities  of  the  times  into  clearer 
relief,  though  the  gain  from  any  given  effort  be 
trifling. 

It  is  for  this  reason,  probably,  that  the  past  few 
years  have  witnessed  the  repeated  rewriting  of  the 
history  of  the  ante-bellum  period  and  of  the 
biographies  of  those  who  were  then  influential  in 
shaping  the  nation's  future.  The  hold  of  Lincoln, 
Stunner,  Seward,  Davis,  and  many  others,  upon  the 


PEEFACE 


imagination  as  well  as  upon  the  sober  thought  of 
students  has  grown  rather  than  been  weakened  by 
continuous  and  valuable  contributions  to  their  his 
tory. 

Stephen  Arnold  Douglas  fills  a  unique  place  in  the 
years  before  the  Civil  War  and  in  his  case  also  the 
lapse  of  time  has  but  intensified  the  interest  of 
students  of  American  history  in  his  bold  career. 
The  scholarly  work  of  Allen  Johnson  and  the  vivid 
personal  recollections  of  Clark  E.  Carr  have  very  re 
cently  presented  not  only  the  detailed  history  but  the 
salient  qualities  of  the  man.  In  writing  the  follow 
ing  pages,  the  effort  has  been  made  to  view  Douglas 
primarily  as  a  figure  in  national  politics  rather  than 
as  one  of  the  chief  actors  in  the  slavery  struggle. 
Picturesque  and  striking,  his  life  possesses  its  own 
peculiar  appeal  apart  from  that  of  the  causes  and 
movements  in  which  it  formed  but  a  strand. 

Very  sincere  thanks  are  due  to  Mr.  Charles 
Francis  Adams  of  Boston,  who  has  examined  the 
proof  of  the  volume  and  has  offered  valuable  sug 
gestions  ;  and  general  acknowledgment  is  made  to 
others  who  have  aided  at  various  stages  of  the 
author7  s  work. 

HENRY  PAEKEB  WILLIS. 


CONTENTS 

CHRONOLOGY 9 

I.    HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS         .        .        .11 

II.     STATE  POLITICS 30 

III.    THE  MORMONS  IN  ILLINOIS         .        .      53 

-  IV.    CONGRESSIONAL  APPRENTICESHIP      .      70 

V.    WAR  AND  SLAVERY    ....      91 

VI.    THE  ILLINOIS  CENTRAL  EAILROAD     .     108 

VII.    ON  THE  SENATE  THRESHOLD      .        .     128 

VIII.    NORTH  AND  SOUTH     ....     148 

IX.     "  AMERICAN  "  FOREIGN  POLICY         .     166 

<-X.    THE  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  STRUGGLE  .     187 

XI.    SHIFTING  PARTY  LINES      .        .        .    208 

XII.    THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS        .        .     225 

-XIII.     THE  JOINT  DEBATES  .        .        .        .265 

XIV.     BREAKING  WITH  THE  SOUTH       .        .     291 

-XV.     THE  LAST  BATTLE       .        .        .        .309 

t—XVI.     WITHOUT  A  PARTY     .        .        .        .333 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 354 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES   .        .        .    356 
INDEX  .  360 


CHRONOLOGY 

1813— April  23d.     Birth  of  Stephen  Arnold  Douglas. 

1814— Death  of  Douglas's  father. 

1828-1832 — Studies  and  apprenticeship. 

1833 — April.     Departure  for  the  West. 

1833 — November.     Arrival  in  Illinois. 

1834— March.     Admitted  to  the  bar. 

1835— February  10th.     Elected  district  attorney. 

1836— Elected  to  the  legislature. 

1837 — Resigns  from  the  legislature. 

1837— Appointed  Register  of  the  Land  Office  in  Springfield. 

1837 — December.     Resigns  as  Register  to  become  a  candidate 
for  Congress. 

1838— Is  defeated  for  Congress. 

1838-1840— Lawyer  and  politician. 

1840— November  30th.     Named  Secretary  of  State  of  Illinois. 

1841 — February.     Becomes  Justice  of    the  Supreme  Court  of 
Illinois. 

1841— Renders  decision  favorable  to  the  Mormons. 

1843 — Resigns  from  Supreme  Court  and  makes  successful  con 
test  for  congressional  election. 

1844 — Speaks  in  favor  of  the  Jackson  bill. 

1844 — August.     Interview  with  General  Jackson. 
^844 — November.     Reflected  to  Congress. 

1845 — First  discussion  of  slavery. 

^846-1847 — Adopts  Folk's  Mexican  War  policies. 

1847— Elected  to  the  United  States  Senate. 

1850 — Aids  in  passing  the  Compromise  measures  of  1850. 

1852 — Advocates  "American  "  foreign  policy. 

1852 — First    real    contest  for  the  presidency.      Defeated  by 
Franklin  Pierce. 


10  CHRONOLOGY 

1853— Visits  Europe. 

1854 — Secures  passage  of  Kansas-Nebraska  Act. 

1856— Second    candidacy    for    the    presidency.     Defeated  by 

Buchanan. 

1857 — Sides  with  Republicans  in  Kansas  question. 
1858— Debates  slavery  question  with  Lincoln.     Is  reflected  to 

Senate  against  Lincoln. 
1860 — Third  candidacy  for  the  presidency.     Nominated  by  one 

section  of  the  Democrats  and    defeated  by   Lincoln  at 

the  polls. 

1860 — March.     Seeks  to  prevent  war.     Draws  close  to  Lincoln. 
1860— June.     Dies  at  Chicago. 


STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 


CHAPTEE  I 

HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS 

"TELL  them  to  obey  the  laws  and  support  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States."  l  This  message, 
supposedly  containing  the  last  words  of  Stephen 
Arnold  Douglas,  transmitted  to  his  boys  " Bobbie" 
and  "Stevie,"  then  four  and  two  years  old  respect 
ively,  furnishes  a  key  to  the  singular  character  of 
the  rival  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  inquire  too  narrowly  into  the  question  whether 
any  man's  "last  words"  were  exactly  what  fell 
from  his  lips  at  the  supreme  moment ;  they  are 
usually  those  which  are  given  to  him  by  interpret 
ers  prone  to  accept  the  spirit  for  the  word.  The 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States, 
obedience  to  which  was  thus  solemnly  enjoined 
upon  his  infant  children  had,  at  the  hands  of  the 
speaker,  perhaps  suffered  sufficient  modification  to 
warrant  him  in  urging  a  recognition  of  them.  At 
all  events,  the  anxious  attention  to  "  constitutional  " 

1  These  words  are  quoted  by  all  of  Douglas's  biographers 
without  definite  statement  as  to  their  authority. 


12  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

questions,  which  thus  made  itself  apparent  even  on 
a  death-bed,  furnishes  a  parallel  to  many  singular 
incidents  in  a  career  curiously  misunderstood  and  as 
curiously  misrepresented. 

Douglas's  early  beginnings  were  by  him  con 
cealed  behind  a  cloud  of  reticence.1  Congressional 
leaders,  not  noted  for  their  personal  modesty,  have  in 
many  instances  abstained  from  vaunting  the  circum 
stances  of  their  origin  or  exposing  them  to  the 
public  eye,  either  because  of  ignorance,  or  of  disre 
gard  for  descent,  or  of  recognition  that  in  a  democ 
racy  too  much  attention  to  ancestral  detail  is  un 
popular.  Douglas,  at  any  rate,  was  never  a  family 
historian.  It  is  from  sources  other  than  his  own 
writings  that  the  details  of  his  genealogy  must  be 
compiled.  His  earliest  known  forbears  were  Scotch, 
settling  at  New  London,  Conn. ,  probably  about  1645. 

1  There  is  no  substantial  controversy  about  the  early  history 
of  the  Douglas  family.  The  clearest  account  of  its  origin  so  far 
as  relates  to  Stephen  Arnold  Douglas  is  found  in  Sheahan's 
Life  of  Stephen  A.  Douglas  (New  York,  1860),  which  was  pro 
duced  as  an  incident  to  the  campaign  of  1860  and  undoubtedly 
presents  authentic  information  approved  by  Douglas  regarding 
his  early  history.  Johnson  in  his  Stephen  A.  Douglas  embodies 
most  of  the  material  given  by  Sheahan  and  adds  a  few  touches 
obtained  from  a  manuscript  biography  of  Douglas  in  the  posses 
sion  of  the  Douglas  family.  A  few  additional  points  are  sup 
plied  in  the  Transactions  of  the  Illinois  State  Historical  Society 
and  some  minor  items  of  information  can  be  gleaned  from  con 
temporary  newspapers.  Flint's  Stephen  A.  Douglas  adds  al 
most  nothing  to  the  matter  contained  in  the  other  works  al 
ready  referred  to,  and  the  same  is  true  of  Gardner's  Life  of 
Douglas  and  the  biography  by  William  Garrott  Brown.  Clark 
E.  Carr's  Stephen  A.  Douglas  gives  a  brief  sketch  of  Mr. 
Douglas's  early  life,  which  is  of  special  interest  because  of  the 
personal  reminiscences  and  impressions. 


HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS  13 

The  family,  though  often  represented  as  of  dis 
tinctly  New  England  stock,  did  not  long  remain  ex 
clusively  so.  It  extended  itself  not  only  over  New 
England  but  throughout  Virginia,  the  Caroliuas, 
and  other  Southern  states.  About  1750  Doug 
las's  grandfather  had  established  himself  in  New 
York  and  there  married  Martha  Arnold.  A  son, 
Stephen  A.  Douglas,  was  born  at  Stephentown, 
Eensselaer  County,  New  York,  but  he  spent  no  more 
than  his  boyhood  in  that  state.  Having  been 
educated  as  a  physician,  graduating  first  from 
Middlebury  College,  he  married  Sarah  Fisk  and, 
after  the  birth  of  two  children,  the  first  a  daughter, 
the  second,  Stephen  Arnold  Douglas,  the  subject 
of  this  biography,  he  died  of  heart  disease.  His 
sudden  death  occurred  but  a  little  while  after  the 
birth  of  the  son  at  Brandon,  Vt,  on  April  23, 
1813. 

The  elder  Douglas,  though  holding  out  promise 
of  successful  and  useful  work  in  his  profession,  had 
done  little  more  than  to  care  for  the  immediate  de 
mands  of  existence,  and  it  was  not  long  before  the 
mother  with  her  children  was  transferred  to  the 
farm  which  she  and  an  elder  brother  had  jointly  in 
herited.  The  farm,  later  referred  to  by  Sheahan, 
Douglas's  Boswell,  as  a  "  patrimonial  estate,'7  was 
not  more  than  the  simple  New  England  homestead  of 
the  early  nineteenth  century.  Douglas  himself 
knew  the  meaning  of  manual  labor,  working  until 
he  was  fifteen  years  old  during  the  long  summer 
seasons  and  getting  a  scant  education  at  the  district 


14  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

school  during  the  winter.  Yet  the  tradition  of  men 
tal  training  had  been  strong  in  the  Douglas  blood, 
and  it  was  a  keen  disappointment  when  at  fifteen 
years  an  application  for  some  arrangement  whereby 
he  would  be  prepared  for,  and  sent  to,  college  was 
met  with  a  refusal.  The  uncle,  upon  whom  Douglas 
had,  in  fact,  depended,  felt  himself  embarrassed  by 
the  presence  of  a  young  wife  and  of  an  infant  son 
less  than  a  year  old,  at  the  time  when  his  nephew 
sought  to  make  this  severe  though  warrantable 
draft  upon  the  narrow  means  of  the  family.  The 
tenor  of  the  conversation  can  be  imagined  from 
Sheahan's  delicate  description.  "  An  affectionate 
remonstrance  against  the  folly  of  abandoning  the 
farm  for  the  uncertainties  of  a  professional  life,  ac 
companied  by  a  gentle  intimation  that  he  had  a 
family  of  his  own  to  support,  and  therefore  did  not 
feel  able  to  bear  the  expense  of  educating  another 
person's  children,  was  the  response  made  to  the 
boy's  request."  l 

It  was  partly  pique  based  upon  a  belief  that  he 
had  been  cheated  through  the  violation  of  a  supposed 
understanding  that  he  was  to  be  given  a  collegiate 
education,  and  partly  the  reaction  of  this  feeling 
upon  a  rugged  and  independent  nature,  that  made 
Douglas  on  the  same  day  walk  fourteen  miles  to 
Middlebury,  Vt.,  where  was  situated  the  college  at 
which  his  father  had  been  educated,  and  there  take 
service  as  a  cabinet-maker's  apprentice.  He  con 
tinued  at  this  work  for  more  than  two  years. 

^heahan,  Life,  p.  4. 


HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS  15 

Enough  had  then  been  earned  to  warrant  Douglas, 
now  seventeen  years  of  age,  in  entering  the  academy 
at  Brandon,  Vt.  Twelve  months  in  the  institution 
gave  him  a  preliminary  acquaintance  with  classical 
studies,  and  at  the  end  of  his  year's  schooling,  a 
new  opportunity  was  opened  to  him  by  the  nearly 
simultaneous  marriage  of  his  sister,  now  in  her 
twentieth  year,  and  of  his  mother,  still  a  young 
woman,  the  first  becoming  the  wife  of  Julius  N. 
Granger  of  Ontario  County,  N.  Y.,  while  the  latter 
married  Gehazi  Granger,  father  of  her  daughter's 
husband.  An  invitation  to  Stephen  to  make  his 
home  for  the  time  with  the  rearranged  family,  re 
sulted  in  his  entering  the  academy  at  Canandaigua, 
N.  Y.,  not  far  away.  Some  further  progress  was 
made  by  Douglas  in  his  classical  studies,  but  he  was 
already  beginning  to  drift  away  from  scholastic  and 
literary  pursuits.  Admiring  biographers  have 
noted  the  development  of  a  taste  for  "  political  con 
troversy"  even  during  Douglas's  early  years,  an 
observation  for  which  there  seems  no  authentic  sup 
port.  The  bitter  discussions  centering  about  the 
second  election  of  President  Jackson  in  1832  could 
hardly  have  failed  to  arrest  the  attention  of  a  pug 
nacious  and  positive  nature.  In  debating  clubs  and 
local  meetings,  Douglas  appeared  as  an  enthusiastic 
Jackson  advocate  and  assumed  a  recognized  position 
as  an  exponent  of  national  policies  in  the  school  in 
which  he  was  then  enrolled. 

Until  this  time,  Douglas  had  had  no  marked  ob 
ject  in  his  course  of  self-cultivation.     The  classical 


16  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

studies  to  which  he  had  addressed  himself  were  the 
natural  and  proper  introduction  to  a  professional 
training  in  a  period  when  it  was  thought  not 
expedient  to  decry  general  culture  in  the  interest  of 
special  money-making  education.  Yet  even  in  his 
first  application  to  his  uncle  for  the  aid  which  would 
render  him  independent  during  the  necessary  years 
of  collegiate  life,  Douglas  had  specified  a  professional 
training  as  his  ultimate  object.  It  is  probable  that 
this  training  would  have  been  that  of  his  father 
who,  however,  died  too  early  to  have  left  his 
son  with  more  than  a  transient  predilection  for 
his  own  profession.  Douglas  now  found  himself 
much  more  attracted  to  the  law  than  to  medicine, 
since  the  former  held  out  far  greater  rewards  as 
well  as  opportunities  for  political  promotion.  Four 
more  years,  however,  would  be  necessary  to  gain 
admission  to  the  bar.  The  young  man  had  already 
done  something  by  getting  a  preliminary  acquaint 
ance  with  a  few  fundamentals  in  the  service  of 
attorneys  established  in  Brandon,  but  the  prospect 
of  a  full  admission  to  the  profession  seemed  remote, 
particularly  as  he  had  not  yet  completed  his  academic 
training. 

In  June,  1833,  Douglas  finally  took  a  step  which 
he  had  contemplated  for  some  months.  He  started 
for  the  West,  with  no  definite  post  in  view  and  with 
but  a  small  sum  of  money,  believing  with  foundation 
that  the  opportunities  in  a  growing  country  would 
be  broader  and  the  restrictions  upon  his  progress 
less  severe  than  in  the  older  states  of  the  Atlantic 


HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS  17 

seaboard.  An  attack  of  bilious  fever  overtook  him 
at  Cleveland,  O.,  where  he  had  secured  an  associa 
tion  of  an  advantageous  character  with  Sherlock  J. 
Andrews,  a  practicing  lawyer.  He  had  not  reached 
Cleveland  with  any  settled  intention  of  remaining 
there,  but  letters  of  introduction  and  personal  friends 
in  the  city  had  succeeded  in  securing  him  an  unex 
pectedly  favorable  opening.  The  sharp  attack, 
probably  due  to  conditions  developed  by  a  compara 
tively  frail  constitution  on  the  somewhat  trying 
journey,  so  much  reduced  a  vitality  already  low  as 
to  compel  Douglas's  physicians  to  advise  against  his 
remaining  longer  in  Cleveland.  Douglas,  however, 
was  unwilling  to  return  to  New  York,  and  during 
October,  1833,  he  went  by  canal  boat  to  Portsmouth 
on  the  Ohio  Eiver  and  then  by  steamer  to  Cincin 
nati,  where  a  week's  search  for  work  left  him  with 
little  money  and  no  prospects.  A  further  journey 
to  Louisville  and  then  to  St.  Louis  by  steamer,  in 
the  course  of  which  the  vessel  was  detained  a  week, 
owing  to  an  accident  to  her  machinery,  gained  him 
several  traveling  acquaintances,  but  brought  him 
nothing  more  than  friendly  and  kind  advice,  with 
an  offer  from  Edward  Bates  of  St.  Louis,  an  eminent 
local  lawyer,  of  the  use  of  his  office  and  library 
without  charge  until  he  could  establish  a  practice. 
The  expenses  of  living  in  St.  Louis  were  compara 
tively  high  and  the  very  few  dollars  then  in  posses 
sion  of  Douglas  evidently  would  not  warrant  his 
awaiting  the  turn  of  fortune  in  a  large  city.  He 
thought,  therefore,  of  securing  an  appointment  to 


18  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

teach — the  occupation  then  as  now  considered  al 
most  the  only  one  for  which  no  previous  experience 
is  necessary.  Douglas  had  always  been  a  close  and 
an  interested  reader  of  books  of  travel  and  descrip 
tion.  It  was  this,  in  part,  that  had  drawn  him  from 
the  more  settled  portions  of  the  Union.  He  recalled 
a  description  of  Illinois  in  the  neighborhood  of  Jack 
sonville  and,  imagining  the  conditions  there  to  be 
favorable,  in  default  of  any  better  plan,  he  spent  the 
whole  remainder  of  his  money  in  reaching  that 
place.  The  journey  was  made  by  steamboat  up  the 
Illinois  Kiver,  with  a  short  run  by  stage-coach  from 
the  landing  to  Jacksonville,  then  a  mere  frontier 
settlement  with  a  huddle  of  cabins  around  the  usual 
country  inn. 

Jacksonville,  in  fact,  was  not  a  place  of  any 
commanding  importance  even  for  a  state  as  little 
developed  as  Illinois.  At  that  time  the  state  was 
chiefly  settled  in  the  lower  or  southern  half  of  its 
territory,  the  capital  being  Vandalia.  The  in 
habitants  in  1836-1837  included  267,000  whites, 
with  about  2,200  free  negroes  and  488  negroes 
registered  as  apprentices,  making  a  total  population 
of  nearly  270, 000  souls.  There  was  the  usual  system 
of  government,  with  a  Supreme  Court  having  four 
members  holding  offices  during  good  behavior,  and 
also  circuit  courts  created  by  the  legislature.  A 
peculiarly  strong  position  was  occupied  by  the 
Supreme  Court,  inasmuch  as  it  was  created  by  the 
constitution,  while  its  members,  jointly  with  the 
governor,  constituted  a  council,  a  majority  of  whose 


HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS  19 

members  could  approve  or  veto  all  acts  of  legisla 
tion.  Essentially  the  state  was  in  an  important 
transition  period.  It  was  facing  the  question  of 
internal  development,  while  politically  its  problems 
were  as  difficult  and  as  evasive  as  those  of  its  in 
dustrial  upbuilding.  President  Jackson  had  carried 
the  state  in  1832  and  since  then  Democratic  votes 
were  in  the  large  majority. 

To  a  frontier  community  thus  constituted  and 
agitated  by  the  local  application  of  broad  national 
policies,  Douglas  had  now  come.  Though  he  had 
been  a  Jacksonian  in  his  Eastern  home,  it  had  been 
some  little  time  since  he  had  concerned  himself 
actively  with  political  questions,  while  to  the  local 
contests  of  Illinois  he  was  of  course  an  absolute 
stranger.  Moreover,  when  he  descended  from  the 
stage  at  Jacksonville,  Douglas  was  practically 
penniless.  By  selling  a  few  school-books  which  he 
had  with  him,  he  secured  the  temporary  means  of 
support,  but  Jacksonville  held  out  no  encourage 
ment  and  a  walk  from  that  place  to  Winchester  ap 
parently  did  not  bring  him  any  nearer  to  employ 
ment.  His  journey  to  Winchester  had  occupied  the 
early  part  of  December,  for  he  had  been  compelled  to 
take  it  slowly.  Not  only  the  low  state  of  his  funds 
but  also  the  lack  of  transportation,  made  it  impos 
sible  for  him  to  arrive  sooner.  More  than  a  week 
was  required  in  making  the  trip.  On  reaching 
Winchester,  it  was  imperative  for  Douglas  to 
secure  work  immediately.  He  had  not  been  able  to 
bring  with  him  the  little  baggage  which  he  retained 


20  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  therefore  could  not  even  resort  to  the  expedient 
of  selling  or  pawning  it.  This  uncomfortable  situa 
tion  was  relieved  by  the  sudden  acquisition  of  six 
dollars  earned  by  acting  as  clerk  to  the  adminis 
trator  of  an  estate  whose  chattels  were  put  up  at 
auction  on  the  very  day  of  Douglas's  arrival.  An 
offer  of  two  dollars  per  day  was  gratefully  accepted 
and  during  the  intervals  of  the  sale,  which  lasted 
three  days,  Douglas  had  several  opportunities  of  de 
fending  in  conversation  the  Jacksonian  policies 
then  under  discussion  in  the  state.  He  seized  the 
occasion  to  make  it  known  that  he  was  desirous  of 
teaching  school  and  chance  acquaintances  who  had 
been  favorably  impressed  with  his  acumen,  suc 
ceeded  in  organizing  a  school,  partly  for  the  benefit 
of  the  young  stranger  and  partly  for  that  of  their 
children.  Forty  pupils,  each  paying  three  dollars 
per  quarter,  were  soon  found,  and  on  the  first 
Monday  in  December,  1833,  he  began  work  in  an 
improvised  schoolroom,  continuing  in  this  service 
barely  for  the  length  of  time  for  which  he  had 
engaged  himself.  The  three  months  were  well 
occupied.  Teaching  did  not  prove  a  heavy  drain 
upon  his  time  and  he  was  able  to  continue  a  little 
reading  of  the  law,  using  borrowed  books  and  oc 
casionally  earning  a  small  fee  before  justices  of  the 
peace  who  required  no  license  on  the  part  of  those 
practicing  before  them.  General  Murray  McConnell 
had  lent  Douglas  a  few  books  during  the  short  time 
that  he  spent  at  Jacksonville  and  had  encouraged 
him  to  make  application  for  an  attorney's  license. 


HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS  21 

The  little  reading  which  Douglas  had  been  able  to 
accomplish  and  the  good- will  of  his  newly  made 
acquaintances,  brought  him  the  desired  recognition, 
and  on  the  4th  of  March,  1834,  being  then  still  less 
than  twenty-one  years  old,  he  was  admitted  to  the 
bar  by  the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court. 

According  to  the  testimony  of  acquaintances  of 
the  time,  Douglas  was  even  younger  in  appearance 
than  he  was  in  years.  S.  S.  Brooks,  then  editor  of 
the  Jacksonville  News,  has  given  his  impression  of 
the  young  man  who  came  to  Jacksonville  at  the 
opening  of  March  for  the  purpose  of  securing  his 
license.  Douglas,  says  Mr.  Brooks,  was  "a  youth 
apparently  not  exceeding  seventeen  or  eighteen 
years  of  age  .  .  .  beardless  and  remarkably 
youthful  in  appearance."  Nevertheless  Mr.  Brooks, 
himself  not  perhaps  a  very  critical  judge,  was  sur 
prised  at  the  development  of  his  acquaintance's  in 
tellect  and  his  "  comprehensive  knowledge  of  the 
political  history  of  the  country."  Brooks  says 
nothing  about  the  scope  of  his  legal  training,  but 
it  is  evident  that  he  was  better  versed  in  politics 
than  in  law,  and  that  his  political  wisdom  was  far 
more  evident  to  those  who  agreed  with  him  than  to 
his  opponents.  Nevertheless,  Douglas  had  now 
taken  the  first  and  necessary  step  to  which  he  had 
for  four  years  looked  forward,  more  or  less  vaguely 
at  first,  and  later  with  a  growing  positiveness  and 
determination.  He  might  not  know  much  law,  but 
he  was  a  recognized  lawyer,  had  made  acquaint 
ances,  had  accepted  a  definite  political  allegiance, 


22  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  was  in  position  to  make  capital  of  his  native 
ability  and  his  connections.  He  hastened  to  open 
an  office  in  Jacksonville. 

There  was,  however,  comparatively  little  business 
in  the  town  which  he  had  selected  as  his  present 
home.  Still,  if  there  was  little  law,  there  was  much 
politics,  and  Douglas  turned  to  the  latter  field  as  a 
means  of  livelihood.  He  had  already  sought  to  get 
a  foothold  with  the  press,  writing  a  commendatory 
letter  to  S.  S.  Brooks,  who  had  just  organized  the 
Jacksonville  News  aiid  had  begun  its  publication  in 
February,  1834.  Brooks  had  appreciated  this  early 
commendation  and  encouragement,  and  as  soon  as 
Douglas  had  fairly  settled  himself  in  Jacksonville, 
the  News  repaid  his  support  and  approval  by  more 
or  less  tactful  advertising.  It  was  largely  to  the 
interest  of  the  newspaper  to  secure  a  better  organi 
zation  of  the  Democratic  party,  thereby  building 
up  a  definite  body  of  subscribers.  Douglas  could 
aid  in  this  process  and  in  return  the  paper  stood 
ready  to  help  him  into  office.  The  new-fledged  at 
torney  began  not  only  energetic  but  systematic  work 
designed  to  put  himself  forward  as  a  local  leader. 
Ooe  of  his  most  sympathetic  biographers  admits 
that  there  was  no  time  even  at  this  early  stage  of 
his  career  l  i  when  the  arts  of  the  politician  were  not 
instinctive  in  him."  l  He  entered  politics  distinctly 
as  a  means  of  livelihood  and  of  self- advancement, 
wholly  without  "  boyish  illusions  to  outlive  regard 
ing  the  nature  and  conditions  of  public  life. "  He 

1  Johnson,  Life  of  Douglas,  p.  19. 


HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS  23 

naturally  attached  himself  more  and  more  to  the 
strong,  dominating  figure  of  Andrew  Jackson,  then 
overshadowing  every  other  upon  the  national  stage, 
bent  upon  holding  the  whole  applause  and  reward 
ing  with  a  more  or  less  generous  hand  the  Hessians 
who  supported  his  policies. 

Douglas  found  an  early  opportunity  for  making 
himself  known.  The  Whigs,  Jackson's  opponents, 
were  apparently  gaining  ground,  partly  owing  to 
local  dissatisfaction  with  Jackson's  attitude  toward 
the  Second  Bank  of  the  United  States.  In  order  to 
offset  their  efforts,  "  it  was  deemed  by  Mr.  Douglas 
and  the  editor  of  the  News  expedient  to  call  a  mass 
meeting  of  the  Democrats  of  the  county  to  test  the 
question  whether  General  Jackson  was  to  be  entirely 
abandoned  or  heartily  supported."  l  The  call  had 
been  made  at  a  well-chosen  moment  and  a  large  and 
an  interested  audience  filled  the  court-house  and 
overflowed  into  the  square.  The  usual  resolutions, 
common  at  political  conventioDS,  had  been  prepared 
in  advance.,  and  partly  as  a  result  of  the  prominence 
which  Douglas  had  acquired  in  the  preliminary  ar 
rangements,  partly  because  of  the  desire  of  his  sup 
porters  to  push  him  into  a  commanding  position, 
partly  because  of  uncertainty  and  doubt  about  the 
resolutions  and  a  desire  to  unload  their  responsi 
bility  should  such  a  course  be  necessary,  Douglas 
was  put  forward  as  their  advocate. 

According  to  Sheahan,  when  the  meeting  had 
been  organized,  Douglas  " boldly  advanced"  and 

Sheahan,  Life,  p.  18. 


24  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

read  the  resolutions,  strongly  endorsing  the  policy 
of  the  President  in  refusing  to  recharter  the  Second 
Bank  of  the  United  States  and  removing  the  public 
deposits  from  the  institution.  The  reading  of  the 
resolutions  was  the  signal  for  a  bitter  debate,  vividly 
described  by  Douglas's  personal  admirer  and  fol 
lower  in  his  usual  florid  manner.  A  local  lawyer, 
one  Josiah  Lamborn,  spoke  in  opposition  to  the 
resolutions,  personally  attacking  their  inexperi 
enced  advocate  and  flatly  contradicting  one  of  his 
statements.  This  led  to  a  reply  by  Douglas,  ad 
mitted  to  have  been  "  in  his  own  peculiar  style  " — 
a  style  later  immortalized  by  John  Quincy  Adams 
and  others,  and  characterized  by  rather  extreme 
and  unbridled  personal  attack.  The  speech,  how 
ever,  had  not  been  pitched  too  low.  His  opponent 
left  the  room,  whether,  as  intimated  by  Douglas's 
biographer,  because  of  the  "irresistible"  effect  of 
the  discourse,  or  because  he  was  not  willing  to  an 
swer  in  the  same  vein,  is  not  certain.  The  rough 
farmers,  "hardy  pioneers,"  and  local  grocery -store 
statesmen,  were  delighted  with  the  words  of  Doug 
las,  bestowing  upon  him  what  Sheahan  has  called 
"most  expressive  complimentary  titles,"  such  as 
"high-combed  cock."1  It  would  appear  that  the 
sobriquet,  "Little  Giant,"  which  lasted  through 
out  Douglas's  life,  was  first  applied  to  him  on  this 
memorable  occasion.  Political  meetings  were  not 
so  numerous  at  that  early  day  as  later  and  the  re 
ports  of  the  speech  were  widely  published.  Prob- 

1  Life,  ante  cit.,  p.  20. 


HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS  26 

ably  the  occasion  had  some  influence  in  confirming 
the  county  (Morgan  County)  as  Democratic  in  poli 
tics  and  Douglas's  success  stimulated  him  to  become 
a  candidate  for  his  first  serious  public  office. 

Joseph  Duncan  had  just  been  elected  governor  of 
Illinois  and  A.  M.  Jenkins,  lieutenant-governor  in 
August,  1834.  Hardly  had  the  new  administration 
come  into  office  early  in  January,  1835,  when  it 
passed  an  act  providing  for  the  election  of  states' 
attorneys  by  the  legislature  in  joint  session  in  place 
of  appointment  by  the  governor.  The  bill  had  been 
drafted  by  Douglas  and  was  put  through  over  the  veto 
of  the  new  governor,  unwilling  as  he  was  to  give  up 
his  appointive  authority  and,  though  chosen  only  by 
a  plurality  of  votes,  to  surrender  even  in  part  his 
character  as  representative  of  the  people  of  the 
state.  Probably  it  would  have  been  more  delicate 
had  Douglas  declined  to  draft  the  bill,  or,  having 
drafted  it,  refused  to  accept  any  emolument  in  con 
sequence.1  If  these  ideas  suggested  themselves  to 
the  young  man,  he  paid  no  attention  to  them,  but 
suffered  himself  to  be  elected  states'  attorney  for  the 
First  Judicial  Circuit  on  February  10,  1835,  by  a 
very  scant  majority,  being  given  thirty-eight  votes 
against  thirty-four  for  John  J.  Hardin,  the  former 
incumbent  of  the  office  and  his  most  considerable 
competitor.  The  list  of  Douglas's  supporters  on 

1  John  T.  Morse,  Jr.,  in  writing  of  Lincoln  (Abraham  Lincoln 
— American  Statesmen  Series,  1899)  says  (Vol.  I,  p.  43)  : 
"What  has  chiefly  interested  the  chroniclers  is,  that  at  this 
[1835]  session  he  first  saw  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  then  a  lob 
byist,  and  said  of  him  :  '  He  is  the  least  man  I  ever  saw.'  " 


26  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

that  occasion,  in  fact,  included  some  political 
workers  who  continued  throughout  life  members  of 
the  Douglas  "  machine."  The  circumstances  at 
tending  the  incident,  the  fact  that  Douglas  himself 
had  up  to  that  time  never  had  a  real  case  in  court, 
had  no  law  library,  and  had  never  practiced  in  any 
way,  naturally  made  serious  and  dignified  members 
of  the  bar  look  upon  the  action  as  a  piece  of  polit 
ical  jobbery.  The  accusations  were  but  too  well 
founded  and  would  have  been  sufficient  to  discredit 
an  attorney  who  had  more  difficult  duties  to  per 
form.  The  fact  was,  however,  that  the  work  before 
Douglas  required  more  energy  and  activity  than 
legal  learning.  Although  the  cases  he  had  to  prose 
cute  included,  according  to  the  fluent  Sheahan, 
u  crime  of  almost  every  grade,"  there  was  a  strik 
ing  similarity  among  them,  and  the  methods  were 
decidedly  rough  and  ready  both  on  the  part  of  at 
torneys  and  of  the  local  courts.  Douglas  was  still  a 
mere  stripling,  small  in  figure,  extremely  short,  and 
pinned  his  faith  to  a  single  copy  of  the  criminal 
law,  the  only  book  he  had  with  him.  In  the  towns 
he  visited,  copies  even  of  the  statutes  under  which 
cases  were  brought,  were  lacking.  An  amusing 
attempt  to  discredit  Douglas's  early  efforts  turned 
entirely  upon  the  spelling  of  the  name  of  one  of  the 
counties  employed  in  the  indictments  written  by 
the  prosecutor.  It  was  necessary  to  send  to  Peoria 
for  a  copy  of  the  act  which  was  called  in  question 
and  when  this  was  finally  produced,  Douglas  was 
able  to  show  that  his  spelling  of  the  name  was  cor- 


HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS  27 

rect.  He,  however,  succeeded  in  establishing  his 
point,  owing  to  a  printer's  error  which  had  made 
the  spelling  appear  as  it  had  been  used  by  himself 
in  the  indictments.1 

With  questions  of  no  more  significance  than  this, 
and  with  a  nature  specially  adapted  to  the  making 
of  friends,  Douglas  succeeded  well  enough  in  per 
forming  his  not  very  difficult  duties.  He  devoted 
far  more  time  to  mingling  with  persons  of  influence, 
getting  the  attention  of  voters,  and  generally  build 
ing  up  a  personal  following  than  to  routine  busi 
ness.  This  was  with  a  view  to  the  establishment  of 
a  distinct  political  organization.  Douglas,  sooner 
than  almost  any  other  in  Illinois,  saw  the  use  that 
could  be  made  of  meetings  and  conventions,  and  re 
garded  the  personal  work  he  was  doing  as  merely 
an  incident  in  the  preparation  for  the  convention, 
rather  than  as  the  direct  preliminary  to  a  contest 
for  office.  In  Jacksonville  he  had  thought  it  best 
to  call  a  meeting  for  the  purpose  of  consolidating 
Democratic  opinion  ;  he  now  thought  it  desirable 
to  perform  a  similar  act  of  consolidation  for  the 
Democracy  of  Morgan  County  as  a  whole. 

Working  with  his  old  friend  Brooks,  the  pro 
prietor  of  the  little  organ  in  Jacksonville,  Douglas 
began  a  movement  for  a  county  convention.  His 
idea  was  to  cut  down  the  number  of  candidates  for 
each  office,  eliminate  the  factional  or  personal  ele 
ment,  put  forward  a  single  candidate  for  each  office 

1  Described  by  Johnson,  Life,  p.  24,  following  manuscript 
Autobiography. 


28  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  thus  concentrate  the  power  of  the  party  in  the 
hands  of  the  clique  of  leaders  who  were  able  to  con 
trol  it.  While,  at  the  time,  pretense  was  made  that 
Morgan  County  was  Whig  in  its  politics,  the  fact 
remains  that  the  reverse  had  been  asserted  after  the 
Douglas  meeting  in  Jacksonville  when  it  had  been 
announced  as  Democratic  without  question.  The 
problem  was  essentially  one  of  personal  control 
rather  than  of  political  domination.  So  carefully 
had  the  preliminary  preparations  been  made,  that 
Douglas's  county  convention  was  entirely  success 
ful.  When  the  meeting  convened  at  Jacksonville, 
a  complete  ticket  was  chosen.  The  county  was  en 
titled  to  six  members  of  the  lower  house  of  the 
legislature  and  there  were  various  more  or  less 
valuable  county  offices.  Two  members  of  the 
state  Senate  were  also  to  be  chosen.  A  complete 
ticket  was  put  in  the  field  and  was  met  by  an 
opposing  ticket  headed  by  Hardin,  the  state's 
attorney,  who  less  than  a  year  before  had  been 
displaced  by  Douglas's  shrewd  manoeuvre  in  the 
state  legislature.  Douglas  was  unable  to  avoid 
meeting  Hardin  on  the  stump  and  finally  deter 
mined  to  accept  a  nomination  for  the  legislature  in 
stead  of  one  of  the  candidates  already  named  who 
gave  way  to  him.  Placing  himself  in  the  field  as 
the  leader  of  the  contest,  he  carried  through  the 
struggle  for  the  regular  nomination  and  convention 
system  and  succeeded  in  securing  the  election  of 
the  full  ticket  with  one  exception — that  of  his 
principal  opponent  Hardin,  the  leader  of  his 


HUMBLE  BEGINNINGS  29 

own  ticket,  who  succeeded  in  gaining  access  to  the 
legislature. 

The  contest  was  of  signal  importance  in  several 
ways.  It  practically  assured  the  maintenance  of 
the  convention  system  and  implied  for  the  imme 
diate  future  a  rigid  system  of  party  control  with  a 
hierarchy  of  leaders  who  directed  the  rank  and  file 
and  compelled  them  to  surrender  personal  prefer 
ences.  The  convention  system  had  already  been 
discussed  and  attempted  sporadically  in  other  coun 
ties,  but  would  probably  not  have  fastened  itself 
upon  the  state  so  soon,  had  it  not  been  for  the  suc 
cess  of  Douglas  in  consolidating  his  personal  fol 
lowing.  In  another  way  also  the  occasion  was  im 
portant.  The  campaign  was  carried  on  by  the 
usual  methods,  with  a  copious  flow  of  corn  whiskey. 
The  methods  to  which  Douglas  then  became  accus 
tomed  doubtless  had  a  significant  influence  upon 
the  mind  of  a  young  man  unfamiliar  with  the  world 
and  possessing  no  illusions  concerning  public  life 
and  public  service.  "  In  those  days,"  says  ex- 
Governor  Ford  of  Illinois,  * t  the  people  drank  vast 
quantities  of  whiskey  and  other  liquors ;  and  the 
dispensation  of  liquors,  or  treating,  as  it  was  called 
by  candidates  for  office,  was  an  indispensable  ele 
ment  of  success  at  elections."  l  Probably  it  was 
during  these  early  days  of  his  life  that  Douglas  laid 
the  foundation  of  those  habits  which  later  marred 
his  public  career  and  were  ultimately  a  primary 
cause  of  his  death. 

1  Ford,  History  of  Illinois,  p.  104. 


CHAPTER  II 

STATE  POLITICS 

BY  such  means  as  have  already  been  sketched, 
Douglas  had  definitely  made  his  entry  into  public 
life.  His  choice  as  district  attorney  had  been  the 
result  of  a  shrewd  manoeuvre  which  might  have 
given  him  merely  a  temporary  incumbency,  followed 
by  retirement  to  private  life.  Douglas,  however, 
had  exhibited  the  first  attribute  of  the  politician — 
the  capacity  to  adjust  himself  to  events  and  to  pass 
rapidly  from  one  position  to  a  new  one.  He  was 
now  a  member  of  the  legislative  body  of  his  newly 
adopted  state.  The  session  which  opened  in  Decem 
ber,  1836,  has  been  described  as  the  most  important 
that  ever  assembled  in  Illinois  prior  to  the  Civil 
War,  because  of  the  adoption  of  a  large  scheme  of 
material  development  based  upon  public  aid.  The 
fever  of  speculative  exploitation  was  then  sweeping 
over  the  state.  Agitation  had  already  begun  dur 
ing  the  summer  and  fall  of  1836  in  favor  of  a  gen 
eral  scheme  of  "internal  improvements."  The 
plan  was  inclusive,  and  was  supported  not  only  by 
the  farming  class  but  also  by  the  townspeople,  who 
had  become  infected  with  the  speculative  mania. 
When  the  legislature  met,  it  found  itself  called 
upon  to  determine  what  should  be  done.  The 
governor  in  his  message  had  condemned  Jackson's 


STATE  POLITICS  31 

policies  and  had  thus  raised  a  warm  political  issue 
which  could  not  fail  to  provoke  ill-feeling  and  to 
lead  to  partisan  balloting  upon  all  questions  pre 
sented  to  that  body.  The  scheme  which  finally 
took  shape  comprised  a  system  of  railroads  running 
from  Galena  to  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio,  from  Alton 
to  Shawneetown,  from  Alton  to  Mt.  Carniel,  from 
Quincy  to  the  Indiana  boundary  of  the  state,  and 
various  other  lines,  including  in  all  about  1,300 
miles.  By  way  of  watercourse  improvement,  there 
was  demanded  provision  for  the  deepening  of 
several  rivers,  while  in  order  to  silence  dissatisfac 
tion  among  the  counties  which  got  no  appropria 
tion,  there  was  asked  a  distribution  of  funds  for 
local  use. 

It  was  in  some  ways  a  remarkable  body  of  men  to 
which  this  plan  and  others  of  striking  local  signifi 
cance  were  submitted.  Not  only  Douglas  but  Abra 
ham  Lincoln  was  enrolled  as  a  member  of  the  legis 
lature,  while  with  them  sat  Hardin,  Douglas's  re 
cent  rival,  John  Calhoun,  James  Shields,  and  others. 
Douglas,  however,  started  with  a  distinction  ac 
quired  by  his  vigorous  campaign.  He  became 
chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Petitions  and  in  that 
capacity  had  some  important  work  demanding  his 
personal  attention.  Petitions  for  divorce  came 
numerously  to  the  body  over  which  Douglas  pre 
sided  and,  recognizing  the  importance  of  the  issue, 
he  presented  to  the  legislature  an  inclusive  report, 
concluding  with  a  resolution  "that  it  is  unconstitu 
tional  and  foreign  to  the  duties  of  legislation  for  the 


32  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

legislature  to  grant  bills  of  divorce. "  l  The  resolu 
tion  was  adopted  by  a  decisive  majority  (fifty -three 
to  thirty- two)  and  the  obnoxious  system  of  legislative 
divorces  was  terminated. 

But  this  creditable  performance  was  shortly  to  be 
offset  by  action  in  another  field  calculated  to 
counterbalance  the  prestige  acquired.  Douglas  was 
later  to  become  known  as  a  shrewd  and  daring  real 
estate  speculator.  Finding  himself  confronted  with 
the  question  of  internal  improvements  and  public 
works  as  an  immediate  and  a  pressing  issue,  he 
threw  in  his  lot  with  the  element  which  favored 
development.  Early  in  the  session  he  submitted 
resolutions  providing  for  the  completion  of  the 
Illinois  and  Michigan  canal  which  had  already  en 
countered  serious  difficulties  involving  large  out 
lay  ;  for  the  construction  of  a  railroad  from  the  end 
of  the  canal  to  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  ;  for  another 
railroad  from  Quincy  east  to  the  state  line  ;  and  for 
various  other  appropriations. 

These  resolutions  were  merely  an  incident  in  the 
general  discussion  into  which  the  legislature  now 
plunged.  Douglas  recognized  the  lack  of  resources 
under  which  the  state  was  laboring  and  proposed 
the  issue  of  bonds,  the  interest  on  them  to  be  met  by 
sales  of  public  lands.  If  he  did  not  go  as  far  as  some 
of  his  more  radical  colleagues,  and  if  his  youth  and 
total  lack  of  knowledge  of  business  excuse  him  for 
being  carried  away  by  the  current  demands  of 

1  House  Journal,  pp.  60  ff. ;  also  Johnson's  Douglas,  pp.  33-34, 
especially  footnote  p.  34. 


STATE  POLITICS  33 

special  interests,  the  fact  remains  that  at  the  time 
he  did  not  raise  his  voice  in  opposition  to  the 
urgent  calls  of  speculators.  Sharing  in  the  work  of 
the  committee  of  conference  which  attempted  to  rec 
oncile  the  views  of  the  two  branches  of  the  state 
legislature,  Douglas,  however,  endeavored  to  restrain 
somewhat  the  excesses  of  the  land  speculators  and 
directly  opposed  any  system  of  improvement  to 
which  the  state  should  be  a  party  or  in  which  it 
should  hold  stock.  He  likewise  antagonized  a 
scheme  whereby  Illinois  would  have  authorized  an 
increase  in  the  stock  of  the  state  bank  and  would 
have  become  a  large  stockholder  in  it.  Finally, 
however,  he  yielded  his  assent  to  a  plan  whereby 
large  sums  were  voted  for  the  improvement  of  the 
rivers  of  the  state  and  still  larger  subsidies  were 
devoted  to  the  establishment  of  railroad  lines,  with 
a  division  of  $200,000  among  the  several  coun 
ties.1  Although  Douglas's  enthusiastic  biographer 
Sheahan  claims  for  him  that,  had  his  original  plan 
been  adopted,  several  millions  of  dollars  would  have 
been  saved,  he  is  obliged  to  admit  that  the  legisla 
ture  *  i  laid  the  foundation  of  a  public  debt  which 
for  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  .  .  .  loomed 
up  in  all  its  hideous  proportions,  an  object  of  terror 
and  of  oppression  to  the  people, "  while  a  more  recent 
though  hardly  less  sympathetic  writer  grants  that 
Douglas  was  put  "  in  a  peculiarly  trying  position." 
It  was  only  a  short  time  after  the  adjournment  of 
the  legislature  when  disaster  swept  over  the  country. 
1  Sheahan,  Life,  p.  32. 


34  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

The  state  bank  went  to  destruction,  local  bank 
stock  being  tremendously  depreciated,  and  the  sys 
tem  of  internal  improvements  at  once  received  a 
decisive  check.  It  was  not  strange  that  the  mem 
bers  of  the  legislature  felt  keenly  the  criticism  to 
which  their  action  had  exposed  them,  and  Douglas, 
who  had  had  the  foresight  to  accept  a  place  as  Reg 
ister  of  the  Laud  Office  at  Springfield,  found  himself 
well  out  of  the  difficulty  to  which  he  would  have  been 
exposed  had  he  remained  a  member  of  the  legisla 
ture  during  the  special  session  shortly  to  be  called 
by  Governor  Duncan.  The  place  as  register  had 
been  given  to  Douglas  under  conditions  which  sug 
gested  a  political  u  deal."  During  his  first  term  in 
the  legislature,  it  had  been  voted  to  move  the  capi 
tal  of  the  state  to  Springfield.  There  had  naturally 
been  keen  competition  among  the  various  towns  de 
sirous  of  being  designated.  Douglas  had  favored 
Springfield  and  had  done  what  he  could  to  secure 
the  location  of  the  capital  at  that  place.  He  was  at 
tached  to  the  town,  had  gained  his  first  start  there 
and  not  unnaturally  supported  its  claims.  The 
charge  that  he  had  done  the  work  in  return  for  a 
pledge  of  the  support  of  the  Springfield  people  for 
the  registership  was  one  of  the  usual  accusations 
likely  to  be  made  under  such  conditions,  but  seems  to 
have  no  historical  basis.  The  fact  that  Douglas  had 
opposed  moving  the  capital,  though  if  it  were  to  be 
moved  at  all  he  had  favored  Springfield,  tends  to 
relieve  him  from  the  imputations  thus  cast  upon  the 
conditions  under  which  he  had  assumed  office. 


STATE  POLITICS  35 

He  had  in  any  event  chosen  wisely  from  a  pecu 
niary  standpoint.  Local  newspapers  promptly 
charged  that  his  receipts  were  enormous,1  and  it  is 
certain  that  they  were  sufficient  to  put  him  for  the 
first  time  in  his  life  upon  a  thoroughly  independent 
basis.  He  was  still,  however,  as  much  of  a  politician 
as  ever,  although  holding  a  more  or  less  non -political 
office.  He  resumed  the  life  which  he  had  led  in 
Springfield 2  when  he  had  first  opened  his  office  there 
without  law  books,  without  training,  and  with  only 
a  few  political  backers.  Although  not  in  the  legis 
lative  body,  he  continued  to  be  a  close  observer  of 
state  politics.  The  special  session  which  had  been 
summoned  by  Governor  Duncan  met  but  a  little 
while  after  the  inauguration  of  President  Van 
Buren,  who  had  called  a  special  session  of  Congress 
before  which  he  had  laid  a  plan  for  a  sub-treasury 
system.  The  position  of  Douglas  with  reference  to 
national  politics  at  this  period  is  not  clear  ;  his  at 
tention  was  far  more  closely  concentrated  upon 
local  than  upon  Federal  issues. 

The  effect  of  the  disturbances,  however,  was  to 
weaken  the  Democratic  party  throughout  the  coun 
try  and  of  course  in  Illinois.  There  was  danger 
that  the  party  machinery  which  Douglas  had  been 

1  Johnson,  Life,  p.  35. 

2  When  Springfield  was  organized  as  a  city  in  1840,  under  a 
special   charter,    a  "grand  ball"  was  given  in  the  American 
House  to  celebrate  the  event.     Invitations  were  sent  to  St.  Louis 
and  Chicago.     "  It  was  designed  to  be  a  grand  affair  which  was 
to  include  wit,  beauty,  and  fashion  of  the  entire  state.     Among 
the  managers  appear  the  names  of  A.  Lincoln,  S.  A.  Douglas." 
Moses,  Illinois  Historical  and  Statistical,  Vol.  I,  p.  431. 


36  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

so  largely  instrumental  in  building  up,  would  go  to 
pieces  and  that  the  controlling  elements  would  lose 
the  management  of  the  state  government  and  the 
patronage  which  they  had  held  so  long.  This 
disorganization  of  public  opinion  naturally  revived 
the  hostility  to  the  convention  system.  During  the 
special  session  of  the  legislature,  the  political  situa 
tion  was  fully  discussed  and  finally  a  state  conven 
tion  was  summoned.  Douglas  had  visited  the  cap 
ital  for  the  purpose  of  securing  concert  of  action  and 
at  a  meeting  on  July  27th  it  had  been  determined 
that  the  convention  should  be  called  in  December. 
The  preliminary  work  was  placed  in  the -hands 
of  a  committee  of  thirty  of  which  Douglas  was  made 
a  member,  while  in  each  congressional  district  a 
committee  of  five  was  organized  to  look  after  local 
conditions.  The  committee  of  thirty  issued  an  ad 
dress  to  the  people  of  the  state  which  appeared  dur 
ing  the  early  autumn  and  probably  had  some  effect 
in  directing  public  opinion.  Douglas  traveled 
hither  and  thither,  addressing  various  local  mass- 
meetings  and  now  fully  defending  the  policy  of  Van 
Buren  in  financial  and  other  matters.  There  were 
then  three  congressional  districts  in  the  state  and 
Douglas,  as  a  member  of  the  committee  controlling 
one  of  these,  was  in  a  most  important  position  of 
vantage.  With  this  start,  it  was  now  not  strange 
that  he  should  endeavor  to  transfer  himself  from 
local  to  national  politics.  Just  when  he  determined 
to  become  the  successor  of  William  L.  May,  then 
representing  his  district,  is  not  certain.  Practice 


STATE  POLITICS  37 

favored  the  continuance  of  the  congressmen  for  more 
than  one  term  and  May  had  had  but  one.  The  con 
vention  system  which  Douglas  had  so  earnestly 
advocated,  however,  demanded  that  the  nomination 
should  be  made  in  convention  and  consequently  one 
was  called  to  meet  at  Peoria  in  November,  1837. 
Brooks,  the  old-time  backer  of  Douglas,  had  been 
doing  what  he  could  to  shape  public  opinion,  and 
to  make  sure  that  the  right  men  were  nominated  as 
representatives  of  the  county  in  the  district  conven 
tion.  Singularly  enough,  Douglas  was  nominated 
on  the  first  ballot,  and  thus  as  a  candidate  stepped 
immediately  into  the  place  of  a  recognized  member 
of  Congress  who  had  rendered  efficient  service,  and 
who  was  now  displaced  by  an  electoral  device  which 
was  far  from  having  obtained  permanent  recogni 
tion.  The  convention  itself  had  represented  only 
about  two-fifths  of  the  total  number  of  counties  in 
the  district. 

Had  Douglas  been  sincerely  attached  to  the  con 
vention  system,  he  would  hardly  have  subjected  it 
to  so  rude  a  shock  as  that  which  it  now  received 
from  the  onset  of  public  criticism.  Douglas,  in  fact, 
was  not  a  strong  candidate.  He  was  then  less  than 
twenty-five  years  of  age ;  the  party  was  generally 
in  a  bad  condition  ;  he  was  inexperienced  save  in 
purely  local  matters  ;  he  had  no  financial  resources 
with  which  to  back  the  organization.  It  was  a 
wonderful  tribute  to  his  personality  and  skill  as  a 
manipulator  that  he  should  have  received  the  nomi 
nation  at  all.  The  fact  that  at  about  the  same  time 


38  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  Democratic  state  convention  nominated  weak 
men  as  candidates  more  than  correspondingly 
weakened  the  local  tickets.  Douglas  was  not  the 
only  Federal  appointee  designated  on  the  slate, 
and  the  machine-made  appearance  which  his  own 
nomination  presented  was  characteristic  of  prac 
tically  the  whole  party  program  throughout 
Illinois.  He  undoubtedly  realized  the  difficulties 
of  the  situation,  but  he  was  in  a  position  where  he 
must  go  forward  or  lose  ground.  The  land  office 
business  was  by  no  means  so  profitable  after  the 
panic  of  1837  as  it  had  been  before  the  disaster, 
while  the  character  of  the  work  did  not  suit 
Douglas's  active  spirit.  He  had  exhausted  about 
all  that  was  immediately  within  his  reach  in  state 
politics  and  his  transfer  to  the  national  capital  was 
the  next  and  natural  step  for  him  to  take.  His 
position  in  the  party  had  been  unexpectedly  con 
spicuous,  but  was  not  sufficiently  confirmed  to 
warrant  him  in  believing  that  two  years  outside  of 
direct  participation  in  political  matters  would  leave 
him  in  a  condition  to  regain  his  place.  He  plunged 
into  the  canvass,  in  opposition  to  a  rival  candidate 
named  John  T.  Stuart,  who  was  described  as  an 
eminent  lawyer  and  a  fine  speaker,  to  neither  of 
which  classes  Douglas  could  as  yet  be  said  to 
belong. 

The  progress  of  the  campaign  showed  that  he  was 
heavily  handicapped  by  the  unfair  tactics  of  his 
party,  while  the  vigor  and  ability  of  his  opponent 
would  in  any  case  have  made  it  difficult  for  him  to 


STATE  POLITICS  39 

gain  headway  against  the  Whigs.  Stuart  was  not 
only  popular  in  Springfield,  Douglas's  own  head 
quarters,  but  he  was  widely  known  throughout  the 
state,  and  had  the  stamina  and  energy  that  political 
campaigns  in  those  primitive  days  especially  de 
manded.  Yet  the  contest  seemed  to  be  more  evenly 
matched  than  many  had  expected.  Douglas  gave  a 
good  account  of  himself  even  in  a  personal  affray 
with  his  opponent,  who  picked  up  his  rival  and 
twisted  his  neck  vigorously,  while  Douglas  re 
sponded  with  a  severe  bite  that  left  its  mark  in 
after  years  upon  Stuart's  person.  The  result,  how 
ever,  showed  that  the  political  jobbery  of  the 
Democrats  had  disgusted  the  district  as  well  as  the 
state,  so  that  Stuart  secured  a  small  majority. 
About  all  that  Douglas  carried  out  of  the  cam 
paign  was  a  reputation  as  a  vigorous  and  resource 
ful  fighter.  It  was  the  general  belief  that  no  other 
man  could  have  done  so  well  as  he  in  this  trying 
struggle.  This,  however,  was  rather  cold  con 
solation. 

Douglas  now  found  himself  in  September,  1838, 
out  of  his  snug  nest  in  the  land  office  and  with  but 
little  to  rely  upon.  He  had  not  been  able  to  save 
much  money,  and  what  he  had  saved  had  been 
heavily  drawn  upon  by  political  contributions  and 
his  own  expenses.  Like  most  disappointed  politi 
cians,  he  fell  back  on  the  practice  of  law,  his  main 
obstacle  being  that  he  had  no  legal  information. 
However,  he  opened  an  office  in  Springfield.  The 
winter's  work  was  not  particularly  profitable,  per- 


40  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

haps  because  he  spent  more  time  in  political  schem 
ing  than  in  preparing  for  practice  or  in  attendance 
on  the  courts.  Early  in  the  spring  he  had  a  sharp 
and  wordy  contest  with  Lincoln,  who  had  himself 
begun  the  practice  of  law,  although  the  affair  had 
no  general  significance  and  was  merely  a  local  bout. 
Other  political  imbroglios,  including  a  personal 
fight  with  a  newspaper  editor  in  a  neighboring 
town,  were  less  creditable  and  Douglas  was  at  this 
time,  perhaps  more  than  at  any  other  in  his  career, 
in  danger  of  dropping  back  into  the  place  of  an 
incompetent  local  attorney  who  devotes  himself  not 
to  law  but  to  the  meaner  tasks  of  political  manage 
ment. 

Fortune,  however,  or  his  own  restless  energy,  did 
not  permit  this  inglorious  termination  of  his  career. 
Douglas  continued  his  political  efforts,  it  is  true, 
sharing  in  local  conventions,  but  he  also  put  him 
self  upon  a  more  dignified  basis  than  he  had  thus 
far  been  able  to  attain  by  securing  a  place  as 
counsel  in  an  important  political  case  brought  by 
some  members  of  the  Whig  party  to  test  the  con 
stitutionality  of  that  provision  of  the  Illinois  con 
stitution  which  allowed  "inhabitants'7  to  vote  at 
state  elections.  The  case  never  came  to  trial  in  the 
Supreme  Court,  Douglas  and  his  associate  counsel 
being  called  in  at  a  moment  when  the  Democrats 
had  been  defeated  in  the  Circuit  Court,  and  secur 
ing  an  adjournment  on  technical  grounds  until  after 
the  election  of  1840  had  passed  by.  As  the  case 
had  been  brought  up  largely  with  a  view  to  the 


STATE  POLITICS  41 

effect  of  a  decision  iii  that  election,  such  action  was 
equivalent,  for  the  immediate  purpose,  to  a  victory 
for  the  Democrats. 

This  danger  out  of  the  way,  Douglas  plunged  into 
the  fierce  contest  of  Van  Buren  and  Harrison  for 
the  presidency  and  succeeded  in  carrying  the  state 
in  favor  of  Van  Buren.  The  campaign  was  one  of 
the  most  bitter  that  Illinois  had  yet  known  and 
Douglas  had  acquitted  himself  with  more  than 
common  skill  and  success.  The  party  owed  him 
something  because  of  the  clever  trick  he  had  turned 
in  securing  an  adjournment  of  the  case  before  the 
Supreme  Court,  as  well  as  for  his  active  and  unpaid 
efforts  during  the  campaign.  What  would  he  take  ? 
The  party  would  undoubtedly  grant  him  anything 
that  was  available.  He  had  already  declined  a  re- 
nomination  to  the  legislature,  recognizing,  as  every 
aspirant  for  political  honors  does,  that  a  second 
term  in  a  state  legislative  body  means  that  he  who 
accepts  it  probably  has  not  much  in  store  for  him 
in  Federal  politics.  Fortunately,  the  secretaryship 
of  state  was  opened  to  him  by  the  resignation  of  the 
previous  incumbent.  This  resignation  had  not  been 
voluntary  ;  it  was  the  result  of  legal  proceedings  in 
stituted  by  the  governor  who  desired  to  oust  Field, 
the  previous  appointee,  because  he  was  a  Whig, 
while  the  administration  was  now  Democratic.  The 
case  had  been  decided  in  Field's  favor  by  the  Su 
preme  Court  of  Illinois  upon  appeal  from  the  lower 
court  which  had  decided  against  him  ;  but  so  much 
irritation  had  been  created  as  a  result  of  the  pro- 


42  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ceedings,  that  Field,  foreseeing  that  his  retention  of 
the  office  would  be  made  a  political  issue,  withdrew  l 
and  was  succeeded  by  Douglas.  The  latter  took  of 
fice  just  at  the  close  of  1840. 2  The  new  place,  how 
ever,  proved  to  be  of  little  importance  save  as  a 
stepping-stone. 

Douglas's  accession  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
state  of  Illinois  is  one  of  the  most  singular  turns  in 
the  political  wheel  of  fortune  by  which  he  was  be 
ing  carried  steadily  on.  He  had  become  Secretary 
of  State  and  had  accepted  the  place  as  a  temporary 
makeshift,  just  as  he  had  accepted  the  various  po 
litical  offices  which  he  had  held  in  the  past.  Ap 
parently  he  had  had  no  thought  of  securing  ad 
vancement  in  the  legal  profession,  nor  had  he  done 
anything  which  could  serve  as  a  medium  of  training 

1  The  governor  named  J.  A.  McClernand  as  Secretary  of  State 
in  place  of  Alexander  P.  Field,  a  Whig.     The  legislature  re 
fused  to  confirm  the  nomination.     After  adjournment  of  the 
legislature,  he  again  commissioned  McClernand.     McClernand 
"  made  a  formal  demand  for  the  office,  and  its  surrender  being 
refused,  sued  out  a  writ  of  quo  warranto  before  Judge  Breese, 
who  upon  the  hearing  decided  in  his  favor.     Field  appealed  the 
case  to  the  Supreme  Court,  where  it  was  ably  argued  on  his  be 
half  by  Cyrus  Walker,  Justice  Butterfield  and  Levi  Davis,  and 
for  the  appellee  by  S.  A.  Douglas,  James  Shields,  and  the  At 
torney-General,  Wickliffe  Kitchell.     The  decision  of  the  court 
below  was  reversed."     Moses,  Illinois  Historical  and  Statistical. 
p.  443. 

2  The  Democrats  "  availed  themselves  of  the  first  opportunity 
offering  itself  to  override,  and  virtually  to  reverse,  the  decision 
of   the  Supreme   Court   by   promptly   confirming   Stephen  A. 
Douglas  whose  nomination  as  Secretary  of  State  was  among  the 
first  official   acts   of   the   governor  after  the  assembling  of  the 
called  session,  on  November  30th.     Mr.  Douglas,  however,  only 
held  the  position  until  February  27th."     2Md.,  p.  444. 


STATE  POLITICS  43 

to  fit  him  for  preferment  in  that  direction.  His  law 
had  throughout  the  few  years  of  his  career  been 
simply  a  servant  to  his  ambition,  and  that  ambition 
had  been  consistently  and  steadily  political.  He 
had  hardly  taken  office  as  Secretary  of  State  when 
there  appeared  to  be  a  probability  of  a  new  ar 
rangement  of  the  various  scheming  groups  which 
were  in  practical  control  of  the  legislature.  It  had 
been  thought  that  a  change  in  the  organization  of 
the  Supreme  Court  would  be  desirable  at  the  session 
of  1840-1841.  The  idea  was  to  substitute  for  the 
Circuit  Courts  of  the  state  a  larger  bench  of  Supreme 
Court  j  udges,  making  nine  in  all,  instead  of  the  four 
previously  appointed,  the  judges  thereafter  to  be 
assigned  to  circuits.  This  plan  apparently  did  not 
grow  out  of  any  general  desire  for  better  judicial 
organization,  but  out  of  partisan  prejudice  which 
had  been  stimulated  by  sundry  decisions  of  the  court 
in  recent  cases  that  involved  political  issues.1 
Douglas,  being  a  "good  mixer,"  had  early  become 
popular  with  the  legislative  wire-pullers  and  he  now 
demanded  some  action  with  reference  to  the  court, 
that  there  might  be  adequate  rebuke  to  it  for  its 
alleged  political  tendencies.  The  bill  reorganizing 
the  Supreme  Court  was  therefore  hastened  forward 


1  The  court  had  "held  that  .  .  .  one  Kyle,  upon  the 
reception  of  whose  vote  the  question  was  made,  possessed  all 
the  qualifications  required  by  the  affidavit,  under  the  law  of 
1829.  .  .  .  The  broad  and  important  question  of  alien 
suffrage  under  the  constitution  did  not  arise  in  the  case,  and  no 
opinion  of  the  court  was  expressed  upon  it."  Davidson  and 
Stuve,  History  of  Illinois,  p.  456. 


44  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

by  all  the  means  of  partisanship  and  legislative 
trickery,  and  was  speedily  enacted.1  Thus  arose  the 
question  of  new  appointments  to  the  bench. 

It  would  have  been  far  better  for  Douglas  at  this 
juncture  had  he  resolutely  refused  to  consider  a  ju 
dicial  appointment,  especially  in  view  of  the  share 
he  had  had  in  urging  the  reorganization.  He  was, 
however,  troubled  with  no  such  scruples,  or  with 
undue  modesty  of  any  kind.  The  report  shortly 
gained  ground  that  he  would  be  rewarded  for  past 
political  service  in  this  way  and  Douglas  made  no 
effort  to  contradict  the  rumor.  Despite  the  opposi 
tion  of  the  more  conservative  and  older  lawyers  of 
the  state,  his  name  was  finally  accepted  as  one  of 
the  appointees  and  he  took  the  place  with  the  usual 
statement  about  the  sacrifice  involved  in  a  step  that 
would  cause  him  wholly  to  surrender  himself  to  a 
judicial  career. 

In  the  court  as  it  was  reorganized,  Douglas  was 
associated  with  some  whose  names  were  subsequently 
conspicuous  in  local  history  and  with  others  who 
have  continued  practically  unknown  to  fame. 
William  Wilson  was  Chief -Justice  and  his  associates 
were  Samuel  D.  Lock  wood,  Theophilus  W.  Smith, 
Thomas  C.  Browne,  Thomas  Ford,  Sidney  Breese, 

1  "  Meanwhile  the  bill  to  reorganize  the  Supreme  Court  was 
pending  before  the  legislature,  and  with  the  rendition  of  this 
decision  by  the  court,  it  was  circulated  about  by  the  politicians, 
and  boldly  charged  by  Douglas  in  a  speech  made  in  the  lobby 
of  the  house,  that  the  main  question  had  been  purposely  evaded 
by  the  court  to  allay  the  apprehension  of  Democrats  as  to  the 
alien  vote,  and  to  conciliate  their  favor,  with  the  object  of  de 
feating  the  bill."  History  of  Illinois,  p.  457. 


STATE  POLITICS  45 

Walter  B.  Scates,  Samuel  H.  Treat,  and  Douglas 
himself.1  Douglas  was  assigned  to  the  fifth  dis 
trict  for  the  performance  of  circuit  duties  under  the 
new  law.  The  only  important  feature  about  the 
fifth  district  was  that  it  included  the  city  of  Quincy, 
in  Hancock  County,  and  a  place  called  Nauvoo  at 
which  had  recently  settled  the  peculiar  religious 
sectaries  who  have  come  to  be  known  as  Mormons. 
Douglas  at  once  began  his  duties  and  handed  down 


1  The  five  additional  supreme  judges  elected  by  the  legislature 
under  this  law  were,  Thomas  Ford  (subsequently  governor), 
Sidney  Breese,  Walter  B.  Scates,  Samuel  H.  Treat,  and 
Stephen  A.  Douglas. 

"  The  last  named  gentleman  had  been  of  counsel  for  the 
aliens,  had  derived  his  information  of  how  the  case  was  going  to 
be  decided  in  June  preceding  from  Judge  Smith,  had  obtained 
the  continuance  then  on  the  defect  in  the  record  as  pointed  oub 
by  him,  had  made  a  violent  attack  upon  the  old  judges  by  a 
characteristic  speech  in  the  lobby,  and  had  furnished  McClernand 
the  data  upon  which  the  latter  denounced  the  court ;  in  view  of 
all  of  which,  it  seems  strange  that  he  had  sought  and  obtained  a 
position  side  by  side  with  the  gentlemen  he  had  traduced  and 
attempted  so  much  to  bring  into  disrepute.  Partisan  scheming 
and  the  cravings  of  office  could  not  well  go  further. 

"The  new  judges  were  charged  with  partisan  conduct  by  the 
Whig  press  of  the  period,  in  the  secret  appointment  of  a  clerk 
of  the  Supreme  Court.  Ebenezer  Peck,  it  seems,  as  a  member 
of  the  legislature  had  originally  opposed  the  judiciary  bill ;  but 
his  position  became  suddenly  changed,  and  the  bill  passed  the 
House  by  one  majority  over  the  objections  of  the  council.  After 
taking  their  seats,  the  new  members  of  the  court  had  no  con 
sultation  with  the  old  judges  on  the  subject  of  the  clerkship, 
and  not  a  word  was  said  in  open  court  about  removing  the  in 
cumbent,  Duncan.  Indeed,  one  of  them  had  given  out  that  to 
avoid  the  imputation  of  being  a  partisan  court,  the  clerkship 
was  not  to  be  disturbed.  The  public  astonishment  was  not  in 
considerable,  therefore,  when  shortly  after  its  adjournment, 
Peck  announced  himself  as  the  clerk  by  appointment  of  the 
majority  of  the  court."  History  of  Illinois,  p.  460. 


46  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

various  decisions.  Among  those  which  he  delivered 
were  Woodward  vs.  Turnbull,  an  action  for  debt  in 
volving  the  issuance  of  local  licenses  for  the  exhibi 
tion  of  a  menagerie  in  which  Justice  Scates  delivered 
a  long  dissenting  opinion  ;  Stevens  vs.  Stebbins,  an 
other  action  for  debt,  raising  the  interesting  ques 
tion  whether  there  was  any  material  variance  in  law 
between  " Stevens'7  the  Christian  name  of  Mr. 
Stebbins  and  '  '  Steven ' '  the  form  in  which  the 
name  had  appeared  in  a  note,  Douglas  reaching  the 
conclusion  that  the  variation  between  the  two  names 
was  immaterial ;  Warren  vs.  Nexsen,  an  action  of 
assumpsit  involving  a  minor  legal  question  of 
technique ;  Gardner  vs.  the  People,  which  involved 
a  motion  for  a  writ  of  error  in  a  murder  case  ; 
Roper  vs.  Clabaugh,  in  which  was  presented  the 
question  of  trespass  upon  lands  by  one  individual 
who  took  away  fence-rails  belonging  to  another ; 
and  other  cases  of  the  same  relatively  inconspicuous 
sort. l  Most  of  the  causes  which  Douglas  was  called 
upon  to  decide  furnished  no  principles  of  law  that 
could  not  be  settled  by  a  man  of  shrewd  common 
sense,  and  this  he  possessed  in  abundant  measure, 
even  though  provided  only  with  the  single  law  book 
with  which  the  new  Supreme  Court  justice  but  a  few 
years  before  had  begun  his  career  as  prosecuting 
District  Attorney.  Although  the  cases  coming  into 
the  tribunal  to  which  Douglas  had  been  elected 
were  at  that  time  possibly  not  of  first-class  impor- 

1  The  cases  here  referred  to  will  be  found  at  length  in  Scam- 
mon's  Illinois  Reports,  Vols.  III-V,  1840-1843. 


STATE  POLITICS  47 

tance,  the  work  lying  before  him  was  as  significant 
in  its  way  as  any  to  which  he  was  likely  to  be 
called,  and  was  more  important  than  the  work  of  the 
courts  in  many  older  and  better -settled  common 
wealths.  It  was  unfortunately  true  that  Douglas 
had  but  too  little  training  for  the  position  which  he 
now  assumed.  The  condition  of  the  bar,  and  of  the 
bench  as  well,  was  exceedingly  crude  at  that  early 
day,  and  no  very  great  amount  of  legal  acumen  was 
called  for  ;  nevertheless,  a  good  deal  of  tact  and 
skill  was  needed  in  order  to  maintain  the  position 
of  a  member  of  the  Supreme  Court  before  a  bar 
which  included  many  able  and  alert  minds,  making 
up  in  shrewdness  what  they  lacked  in  legal  learning. 
Of  more  interest  than  the  character  of  the  cases 
passed  upon  by  Douglas  is  the  fact  that  one  of  the 
practicing  lawyers  who  appeared  before  the  court 
was  Abraham  Lincoln.  John  J.  Hardin,  Douglas's 
sometime  rival  for  political  honors,  was  another  of 
the  lawyers,  while  among  his  colleagues  on  the 
bench  was  Sidney  Breese,  who  was  in  the  future  to 
be  associated  with  him  as  a  member  of  the  United 
States  Senate.  Lyman  Truuibull,  who  appeared 
before  the  court  as  an  attorney,  was  also  to  join 
Douglas  in  the  Senate  some  years  later.  Altogether 
the  make-up  of  the  bench  and  the  bar  gave  Douglas 
interesting  and  valuable  connections  and  enabled 
him  to  extend  his  political  acquaintance.  The  ex 
perience,  moreover,  brought  him  into  contact  with 
men  with  whom  he  was  later  to  engage  in  some  of 
the  keenest  struggles  of  his  life,  and  gave  him  the 


48  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

opportunity  of  estimating  their  mental  caliber  in  a 
way  that  would  probably  not  have  been  possible 
under  other  circumstances.  He  gained  an  insight 
into  the  character  of  Lincoln  that  served  him  in 
good  stead  in  subsequent  years,  and  laid  the  founda 
tion  for  the  respect  which  he  later  accorded  to  the 
ungraceful  countryman  who  was  to  guide  the  desti 
nies  of  the  nation  during  the  Civil  War.  There  was 
no  close  association  between  Douglas  and  Lincoln, 
nor  probably  was  there  any  love  lost  on  either  side. 
Yet  each  contrived  to  get  a  fair  appreciation  of  the 
other.1 

The  physical  equipment  of  the  court,  too,  was  as 
limited  as  the  training  of  those  who  appeared  before 
it.  "  Rude  frame  or  log  houses  served  the  purposes 
of  bench  and  bar.  The  judge  sat  usually  upon  a, 
platform  with  a  plain  table  or  pine- board  for  a  desk. 
A  larger  table  below  accommodated  the  attorneys 
who  followed  the  judge  in  his  circuit  from  county  to 
county. ' '  Nor  was  there  anything  in  the  demeanor 

1  "  When  Lincoln  was  admitted  to  the  bar,  the  practice  of  the 
law  was  in  a  very  crude  condition  in  Illinois.     General  prin 
ciples,  gathered  from  a  few  text-books,  formed  the  simple  basis 
upon  which  lawyers  tried  cases  and  framed  arguments  in  im 
provised  court-rooms.     But  the  advance  was  rapid  and  carried 
Lincoln  forward  with  it.     The  raw  material,  if  the  phrase  may 
be  pardoned,  was  excellent ;  there  were  many  men  in  the  state 
who    united  a  natural  aptitude  for  the  profession  with  high 
ability,    ambition,    and    a    progressive    spirit.      Lincoln   was 
brought  in  contact  with  them  all,  whether  they  rode  his  circuit 
or  not,  because  the  Federal  courts  were  held  only  in  Spring 
field.      Among    them    was    Stephen   A.    Douglas."      Morse's 
Lincoln,  ante  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  67. 

2  Johnson,  Douglas,  p.  63. 


STATE  POLITICS  49 

of  the  judges  to  inspire  particular  awe  or  anxiety 
among  those  who  practiced.  "The  relations  be 
tween  the  bench  and  the  bar  were  free  and  easy, 
and  flashes  of  wit  and  humor  and  personal  repartee 
were  constantly  passing  from  one  to  the  other.  The 
court-rooms  in  those  days  were  always  crowded. 
To  go  to  court  and  listen  to  the  witnesses  and 
lawyers  was  among  the  chief  amusements  of  the 
frontier  settlements."  l  Douglas  did  not  attempt  to 
raise  himself  above  his  easy  plane  of  familiarity. 
One  who  knew  him  well  says  that  "  when  presiding 
as  a  judge  on  the  bench  he  would  frequently,  while 
the  lawyers  were  addressing  the  jury,  go  down 
among  the  spectators  and  seat  himself  beside  an  old 
friend  and  visit  with  him,  all  the  time  keeping 
cognizance  of  what  was  going  on,  ready  to  respond 
when  his  attention  to  the  case  was  required,  main 
taining  all  the  time  the  most  perfect  order.  He  has 
been  seen  at  Knoxville,  when  the  court-room  was 
crowded,  to  seat  himself  upon  the  knee  of  old 
Governor  McMurtry  and,  with  his  arm  upon  his 
shoulder,  talk  with  him  for  a  considerable  time."  2 

Douglas  was,  however,  still  preeminently  a  poli 
tician.  Although  there  was  comparatively  little 
criticism  of  his  decisions,  it  was  evident  that  they 
were  not  the  product  of  very  much  thought,  and 
that  their  author  was  preparing  for  some  other  field 
than  that  of  judicial  life,  notwithstanding  his  early 

1  Arnold,  Reminiscences  of  the  Illinois  Bar,  quoted  by  Johnson. 
p.  63. 
1  Can,  Douglas,  pp.  42-43. 


50  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

statement  to  the  contrary.     In  this  respect  he  did 
not  differ  from  his  associates.1 

His  colleague,  Sidney  Breese,  had  long  felt  an 
ambition  to  go  to  the  United  States  Senate,  and  in 
this  Douglas  himself  thought  he  might  perhaps  rival 
his  associate.  Senator  Young  was  hoping  to  be  re- 
elected  in  the  autumn  of  1842  and  Douglas's  friends 
at  Springfield,  knowing  that  he  and  Breese  would 
soon  be  in  a  personal  war,  began  a  movement  to  se 
cure  support  for  Douglas  as  a  potential  a  dark- 
horse"  when  the  contest  was  settled  in  the  legisla 
ture.  So  well  did  they  lay  their  plans  that  Douglas 
received  a  very  substantial  vote,  although  Breese 
was  finally  elected  by  a  small  margin.  Douglas 
himself  probably  realized  that  the  attempt  thus 
boldly  made  in  his  behalf  had  been  rather  too  am 
bitious,  and  he  now  determined  to  effect  some 
thing  of  a  more  modest  character.  He  continued 
to  cast  his  eyes  longingly  toward  the  national  gov 
ernment  and  in  the  autumn  of  1842  he  allowed  the 
rumor  to  be  circulated  that  he  would  not  object  to 
being  drafted  into  the  service  of  the  party  at  Wash 
ington.  Illinois  had  been  gaining  rapidly  in  popu 
lation  and  the  census  of  1840  had  indicated  that  the 
state  ought  to  have  seven  members  of  Congress  in- 


1  One  of  the  newly  appointed  judges,  writing  of  the  reorgani 
zation  of  the  court,  said  :  "  The  highest  courts  are  but  indiffer 
ent  tribunals  for  the  settlement  of  great  political  questions. 
.  .  When  any  great  political  question  on  which  parties  are 
arrayed  conies  up  for  decision,  the  utmost  which  can  be  ex 
pected  of  them  is  an  able  and  learned  argument  in  favor  of 
their  own  party,  whose  views  they  must  naturally  favor." 


STATE  POLITICS  61 

stead  of  only  four.  This  change,  however,  required 
action  by  the  legislature  in  re-districting  the  state. 
The  problem  was  how  to  retain  all  of  the  districts  in 
Democratic  hands.  Here  Douglas  saw  his  oppor 
tunity.  If  a  suitable  district  could  be  selected  for 
him,  he  might  easily  secure  election.  The  revision 
act  was  passed  in  June,  1842,  and  during  the  next 
spring  the  problem  of  a  nomination  was  taken  in  hand. 
The  fifth  district  or  circuit  in  which  Douglas  had  been 
holding  court  was  in  part  covered  by  a  fifth  congres 
sional  district,  so  arranged  as  to  give  him  the  maxi 
mum  number  of  favorable  votes.  A  small  body  of 
Democrats  on  June  5,  1843,  after  the  farce  of  con 
sidering  a  number  of  candidates,  gave  Douglas  a 
unanimous  nomination  and  perfected  the  organiza 
tion  necessary  to  carry  on  the  contest.  Douglas, 
after  the  usual  excuses  and  expressions  of  regret, 
resigned  office  on  the  28th,  little  more  than  three 
weeks  after  his  nomination.1  His  opponent,  a 
Southerner  named  Browning,  was  put  forward  by 
the  Whigs  and  the  campaign  was  waged  not  only 
upon  the  usual  local  issues  but  also  upon  dis 
tinctly  sectional  lines.  The  contest,  although  not 
unusually  long,  was  carried  on  under  great  dif 
ficulties.  Constant  travel  by  all  sorts  of  con 
veyances,  the  necessity  of  addressing  many  public 
meetings  in  the  open  air  and  the  usual  election 
excesses,  wore  out  both  candidates  and  at  the 
close  of  the  campaign,  Douglas  was  obliged  to 
take  to  his  bed,  where  he  lay  for  some  time  with 
1  Scammon,  Illinois  Reports,  Vol.  IV,  p.  viii. 


52  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

a  serious  illness.  The  election,  however,  resulted 
in  his  favor,  giving  him  a  fairly  large  majority. 
The  district  had  been  too  well  arranged  to  make 
good  the  chances  of  his  opponent. 


CHAPTEB  III 

THE  MORMONS  IN  ILLINOIS 

COINCIDENT  with  Douglas's  short  term  as  Secre 
tary  of  State,  local  politics  underwent  a  curious 
experience — an  experience  which  extended  into  and 
partly  modified  not  only  Douglas's  brief  career  on 
the  Supreme  Bench  of  the  state  but  also  his  later 
political  career.  This  was  the  entanglement  with 
the  Mormon  church  into  which  he  was,  probably 
unconsciously,  drawn  by  his  desire  to  secure  political 
support  and  advance  the  interests  of  his  party. 

The  experience  with  the  Mormons  covers,  in  Doug- 
las' s  life,  a  continuous  period  of  some  six  years, 
1840-1846,  and  was  destined  to  furnish  him  food  for 
future  thought.  It  has  been  variously  interpreted 
by  historians  and  biographers,  some  of  whom  regard 
it  as  little  more  than  a  temporarily  auuoyiag  situa 
tion  out  of  which  Douglas  doubtless  made  the  best 
that  was  possible  ;  while  others  bitterly  denounce 
what  they  consider  the  unprincipled  attitude  adopted 
by  him  in  connection  with  the  fortunes  of  what  was 
thought  by  the  people  of  the  state  to  be  an  odious 
sect,  full  of  danger  to  the  commonwealth.  The 
truth  seems  to  be  that,  throughout  this  singular 
episode,  Douglas  hardly  recognized  the  character  of 
the  forces  with  which  he  was  dealing,  being  in  this 


54  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

regard  perhaps  not  very  different  from  his  con 
temporaries.  He  always  endeavored  to  avoid  an 
tagonizing  in  an  undue  way  any  large  section  of 
voters  who  were  not  distinctly  determined  in  oppo 
sition  to  him  already.  It  is  fair  to  suppose,  more 
over,  that  in  all  of  his  decisions  as  a  judge,  he  was 
animated  by  the  desire  to  hold  the  scales  substan 
tially  even.  In  the  case  of  the  Mormons,  both  the 
political  and  the  judicial  motive  combined,  with 
the  result  that  the  Mormons  invariably  found 
Douglas  one  of  the  most  sympathetic  judges  with 
whom  they  had  to  deal.  The  Mormon  experience 
throws  into  unusually  clear  relief  some  of  the  meth 
ods  which  were  becoming  habitual  with  rising 
politicians. 

The  Mormons  had  first  gained  a  foothold  at 
Nauvoo,  Illinois,  having  come  largely  from  Missouri. 
In  Missouri  their  politics  had  usually  been  Demo 
cratic,  yet  they  had  been  driven  out  by  the  Demo 
cratic  governor  of  a  Democratic  state,  while  Yan 
Buren,  although  himself  a  Democrat,  had  refused 
to  give  them  any  relief.  When  they  arrived  at 
Nauvoo  in  Hancock  County,  111.,  they  declared 
that  they  would  join  neither  party  but  would  vote 
for  the  one  which  would  give  them  the  greatest  aid. 
The  announcement  of  this  policy  created  no  little 
excitement  among  local  politicians,  for  with  parties 
as  evenly  balanced  as  they  then  were,  it  was  ap 
parent  to  most  persons  that  the  Mormons  might 
easily  come  to  hold  the  balance  of  power.  On 
settling  at  Nauvoo,  they  determined  to  secure  some 


THE  MOKMONS  IN  ILLINOIS  55 

distinct  recognition  from  the  state.  They  employed 
a  certain  John  C.  Bennett  as  their  agent  and  sent 
him  to  Springfield  with  instructions  to  secure  a  city 
charter  and  authority  to  establish  a  "  military 
legion.'7  Bennett  naturally  went  to  the  representa 
tives  of  Hancock  County  in  the  legislature  and  ad 
dressed  himself  chiefly  to  a  Mr.  Little  who  was  then 
a  senator  for  the  county.  Bennett  also  thought  it 
well  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  Democrats,  and  after 
casting  about  for  that  person  with  whom  it  would 
be  most  expedient  to  deal,  he  determined  to  go  to 
Douglas.1 

There  is  no  record,  probably,  of  the  exact  nature 
of  his  negotiations  but  the  outcome  shows  what  they 
were  clearly  enough.  The  plan  as  finally  developed 
was  to  have  the  charter,  which  Bennett  desired, 
presented  to  the  legislature  by  Whig  interests,  while 
Douglas  undoubtedly  promised  that  Democratic  op 
position  should  be  prevented  from  showing  itself. 
Senator  Little  did  present  such  a  charter,  which 
was  referred  to  the  Judiciary  Committee  whose 
chairman,  a  Mr.  Snyder,  was  a  Democrat.  Snyder 
recommended  the  passage  of  the  charter,  which  was 
then  adopted  by  a  viva  voce  vote,  no  one  wishing  to 
go  on  record  either  one  way  or  the  other.  The 
charter  incorporated  the  city  of  Nauvoo,  provided 

1  Douglas's  relations  with  the  Mormons  are  best  set  forth  in 
Linn's  Story  of  the  Mormons,  and  Ford's  History  of  Illinois. 
Sheahan's  Life  of  Stephen  A.  Douglas  and  Johnson's  Stephen  A. 
Douglas  review  the  episode  in  their  customary  way.  Some 
light  on  the  Mormon  situation  in  Illinois  was  also  afforded  by 
Douglas  himself  in  certain  of  his  later  utterances. 


56  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

for  the  usual  officers,  and  gave  them  the  usual 
powers  to  pass  ordinances  in  case  they  "were 
not  repugnant  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  or  this  state  [Illinois]."  Later  the  question 
arose  whether  the  ambiguous  language  of  the 
charter  permitted  them  to  pass  ordinances  in  viola 
tion  of  the  laws  of  the  state  and  to  establish  a 
system  of  government  for  themselves.  Important 
as  bearing  upon  this  question  is  the  fact  that  the 
charter  established  courts  with  extensive  jurisdic 
tion,  the  municipal  or  higher  court  being  composed 
of  the  mayor  as  chief -justice  and  the  four  aldermen 
as  his  associates,  but  an  appeal  was  allowed  to  the 
Circuit  Court  of  the  county.  This  singular  charter 
also  incorporated  the  militia  of  Nauvoo  under  the 
title  of  "The  Nauvoo  Legion."  That  body  was 
made  entirely  independent  of  the  military  organiza 
tion  of  the  state,  and  was  divorced  from  the  control 
of  all  the  officers  of  the  state  militia  except  the 
governor.  The  commissioned  officers  of  the  Legion 
were  to  constitute  a  court-martial,  which  was  to 
make  and  execute  all  ordinances  necessary  for  its 
government,  and  was  not  bound  to  regard  the  laws 
of  the  state  of  Illinois,  though  it  was  forbidden  to 
do  anything  repugnant  to  the  constitution.  This 
Legion  was  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  mayor  for 
the  purpose  of  assuring  the  execution  of  the  laws 
and  ordinances  of  the  city  of  Nauvoo.  Had  it  not 
been  for  the  shrewdness  of  the  Mormons  in  arrang 
ing  for  the  support  of  both  parties,  it  is  hard  to  see 
how  such  a  document  could  have  passed  any 


THE  MORMONS  IN  ILLINOIS  57 

legislative  body.  Governor  Ford  who  took  office 
some  three  years  after  the  charter  had  been  passed 
at  the  session  of  the  Illinois  legislature  in  1840-1841, 
thinks  that  the  powers  "  were  unheard  of  and 
anti-republican  in  many  particulars ;  and  capable 
of  infinite  abuse  by  a  people  disposed  to  abuse 
them."  l  The  opinion  is  undoubtedly  just  and  it 
would  be  hard  to  account  for  the  passage  of  such 
measures  on  any  ground  other  than  that  which  is 
assigned  by  him — political  timidity  and  unwilling 
ness  to  run  the  hazard  of  defeat. 

Whatever  may  be  thought  of  this  charter  and 
however  little  its  ultimate  effects  were  at  the  time 
foreseen,  the  real  influence  of  the  Mormons  shortly 
became  apparent.  A  city  government  was  speedily 
organized  at  Nauvoo  and  the  Nauvoo  Legion  was 
established.  Joseph  H.  Smith  was  not  only  mayor 
but  also  commander  of  the  Legion  and  head  of  the 
church.  In  the  meanwhile  Douglas  had  been 
elected  to  the  bench  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
state  and  in  that  capacity  he  had  been  placed  in  a 
position  in  which  his  recent  attitude  toward  the 
Mormons,  while  Secretary  of  State,  was  likely  to  be 
sternly  tested.  As  he  had  assisted  in  passing,  per 
haps  had  been  primarily  responsible  for,  the 
singular  charter  of  the  Mormons,  he  was  now  to  be 
called  upon  to  adjudicate  the  questions  which  might 
arise  under  it.  The  legislature  had  selected  Douglas 
as  judge  on  the  15th  of  February,  1841,  and  as  we 
have  already  seen,2  he  was  now  sent  to  the  fifth 

1  Ford,  History  of  Illinois,  p.  265.  J  Supra,  p.  45. 


58  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

circuit — the  Quincy  district — which  happened  to 
be  that  in  which  the  Mormons  had  taken  up  their 
residence.  Under  the  conditions,  it  would  not 
have  been  strange  if  the  inhabitants  of  the  district, 
who  speedily  became  antagonistic  to  Mormon  in 
fluence,  had  given  special  attention  to  the  attitude 
which  Douglas  would  assume.  The  circuit  had 
been  much  agitated  by  the  conflicts  between  the 
Mormons  and  the  so-called  Gentiles  by  whom  they 
were  surrounded,  and  the  position  of  a  judge  was 
one  of  exceptional  difficulty  in  such  cases,  because 
of  the  exceedingly  bitter  feeling  that  had  been  pro 
duced  between  the  Mormon  and  non-Mormon  groups 
in  the  population.  Douglas,  however,  did  not 
waver  in  his  attitude.  He  sought  to  give  the 
Mormons  full  recognition  in  all  of  his  decisions, 
and  on  one  occasion  when  Joseph  H.  Smith,  who 
was  held  by  the  populace  to  be  responsible  for  the 
crimes  charged  against  his  sect  generally,  was  per 
sonally  endangered,  Douglas  was  largely  responsible 
for  rescuing  the  leader  from  a  lynching  which  was 
imminent.1 

Most  of  the  cases  coming  before  Douglas  in  this 
connection  were  comparatively  trivial,  but  there 
was  at  least  one  of  very  considerable  importance. 
This  one  raised  a  question  concerning  the  Nauvoo 
Legion  and  its  power  under  the  charter  which  had 
been  granted  it  by  the  legislature  through  the  in 
fluence  of  Senator  Little  and  Secretary  Douglas. 
Douglas,  almost  as  soon  as  he  took  his  place  on  the 

1  Sheahan,  Life,  p.  50. 


THE  MOEMONS  IN  ILLINOIS  59 

bench,  had  appointed  Doctor  Bennett,  the  agent  of 
the  Mormons,  a  Master  of  Chancery,  doubtless  as 
representing  the  Mormon  interests  in  Hancock 
County.  Bennett  was  not  only  an  influential  Mor 
mon,  an  alderman  of  Nauvoo  and  a  major-general 
in  the  Nauvoo  Legion,  but  prior  to  his  joining  the 
Mormons,  he  had  also  been  appointed  an  adjutant- 
general  of  the  state  militia.  Within  a  very  short 
time  after  Douglas  had  taken  office  as  judge,  a  war 
rant  for  the  arrest  of  Joseph  H.  Smith  and  several 
other  Mormons  was  issued  by  Governor  Carlin,  of 
Illinois,  at  the  demand  of  the  governor  of  Missouri. 
Smith's  case  came  up  before  Judge  Douglas  and  he 
was  discharged  upon  a  technicality.  This  he,  per 
haps  not  unnaturally,  regarded  as  a  recognition  of 
Mormonism  by  the  Democratic  party  and  directly 
assumed  a  position  as  an  ardent  supporter  of  Doug 
las,  publishing  a  proclamation  to  that  effect  in  the 
Nauvoo  newspapers  in  which  he  described  the  judge 
as  a  "  master-spirit."  The  manifesto  of  Smith  ap 
parently  transferred  the  Mormon  vote  from  the 
Whigs  to  the  Democrats  and  led  to  an  immediate 
change  of  front  on  the  part  of  the  Whig  party, 
which  now  could  hardly  find  strong  enough  lan 
guage  in  denunciation  of  Mormon  iniquities. 

In  the  meantime  the  growth  of  this  singular  sect 
had  been  proceeding  rapidly.  It  numbered  about 
16,000  in  Hancock  County  in  1842,  while,  accord 
ing  to  the  estimate  of  Governor  Thomas  Ford,1  there 
were  " several  thousand"  scattered  about  in  other 
1  Ford,  History  of  Illinois,  p.  313. 


60  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

counties.  This  was  a  compact  body  of  voters  which 
could  not  be  neglected  in  a  state  where  political 
power  was  as  evenly  balanced  as  in  Illinois.  The 
conduct  of  the  Mormons  and  their  status  before  the 
law,  however,  rendered  it  difficult  to  overlook  cer 
tain  of  their  acts  and  consequently  almost  continu 
ous  conflicts  had  occurred  between  them  and  the 
recognized  state  officials.  Crimes  of  all  sorts  were 
currently  attributed  to  Mormon  influence,  or  to  the 
direct  action  of  members  of  the  sect,  and  the  num 
ber  of  cases  coming  before  the  courts,  in  which  the 
religious  and  social  prejudice  aroused  by  Mormon 
doctrine  was  involved,  was  very  considerable. 

In  the  opinion  that  Douglas  had  rendered  in 
1841  in  Smith's  case,  the  attitude  of  the  Mormons 
with  reference  to  military  service  had  already  been 
discussed.  The  decision  was  construed,  both  by 
the  Mormons  and  by  others,  as  permitting  them  to 
control  their  military  company  through  a  court- 
martial  of  its  own  officers.  According  to  Linn l  the 
so-called  "Nauvoo  Legion"  had  actually  been 
recognized  as  independent  of  state  control  by  virtue 
of  a  provision  of  law  which  allowed  it  to  be  gov 
erned  by  a  court-martial  of  its  own  officers.  This 
view  of  its  independence,  taken  by  the  Mormons, 
says  Mr.  Linn,  "may  be  seen  in  the  following  gen 
eral  order  signed  by  Smith  and  Bennett  in  May, 
1841,  founded  on  an  opinion  by  Judge  Stephen  A. 
Douglas : 

"  '  The  officers  and  privates  belonging  to  the 
1  Story  of  the  Mormons,  p.  237,  et  seq. 


THE  MOEMONS  IN  ILLINOIS  61 

Legion  are  exempt  from  all  military  duty  not  re 
quired  by  the  legally  constituted  authorities 
thereof ;  they  are  therefore  expressly  inhibited 
from  performing  any  military  service  not  ordered 
by  the  general  officers  or  directed  by  the  court- 
martial/ 

"In  other  words  this  city  military  company  was 
entirely  independent  of  even  the  governor  of  the 
state.  Little  wonder  that  the  Presidency,  writing 
about  the  new  law  to  the  Saints  abroad  said  :  l  'Tis 
all  we  ever  claimed.'  " 

With  the  support  which  had  been  obtained  from 
Douglas's  decision  and  other  favorable  verdicts,  the 
Mormons  were  emboldened  to  push  their  views  be 
fore  the  courts  as  well  as  to  try  to  exert  some  polit 
ical  influence.  In  1842,  as  we  have  seen,  Governor 
Carlin  had  issued  a  warrant  for  the  arrest  of  Joseph 
H.  Smith,  then  the  head  of  the  Mormon  church,  on 
the  ground  that  he  was  a  fugitive  from  justice  in 
Missouri.  Governor  Ford  has  stated  that  this  war 
rant  had  never  been  executed  and  was  still  outstand 
ing  when  he  took  office  two  years  later.  The  Mor 
mons,  however,  were  desirous  of  having  the  case 
well  tested  in  the  Federal  court,  and  upon  their  ap 
plication  a  duplicate  warrant  was  issued  during  the 
winter  of  1842-1843,  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
sheriff  of  Sangamon  County.  Joseph  H.  Smith 
consequently  surrendered  himself  a  prisoner  in 
Springfield  and  then  applied  for  a  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  to  Judge  Polk  of  the  Federal  court.1  Polk 

1  Ford,  History,  p.  314. 


62  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

discharged  Smith  and,  as  the  case  had  been  man 
aged  for  him  by  lawyers  who  were  Whig  in  politics 
while  Judge  Polk  was  also  a  Whig,  the  Mormons 
now  began  to  incline  toward  that  side  in  politics. 

The  situation  was  rendered  particularly  interest 
ing  because  of  the  approaching  election  of  a  con 
gressman  in  the  Mormon  district  in  August,  1843. 
Two  candidates,  Cyrus  Walker  and  Joseph  P.  Hoge, 
the  former  a  Whig,  the  latter  a  Democrat,  had  pre 
sented  themselves  and  the  Mormons  were  inclined  to 
favor  Walker.  Further  legal  proceedings  were  just 
then  instituted  by  the  governor  of  Illinois  by  reason 
of  a  new  demand  from  the  governor  of  Missouri  for 
the  person  of  Smith,  based  upon  an  indictment  found 
against  him  in  Missouri  on  the  5th  of  June,  1843. 
Judge  Ford's  warrant  resulted  in  the  arrest  of 
the  Mormon  leader,  and  Walker  appeared  as  his 
counsel.  In  the  course  of  the  proceedings  before  the 
municipal  court  in  Nauvoo,  Walker's  opponent, 
Hoge,  being  present,  both  men  were  called  upon  to 
express  their  opinion  as  to  the  power  of  the  munic 
ipal  court  to  issue  writs  of  habeas  corpus  in  all  cases 
of  imprisonment,  and  both  affirmed  the  power.  The 
municipal  court  discharged  Smith,  and  immediately 
a  request  was  made  upon  the  governor  for  militia  to 
renew  the  attempt  to  secure  enforcement  of  the  war 
rant  issued  by  the  government.  The  governor  was 
inclined  to  order  out  the  militia.  He  restrained  him 
self  owing  to  political  considerations,  but  the  local 
Democrats  near  Nauvoo  allowed  the  rumor  to  be 
circulated  that,  should  the  Mormons  persevere  in 


THE  MORMONS  IN  ILLINOIS  63 

their  intention  of  voting  for  Walker,  the  militia 
would  certainly  be  sent  against  them.  There  was  a 
considerable  amount  of  bargaining  between  the  Mor 
mons  and  the  Democratic  managers  with  the  result 
that  the  Mormon  vote,  on  what  the  sect  believed  to 
be  a  pledge  of  immunity  from  further  persecution, 
was  transferred  to  Hoge,  who  was  elected  to  Con 
gress  by  600  or  800  majority.  It  was  at  this  same 
election  in  the  Quincy  district  that  Douglas  was  sent 
to  Congress  for  his  first  term  although  in  that  dis 
trict  the  Mormons,  not  having  had  time  to  receive 
word  of  the  change  in  the  policy  of  their  leaders  in 
favor  of  the  Democrats,  voted  for  Douglas's  oppo 
nent.  He  was  now  in  a  peculiar  and  embarrassing 
position,  since  he  was  face  to  face  with  an  important 
and  influential  group  in  the  community  who  had 
opposed  his  own  election  but  who  had  been  re 
sponsible  for  the  choice  of  a  Democrat  in  another 
district.  They  were  at  least  potentially  Democratic 
voters  and  decidedly  difficult  to  control.  In  Doug 
las's  second  candidacy  for  Congress  two  years  later 
the  Mormons  were  friendly  to  him  rather  than 
otherwise,  and  it  would  appear  that  he  received  a 
substantial  number  of  votes  from  them.  Early  in 
1844,  Judge  Ford,  who  was  then  in  charge  of  the, 
ninth  circuit,  was  nominated  for  the  governorship 
by  a  little  group  of  Democrats  who  were  practically 
in  control  of  the  state  organization.  While  Douglas 
had  bent  the  knee  to  Mormonism,  Ford  had  not, 
and  in  his  later  History  of  Illinois  he  did  not  hesi 
tate  to  criticize  Douglas  in  unmeasured  terms  for  his 


64  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

action  in  deferring  to  the  sectaries.  Douglas  ap 
parently  had  no  objection  to  Ford  as  governor  ;  he 
rather  approved  of  the  choice,  as  a  clever  ruse  de 
signed  to  win  the  support  of  those  elements  in  the 
party  which  had  been  antagonized  by  his  own 
friendliness  to  the  Mormons. 

The  attitude  of  the  Mormons  toward  the  people  of 
the  state  had  not  been  at  all  improved.  Friction 
had  continued  and  the  apparent  success  of  Smith  in 
resisting  arrest  rendered  them  more  and  more  assert 
ive  with  regard  to  their  own  powers  of  self-govern 
ment.  Stolen  property  taken  into  Nauvoo  could 
seldom  be  recovered,  owing  to  the  composition  of 
the  courts  in  the  "  holy  city,"  and  the  effort  of  the 
two  political  parties  to  gain  Mormon  support  ren 
dered  both  of  them  unwilling  to  take  any  very  pos 
itive  step.  In  the  spring  of  1844,  Joseph  H.  Smith 
announced  himself  as  a  candidate  for  the  presidency 
of  the  United  States  and  at  about  the  same  time  set 
up  a  much  more  elaborate  and  powerful  religious 
hierarchy.  Numbers  of  missionaries  were  sent  out 
to  preach  the  Mormon  religion,  and  thus  to  political, 
legal  and  other  difficulties  were  added  the  prejudices 
growing  out  of  sectarianism.  The  situation  became 
so  strained  as  practically  to  lead  to  a  threat  of  gen 
uine  war  and  the  demand  of  the  public  that  the 
Mormons  should  leave  the  state  with  as  little  delay 
as  possible  became  insistent.  Things  reached  a 
crisis  about  the  beginning  of  1846,  when  the  people 
near  Nauvoo  determined  to  drive  the  Mormons  out 
of  the  country.  Governor  Ford  sent  a  body,  con- 


THE  MOEMONS  IN  ILLINOIS  65 

sisting  of  about  450  men,  toward  Nauvoo  for  the 
purpose  of  arresting  the  Mormon  leaders.  The  force 
was  under  the  command  of  John  J.  Hardin,  Doug 
las's  sometime  bitter  opponent  and  political  rival, 
as  colonel,  while  Douglas  himself  held  a  post  as 
major.  As  it  approached  Nauvoo,  it  encountered  a 
force  of  about  4, 000  Mormons,  well  armed  and  drawn 
up  to  oppose  further  advance.  It  was  evident  that 
in  the  event  of  actual  conflict  the  Mormons  would 
easily  gain  the  victory.  Hardin  naturally  saw  the 
wisdom  of  avoiding  an  open  breach  and  determined 
to  send  Douglas  to  Nauvoo  for  the  purpose  of  ar 
resting  the  twelve  apostles  of  the  church.  He  told 
Douglas  to  take  a  guard  of  100  men  and  proceed  at 
once  to  the  town.  Douglas,  however,  dreaded  the 
consequences  of  any  such  effort ;  he,  therefore, 
begged  Hardin  to  change  his  order  and  to  send  him 
alone  as  a  personal  ambassador  for  the  purpose  of 
discussing  the  question  of  the  removal  of  the  apos 
tles.1  Hardin  finally  reconsidered  his  original  order 
and  Douglas  started  at  once,  without  any  attendants, 
for  Nauvoo.  The  Mormon  forces,  seeing  him  ap 
proach  alone,  had  no  hesitation  in  allowing  him  to 
pass  through  their  lines.  Indeed,  they  sent  an  es 
cort  with  him  to  the  city,  where  he  succeeded  in  per 
suading  the  twelve  apostles  to  accompany  him  to 
the  militia  camp  for  the  purpose  of  talking  over  the 
situation.  As  soon  as  they  arrived,  negotiations 
were  begun  and  terms,  under  which  the  Mormons 
should  withdraw  from  the  state,  were  finally  worked 
^heaban,  Life,  p.  52. 


66  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

out,  but  proved  unacceptable  to  some  of  the  princi 
pal  factors  in  the  Mormon  hierarchy.  Douglas, 
however,  was  successful  in  finally  holding  them  to 
the  chief  points  in  the  arrangement  and  it  was 
agreed  that  they  should  withdraw.  The  outcome  was 
regarded  as  a  great  triumph  for  Douglas,1  but  Gov 
ernor  Ford  and  other  Democrats  were  not  inclined  to 
assign  him  the  same  amount  of  credit.  They  took 
the  view  that  the  Mormons  had  already  practically 
determined  to  go  on  the  ground  that  "  the  kind  of 
Mahometanism  which  they  sought  to  establish  could 
never  be  established  in  the  near  vicinity  of  a  people 
whose  morals  and  prejudices  were  all  outraged  and 
shocked  by  it."  2  Linn,  the  faithful  historian  of  the 
Mormons,  finds  that  i  i  they  had  begun  arrangements 
to  remove  from  the  county  before  the  recent  disturb 
ances,  1,000  families,  including  the  heads  of  the 
church,  being  determined  to  start  in  the  spring  with 
out  regard  to  any  sacrifice  of  their  property."  3 

Whatever  was  the  influence  of  Douglas  in  this 
particular  incident,  it  is  clear  that  his  work  was  un 
qualifiedly  on  the  side  of  order  and  in  the  direction 
desired  by  the  bulk  of  the  non- Mormon  inhabitants 
of  the  state  notwithstanding  that,  as  always  in  the 
past,  he  took  pains  to  avoid  unnecessarily  antago 
nizing  the  intruders.  He  of  course  could  hardly 
have  foreseen  the  growth  of  the  sect  in  power  and 
influence  during  later  years,  yet  he  for  a  time  con 
tinued  his  pleasant  relations  with  the  Mormon 

1  Sheahan,  Life,  pp.  52-53.  2  Ford,  History,  p.  411. 

•Linn,  Story  of  the  Mormons,  ante  cit.,  p.  340. 


THE  MORMONS  IN  ILLINOIS  67 

leaders,  and  presented  a  memorial  in  the  shape  of 
an  application  for  Utah's  admission  as  a  state  sub 
sequent  to  the  final  settlement  of  the  sect  in  that 
territory.1  Several  years  later,  when  Douglas  was 
looking  hopefully  to  the  presidential  nomination 
and  election,  he  devoted  not  a  little  attention  to  the 
Mormon  question,  dealing  with  it  in  a  speech  at 
Springfield,  111.,  on  June  12,  1856.  He  then  de 
clared  that  reports  from  the  Mormon  territory 
seemed  to  justify  the  belief  that  nine- tenths  of  its 
inhabitants  were  aliens  and  that  ' t  all  were  bound 
by  horrid  oaths  and  penalties  to  recognize  and 
maintain  the  authority  of  Brigham  Young."  2  "I 
think  it  is  the  duty  of  the  President,"  said  he,  "as 
I  have  no  doubt  it  is  his  fixed  purpose,  to  remove 
Brigham  Young  and  all  his  followers  from  office, 
and  to  fill  their  places  with  bold,  able  and  true 
men  ;  and  to  cause  a  thorough  and  searching  inves 
tigation  into  all  the  crimes  and  enormities  which  are 
alleged  to  be  perpetrated  daily  in  that  territory 
under  the  direction  of  Brigham  Young  and  his  con 
federates  ;  and  to  use  all  the  military  force  necessary 
to  protect  the  officers  in  discharge  of  their  duties 
and  to  enforce  the  laws  of  the  land.  When  the 
authentic  evidence  shall  arrive,  if  it  shall  establish 
the  facts  which  are  believed  to  exist,  it  will  become 
the  duty  of  Congress  to  apply  the  knife  and  to  cut  out 
this  loathsome,  disgusting  ulcer. ' '  The  condition 

1  Linn,  ante  cit.,  p.  430.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  476-477. 

3  Speech   given   in   full,    New  York    Times,  June  23,  1856, 
quoted  by  Linn,  p.  477. 


68  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  the  Mormons  after  they  reached  Utah  was  per 
haps  not  worse  than  it  had  been  while  they  were 
still  at  Nauvoo,  and  their  character  as  an  element 
in  the  national  constituency  was  perhaps  not  more 
seriously  objectionable  than  it  had  been  while  they 
were  still  merely  an  element  in  the  state  constitu 
ency.  But  presidential  candidates  necessarily  take 
a  different  point  of  view  from  that  of  state  politi 
cians  and  Douglas  had  traveled  a  long  way  during 
the  ten  years  after  1846.  His  position  with  respect 
to  the  Mormons  so  long  as  they  were  residents  of 
Illinois  had,  in  fact,  been  almost  purely  political. 
He  had  clearly  recognized  the  influence  that  these 
fanatics  exercised  in  the  doubtful  counties  where  the 
balance  between  Whig  and  Democrat  might  readily 
be  turned  either  in  one  direction  or  the  other.  His 
subsequent  sympathy  with  the  Mormons  after  they 
had  moved  from  the  state  and  had  settled  in  Utah 
was  possibly  only  a  reminiscence.  At  all  events 
the  friendliness  for  Mormonism  with  which  Douglas 
had  often  been  charged  was  merely  friendliness  for 
a  body  of  voters,  and  his  position  in  1856  was  doubt 
less  truly  representative  of  his  own  attitude  on  the 
question. 

It  does  not  appear  that  Douglas's  course  with  re 
gard  to  Mormonism  brought  him  into  any  local  dis 
favor.  Ford  and  other  partisan  writers  evidently 
regard  his  conduct  as  unprincipled,  while  the  de 
voted  biographers  like  Sheahan  treat  it  as  simply  an 
exhibition  of  tact  and  courage  rather  than  as  in 
volving  any  political  or  moral  blame.  The  fact  that 


THE  MOKMONS  IN  ILLINOIS  69 

the  Mormons  finally  left  Illinois,  as  had  been 
earnestly  desired,  and  that  they  were  evidently  and 
undoubtedly  furthered  in  this  intent  by  Douglas, 
who  had  manifestly  become  convinced  that  they 
presented  too  serious  a  local  problem,  resulted  in 
the  closing  of  the  incident  so  far  as  state  politics 
were  concerned  ;  while  it  was  not  until  after  Douglas 
had  passed  from  the  national  stage  that  Mormonism 
really  became  a  sufficient  factor  in  national  politics 
to  call  for  definite  governmental  action.  The 
Mormons  served  the  purposes  of  Douglas  during  the 
troubled  years  when  he  was  passing  from  his  secre 
taryship  of  state  to  his  place  on  the  bench,  and  from 
that  again  to  his  membership  in  Congress.  Having 
answered  that  purpose,  Douglas,  now  firmly  es 
tablished  at  Washington  and  a  figure  of  state  im 
portance,  could  afford  to  discard  them  and  was  un 
doubtedly  glad  when  their  removal  westward  re 
lieved  him  of  an  embarrassing  entanglement. 


CHAPTER  IV 

CONGRESSIONAL  APPRENTICESHIP 

DOUGLAS  was  now  to  enter  upon  a  much  larger 
field  than  any  in  which  he  had  yet  appeared.  Thus 
far  his  experience  had  been  solely  that  of  the  local 
politician.  The  two  experiences  with  the  law — one 
as  prosecuting  attorney,  the  other  as  judge  of  the 
Supreme  Court — had  been  mere  interludes  in  a 
purely  political  career.  Neither  had  given  him 
any  opportunity  for  reading,  and  the  active  life 
that  he  had  led  had  not  been  such  as  to  afford  much 
leisure  for  serious  attention  to  the  study  of  history 
or  the  broader  aspects  of  public  questions.  The 
reading  he  had  done  had  been  incidental,  hasty, 
and  planned  merely  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  an 
immediate  emergency,  such  as  the  preparation  of  a 
speech,  the  drafting  of  a  political  address,  the  writ 
ing  of  a  vehement  newspaper  article  or  some  equally 
transitory  production.1  It  was  thus  a  grave  ques- 

1  "  Judge  Douglas  wrote  little,  but  suggested  much.  His 
mind  teemed  with  '  points. '  I  never  spent  an  hour  with  him 
which  did  not  furnish  me  with  new  ideas.  He  grasped  and 
understood  most  questions  thoroughly.  When  he  read  was 
always  a  mystery.  Social  to  a  degree,  driving  out  almost  daily 
when  not  entertaining  his  friends  at  his  own  hospitable  home, 
visiting  strangers  at  their  hotels,  leading  in  debate  or  counsel 
ing  in  committee,  he  was  rarely  at  fault  for  a  date  or  a  fact. 
He  was  a  treasure  to  an  editor,  because  he  possessed  the  rare 
faculty  of  throwing  new  light  upon  every  subject  in  the 
shortest  possible  time."  Forney,  Anecdotes  of  Public  Men,  p.  21. 


CONGRESSIONAL  APPBENTICESHIP     71 

tion  whether  the  arts  of  the  local  frontier  politician 
would  serve  to  advance  Douglas  upon  the  wider 
stage  to  which  he  had  gained  access.  He  himself 
entertained  few  doubts  upon  the  subject  and  allowed 
none  to  appear.  His  first  entry  into  the  House  of 
Eepresentatives  took  place  in  December,  1843,  and, 
as  usual,  with  true  intuition,  he  sought  for  an  op 
portunity  to  catch  public  attention  and  place  him 
self  in  the  centre  of  a  group  or  movement  which 
would  recognize  him  as  its  spokesman.  There  was 
at  that  time  no  public  question  prominently  before 
Congress  with  which  he  was  personally  and  closely 
familiar.  The  usual  delay  in  developing  a  program 
characterized  the  opening  of  a  session  which,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  turned  out  to  be  tolerably  quiet  and 
untroubled.  Douglas  would  probably  not  have 
sought  to  attract  general  attention  by  discussing  in 
public  any  subject  of  which  he  was  obviously  igno 
rant,  for  he  himself  was  far  too  astute  to  trade  upon 
an  undue  ignorance  on  the  part  of  others.  Like 
many  a  new  congressman  just  come  to  Washington, 
he  therefore  sought  to  make  the  subject  of  his  first 
speech  a  topic  of  personal  political  interest  likely 
to  be  understood  by,  and  to  appeal  to,  a  body  of 
men  throughout  the  country,  and  calculated  to 
arouse  strong  partisanship  for  and  against  the  views 
advanced  by  the  speaker.  For  this  purpose  a  most 
favorable  opening  shortly  presented  itself. 

General  Jackson,  during  his  defense  of  New 
Orleans,  had  been  fined  $1,000  by  a  judge  in  that 
city  for  acts  connected  with  the  performance  of  his 


72  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

duties.  Jackson  paid  the  fine  but  later  sought  to 
induce  Congress  to  refund  it  to  him.  A  bill  for 
that  purpose  had  been  pending  intermittently  for 
some  time  but  had  never  been  passed.  Sheahau  l 
says  that  it  had  been  considered  by  i  i  some  of  the 
best  minds  in  Congress,"  although  he  does  not  tell 
who  they  were.  The  bill  was  one  of  those  measures 
that  are  frequently  offered  by  personal  or  partisan 
adherents  who  wish  to  compliment  a  public  man,  or 
furnish  a  bone  of  coutention  that  may  be  used  to 
wrangle  over  during  the  intervals  between  real  acts 
of  legislation.  This  old  bill  was  reintroduced  at 
the  session  of  1843-1844,  and  again  served  its  former 
purpose.  The  usual  eulogies  upon  Jackson  were 
offered  and  the  usual  controversial  discussion  was 
indulged  in.  It  was  in  fact  merely  an  opportunity 
for  "  oratory,"  being  supported  only,  as  even 
Sheahan  admits  (and  as  the  record  shows),  "by  its 
friends."  This  was  an  unexpectedly  good  op 
portunity  for  Douglas.  He  had  always  been  known 
as  a  Jackson  man  ;  and,  as  has  been  seen  when  re 
viewing  his  early  history,2  had  on  various  occasions 
delivered  himself  of  the  sophomoric  rant  in  eulogy 
of  the  general  that  is  familiar  in  school  and  college 
debating  societies.  Later  on  he  had  found  it  con 
venient  to  accept  the  position  of  a  strong  pro- Jack 
son  leader  in  Illinois.8  He  had  probably  followed 
and  analyzed  the  career  of  Jackson,  particularly  its 
later  phases,  with  as  much  attention  as  he  had  be 
stowed  upon  that  of  any  public  man.  The  bill  to  re- 
1  Life,  p.  60.  2  See  ante,  p.  15.  8  Ibid.,  p.  23. 


CONGRESSIONAL  APPRENTICESHIP     73 

fuud  the  $1,000  was  therefore  an  exceptional  oppor 
tunity  for  a  maiden  speech.  Much  old  material 
could  be  used,  and  there  was  a  chance  for  a  great 
deal  of  fire  and  fury. 

Douglas,  more  fortunate  than  congressmen  of  the 
present  day,  had  no  difficulty  in  obtaining  the 
floor,  and  on  the  7th  of  January,  1844,  undertook 
to  present  his  views  upon  the  Jackson  bill.1  The 
real  substance  of  his  argument  was  merely,  first, 
that  in  declaring  martial  law,  General  Jackson, 
while  at  New  Orleans,  had  acted  in  an  entirely 
legal  way,  and  that,  secondly,  even  conceding  that 
his  action  was  illegal  and  unconstitutional,  the 
local  court  had  had  no  authority  to  condemn  him 
for  contempt  of  court.  No  act  really  done  by 
General  Jackson  had  ever  been  pointed  to  in 
specific  terms  as  illegal  or  improper  in  such  a  sense 
as  to  constitute  a  contempt  of  court.  Therefore 
there  was  no  justification  for  the  verdict  and  the 
least  that  could  be  done  was  to  refund  the  money 
paid  in  consequence  of  the  fine  imposed  upon 
him.  There  was  nothing  particularly  novel  in 
this  u legal77  argument,  for  it  had  been  ad 
vanced  on  various  occasions  in  the  past.  Douglas 
perhaps  put  it  somewhat  more  pointedly  and  freshly 
than  ever  before.  It  was  not,  however,  the  quality 
of  the  argument,  but  the  character  of  the  appeal 
which  at  once  made  Douglas  a  figure  of  some  note. 

Adams's  often  quoted  account  of  the  speaker  re- 

1  Douglas's  speech  is  found  in  the  Globe,  28th  Cong.,  1st  Sess., 
pp.  112  et  seq. 


74  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

mains  the  best  and  most  graphic  picture  of  the 
newly-elected  legislator.  His  caustic  criticism, 
however,  was  tempered  by  a  note  of  appreciation. 
Adams  admitted  that  the  speech  was  eloquent 
though  sophistical,  while  he  noted  as  a  further 
ground  for  disliking  it  that  it  was  admired  by  the 
"  slave  Democracy.'7  There  was  in  fact  little  real 
merit  in  the  effort.  In  rhetorical  turgid  language, 
Douglas  sought  to  appeal  to  the  strong  pro- Jackson 
feeling  throughout  the  country  and  in  closing  drew 
a  melodramatic  picture  of  the  appearance  of  the 
"  hero  of  New  Orleans  "  before  the  judge  who  would 
have  sent  him  "  to  his  grave  branded  as  a  criminal." 
The  real  success  of  the  effort  was  in  fact  largely  found 
in  certain  passages  which  Adams  with  keen  insight 
had  noted  as  appealing  to  the  states'  rights  senti 
ment.  For  this  Douglas  was  almost  immediately 
taken  up  by  the  Southern  Democrats.  An  after 
math  of  the  speech  came  shortly  after  the  adjourn 
ment  of  Congress  at  a  pftlitical  convention  in  Nash 
ville,  Tenu.,  whither  Douglas  went  with  other  Illinois 
delegates  to  attend  the  meeting.  According  to  the 
later  partisan  legend,  however,  the  occasion  was 
to  him  more  in  the  nature  of  a  political  pilgrimage 
than  the  sober  work  of  a  routine  elective  gathering. 
He  wished  to  see  Andrew  Jackson  personally. 
Jackson,  like  more  recent  politicians,  was  quite 
willing  to  receive  the  predetermined  homage  of  the 
well-disciplined  pilgrims  who  had  been  marshaled 
before  the  doors  of  the  "  Hermitage. "  The  house 
was  thrown  open  and  the  usual  "  countless  multi- 


CONGKESSIONAL  APPBENTICESHIP     75 

tude"  filed  through  the  front  hallway,  inflicting 
upon  the  retired  statesman  the  customary  hand 
shaking  suffering.  It  was  hard  for  Douglas  to  reach 
the  door.  The  strain  of  the  convention  and  the  dif 
ficulty  of  struggling  through  the  crowds  had  ex 
hausted  him,  and  his  paleness  and  apparent  weari 
ness  were  noticeable.  Still  a  very  young  man  and 
not  yet  as  massively  built  as  in  later  life,  one  ob 
server  noted  that  he  looked  "  small  and  plain  .  .  . 
beside  the  hundreds  of  robust  and  gallant  specimens 
of  Tennessee  manhood."  l  By  one  of  those  fortu 
nate  coincidences,  likely  to  occur  in  well-regulated 
political  lives,  Douglas  had  at  his  side  a  faithful 
newspaper  correspondent  at  the  moment  when  he 
approached  General  Jackson  and  it  is  to  the  account 
of  this  eye-witness  that  much  of  the  description  of 
the  incident  is  attributable.  According  to  this  cor 
respondent,  Mr.  Walters,  the  editor  of  the  Illinois 
State  Register,  General  Jackson  "  raised  his  still 
brilliant  eyes  and  gazed  for  a  moment  in  the  coun 
tenance  of  the  judge,  still  retaining  his  hand." 
After  inquiring  whether  Douglas  was  the  author  of 
the  speech  in  the  House  of  Eepresentatives  and  re 
ceiving  an  affirmative  reply,  Jackson  said  :  "  Then 
stop,  sit  down  here  beside  me.  .  .  .  You  are  the 
first  man  that  has  ever  relieved  my  mind  on  a  subject 
which  has  rested  upon  it  for  thirty  years.  .  .  . 
Throughout  my  whole  life  I  never  performed  an 
official  act  which  I  viewed  as  a  violation  of  the  Con 
stitution  of  my  country  ;  and  I  can  now  go  down  to 
1  Quoted  by  Sheahan,  Life,  p.  70. 


76  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  grave  in  peace.  .  .  ."  Douglas,  according 
to  the  dramatic  observer,  was  not  able  to  accept  the 
invitation  to  be  seated.  He  shook  the  hand  of 
General  Jackson  a  convulsively '  '  and  left  the  hall. 
Touching  as  was  the  regard  for  the  Constitution  ex 
hibited  both  by  Jackson  and  by  Douglas,  the  de 
scription  raises  some  doubt  with  reference  to  the 
circumstances  surrounding  the  meeting.  But  what 
ever  they  were,  the  endorsement  of  Jackson  stood 
Douglas  in  excellent  stead,  and  in  the  autumn  he 
found  himself  reflected  by  a  substantial  majority. 

Meanwhile  the  support  which  he  had  afforded  to 
the  bill  for  reimbursing  Jackson  was  not  the  only 
work  performed  by  him  during  the  session.  In  the 
assignment  of  members  to  committees,  the  most  im 
portant  place  that  had  fallen  to  him  was  that  upon 
the  Committee  on  Elections.  The  usual  number  of 
contested  questions  relating  to  elections  had  been 
presented  and  conspicuous  among  them  was  one  of 
some  general  interest.  There  had  recently  been  a 
reapportionment  of  representation  in  Congress,  but 
in  spite  of  the  act  dealing  with  that  subject,1  it  had 
failed  to  receive  observance  in  four  states.  The 
problem  presented  was  whether  the  members  from 
such  states  could  be  chosen  en  bloc  or  whether  they 
must  be  selected  in  "  districts  composed  of  contig 
uous  territory  equal  in  number  to  the  number  of  rep 
resentatives.  ' '  The  question  was  important  from  a 
party  standpoint,  because  nearly  all  of  the  members, 
some  twenty-one  in  number,  who  had  thus  been  erro- 

1  U.  8.  Statutes  at  Large,  Vol.  V,  p.  490  (1842). 


CONGRESSIONAL  APPRENTICESHIP     77 

neously  chosen  were  Democrats,  while  the  majority 
of  the  House  was  Democratic.  4  A  failure  to  act  in 
regard  to  the  matter  would  be  a  permanent  discredit 
to  the  party  and  might  serve  as  a  dangerous  prec 
edent.  The  result  was  the  selection  of  a  special 
committee,  consisting  of  six  Democrats  and  three 
Whigs,  charged  with  the  duty  of  investigating  the 
legitimacy  of  the  election  in  question.  In  appoint 
ing  the  committee,  search  was  made  for  earnest 
party  men  who  had  demonstrated  their  shrewdness 
in  times  of  political  pressure  at  home.  Among  such 
a  body  of  men  it  was  not  strange  to  find  Douglas. 
Though  a  new  member,  he  was  chosen  to  draft 
the  majority  finding,  which,  it  was  a  foregone  con 
clusion,  would  be  as  favorable  as  possible  to  the 
status  of  the  contested  Democratic  seats.  Douglas's 
report  must  have  fulfilled  the  expectations  of  the 
party.  He  pronounced  the  enactment  requiring  the 
choice  of  representatives  by  districts  to  be  invalid 
and  unconstitutional,  unless  accepted  by  the  states 
and  by  them  reenacted  into  local  law.  The  power 
to  prescribe  the  methods  of  electing  its  members 
under  the  Constitution  undoubtedly  could  be  exer 
cised  by  Congress  but  only  in  the  event  that  state 
legislative  action  was  absent  or  was  obviously  un 
constitutional. 

This  remarkable  report  was,  not  unexpectedly, 
received  with  vigorous  criticism.  Adams  in  com 
menting  upon  Douglas's  defense  of  the  position 
taken,  said  that  "  at  the  House  Stephen  A.  Douglas 
of  Illinois,  the  author  of  the  majority  report  from 


78  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  Committee  on  Elections,  had  taken  the  floor  that 
evening,  and  now  raved  out  his  hour  in  abusive  in 
vectives  upon  the  members  who  had  pointed  out  its 
slanders,  and  upon  the  Whig  party.  His  face  was 
convulsed,  his  gesticulation  frantic,  and  he  lashed 
himself  into  such  a  heat  that  if  his  body  had  been 
made  of  combustible  matter  it  would  have  burnt 
out.  In  the  midst  of  his  roaring,  to  save  himself 
from  choking,  he  stripped  off  and  cast  away  his 
cravat,  unbuttoned  his  waistcoat,  and  had  the  air  and 
aspect  of  a  half -naked  pugilist."  1  The  unfavorable 
attitude  of  opponents,  the  criticisms  of  the  punctil 
ious  Adams  and  the  manifest  impropriety  of  bringing 
into  Congress  this  body  of  illegally  elected  members 
were,  however,  considerations  insufficient  to  offset 
the  manifest  advantage  which  would  accrue  to  the 
party  from  the  acceptance  of  the  report  framed  by 
the  majority. 

Douglas,  moreover,  felt  the  necessity  common  to 
all  new  congressmen  not  only  of  working  for  the 
party  in  the  national  field,  but  also  of  getting  some 
direct  recognition  from  the  public  treasury  for  his 
constituents.  His  previous  experience  in  pushing- 
local  river  and  harbor  improvements,  and  in  spread 
ing  the  craze  for  internal  development  which  was 
still  prevalent  in  the  West,  naturally  turned  his  at 
tention  to  these  subjects  in  the  Federal  arena. 
While  he  did  not  succeed  in  obtaining  the  exorbi 
tant  appropriation  for  the  Illinois  Eiver  which  he 

1  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  edited  by  Charles  Francis 
Adams,  1876,  Vol.  II,  pp.  510-511. 


CONGRESSIONAL  APPRENTICESHIP     79 

demanded,  the  item  asked  for  being  dropped  from 
the  bill,  he  was  able  by  his  oratory  to  attract  con 
siderable  attention  to  himself  at  home  and  to  im 
press  his  constituents  firmly  with  the  idea  that  he 
was  strongly  devoted  to  their  interests.  Not  only  in 
regard  to  internal  improvements,  but  in  other  mat 
ters  too,  Douglas's  early  years  in  Congress  showed  a 
nice  recognition  of  the  necessities  of  his  constituents. 
On  one  occasion  an  earnest  effort  to  secure  the  pas 
sage  of  a  bill  for  the  purchase  of  1,500  copies  of 
Somebody's  "  History  of  Oregon  "  called  forth  the 
caustic  comment  of  Adams  and  threw  light  upon  the 
methods  by  which  the  young  legislator  managed  to 
retain  the  good  graces  of  his  constituents  and 
others.1 

The  first  session,  at  all  events,  though  productive 
of  nothing  more  than  the  biassed  speech- making 
and  repulsive  drudgery  of  a  well-bitted  party  hack, 
demonstrated  that  Douglas  could  fit  into  a  very 
definite  niche  in  Washington,  just  as  he  had  done 
in  Illinois.  Thus  far  he  was  of  the  type  which  the 
leaders,  even  at  the  present  day,  recognize  as  one 
that  will  "stand  without  hitching  "—always  re 
liable  in  partisan  matters  and  possessed  of  sufficient 
shrewdness  to  cover  any  defects  of  knowledge.  To 
many,  however,  Douglas's  methods  and  manners 
were  repellent.  Lincoln's  earlier  description  of 
him,  couched  in  suggestively  ambiguous  language, 
as  "  the  least  man  I  ever  saw,"  was  now  still  about 
as  valid  as  in  1835  when  it  had  first  been  given,  and 
1  Adams's  Memoirs,  Vol.  XII,  p.  154. 


80  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  habits  which  are  termed  "  convivial"  by  cour 
teous  biographers  were  by  this  time  tolerably  well 
established. ]  Douglas,  however,  had  not  yet  become 
well  accustomed  to  the  life  of  Washington,  nor  had 
he  seen  enough  of  men  and  methods  anywhere  to 
enable  him  to  mitigate  the  crudities  of  his  style  and 
his  attitude,  which  constituted  so  serious  a  hin 
drance  to  his  advancement.  At  the  close  of  his 
first  long  session  of  Congress,  with  the  endorsement 
of  General  Jackson  and  his  triumphal  reelection  in 
prospect  in  the  near  future,  as  well  as  with  the  sub 
stantial  approval  of  the  party  leaders,  it  was  still 
questionable  whether  he  could  advance  himself  to 
the  higher  levels  of  political  management. 

Douglas  had  hardly  expected  the  nomination  of 
Polk  for  the  presidency,  and  it  is  probable  that  it  was 
not  altogether  acceptable  to  him.  As  a  good  party 
man,  however,  he  had  nothing  to  say  in  criticism  of 
the  selection,  and  speedily  became  a  warm  sup 
porter  of  the  national  ticket,  not  only  from  the  stand 
point  of  the  platform  which  the  convention  had 
adopted,  but  also  in  a  personal  way,  offering  Jack 
son  i an  compliments  to  Polk  upon  the  floor  of  Con 
gress  and  eulogizing  him  at  party  gatherings.  The 
election  of  Polk  in  the  autumn  of  1844,  shortly  after 
Douglas's  own  reelection,  placed  him  in  a  favorable 
position  as  a  strong  administration  Democrat  of  rec- 

1  "Judge  Weldon  remembers  that  he  was  once  in  Mr.  Douglas's 
room  at  Springfield  when  Lincoln  entered,  and,  following  the 
custom,  Mr.  Douglas  produced  a  bottle  and  some  glasses  and 
asked  his  callers  to  join  him  in  a  drink."  W.  E.  Curtis,  True 
Abraham  Lincoln,  p.  380. 


CONGRESSIONAL  APPRENTICESHIP     81 

ognized  utility,  if  not  of  undoubted  talents.  The 
short  session  of  Congress,  completing  the  first  term 
for  which  Douglas  had  been  elected,  opened  in 
December,  1844,  and  presented  some  questions  of  a 
considerable  interest.  Conspicuous  among  these 
was  the  now  threatening  problem  of  the  annexation 
of  Texas  and  the  war  which,  it  was  already  foreseen, 
might  grow  out  of  it.  The  national  Democratic 
convention  had  placed  the  annexation  of  Texas 
upon  the  same  basis  as  the  problem  of  the  Oregon 
Territory.  The  issue  had  figured  to  some  extent  in 
the  campaign ;  there  had  at  least  been  no  definite 
popular  declaration  against  the  annexation  of  Texas. 
Polk  urged  annexation  from  the  outset,  alleging  this 
to  be  his  duty  because  of  the  popular  mandate  he 
had  received.  With  the  question  thus  forced  to  the 
front  in  a  large  national  way  and  with  his  own  per 
sonal  endorsement  of  Polk  in  mind,  Douglas's  tend 
ency  toward  the  annexation  policy,  despite  its  in 
evitable  conflict  with  most  of  the  theories  of  states7 
rights  and  the  like,  for  which  he  had  previously 
stood,  was  rapid. 

In  the  new  Congress,  opening  in  December,  1844, 
he  had  been  recognized  by  two  good  committee  ap 
pointments,  being  given  places  on  the  Judiciary 
Committee  and  on  the  Committee  on  Elections. 
\Yithout  a  commanding  position  in  either,  however, 
it  was  necessary  for  him  to  adopt  some  other  method 
than  faithful  service,  if  he  desired  to  become  a  man 
of  prominence  without  delay.  Having  definitely 
accepted  the  leadership  of  Polk,  he  could  not  do 


82  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

better,  it  seemed,  than  become  a  pro- administration 
exponent  in  the  lower  chamber.  Anticipating  the 
action  of  Congress,  he  introduced  resolutions  pro 
viding  for  the  annexation  of  Texas  which  he  advo 
cated  in  season  and  out  of  season.  The  effort  to 
secure  attention,  however,  fell  flat.  Not  Douglas's 
resolutions,  but  others  in  process  of  formulation  by 
the  older  and  wiser  heads  of  the  party,  were  those 
which  gained  acceptance  as  a  basis  for  discussion. 
He  had  in  fact  made  a  serious  error.  The  effort  to 
get  the  lead  with  his  resolutions  providing  for  the 
annexation  of  Texas  would  probably  have  been  un 
objectionable,  although  the  older  members  would 
still  have  persisted  in  retaining  for  themselves  the 
prominence  which  they  conceived  to  be  their  just 
due  as  promoters  of  the  movement.  In  addition  to 
this,  Douglas  had  committed  the  plain  blunder  of 
forcing  to  the  front  the  slavery  question  in  an  un 
necessary  way,  by  providing  that  the  boundary  es 
tablished  by  the  Missouri  Compromise  should  be 
extended  through  Texas.  This  alone  would  have 
rendered  his  proposal  impossible  and  the  fact  was 
early  recognized.  When  a  new  form  of  resolution 
for  the  annexation  of  Texas  was  reported  by  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  it  became  known  that 
Polk  had  given  this  proposal  his  endorsement,  so 
that  it  was  emphatically  the  administration  measure. 
The  result,  of  necessity,  was  that  Douglas  found 
himself  blocked  in  his  effort  at  self-advancement 
and,  unwilling  to  appear  as  the  leader  of  a  separate 
section  of  the  administration  forces,  he  now  dropped 


CONGRESSIONAL  APPRENTICESHIP     83 

his  own  scheme  and  turned  heartily  to  the  support 
of  the  new  plan.  Securing  recognition  by  the 
Speaker,  after  some  delay,  he  devoted  his  principal 
attention  to  an  attack  upon  the  New  England  men 
who  were  antagonizing  the  resolution,  and  delivered 
a  speech  in  which  he  contended  that  a  distinction 
must  be  drawn  between  the  power  of  Congress  to 
admit  new  states  and  its  power  to  annex  territory. 
His  main  point  here  was  found  in  the  thesis  that  the 
admission  of  the  state  was  impossible  save  with  an 
nexation  as  a  preceding  step.  The  speech  also  was 
characterized  by  a  rampant  imperialism  ;  it  was 
evidently  intended  as  an  appeal  to  those  who  were 
already  urgent  that  the  United  States  should  seize 
the  whole  of  the  North  American  continent.  But 
Douglas's  style  had  not  improved  materially  since 
his  first  appearance  on  the  floor  and  Adams,  ever 
critical  of  the  young  frontiersman,  characterized  him 
cleverly  enough  when  he  wrote  in  his  diary  that 
1  i  Douglas  of  Illinois  raved  an  hour  about  democracy 
and  Anglo-phobia  and  universal  empire."1  Doug 
las,  in  fact,  distinctly  advocated  the  expulsion  of 
Great  Britain  from  North  America,  and  the  exten 
sion  of  the  annexation  policy  northward  as  well  as 
southward. 

While  he  had  discarded  his  early  design  to  im 
pose  a  slavery  discussion  upon  Congress  in  connec 
tion  with  the  annexation  of  Texas,  seeing  the  un 
willingness  of  the  administration  to  open  the  vexed 
issue,  the  suggestion  which  he  had  offered  had  not 

1  Adams's  Memoirs,  Vol.  XII,  p.  159. 


84  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

gone  astray.  Southern  men  were  urgent  that  the 
question  should  be  settled,  and  settled  by  permitting 
distinctively  Southern  states  that  might  be  formed 
out  of  the  new  territory  to  enter  the  Union  as  slave 
states  if  they  so  desired.  Douglas  suggested  that  in 
the  event  of  states  being  formed  out  of  the  new  ter 
ritory  north  of  the  line  established  in  the  Missouri 
Compromise,  slavery  should  be  prohibited  in  such 
commonwealths.  This  final  agreement  was  sub 
stantially  the  idea  which  had  been  brought  forward 
in  Douglas's  early  resolutions  about  annexation. 
The  conditions  under  which  the  modification  had 
been  made,  and  the  final  form  given  to  the  clause, 
however,  were  not  favorable  to  Douglas's  claims  for 
credit  either  with  Southern  or  with  Northern  men. 
He  emerged  from  the  Texan  discussion  with  rela 
tively  little  added  reputation.  So  low  an  estimate 
does  Douglas's  own  personal  biographer  put  upon 
the  achievements  of  his  hero  during  the  session  of 
1844-1845,  that  he  devotes  almost  no  attention  to  it. 
The  first  skirmish  over  the  Texas  question  had, 
however,  a  special  significance.  This  lay  in  the 
fact  that  Douglas  had  now  come,  though  incidentally 
only,  face  to  face  with  the  issue  which  colored  all 
his  later  career,  and  which  furnished  the  inspiration 
for  most  of  his  important  public  debates.  Slavery 
changed  the  whole  current  of  his  life  and  while  the 
subject  gave  him  the  opportunity  for  some  of  his 
most  brilliant  successes,  it  also  exposed  him  to  his 
most  serious  inconsistencies  and  opened  the  way  to 
his  worst  defeats. 


CONGRESSIONAL  APPRENTICESHIP     85 

There  is  no  evidence  that  Douglas  was  naturally 
predisposed  to  the  support  of  slavery.  On  the  con 
trary,  his  training,  his  traditions,  his  whole  early 
career,  were  hostile  to  it.  He  had  been  allied  neither 
with  slavery  advocates  nor  with  the  owners  of 
slaves.  He  had  never  owned  slaves  himself,  and 
the  sentiment  of  his  immediate  environment  had 
undoubtedly  been  antagonistic  to  the  institution. 
The  circumstances  that  made  Douglas  appear  as  an 
advocate  of  slavery  throughout  almost  the  whole  of 
his  congressional  career  were  two-fold. 

He  was  above  all  things  a  partisan  Democrat. 
As  such  he  had  the  feeling  of  all  partisans  that 
nothing  must  be  done  to  disrupt  or  weaken  the 
organization  of  which  he  was  in  charge,  or  whose 
fortunes  he  was  endeavoring  to  promote.  Just  as 
he  had  sought  to  gain  the  aid  of  the  Mormons  by 
favoring  their  peculiar  ideas  and  institutions,  so  he 
sought  to  make  to  the  Southern  interests  in  Congress 
those  concessions  which  he  believed  were  necessary  to 
satisfy  them  and  to  keep  them  harmoniously  united 
with  the  Northern  branch  of  the  Democratic  party. 
He  saw  the  South  a  solid,  compact  body,  held  by 
the  common  tie  of  the  institution  of  slavery.  He  saw 
the  Northern  Democrats  united  by  no  such  common 
bond  and  influenced,  if  at  all,  only  by  general 
principles,  in  opposing  slavery.  Scantily  trained 
in  history  or  in  general  political  theory,  Douglas 
had  not  the  knowledge  or  the  insight  to  appreciate 
the  significance  of  slavery  as  an  historical  institu 
tion.  From  the  economic  standpoint,  he  was  largely 


86  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

or  wholly  untrained,  and  he  scarcely  comprehended 
the  bearing  of  the  question  upon  the  industrial  de 
velopment  of  the  United  States.  There  is  every 
reason  to  think  that  Douglas's  attitude  toward 
slavery  therefore  when  he  first  came  to  recognize  it 
as  a  definite  force  in  politics,  was  one  of  pure  op 
portunism.  Always  lacking  in  the  idealistic  in 
stincts  which  lead  some  men  to  devote  themselves 
to  a  cause  for  its  own  sake,  Douglas  had  from  his 
earliest  years  been  a  strictly  practical  politician. 
In  every  way,  he  felt  impelled  toward  those  courses 
which  would  best  advance  his  own  interests.  In 
thus  acting  with  reference  to  the  slavery  question,  he 
might  easily  find  a  basis  of  justification  in  the  fact  that 
slavery  actually  existed,  in  the  fact  that  its  eradica 
tion  or  suppression  would  involve  a  tremendous 
conflict,  and  in  the  general  hopeful  philosophy 
which  was  inclined  to  leave  the  subject  to  the 
future  in  the  confidence  that  it  would  ultimately 
work  out  its  own  corrective.  From  all  these  stand 
points,  there  was  every  reason  why  Douglas  should 
stand  ready  to  accept,  up  to  a  certain  point,  the 
dictation  of  the  strongest  element  in  his  party,  and 
should  yield  his  assent  to  plans  and  proposals 
which  under  other  circumstances  he  would  probably 
have  antagonized. 

The  second  important  influence  which  tended 
to  affect  the  life  of  Douglas  in  reference  to  the 
slavery  question  is  seen  in  his  own  personal  rela 
tionships.  Douglas  early  in  his  congressional  career 
was  thrown  with  slaveholders  of  the  gentle  and 


CONGRESSIONAL  APPRENTICESHIP     87 

patriarchal  type,  to  whom  the  welfare  of  the  human 
property  entrusted  to  their  care  was  one  of  the 
most  serious  duties  of  existence.  He  had  not  be 
come  convinced  of  the  fundamental  and  vital  char 
acter  of  the  slavery  question  at  the  time  of  his  first 
marriage  in  1847.  True,  Illinois  had  been  slave 
ground  in  the  territorial  days,  and  even  at  that 
time  the  issue  was  important.1  Although  the  state 
came  into  the  Union  in  1818  without  slavery,  the 
institution  existed  there  for  a  time  and  then,  in 
theory  at  least,  was  driven  out.  Indentured  negroes, 
who  were  practically  slaves,  continued  to  be  held  in 
servitude,2  but  they  were  not  numerous  and  their 
condition  was  not  very  unfortunate.  There  had 
been  a  slow  growth  of  an ti- slavery  sentiment  in 
Illinois  from  1830  to  1840  but  progress  toward 
Abolitionism  or  anything  approaching  it  had  been 
exceedingly  slight.  Not  long  after  Douglas  first 
went  to  Congress,  he  made  the  acquaintance  of  the 
lady  who  was  to  become  his  first  wife,  Miss  Martha 
Denny  Martin.  Her  father,  Colonel  Robert  Martin, 
owned  a  substantial  tract  of  land  in  North  Carolina 
with  an  adequate  force  of  slaves,  besides  150  or  more 

1  "The  legislatures  of  the  Indiana  and  Illinois  Territories  had 
passed  laws  allowing  a  qualified  introduction  of  slavery. 

It  had  been  enacted  that  emigrants  to  the  country  [Illinois] 
might  bring  their  slaves  with  them,  and  if  the  slaves,  being  of 
lawful  age  to  consent,  would  .  .  .  voluntarily  sign  an  in 
denture  to  serve  their  master  for  a  term  of  years,  they  should 
be  held  to  a  specific  performance  of  their  contracts.  .  . 
Such  slaves  were  then  called  indentured  and  registered  servants  ; 
the  French  negroes  were  called  slaves.  Many  servants  and  slaves 
were  held  under  these  laws."  Ford,  History  of  Illinois,  p.  32. 

2  Moses,  History  of  Illinois,  Vol.  I,  p.  314  et  seq. 


88  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

slaves  upon  a  Mississippi  plantation.  During  his 
courtship,  Douglas  visited  the  North  Carolina  plan 
tation  and  there  he  saw  slavery  at  its  best.  His  bent 
was  already  friendly  to  the  Southern  slaveholders, 
and  it  was  now  to  become  still  more  so  by  reason  of 
circumstances.  His  father-in-law's  death  within  a 
year  after  the  marriage  threw  a  quantity  of  valuable 
property,  whose  worth  was  dependent  upon  slave 
labor,  into  the  hands  of  his  wife.  Eecognizing  the 
political  unwisdom  of  such  action,  Douglas  declined 
to  accept  the  direct  ownership  of  the  slaves  and  the 
plantations,  but  the  fact  that  the  financial  welfare  of 
his  family  was  thus  so  intimately  bound  up  with  the 
continued  successful  maintenance  of  a  slave  system 
of  labor,  could  hardly  have  operated  otherwise 
than  to  make  him  friendly  to  the  existence  of  the 
institution.  Though  his  wife  lived  for  but  six 
years,  his  children's  pecuniary  interests  and  the 
growing  connection  between  himself  and  the  South 
ern  party  in  Congress,  had  by  that  time  definitely 
moulded  his  attitude  toward  the  question. 

It  would  be  wrong  to  suppose,  however,  that 
Douglas  ever  distinctly  advocated  the  slave  system. 
There  is  more  than  a  little  evidence  that  he  re 
gretted  its  existence,  although  in  common  witlr 
many  high-minded  Southerners  he  thought  it 
neither  possible  nor  feasible  to  attempt  any  im 
mediate  change.  His  doctrine  that  the  people  of 
every  community  should  determine  their  own  rela 
tionship  to  the  question  was  a  natural  outgrowth  of 
his  general  states'  rights  and  democratic  ideas.  It 


CONGRESSIONAL  APPRENTICESHIP     89 

would  probably  have  been  better  for  him,  in  the 
sight  of  his  contemporaries,— better,  too,  from  the 
standpoint  of  his  historical  status,  had  he  not  mar 
ried  the  daughter  of  a  Southern  slave-owner  and  be 
come  the  father  of  slave- owning  children.  It  was 
not  an  unfair  inference  for  party  opponents  to  draw 
that  these  connections  influenced  him  in  his  public 
life,  even  though  there  were  many  others,  following 
the  same  path  as  Douglas,  who  were  entirely  free 
from  any  suspicion  of  personal  interest. 

Douglas's  relationship  to  slavery  may  perhaps  be 
fairly  divided  into  three  periods  :  the  first  embracing 
his  early  legislative  career,  which  we  have  already 
traced,  and  covering  the  time  of  his  courtship  and 
first  marriage,  during  which  he  was  perhaps  more 
friendly  to  slavery  as  slavery  than  at  any  subsequent 
period ;  the  second,  extending  from  the  passage  of 
the  legislation  of  1850  to  the  close  of  the  Kansas-Ne 
braska  contest,  which  may  be  regarded  as  his  period 
of  constitutional  support  of  the  slavery  cause  ;  and 
the  third,  extending  from  the  time  of  the  Lecompton 
struggle  in  Kansas  to  his  death,  a  period  in  which 
he  manifestly  underwent  a  course  of  development, 
carrying  him  away  from  the  extremes  toward  which 
the  slavery  advocates  were  now  tending,  and  in 
which  he  found  himself  in  a  state  of  revolt  against 
the  desperate  measures  of  the  Southern  politicians. 
It  is  not  inconceivable  that,  had  his  life  been  length 
ened,  Douglas  would  have  appeared  as  the  author  of 
some  plan  for  abolishing  or  limiting  slavery  in  such 
a  way  as  to  dispose  of  the  question  with  possibly 


90  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

less  harshness  than  was  finally  resorted  to  in  the 
settlement  of  the  great  economic  and  political  dis 
pute. 

Meantime  the  issue  was  only  germinating.  The 
territorial  questions  raised  by  the  Mexican  War  and 
the  annexation  of  Texas,  must  much  more  fully  de 
velop  before  the  differences  on  the  subject  of  slavery 
could  become  acute. 


CHAPTER  T 

WAR  AND  SLAVERY 

THE  question  of  the  relations  of  the  United  States 
with  Mexico  and  Texas  came  into  Congress  in 
December,  1845.  Hardly  had  the  session  begun, 
when  Douglas  placed  before  the  lower  chamber  a 
joint  resolution  in  which  he  called  for  the  admis 
sion  of  Texas  upon  the  same  basis  as  the  other 
states.  Congress  had  now  reached  a  point  where  it 
had,  in  its  opinion,  ascertained  the  feeling  of  the 
country  sufficiently  to  act,  and  the  House  promptly 
passed  the  resolution  which  Douglas  had  proposed. 
This  was  in  line  with  the  Democratic  platform  of 
1844,  and  coming  from  such  a  source  cannot  be  re 
garded  as  a  novel  proposal.  He,  however,  was 
responsible  for  the  earnest  pressing  of  the  measure, 
and  there  is  evidence  that  he  always  regarded  the 
work  done  by  him  in  behalf  of  Texan  annexation  as 
among  his  greatest  accomplishments  as  a  congress 
man.  There  was  no  delay  in  the  Senate,  and  before 
the  close  of  the  year,  on  December  29th,  the  resolu 
tion  had  been  accepted  and  had  thus  practically 
received  the  force  of  law. 

The  action  taken  meant  war  with  Mexico  as  a 
matter  of  course.  Information  that  Mexican  troops 
had  passed  the  border  and  had  invaded  the  United 


92  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

States,  was  conveyed  to  Congress  by  President  Polk 
on  May  11,  1846 — the  culmination  of  a  long  and 
entangled,  but  fruitless,  series  of  negotiations. 
He  asked  for  a  sufficient  body  of  volunteers  to 
repel  the  movement.  There  was  already  pending 
before  the  lower  chamber  a  bill  which  had 
been  drafted  and  reported  by  the  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs  on  the  27th  of  January  pre 
ceding.  This  bill  had  been  shaped  with  a  view 
to  possible  aggression  on  the  part  of  Mexico,  and 
action  on  it  was  now  demanded.  The  measure  was 
promptly  passed.  It  authorized  the  enlistment  of 
50, 000  men  beside  appropriating  $10, 000, 000.  This 
at  once  opened  the  way  for  a  debate  involving  the 
whole  subject  of  policy  with  respect  to  foreign 
countries,  and  particularly  with  reference  to  the 
Mexican  contest.  In  this  Douglas  took  the  lead.1 
His  chosen  biographer  says  that  the  speech  which 
he  delivered  1 1  was  a  most  thorough  vindication  of 
the  war  and  of  President  Polk's  policy  "  and  "  was 
never  surpassed."  Without  endorsing  this  view,  it 
is  undoubtedly  the  case  that  Douglas  made  himself 
almost  indispensable  to  the  administration,  and 
powerfully  forwarded  a  cause  which  might  other 
wise  have  encountered  difficulties.  He  spoke  in 
vigorous  but  sufficiently  moderate  terms  of  the  in 
sults  to  the  United  States  which  had  been  offered 
and  the  injury  to  American  commerce  which  had 

1  Congressional  Glolw,  1st  Sess.,  29th  Cong.,  pp.  815,  et  seq., 
for  debate,  also  Sheahau,  Douglas,  Chap.  5,  for  full  extracts  from 
Douglas's  argument. 


WAR  AND  SLAVERY  93 

been  inflicted  by  Mexico  during  the  past  fifteen 
years,  while  with  respect  to  Texas  he  excul 
pated  the  United  States  for  its  action  in  con 
nection  with  annexation  on  the  ground  that  the 
reason  for  hostilities  with  Mexico  had  been  brought 
into  existence  prior  to  annexation.  The  war  was, 
therefore,  a  much  larger  matter  than  a  mere  strug 
gle  for  territory.  France  had  been  treated  in  the 
same  way  and  had  declared  her  ultimatum  from  the 
deck  of  a  man-of-war  off  Yera  Cruz.  Great  Britain 
had  also  sent  an  ultimatum.  Payment  for  damages 
had  been  made  in  both  cases,  but  the  United  States 
had  supinely  refrained  from  taking  any  step. 
Mexico  had  dismissed  our  minister,  and  had  per 
mitted  him  to  be  robbed  by  highwaymen  t '  accord 
ing  to  the  usage  of  the  country."  As  for  Texas, 
that  state  had  become  independent  in  1827  and  now 
simply  desired  to  join  the  United  States.  Under  a 
republican  constitution,  it  was  free  and  independent 
of  the  other  united  Mexieao  states  and  of  every  other 
foreign  power,  although  in  all  matters  relating  to 
the  Mexican  confederation,  it  had  delegated  its 
powers  to  the  general  Congress  of  Mexican  states. 
The  republic  of  Texas  held  its  position  "  by  the  same 
title  that  our  Fathers  of  the  Ee volution  acquired 
the  territory  and  achieved  the  independence  of  this 
republic" — a  successful  revolution.  We  had  re 
ceived  the  republic  of  Texas,  which  had  thus 
divorced  itself  from  the  Mexican  confederation,  into 
our  Union  as  an  independent  and  a  sovereign  state. 
We  could  not  retreat  were  we  so  disposed.  We 


94  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

could  not  surrender  a  part  of  Texaii  territory  since 
we  had  accepted  the  state  with  her  whole  territory. 
Nothing  was  to  be  done  then,  save  to  resist  the  ag 
gression  of  Mexico  and  to  insist  upon  the  mainte 
nance  of  the  entire  territory  of  the  United  States  in 
tact,  including  therein  such  land  as  Texas  had 
acquired  for  herself  and  had  brought  into  the  Union 
of  her  own  free  will. 

Not  only  did  Douglas  thus  seek  to  vindicate  the 
Mexican  War  by  reasoning  that  followed  practically 
the  only  available  line  along  which  success  could  be 
attained  from  any  other  than  a  mere  partisan  stand 
point,  but  it  was  a  notable  feature  of  the  debate  that 
he  succeeded  in  part  in  winning  over  the  good 
opinion  of  his  most  notable  opponent,  John  Quincy 
Adams,  who  but  a  short  lime  before  had  spoken  of 
him  as  a  "  homunculns,1'  given  to  abusive  and 
frantic  ravings.  Adams  had  contended  that  the 
western  boundary  of  Texas  was  the  Nueces  Eiver 
and  not  the  Eio  Grande.  Douglas  induced  his  dig 
nified  and  venerable  critic  to  commit  himself  defi 
nitely  and  positively  to  that  opinion  and  then  pro 
ceeded  to  refute  the  view  expressed  by  Mr.  Adams, 
basing  his  reply  upon  a  dispatch  which  Mr.  Adams 
himself  had  prepared  about  thirty  years  before 
while  Secretary  of  State  in  President  Monroe's 
Cabinet.1  In  this  Mr.  Adams  had  established  con 
clusively  that  the  Eio  Grande  was  the  western  boun 
dary  of  Texas  and  that  the  country  between  the 

1  CongresvionaJ  Globe,  1st  Sess.,  29t>h  Cong.,  p.  817,  for  speech; 
also  Sheahan,  Chap.  5. 


WAR  AND  SLAVERY  95 

Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande  was  a  part  of  Texas. 
Adams  was  fairly  beaten  by  this  ruse  and  frankly 
admitted  his  opponent's  capacity,  and  in  the  main 
the  courtesy  and  tact,  which  he  had  employed  in 
the  parliamentary  struggle.1  The  speech  and  the 
Adams  colloquy  doubtless  gave  Douglas  a  decided 
increase  of  popularity  and  standing,  and  when  he 
went  to  the  White  House,  not  long  after  the  opening 
of  the  war,  President  Polk  hastened  to  smooth  over 
such  irritation  as  Douglas  felt  because  of  political 
appointments  to  Federal  places  in  Illinois,  and 
practically  designated  him  as  the  leader  of  the 
Democratic  party  in  the  lower  chamber.2 

The  question  now  was  the  successful  prosecution 
of  the  war.  Polk  needed  aid  in  Congress,  for  he 
had  to  struggle  not  only  with  military  problems, 
but  also  with  those  which  surrounded  the  question 
of  government  in  Texas.  The  President  had  gone 
on  to  establish  a  tentative  administration  in  the  new 
territory  and  this  gave  rise  at  the  opening  of  the 
session,  1846-1847,  to  colloquies  based  upon  the  as 
sumption  that  he  had  resorted  to  an  excessive 
use  of  his  power.  Men  looked  to  Douglas  once 
more  as  the  spokesman  of  the  administration  in 
matters  relating  to  the  war,  and  they  were  not  dis 
appointed.  He  had  already  been  tutored  by  Polk, 
who  had  given  him  his  side  of  the  case  at  length. 
Douglas  hastened  to  vindicate  the  position  of  the 

1  Sheahan,  p.  74. 

2  Polk  MS.  Diary  entry  for  June  17,  1846,  quoted  by  Johnson, 
p.  106. 


96  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

administration  and  drew  still  closer  to  the  Presi 
dent.  The  question  now  was  how  to  carry  on  the 
war,  while  at  the  same  time  looking  forward  to 
peace  with  Mexico.  Polk  thought  that  a  transfer 
of  $2,000,000  to  pay  Mexico  for  the  ceded  territory 
would  be  the  best  policy  and  in  this  Douglas  con 
curred,  although  they  knew  that  the  appropriation 
would  be  far  from  easy  to  secure.  Just  at  this  junc 
ture  Douglas  secured  his  election  to  the  United 
States  Senate,  and  entered  that  body  with  the  inten 
tion  of  pursuing  the  same  policy  with  reference  to 
the  war  which  he  had  already  followed  while  a 
member  of  the  lower  chamber.1  His  advent  upon 
the  floor  of  the  Senate  was  not  characterized  by  the 
shrinking  modesty  enforced  upon  latter-day  states 
men  by  the  managers  of  the  legislative  organization 
in  the  "American  house  of  lords,"  for  the  change 
was  to  Douglas  nothing  more  than  speaking  at  one 
end  of  the  Capitol  rather  than  at  the  other. 

He  opened  his  senatorial  career  on  February  1, 
1848,  with  a  vigorous  speech  in  which  he  once  more 
sought  to  vindicate  Polk  and  urged  the  adoption  of 
an  administration  measure  then  pending  in  the 
Senate.  This  was  called  the  "  Ten  Eegiments  Bill " 
and  had  been  offered  by  Lewis  Cass.  Douglas  had 
comparatively  little  to  say  about  the  bill  itself, 
save  incidentally,  but  devoted  himself  chiefly  to 
the  subject  of  the  necessity  of  the  war  and  its  pro 
priety  from  the  abstract  standpoint,  at  the  same 

1  See  page  102  for  further  description  of  circumstances  sur 
rounding  election. 


WAR  AND  SLAVERY  97 

time  also  giving  due  attention  to  the  boundary  ques 
tion.  While  Douglas  was  thus  striving  to  vindicate 
a  weak  administration  by  denying  facts  which  were 
known  of  all  men,  the  feebleness  of  Mexico  was  con 
tributing  to  bring  about  the  speedy  termination  of 
hostilities.  Our  troops  had  had  success  in  pene 
trating  to  the  capital,  and  in  holding  most  of  the 
strong  points  that  were  needed  to  support  the  ad 
vance.  The  question  of  peace  was  under  serious 
discussion,  and  a  draft  of  a  treaty  had  reached  the 
Senate  even  while  Douglas  was  still  working  for  the 
Ten  Regiments  Bill.  The  treaty  was  in  fact  form 
ally  transmitted  by  the  President  on  February  23, 
1848,  only  about  three  weeks  after  Douglas  had  de 
livered  his  opening  address  on  the  floor.  Discus 
sions  continued  until  March  10th,  when  a  vote  was 
taken,  thirty-eight  to  fourteen,  in  favor  of  the  treaty 
in  the  form  in  which  it  then  stood.  Douglas  had 
voted  against  it,  but  there  were  not  enough  senators 
with  him  to  make  up  the  necessary  one-third  in 
opposition.  It  was  a  surprise  to  many  during  the 
days  between  February  23d  and  March  10,  1848,  that 
he  who  had  so  vigorously  upheld  the  administration 
in  its  Mexican  policy  now  attacked  it  at  a  vital 
point.  He  disliked  the  boundary  provision  of  the 
treaty l  because,  by  providing  that  the  line  laid 
down  in  the  agreement  should  be  permanent,  it  cut 
off  the  possibility  of  a  future  rearrangement  of  the 
frontier.  Such  a  rearrangement,  Douglas  appar 
ently  felt,  might  be  necessary  at  a  later  date,  but 

1  Sheahan.  Douglas,  passim. 


98  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

his  failure  to  support  the  Polk  administration  to  the 
last  was  of  comparatively  little  importance,  since  it 
was  now  considerably  discredited  in  several  direc 
tions,  while  Douglas  himself  had  grown  remarkably 
in  power  and  influence  since  the  opening  of  the  war. 
The  question  of  territorial  expansion,  which  had 
figured  as  one  of  the  vital  issues  in  the  Mexican 
War,  had  also  presented  itself  in  a  pressing  form  in 
connection  with  Oregon.  While  still  in  the  House 
and  still  struggling  with  the  Mexican  question  in 
its  early  stages,  Douglas  had  bitterly  assailed  Great 
Britain  because  of  her  claim  to  Oregon,  bringing 
forward  the  view  that  England  should  never  be 
allowed  to  hold  a  single  spot  of  territory  in  the 
Northwest. l  He  himself  had  introduced  a  measure, 
defining  the  legal  status  of  the  American  inhabit 
ants  of  the  territory  under  the  treaty  which  then 
existed  with  Great  Britain.  This  treaty  was  to  be 
abrogated  and  Douglas  now  urged  that,  in  connec 
tion  with  such  abrogation,  we  should  insist  upon 
absolute  and  full  control  of  the  whole  Northwest. 
On  the  27th  of  January,  1846,  he  demanded  the 
adoption  of  his  proposed  policy,  and  insisted  upon 
the  maintenance  of  American  power  upon  the  Pa 
cific  with  a  view  to  the  control  of  future  trade. 
Continuing  in  this  strain,  Douglas  found  himself 
but  one  of  ten  who  voted  for  a  substitute  resolution 
(offered  in  place  of  the  resolution  terminating  the 
treaty  with  Great  Britain),  in  which  it  was  declared 
that  Oregon  was  already  defined  in  its  status  and 

1  Congressional  Globe,  29th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  pp.  124,  etc 


WAR  AND  SLAVERY  99 

could  not  be  made  the  subject  of  controversy.  The 
small  number  of  supporters  which  he  had  succeeded 
in  enlisting  did  not  deter  him  from  continued  in 
sistence  upon  the  54°  40'  line.  He  persevered  in 
his  demand,  and  when  it  was  suggested  a  little  later 
that  Polk  thought  of  settling  with  England  upon 
the  forty-ninth  parallel  as  a  boundary,  he  declared 
himself  positively  to  the  eifect  that  the  acceptance 
of  such  a  settlement  would  be  a  violation  of  party 
pledges  as  embodied  in  the  last  Democratic  plat 
form.  In  fact,  the  advocacy  of  extreme  views  about 
Oregon  carried  Douglas  into  an  almost  ridiculous 
position  even  with  his  own  political  associates,  al 
though  he  succeeded  in  pushing  through  the  House 
his  bill  relating  to  the  settlers  in  the  territory,  which 
was  later  allowed  to  die  quietly  in  the  Senate. 

The  final  draft  of  the  treaty '  was  unsatisfactory 
to  Douglas,  particularly  in  view  of  the  language 
employed  in  the  President's  message  conveying  to 
Congress  the  information  that  the  treaty  had  been 
agreed  upon.2  Douglas  felt  the  concessions  to  Great 
Britain  to  be  a  serious  personal  rebuke,  but  he 
could  not  urge  warlike  action  at  a  moment  when 
we  were  evidently  on  the  point  of  hostilities  with 
Mexico.  Polk  had  urged  that  a  territorial  govern 
ment  be  promptly  established  in  Oregon,  and  Doug 
las  was  a  sufficiently  skilful  tactician  to  drop  such 
of  his  demands  as  were  now  plainly  out  of  the  ques 
tion  and  take  np  the  remaining  issues.  He  pre- 

1  Treaties  in  Force,  1899,  p.  231. 

3  Messages  and  Papers,  Vol.  IV,  p.  449. 


100  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

sented  a  measure  establishing  a  government  in  Ore 
gon  and  when  adopted  by  the  House,  he  admitted 
an  amendment  prohibiting  the  existence  of  slavery. 
This  measure,  however,  like  Douglas's  other  bill, 
went  no  further  than  the  lower  chamber,  so  that  the 
incorporation  of  the  anti-slavery  provision  was  sug 
gestive  rather  than  actual  for  the  time  being.  The 
Oregon  question  was  now  shelved  for  a  while  and 
not  until  Douglas  himself  had  entered  the  Senate, 
the  Mexican  War  having  meantime  passed  by  as  a 
cause  of  alarm,  was  the  discussion  resumed.  As 
soon,  however,  as  conditions  permitted,  Douglas  re 
curred  to  the  Oregon  question  and  early  in  1848  he 
offered  a  measure  establishing  a  regular  form  of  rule 
in  that  territory.  It  was  unfortunate  that  the  issue 
had  been  so  long  deferred,  for  in  the  meanwhile  the 
annexation  of  Texas  and  the  question  of  its  govern 
ment  had  sharply  brought  to  the  front  the  problem 
of  slavery.  Few,  if  any,  were  so  extreme  as  to  sup 
pose  that  slavery  would  flourish  in  the  far  North 
west,  or  that  any  declaration  on  the  subject  which 
might  be  embodied  in  the  laws  or  constitution  of 
Oregon,  either  as  a  territory  or  as  a  state,  would  be 
much  more  than  an  academic  assertion  of  belief. 
While  this  was  true,  there  was,  however,  a  consid 
erable  distaste  for  any  action  which  might  be  held 
to  establish  a  precedent,  to  govern  later  policy  in 
connection  with  other  territories  that  might  apply 
for  admission.  Many  such  territories  were  now  in 
sight,  and  their  entry  into  the  Union  was  certain  to 
raise  the  old  question  repeatedly.  The  subject  was 


WAR  AND  SLAVES^  :14)1 

at  length  referred  to  a  committee,  charged  with  the 
duty  of  investigating  the  whole  territorial  situation 
in  the  Northwest,  and  this  committee  finally  offered 
a  plan  for  the  government  not  only  of  the  Oregon 
territory,  but  also  of  New  Mexico  and  California  in 
respect  to  this  topic. 

The  compromise  proposal  proved  satisfactory  in 
the  upper  chamber  but  the  House  would  have  noth 
ing  to  do  with  it.  Douglas  had  been  willing  to  ac 
cept  the  scheme,  although  he  had  suggested  certain 
amendments  designed  to  carry  the  line  of  the  Mis 
souri  Compromise  through  to  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
and  to  place  the  restriction  of  slavery  in  Oregon 
upon  the  ground  that  it  was  north  of  the  parallel  of 
latitude  which  formed  the  southern  boundary  of 
Missouri.  Polk  desired  the  adoption  of  some  such 
measure,  but  at  the  last  Oregon  was  finally  provided 
for  in  a  bill  which  retained  the  clause  restricting 
the  introduction  of  slavery,  while  Douglas  had 
the  poor  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  the  plan  as 
adopted  was  substantially  the  one  for  which  he  had 
stood  while  still  a  member  of  the  lower  chamber. 
The  significant  feature  of  the  situation  lay  in  the 
fact  that  controversy  had  now  been  definitely  opened 
on  the  slavery  question  and  that  Douglas  had  as 
sumed  a  positive  attitude  on  that  issue.  He  had  in 
fact  committed  himself  in  a  preliminary  way  to  the 
policy  which  was  later  to  cause  him  so  much  em 
barrassment,  and  ultimately  to  lead  him  into  the 
mistake  in  his  political  career  in  connection  with 
the  Kansas- Nebraska  question. 


A.  DOUGLAS 

Before  Douglas  could  go  further  in  his  study  of 
national  politics,  however,   he  must  take  account 
of  his  position   at  home.     He   had  in  a  meastire 
antagonized  the  national  administration,  notwith 
standing  the  earnest  and  valuable  support  which  he 
had  rendered  ;  for  Polk  was  not  a  sufficiently  large 
man  to   allow  much   freedom  to  members  of  any 
party   who  might  differ  with  him  even   in  small 
particulars.     Moreover,  his  status  in  Illinois  was 
not  altogether  encouraging.     The  development  of 
state  politics  had  raised  several  serious  questions, 
making    it  doubtful   how  men  must  shape  their 
courses  in  order  to  maintain  themselves  at  Wash 
ington.     As  has  already  been  seen,   Douglas  had 
been  sent  to  the  Senate  by  action  of  the  legislature 
late  in  1847.     His  election  had  been  effected  as  the 
result  of  a  caucus  in  which  there  had  been  the  usual 
display  of  irritation  and  friction  growing  out  of  the 
opposition  of  the  older  politicians,  unable  to  agree 
among  themselves  and  equally  dissatisfied  at  seeing 
a    younger  man  substituted.      The  candidacy  of 
Douglas  had  been  known  in  connection  with  the 
senatorship  for  a  long  time,  but  most  persons  had 
supposed  he  would  be  unable  to  attain  his  ambition. 
Success  in  this  regard  was  therefore  somewhat  sur 
prising  at  the  particular  juncture  in  question,  and 
the  charge  was  made  that  he  had  entered  into  a 
political  bargain  whereby  a  possible  opponent  was 
eliminated  in  return  for  a  substantial  Federal  ap 
pointment.     Douglas's  elevation  to  the  Senate  at  all 
events  was  unexpected  and  could  not  be  said  in  any 


WAR  AND  SLAVERY  103 

sense  to  be  the  deliberate  verdict  of  the  people  of 
the  state,  but  rather  a  purely  party  matter.  His 
problem,  therefore,  was  that  of  identifying  himself 
with  the  state  as  a  whole  more  fully  than  he  had 
been  able  to  do  while  still  representing  only  a  part 
of  it.  If  he  wished  to  remain  in  the  Senate,  he 
must  understand  and  accept  the  views  of  his  con 
stituency  and  definitely  represent  it.  Meanwhile 
this  constituency  had  been  changing.  The  steady 
filling  up  of  Illinois  with  eastern  and  northern 
emigrants  and  with  the  German  element,  which 
made  its  way  across  the  Atlantic  in  consequence  of 
the  political  disturbances  in  its  native  land,  had 
made  the  vote  there  somewhat  uncertain.  It  was 
no  longer  possible  to  determine  accurately  how 
the  electorate  would  vote  on  any  given  question, 
nor  was  it  certain  that  one  man  could  fill  and  satisfy 
the  ideals  of  the  differing  elements  that  existed  in 
this  new  constituency.  Douglas  as  a  representative 
in  Congress  had  reckoned  cleverly  and  successfully 
with  the  pro-slavery  element  in  the  state,  and  as  the 
Abolition  element  developed  there  he  had  made  due 
allowance  for  it,  though  he  still  held  it  in  but  slight 
respect.  He  now  saw  it  decidedly  on  the  increase 
and  was  undoubtedly  somewhat  surprised  at  the 
action  of  the  state  in  1848  when  a  vote  upon  a  con 
stitutional  provision  prohibiting  the  entry  of  free 
negroes  into  Illinois  territory  resulted  in  a  sub 
stantial  ballot  in  favor  of  the  entry  of  such  negroes. 
Party  lines  were  still  very  sharply  drawn,  however, 
and  the  Democrats  had  contrived  to  maintain  their 


104  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ascendency  successfully.  The  party  had  skilfully 
arranged  and  rearranged  the  congressional  districts 
in  such  a  way  as  to  keep  a  majority  of  votes  within 
its  own  hands,  in  most  of  them  changing  the  lines 
as  the  incoming  population  threatened  to  alter  the 
political  complexion  of  any  given  district.  Doug 
las's  ability,  his  skill  in  manipulation,  the  fact  that 
he  had  now  risen  to  the  highest  Federal  office  in  the 
gift  of  the  state,  marked  him  as  its  political  leader 
par  excellence.  The  retirement  of  his  colleague, 
Senator  Breese,  shortly  left  him  without  a  rival  for 
the  control  of  Federal  appointments.  It  was  nec 
essary,  however,  to  have  a  strong  hold  upon  the 
national  administration  and  to  move,  so  far  as  pos 
sible,  with  the  current  of  opinion. 

Before  leaving  Washington  after  the  struggle  over 
the  Mexican  question,  Douglas  had  done  what  he 
could  to  draw  closer  to  the  administration  with 
which  he  had  to  sonic  extent  broken.  He  had  even 
apologized  to  Polk  in  August,  1848,  and  had  ob 
tained  promises  of  regard  for  his  own  wishes  in 
local  political  matters.  In  apparent  control  of  the 
party  organization,  sufficiently  in  favor  with  the 
national  government  to  assure  proper  respect  for 
his  recommendations,  it  was  only  requisite  that  he 
should  be  sure  of  his  ground  on  those  broader 
questions  involving  slavery  which,  as  he  now  recog 
nized,  were  growing  more  and  more  acute.  Itwas  not 
possible  ultimately  to  avoid  the  slavery  question  in 
some  form,  and  this  was  keenly  brought  home  to  him 
when  the  Illinois  legislature  sought  to  instruct  him 


WAR  AND  SLAVEEY  105 

regarding  his  position  on  the  subject.  The  presi 
dential  election  in  the  autumn  of  1848  had  revealed 
a  remarkable  strengthening  of  the  anti-slavery 
forces.  Zachary  Taylor,  the  Whig  candidate,  had 
received  1,360,000  popular  votes,  but  Cass,  whom 
the  Democrats  nominated,  had  1,220,000,  while 
Van  Buren,  running  on  a  Free  Soil  ticket,  received 
291,000.  Taylor's  electoral  vote  was  163  against 
127  for  Cass,  and  Taylor  consequently  assumed 
office.  The  contest  was  very  close  in  Illinois,  where 
Cass,  the  candidate  of  the  Democrats,  had  received 
only  56,300  votes  as  against  53,047  for  Taylor.1 
The  legislature  was  safely  Democratic  but  the  in 
troduction  of  a  resolution  instructing  the  senators 
and  representatives  to  use  all  possible  means  of  an 
honorable  character  for  giving  the  new  territories  a 
government  free  of  slavery  had  been  unexpected, 
and  produced  considerable  confusion  in  the  party. 

Opponents  of  Douglas  had  noted  with  interest  his 
inclination  to  compromise  on  the  question  of  slavery, 
and  so  far  as  possible  to  regard  the  wishes  of  its 
Southern  advocates.  He  had  opposed  the  limiting 
clause  on  the  ground  that  the  territories  should  be 
left  free  to  come  into  the  Union  without  any  restric 
tion  upon  the  subject  of  slavery,  and  his  course  had 
also  been  directly  opposed  to  the  imposition  of 
slavery  or  the  withholding  of  it,  during  the  time 
that  the  territories  were  organized  as  such,  through 
congressional  enactments.  For  these  reasons  the 
action  of  the  legislature  might  by  some  be  con- 
1  Stanwood,  History  of  the  Presidency,  p.  243. 


106  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

sidered  as  a  vote  of  lack  of  confidence  in  him,  and 
under  some  conditions  would  probably  have  driven 
him  out  of  office  by  a  forced  resignation.  His 
efforts  to  accept  the  idea  of  the  Missouri  Com 
promise  as  applied  to  the  new  territories  of  the 
southwest  and  northwest  were  directly  opposed  to 
the  ideas  embodied  in  the  resolution  of  the  legisla 
ture  of  Illinois.  This  resolution  had  been  passed 
by  a  combination  of  party  groups,  all  of  which 
were  more  or  less  opposed  to  slavery,  and  which  in 
cluded  not  a  few  Democrats.  Democrats  represent 
ing  southern  Illinois  did  not  of  course  sympathize 
with  these  anti-slavery  leanings  and  naturally  voted 
against  the  resolution,  but  they  were  unable  to  con 
trol  the  legislature. 

Douglas  was  now  faced  by  an  embarrassing  alter 
native.  Should  he  give  up  all  that  he  had  accom 
plished  by  his  strenuous  efforts, —the  titular  head 
ship  of  the  party  in  his  state,  his  favorable  stand  ing 
at  Washington,  his  new  prominence  in  national 
affairs,  and  other  achievements  merely  because  of  a 
scruple  over  his  relation  to  local  politics?  He 
determined  not  to  hand  in  his  resignation  but  to  at- 
cept,  at  least  formally,  the  idea  which  had  been 
conveyed  in  the  resolution  sent  him  by  the  legisla 
ture.  He  told  the  Senate  that  he  would  not  resign 
because  he  thought  the  practical  vote  of  lack  of 
confidence  in  him  was  due  to  a  fortuitous  combina 
tion  of  opposing  elements.  The  call,  however,  was 
for  strenuous  political  labor  designed  to  reestablish 
his  position  in  the  state.  Meanwhile,  it  was  obvi- 


WAR  AND  SLAVERY  107 

ous  that  he  must  cease  his  advocacy  of  the  precise 
policy  toward  the  slavery  question  which  the 
Illinois  legislature  had  opposed.  The  question  then 
would  be  whether  during  the  next  two  or  three 
years  he  could  succeed  in  strengthening  his  founda 
tions,  and  in  setting  himself  four-square  to  the 
changing  public  opinion  of  his  state.  The  course  of 
political  events  justified  his  foresight,  for  within 
two  years  the  shifting  of  party  lines  and  the  rapid 
development  of  new  national  issues  altered  the 
aspect  of  affairs.  To  this  end,  desirable  as  it  was 
from  his  standpoint,  Douglas  vigorously  contributed 
by  effort  to  reshape  the  opinion  of  the  state  so  as  to 
lay  greater  stress  upon  the  constitutional  and  legal 
side  of  the  slavery  question  and  less  upon  its  moral 
or  ethical  aspects.  Events  showed  that  the  conjunc 
tion  of  parties  against  him  in  the  Illinois  legislature 
had  been  a  matter  of  chance  and  of  shrewd  political 
manipulation,  partly  growing  out  of  the  newness  of 
his  own  leadership  ;  and,  as  the  coalition  against  him 
proved  its  inability  to  hold  together,  he  steadily 
consolidated  his  own  local  organization,  aiding 
wherever  possible  the  disintegration  of  the  oppos 
ing  groups.  Threatening  as  it  had  seemed,  the  storm 
soon  subsided  and  he  emerged  stronger  than  ever, 
because  he  was  now  fully  warned  of  the  dangers 
which  confronted  him. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  ILLINOIS   CENTRAL  RAILROAD 

LIKE  other  members  of  Congress,  Douglas  had 
recognized  the  necessity  of  promoting  the  interests 
of  his  constituents  in  a  definite  and  tangible  way. 
Then,  as  now,  the  average  voter  was  far  from  will 
ing  to  take  an  active  part  in  national  affairs,  and  was 
most  unwilling  to  put  aside  his  own  personal  inter 
ests  and  needs  in  behalf  of  those  of  the  country  at 
large.  This  situation  was  recognized  by  Douglas 
very  early  in  his  political  life  ;  and  throughout  his 
subsequent  career,  while  he  was  concentrating  his 
mind  largely  upon  national  affairs  and  endeavoring 
to  fight  his  way  to  the  presidential  chair,  he  was 
never  without  a  distinct  policy  in  regard  to  the 
economic  questions  which  were  closely  and  directly 
touched  by  Federal  action.  We  have  seen  how,  on 
the  very  threshold  of  his  legislative  life  in  the 
Illinois  legislature,  he  had  been  confronted  by  the 
necessity  of  adopting  a  definite  standpoint  in  regard 
to  the  use  of  state  money  for  internal  improvements 
and  how,  although  setting  his  face  against  the 
wildest  excesses  of  the  internal  improvement  mania, 
he  had  seei}  the  wisdom  of  voting  for  a  bill  which 
involved  th^state  in  most  serious  financial  entangle 
ments.  The  action  then  taken  might  well  be  over- 


THE  ILLINOIS  CENTRAL  KAILKOAD     109 

looked  in  any  critical  review  of  Douglas's  career  on 
the  ground  that  he  was  a  young  man  untrained  in 
economic  thinking,  with  his  political  future  still  to 
work  out,  and  unable  alone  to  withstand  the  strong 
current  of  popular  sentiment. 

The  course  of  Douglas  while  a  member  of  the  Illi 
nois  legislature  must,  however,  be  regarded  as 
merely  the  beginning  of  a  definite  and  set  policy 
with  respect  to  the  distribution  of  public  funds, 
which  was  continued  and  expanded  as  he  advanced 
more  and  more  in  Federal  politics  and  became  in 
creasingly  able  to  dictate  legislation  in  Washington. 
Douglas's  faithful  biographer  maintains  that  "  dur 
ing  his  entire  political  life"  he  "  agreed  with  the 
Democratic  party  in  resisting  any  general  system  of 
internal  improvements  by  the  Federal  govern 
ment."  l  Sheahan  admits,  that  "  upon  some  points, 
however,  ...  he  ...  had  opinions  some 
what  peculiar."  These  peculiar  ideas  related  to  the 
promotion  of  works  that  were  intended  to  develop 
commercial  and  transportation  enterprises,  and  were 
disapprovingly  directed  only  toward  those  works 
which  were  u  asked  for  by  parties  having  local  in 
terests  to  serve."  The  question  in  what  sense  the 
term.  " local"  is  used  by  his  biographer  is  one  that 
might  give  rise  to  differences  of  opinion.  Undoubt 
edly  Douglas's  action  with  reference  to  some  of  the 
most  important  commercial  enterprises  ever  devel 
oped  in  the  state  of  Illinois  constituted  one  of  the 
principal  features  of  his  public  career,  although  one 

1  Sheahan,  Life,  p.  354.  *  Ibid. 


110  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

which  has  been  regarded  as  largely  incidental  to  his 
participation  in  the  broad  national  questions  center 
ing  around  the  slavery  controversy.  While  Doug 
las,  from  the  opening  of  his  congressional  service, 
recognized  the  political  obligation,  not  to  say  the 
necessity,  resting  upon  a  young  and  rising  politician 
of  working  actively  for  the  usual  river  and  harbor 
distribution  of  public  moneys,  the  feature  of  his 
work  which  clearly  distinguished  him  from  the  or 
dinary  seeker  after  congressional  grants  was  that  he 
had  the  insight  to  take  up,  and  the  pertinacity  to  ad 
here  to,  a  plan  for  a  very  large  enterprise,  which 
would  be  not  only  a  permanent  source  of  expendi 
ture  within  his  state  but  which  would  regularly 
divert  to  the  pockets  of  a  very  large  number  of  con 
stituents  some  of  the  wealth  of  the  Federal  govern 
ment,  whether  in  the  form  of  public  lauds  (whose 
value  he  himself  as  a  land  officer  had  learned  to 
know),  or  in  some  other  form.  He  early  attached 
himself  therefore  to  the  scheme  for  building  a  long 
line  of  railroad  crossing  the  state  of  Illinois  from 
north  to  south.1  Thus  he  became  one  of  the  real 
originators  of  the  great  transportation  system  now 
controlled  by  the  Illinois  Central  Eailroad  Company. 
When  Douglas  entered  the  field  of  national  pol 
itics  in  the  autumn  of  1843,  he  undoubtedly  had 
carefully  considered  the  projects  of  railroad  devel 
opment  which  were  most  in  the  public  mind  in 
Illinois.  The  idea  of  a  line  from  the  junction  of  the 

1  The  history  of   Douglas's  ideas  is  best  given  by  Cntts,  Con 
stitutional  and  Party  Questions,  pp.  187-199. 


THE  ILLINOIS  CENTRAL  RAILROAD     111 

Ohio  and  the  Mississippi  to  some  point  on  the  Illi 
nois  River,  and  then  north  to  Galena,  had  been  talked 
of  in  the  state  for  a  good  while,  and  its  early  begin 
nings  are  to  be  found  in  connection  with  the  great 
and  impracticable  scheme  for  internal  improve 
ments  for  which  Douglas  himself  had  voted  when  he 
entered  the  legislature  and  which  had  broken  down 
because  of  the  lack  of  adequate  state  funds  subse 
quent  to  the  panic  of  1837.  This  was  accepted  by 
Douglas  as  his  leading  proposal,  and  he  soon  had  an 
opportunity  of  exhibiting  his  attitude,  for  the  people 
of  Illinois  were  now  definitely  looking  to  Congress  as 
the  available  source  of  the  aid  which  the  state  itself 
could  not  bestow. 

Simultaneously  with  Douglas's  entry  into  Con 
gress,  a  bill  was  favorably  reported  in  the  Senate 
whereby  a  man  named  Holbrook  was  granted  a 
right  of  way  for  a  railroad  through  the  public  lands 
in  Illinois.  The  railway  was  to  be  allowed  to 
preempt  the  lands  along  the  route  at  $1.25  per  acre. 
This  bill  passed  the  Senate  but  failed  of  any  action 
in  the  House,1  and  at  the  next  session  a  similar  bill, 
with  some  slight  changes,  was  introduced  but  went 
no  farther.  Again  in  1845-1846,  a  Senate  bill 
granting  to  Illinois  a  large  quantity  of  public  lands 
located  within  the  state  for  railroad  construction  was 
presented,  but  made  no  progress.  The  years  1843- 
1847  covered  Douglas's  career  as  a  member  of  the 
lower  house.  During  all  this  time  he  had  been 
earnest  in  support  of  the  general  idea  of  the  rail- 

1  Sheahan,  p.  367. 


112  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

road,  but  he  had  not  cared  to  support  the  particular 
propositions  which  were  then  presented  for  discus 
sion.  Sheahan  thinks  that  he  would  have  opposed 
the  original  measure  providing  for  preemption  at 
$1.25  an  acre  had  it  become  a  live  issue  in  the 
House,  and  intimates  that  Douglas  was  largely  re 
sponsible  for  its  failure  on  the  ground  that  he  had 
no  faith  in  Holbrook  or  his  associates  who,  he 
thought,  would  simply  take  the  grant  and  sell  it  to 
others.  His  idea  was  that  the  grant  of  lands  should 
be  made  direct  to  the  state,  and  this  idea,  as  already 
noted,  was  embodied  in  the  subsequent  bill  bearing 
on  the  subject.  All  of  these  manoeuvres,  however, 
came  to  nothing. 

In  the  meanwhile  Douglas  had  become  more  and 
more  attached  to  a  railroad  scheme  and,  during  his 
travels  in  Illinois  just  before  taking  his  seat  as 
senator,  he  spoke  freely  upon  the  question.  Aban 
doning  the  idea  of  a  direct  grant  to  the  state,  as 
mentioned  in  the  early  Senate  bills  which  had  been 
framed  somewhat  along  the  lines  he  had  suggested, 
he  now  advocated  the  gratuitous  transfer  to  the  rail 
way  of  alternate  sections  of  the  public  land  on  each 
side  of  the  proposed  railway,  such  grant,  however, 
not  to  take  effect  until  the  road  should  be  con 
structed.  The  scheme  proved  to  be  very  popular 
and  Douglas  was  more  than  ever  confirmed  in  the 
idea  that  something  should  be  done.  In  fact,  he 
became  so  strongly  interested  in  it,  that,  as  the  plan 
took  form,  he  gradually  enlarged  it  and  finally, 
growing  enthusiastic  over  the  commercial  possibili- 


THE  ILLINOIS  CENTRAL  RAILROAD     113 

ties  opening  before  him,  he  resolved  to  get  for  him 
self  a  share  of  the  magnificent  development  which 
he  believed  would  follow  the  construction  of  the 
line.  He  was  now  in  a  position  where  he  could  be 
of  immense  service  in  promoting  the  railroad  plan. 
All  the  bills  thus  far  had  originated  in  the  Senate, 
and  that  body  had  on  the  whole  been  the  home  of 
the  internal  improvement  scheme  in  its  various 
forms.  Douglas's  name,  too,  had  acquired  large 
prestige  in  Illinois,  and  it  might  safely  be  antici 
pated  that  any  project  in  which  he  became  inter 
ested  would  secure  favor  for  that  very  reason.1 

Before  taking  his  seat  in  the  upper  chamber 
Douglas  purchased  Chicago  real  estate  on  a  large 
scale.  Johnson  thinks  his  action  was  the  result 
of  "a  sort  of  sixth  sense"  which  enabled  him  to 
foresee  "the  growth  of  the  ugly,  but  enterprising 
city  on  Lake  Michigan."  '2  Whether  his  action  was 
due  to  a  "sixth  sense"  or  to  a  confidence  in  his 
own  ability  to  shape  things  in  such  a  way  as  to 
promote  the  development  of  Chicago,  is  a  matter  of 
opinion.  Chicago  was  not  yet  included  within  the 
proposed  railroad  route  but  Douglas  promptly  set 
out  to  correct  this  defect.  Immediately  after  his 
land  purchases  in  Chicago,  he  took  the  view  during 
the  summer  of  1847,  that  the  line  to  be  built  must 

1  Forney,  in   his    Anecdotes   of  Public   Men,  p.  19,  recites  in 
stances   of   investments   in  Superior  City,  at  Fond  du  Lac,  the 
head  of  Lake  Superior,  at  the  terminus  of  the  projected  Northern 
Pacific  Railroad  made  at  the  advice  of  Douglas  and  speaks  of  the 
large  returns  received  therefrom. 

2  Johnson,  Life,  p.  169. 


114  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

connect  with  the  Great  Lakes,  and  in  support  of 
this  proposition  he  presented  not  only  commercial 
considerations l  but  also  arguments  growing  out  of 
local  politics.2  Going  to  Washington  in  the  fall  of 
1847,  Douglas  promptly  introduced  the  bill.  It 
provided  for  a  grant  to  the  state  of  Illinois  of 
alternate  sections  of  public  land  to  aid  in  the  con 
struction  of  a  railroad  from  Cairo  to  Galena,  with  a 
branch  at  some  suitable  point  on  the  road  to 
Chicago.  This  and  rival  bills  were  referred  to  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Public  Lauds  presided  over  by 
Douglas's  own  colleague,  Breeseof  Illinois.  Breese 
had  been  somewhat  cold  toward  the  scheme  and  had 
apparently  been  an  advocate  of  the  original  group 
of  railway  promoters  headed  by  Holbrook,  who  had 
sought  to  secure  a  preemption  privilege  at  $1.25  per 
acre.  Douglas  had  already  sounded  Breese  during 
the  summer,  but  had  found  him  in  favor  of  the 
Holbrook  scheme.  Breese,  however,  had  become 
convinced  that  he  could  not  afford  to  exhibit 
undue  partiality  toward  Holbrook,  and  he  there 
fore  reported  both  bills  from  the  Committee  on 
Public  Lands.  Douglas,  in  spite  of  the  opposi 
tion  of  his  colleague,  which  was  manifest  in  a  sub 
dued  way,  succeeded  in  forcing  his  measure  through 
the  Senate  but  without  effect,  for  near  the  end  of  the 
session  the  house  laid  it  on  the  table  by  a  small  vote. 
The  opposition  was  partly  due  to  the  hostility  of 
the  Southern  states,  but  other  states  which  had 
no  public  lauds  cooperated  in  antagonizing  it. 
1  Sheahan,  Life,  p.  368.  2  Johnson,  ante  cit.,  p.  170. 


THE  ILLINOIS  CENTEAL  EAILEOAD     115 

Douglas  had  already  told  the  Chicago  men  who 
were  backing  the  scheme,  that  the  votes  of  other 
portions  of  the  country  would  have  to  be  secured,1 
and  he  now  proceeded  to  make  practical  use  of  an 
idea  which  had  been  neglected  by  other  advocates 
of  the  plan  and  which  he  himself  had  not  had  the 
time  to  follow  up.  He  believed  that  by  forming  an 
alliance  with  defunct  or  embarrassed  railroad 
schemes  in  the  Southern  territory  which  the  new 
road  was  to  penetrate,  or  with  which  it  was  to  connect 
he  would  be  able  to  bring  about  a  diversion  in  Con 
gress  which  would  give  him  the  votes  he  required. 
The  enterprise  that  he  selected  for  the  negotiation 
was  the  so-called  Mobile  Eailroad.  In  the  course 
of  a  visit  to  the  plantation  owned  by  his  children, 
he  went  by  a  circuitous  route  to  Mobile,  and  there 
he  arranged  a  scheme  which  would  result  in  a 
public  land  grant  to  the  Mobile  Eailway,  simultane 
ous  with  that  to  the  Illinois  Central,  the  votes  of 
the  advocates  of  both  schemes  being  cast  en  bloc. 

With  this  clever  "  deal  "  arranged,  Douglas  rein- 
troduced  his  bill  in  December,  1849.  Breese  was 
now  out  of  Congress  and  had  been  succeeded  by 
Shields.  Douglas,  Shields,  and  the  House  delega 
tion  jointly  drafted  the  measure  and  proceeded  to 
push  it.  It  was  made  public  in  January,  1850,  but 
the  pressure  of  the  slavery  question  and  the  legisla 
tion  relating  thereto  greatly  hampered  its  progress. 

1 A  letter  written  by  Douglas  to  Breese  and  published  in  the 
Illinois  State  Register  January  20,  1851,  is  relied  Upon  to  prove 
this  point.  See  Johnson,  Life,  p.  170. 


116  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Enough  was  done,  however,  to  make  it  evident  that 
if  any  bill  could  be  passed,  it  would  be  the  Douglas 
bill  and  not  that  of  the  rival  group  of  promoters. 
Eecogniziug  their  defeat,  the  Holbrook  politicians 
and  boomers  hastened  back  to  Illinois  and  there 
"by  the  most  dexterous  management"  succeeded 
in  inducing  the  legislature  to  pledge  them  any  lands 
which  might  in  future  be  granted  by  Congress  to 
the  state  for  the  construction  of  the  Illinois  Central 
Railroad.1  This  apparently  blocked  Douglas's 
further  progress,  for  the  latest  bill,  which  had  been 
approved  by  all  of  the  Illinois  members,  now 
provided  solely  for  a  single  road — the  Illinois 
Central.  The  scheme  had  undoubtedly  been 
cleverly  managed  and  there  was  the  usual  igno 
rance  as  to  the  methods  by  which  Douglas  and 
his  political  followers  had  been  outinauo3uvred.2 
However  it  had  been  done,  no  further  progress 
could  be  made.  It  was  evident,  therefore,  that  a 
coup  would  be  necessary.  Boldly  sending  for  Hol 
brook,  the  head  of  the  rival  group  of  boomers,  Doug 
las  now  threatened  him  with  publicity  and  the  abso 
lute  ruin  of  his  whole  scheme  unless  he  should  assign 
every  right  and  claim  to  congressional  land  grants. 
This  release  was  to  be  made  in  favor  of  the  state  of 
Illinois.  The  facts  as  to  Holbrook' s  machinations 
had  apparently  not  become  well  known,  and  had 
only  been  discovered  by  Douglas  in  the  course  of  a 

^Sheahan,  Life,  p.  369. 

9  Moses,  Illinois  Historical  and  Statistical,  Fergus  Printing  Co., 
1889,  Vol.  II,  p.  574. 


THE  ILLINOIS  CENTRAL  EAILEOAD     117 

visit  to  Springfield  in  which  he  had  happened  to 
look  into  the  text  of  a  measure  wherein  the  clause 
conveying  the  grant  had  been  concealed.  Holbrook 
became  convinced  that,  with  Douglas  on  guard  at 
Washington,  he  could  hope  for  nothing  and  being 
averse  to  the  threatened  publicity,  he  resolved  to 
yield.  He  executed  the  desired  release,  which  was 
then  forwarded  to  Springfield  and  filed  with  the 
public  papers.  Satisfied  on  this  point,  Douglas 
pushed  on  with  his  effort  to  pass  the  measure. 

The  bill,  whatever  the  inspiring  motive,  now  at 
least  presented  the  appearance  of  a  grand  conception 
— a  line  from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  Gulf.  There 
was  the  same  reason  for  acting  in  the  matter  that 
existed  in  the  case  of  the  Pacific  railways,  and  in 
addition  there  was  the  argument  that  by  enabling 
the  construction  of  this  road,  Congress  would  con 
nect  the  Middle  West  with  the  South  and  Southwest 
in  a  way  never  before  possible.  A  good  deal  of 
shrewd  political  bargaining  was  still  necessary. 
Votes  must  be  conciliated  in  the  Eastern  states,  and 
appear  to  have  been  gained  by  promises  either  of 
tariff  changes  or  aid  in  securing  such  changes,  by 
glowing  predictions  of  the  benefits  to  come  to  East 
ern  roads  by  reason  of  the  connection  at  Chicago 
with  the  Illinois  Central  and  in  other  ways.  In  the 
South  votes  were  obtained  by  urging  the  advantages 
that  would  accrue  to  that  section  in  the  shape  of 
quick  and  cheap  transportation,  while  the  interven 
ing  states  without  public  lauds  almost  inevitably 
drew  to  the  side  of  the  plan,  as  they  realized  the 


118  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

benefits  that  were  likely  to  be  gained  from  the  con 
struction  of  a  road  which  would  cost  them  nothing. 
The  outcome  of  all  this  trafficking  was  clearly  seen 
when  the  vote  was  taken  on  April  29th  in  the 
Senate,  where  the  measure  passed  twenty-six  to 
fourteen.  It  subsequently  went  through  the  House 
on  the  17th  of  September  by  a  vote  of  101  to 
seventy-five.  The  result  showed  that  Douglas  had 
been  unerring  in  his  forecast  of  the  support  he  could 
get  by  his  manoeuvring,  for  he  had  won  over 
nearly  twenty  votes,  which  would  otherwise  have 
been  against  him  and  would  have  sufficed  to  defeat 
the  measure  ignominiously.  Running  through  the 
debate  were  the  usual  florid  utterances  and  the 
familiar  vague  prophecies  of  untold  wealth  and 
enormous  commercial  expansion  to  follow  from  the 
new  enterprise. 

The  bill,  however,  had  been  passed  and  Chicago, 
the  place  of  Douglas's  new-made  investments,  was 
duly  appreciative,  offering  to  the  two  senators  the 
customary  i  l  ovation. ' '  Work  was  immediately  be 
gun  and  the  road  shortly  proved  successful  in  many 
ways.  The  growth  of  Chicago  was  already  in  prog 
ress  and  Douglas's  property  was  advancing  in  value. 
He  profited  materially  from  the  development  he  had 
helped  to  bring  about.1  In  his  later  political  career 

1  Forney,  A  necdotes  ofPuUic  Men,  p.  20,  seems  to  feel  that  Doug 
las's  work  was  not  appreciated  :  "  I  say  I  could  not  help  .  .  . 
drawing  the  contrast  between  the  vital  and  vigorous  champion 
ship  of  Douglas  iu  this  stupendous  work  and  the  studied  neg 
lect  of  his  memory  by  those  who  have  profited  by  it.  After 
passing  through  the  magnificent  depot  [Chicago]  and  the  ad- 


THE  ILLINOIS  CENTRAL  RAILROAD     119 

he  received  many  favors  from  the  Illinois  Central 
Kailroad,  while  the  increased  cost  of  political 
campaigning,  which  had  to  be  met  in  1858  from  the 
candidate's  own  resources,  was  paid  out  of  a  fund  of 
$80,000  borrowed  by  Douglas  on  the  strength  of  his 
land  holdings  in  or  near  Chicago.  More  than  this 
had  been  borrowed  by  him  at  one  time  or  another, 
but  the  fact  that  at  a  critical  period  he  could  secure 
so  much  upon  his  real  estate  shows  how  largely  he 
had  profited  from  the  commercial  growth  of  the 
city,  now  to  be  promoted  by  the  construction  of  the 
railway  and  later  by  the  development  of  trade 
which  followed  the  completion  of  the  work.1 
Douglas,  moreover,  in  connection  with  the  Illinois 
Central  scheme,  acquired  a  considerable  degree  of 
personal  popularity  with  many  of  his  constituents, 
and  undoubtedly  was  well  rewarded  for  all  that  he 
had  attempted  while  in  Washington  by  the  growth  of 
his  prestige  among  business  men. 

Douglas's  experience  with  the  Illinois  Central 
now  practically  committed  him  to  the  advocacy 
of  similar  schemes  in  all  directions.  A  certain 
degree  of  consistency  is  necessary  in  public  life,  and 

jacent  buildings,  I  said  to  an  employee,  '  Who  owns  the  most 
stock  in  the  Illinois  Central?  '  '  Indeed  I  do  not  know,  sir,'  was 
his  reply.  '  Well,  my  friend,  I  think  the  man  who  ought  to 
own  the  most  of  it,  and  whose  children  should  be  most  benefited 
by  it,  was  Stephen  A.  Douglas.'  I  think  the  man  may  have 
heard  of  Douglas,  but,  it  was  clear  to  me,  from  his  look,  that  he 
thought  I  was  a  lunatic/' 

1  Tho  details  about  Douglas's  use  of  these  funds  are  supplied 
by  Horace  Greeley,  Century  Magazine,  July,  1891,  p.  375, 
quoted  by  Rhodes  (with  approval).  History,  Vol.  II,  p.  338. 


120  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

it  was  the  more  requisite  iu  this  instance  because  of 
the  bargains  that  had  been  made  for  votes  during 
the  struggle  in  behalf  of  this  railroad.  Douglas 
could  not  very  well  refuse  his  aid,  or  at  least  his 
countenance  to  the  advocates  of  any  proposed  land 
grant  that  had  the  color  of  legitimacy,  when  only  a 
short  time  before  he  had  relied  for  support  in  be 
half  of  his  own  project  upon  the  votes  of  these  same 
men  or  their  immediate  predecessors.  In  con 
sequence,  during  the  decade  of  his  greatest  prestige 
and  prominence,  he  found  himself  constantly  obliged 
to  lend  his  favor  to  land  grant  propositions  and  in 
this  way  paid  a  heavy  price  for  the  aid  he  had  ob 
tained  for  the  Illinois  Central.  Particularly  in  the 
Southwest  was  the  pressure  strongly  felt,  for  this 
was  the  region  to  which  Douglas  had  first  ap 
pealed.  He  found  himself  obliged  to  vote  at  one 
time  or  another  for  land  grant  bills  covering  public 
property  in  Alabama,  Mississippi,  Louisiana, 
Arkansas  and  Missouri.  From  the  middle  western 
states,  to  which  appeal  had  also  been  made,  came 
similar  pressure,  and  Douglas  was  compelled  to 
vote  in  behalf  of  schemes  affecting  Iowa,  Michigan, 
Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  and  possibly  others.1 

The  most  important  subsequent  development  of 
Douglas's  economic  policy  was  seen,  however,  in 
his  promotion  of  the  Pacific  railway  movement. 
He  was  strongly  actuated  in  this  connection  by  the 
stand  he  had  previously  taken  on  the  subject  of  the 

1  Sheahan,  Life,  p.  371,  summarizes  these  projects  very 
briefly. 


THE  ILLINOIS  CENTRAL  EAILEOAD     121 

Illinois  Central,  although  the  influence  here  was 
less  specialized  than  had  been  the  case  with  the 
smaller  land  grants.  Having  accepted  the  general 
idea  of  national  aid  to  great  through  routes  de 
signed  to  connect  distant  parts  of  the  country  with 
one  another,  and  thereby  to  help  in  abolishing  sec 
tionalism,  he  could  not  turn  a  deaf  ear  to  similar 
pleas.  Morever,  as  time  passed,  it  became  plain 
that  a  western  outlet  for  the  commerce  of  Chicago 
would  be  quite  as  desirable  as  a  southern  trunk  line. 
All  of  these  considerations  shaped  his  subsequent 
policy.  When  the  Nebraska  bill  was  in  process  of 
passage  in  the  Senate,  Douglas  materially  modified 
its  form l  in  order  to  assure,  if  possible,  a  central 
route  for  the  proposed  railway  to  the  coast.2  In 
connection  with  the  Pacific  Eailroad  legislation  it 
self,  Douglas  early  committed  himself  to  a  favorable 
attitude,  and  went  so  far  as  to  recognize  and  ap 
prove  not  one  but  three  routes  which  later  became 
substantially  the  lines  across  the  continent.  "While, 
however,  thus  endorsing  the  scheme  and  occasion 
ally  making  a  declaration  in  favor  of  the  general 
idea,  Douglas  never  allowed  himself  to  become  an 
active  promoter  of  these  particular  projects.  The 
utmost  that  he  did  was  to  speak  strongly  in  the 
Senate  on  April  17,  1858,  in  favor  of  the  Pacific 
Eailroad  measure,  providing  that  whenever  a  sec 
tion  of  the  road  should  be  completed,  the  govern 
ment  might  advance  a  certain  amount  of  land  and 
$12,500  per  mile  in  bonds  in  order  to  enable  the 
1  Infra,  p.  193  n.,  etc.  2  Sheahan,  Life,  p.  372. 


122  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

company  to  construct  the  next  section.  He  then 
presented1  the  stereotyped  arguments  in  favor  of 
government  aid  to  trunk-line  railroads,  urging  the 
desirability  of  such  roads  for  the  transportation  of 
military  equipment  in  time  of  war,  as  economical 
avenues  over  which  to  carry  the  mails,  as  means  of 
uniting  the  country  in  its  various  parts,  and  on 
other  grounds.  In  this  speech  he  perhaps  gave  the 
most  accurate  and  clear-cut  expression  of  his  phi 
losophy  with  reference  to  the  support  of  internal 
improvements  by  the  Federal  government.  ' t  Some 
gentlemen,"  he  said,  "  think  it  is  an  unsound  policy 
leading  to  the  doctrine  of  internal  improvements  by 
the  Federal  government  within  the  different  states 
of  the  Union.  We  are  told  we  must  confine  the 
road  to  the  limits  of  the  territories,  and  not  extend 
it  into  the  states,  because  it  is  supposed  that  enter 
ing  a  state  with  this  contract  violates  some  great 
principle  of  state  rights.  Mr.  President,  the  com 
mittee  considered  that  proposition  and  they  avoided 
that  objection  in  the  estimation  of  the  most  strict, 
rigid,  tight-laced  states'  rights  men  that  we  have  in 
the  body.  We  struck  out  the  provision  in  the  bill 
first  drawn,  that  the  President  should  contract  for 
the  construction  of  a  railroad  from  the  Missouri 
River  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  followed  an  ex 
ample  that  we  found  on  the  statute  book  for  carry 
ing  the  mails  from  Alexandria  to  Eichmond,  Va.,— 
an  act  passed  about  the  time  when  the  resolutions  of 
1798  were  passed,  and  the  report  of  1799  was  adopted 

1  Congressional  Globe,  1st  Sess.,  35th  Cong.,  pp.  1643  etfwq. 


THE  ILLINOIS  CENTEAL  EAILEOAD     123 

— an  act  that  we  thought  came  exactly  within  the 
spirit  of  those  resolutions.  That  act,  according 
to  my  recollection,  was,  that  the  department  be 
authorized  to  contract  for  the  transportation  of  the 
United  States  mail  by  four-horse  post-coaches,  with 
closed  backs,  so  as  to  protect  it  from  the  weather 
and  rain,  from  Alexandria  to  Eichmond,  in  the 
state  of  Virginia.  It  occurred  to  this  committee 
that  if  it  had  been  the  custom,  from  the  beginning 
of  this  government  to  this  day,  to  make  contracts  for 
the  transportation  of  the  mails,  in  four-horse  post- 
coaches,  built  in  a  particular  manner,  and  the  con 
tractor  left  to  furnish  his  own  coaches  and  his  own 
horses,  and  his  own  means  of  transportation,  we 
might  make  a  similar  contract  for  the  transporta 
tion  of  the  mails  by  railroad  from  one  point  to  an 
other,  leaving  the  contractor  to  make  his  own  rail 
road,  and  furnish  his  own  cars,  and  comply  with 
the  terms  of  the  contract."  l 

The  superficial  point  of  view  which  could  draw 
this  analogy  might  perhaps  be  attributed  to  the  en 
tire  lack  of  understanding  of  the  position  of  rail 
roads  as  common  carriers,  characteristic  of  most 
public  men  at  the  time  this  speech  was  delivered. 
It  is  difficult,  however,  to  find  anywhere  in  Doug 
las's  speeches  or  writings  a  satisfactory  reconcilia 
tion  of  his  idea  of  government  subsidies  to  private 
enterprises  with  the  general  philosophy  of  laissez 
faire  and  government  non-interference,  which  is 
the  controlling  note  in  all  of  his  other  utterances. 

1  Globe. 


124  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Taken  as  a  whole,  it  must  be  admitted  that  Doug 
las's  career  exhibits  in  the  case  of  his  pro-subsidy 
tendencies,  one  of  those  singular  inconsistencies 
which  must  be  ascribed  to  the  direct  pressure  of 
immediate  political  or  private  interests  upon  the 
general  trend  of  a  public  man's  life. 

With  the  acceptance  of  so  extensive  and  impor 
tant  a  general  policy  as  that  of  government  aid  to 
trunk-line  railroads,  it  was  probably  not  hard  for 
Douglas  to  unite  a  theory  or  policy  of  conduct 
which  would  permit  him  to  work  steadily  and  con 
sistently  for  the  usual  petty  distribution  of  public 
money  involved  in  excessive  river  and  harbor  ap 
propriations.  Douglas  was  one  of  the  original  ad 
vocates  of  "systematic"  river  and  harbor  im 
provement.  Sheahan  admits  that  he  voted  pretty 
generally  for  ' '  all  the  river  and  harbor  appropria 
tion  bills"  although  he  always  protested  "  against 
such  items,  as  were  included  in  them,  that  did  not 
come  up  to  his  idea  of  justice  or  propriety. ' '  Never 
theless,  as  a  result  of  this  policy  he  was  "  often 
compelled  to  vote  for  a  number  of  small  appropria 
tions  for  what  he  deemed  inappropriate  works."  1 
It  was  a  remarkable  fact  that,  in  order  to  get  rid  of 
the  system  of  log-rolling,  whose  evils  he  plainly  saw, 
he  urged  a  striking,  though  wholly  impossible,  plan 
which  if  adopted  would  have  largely  changed  the 
development  of  one  of  our  present  chief  items  of 
Federal  expenditure.  In  1852  he  suggested  that 
three  sections  be  added  to  the  Eiver  and  Harbor 
1  Sheahan,  Life,  p.  355. 


THE  ILLINOIS  CENTEAL  EAILEOAD     125 

Bill,  whereby  the  consent  of  Congress  would  be 
granted  to  the  several  states,  and  might  by  the  lat 
ter  be  granted  to  their  various  municipalities,  to 
levy  a  tonnage  tax  of  not  over  ten  cents  per  ton  upon 
vessels  entering  the  local  harbors,  such  tonnage  tax 
to  be  used  in  improving  the  harbors  and  the  rivers 
and  channels  connected  therewith.  This  scheme 
was  an  evident  recognition  of  the  inconsistency  of 
the  then  extending  river  and  harbor  policy  with  the 
general  policy  of  states'  rights  and  was  advocated 
distinctly  on  that  ground.  So  earnestly  did  Doug 
las  believe  in  the  practicability  of  the  plan  that 
he  spoke  on  the  floor  of  Congress  in  its  favor,  dis 
cussing  the  constitutional  phases  of  the  issue,  while 
later  he  sent  to  the  governor  of  Illinois  under  date 
of  January  2,  1854, 1  a  letter  in  which  he  sought 
to  vindicate  his  attitude.  In  this  letter  he  took 
the  view  that  by  adopting  his  plan,  commercial 
competition  would  automatically  develop  those 
harbors  and  channels  which  were  of  service  to 
commerce  in  a  way  that  was  not  possible  under 
the  system  of  artificial  Federal  aid.  The  notion 
was  unmistakably  a  product  of  restlessness  and 
discontent  with  the  idea  of  Federal  assistance,  but 
can  hardly  be  looked  upon  very  seriously,  since  it 
was  never  proposed  as  a  substitute  for  the  river 
and  harbor  appropriations, — merely  as  an  addition 
thereto. 

The  record  of  Douglas  regarding  Federal  aid  to 
internal  improvements  must  thus  in  all  its  aspects 

1  Text  given  by  Sheahan.  Life,  p.  358  ff. 


126  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

be  considered  strikingly  inharmonious  with  his  gen 
eral  philosophy. 

It  is  significant  of  his  point  of  view  that,  notwith 
standing  the  prominence  he  speedily  attained  in  the 
Senate,  Douglas  took  little  or  no  part  in  the  discus 
sion  of  the  more  important  economic  questions  then 
pressing  upon  the  attention  of  Congress.  The  tariff 
issue,  which  had  been  a  fundamental  problem  with 
the  Democrats  for  many  years,  did  not  appeal  to 
him,  though  he  favored  reciprocity  with  Canada  in 
1850-1851. l  True,  when  the  question  came  up  in 
1857,  he  undertook  to  express  some  views  on  the 
subject,  but  only  with  an  unaccustomed  reservation 
to  the  effect  that  he  knew  little  or  nothing  about  the 
issue.2  That  this  modest  statement  was  correct,  was 
speedily  demonstrated  in  his  analysis  of  the  ques 
tion,  as  it  then  presented  itself.  He  took  the  point 
of  view  that  the  question  was  essentially  a  matter  of 
expediency,  and  that  the  framing  of  a  tariff  bill  was 
therefore  simply  a  problem  of  adjustments,  so  as  to 
bring  about  an  equality  of  burden  upon  different 
"  classes "  in  the  community.  Some  ideas  of  an 
unusually  liberal  character,  however,  were  ex 
pressed  by  Douglas  in  connection  with  the  tariff 
issue.  He  in  1857  secured  the  adoption  of  ati 
amendment  to  the  tariff  act s  of  that  year,  making 
wool  worth  less  than  twenty  cents  free ;  advocated 
the  free  admission  of  works  of  art,  and  in  certain 

1  Cutts,  Constitutional  and  Party  Questions,  pp.  205-206. 

8  Congressional  Globe,  34th  Cong.,  3d  Sees.,  p.  353. 

3  Stanwood,  American  Tariff  Controversies,  Vol.  II,  p.  108. 


THE  ILLINOIS  CENTRAL  EAILEOAD     127 

other  respects  appeared  to  be  decidedly  in  advance 
of  the  narrow,  materialistic  views  on  the  question  of 
customs  which  then  controlled  men  of  far  broader 
opportunities  for  early  education. 


CHAPTEE  VII 

ON  THE  SENATE  THRESHOLD 

THE  chief  work  of  Douglas's  life  was  now  to  be 
begun.  Up  to  the  time  of  his  entry  into  the  Senate, 
his  activities  in  national  affairs  had  been  of  com 
paratively  slender  importance  when  viewed  from 
the  historical  standpoint.  Although  a  useful  party 
man,  already  recognized  as  exceptionally  effective 
in  debate,  not  overscrupulous,  and  placing  the 
progress  of  his  party  as  well  as  the  development  of 
his  own  personal  fortunes  decidedly  ahead  of  con 
siderations  of  abstract  ethics,  there  are  probably  few, 
if  any,  who  would  consider  Douglas  more  than  an 
interesting  figure  in  the  early  history  of  Illinois,  had 
his  life  been  cut  short  at  the  time  of  his  election  to 
the  Senate,  or  even  within  the  first  two  years  of  his 
membership  in  that  body. 

This,  however,  was  not  to  be.  The  ten  years  fol 
lowing  his  entry  into  the  upper  house  of  Congress 
were  to  form  perhaps  the  most  critical  decade  in  the 
history  of  the  United  States  under  the  Constitution, 
and  in  this  critical  period  Douglas  was  to  play  one 
of  the  leading  roles. l 

1  For  Douglas's  personal  appearance  and  for  the  impressions 
of  contemporaries  regarding  the  man  at  the  time  of  his  most 


ON  THE  SENATE  THRESHOLD        129 

The  body  of  which  Douglas  was  now  a  member 
was  the  greatest  forum  which  the  country  presented. 
At  that  time,  the  Senate  had  not  become  hopelessly 
crippled  by  purely  machine  control,  nor  had  it 
fallen  a  prey  to  the  influence  of  special  business  in 
terests.  It  was  a  wide  field  of  open  debate  in 
which  large  personalities  moved  across  the  stage 
with  decided  freedom.  Great  forces  were  at  work 
there  and  the  traditions  of  the  body  were,  on  the 
whole,  high.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  dom 
inating  influences  operative  among  the  different 
groups  in  the  Senate,  it  is  a  fact  that  they  were,  at 
all  events,  political  and  not  commercial  groups. 
Douglas's  entry  upon  this  first-class  field  for  the 
display  of  his  capacity  was  particularly  auspicious. 
Webster,  Clay  and  Calhoun  were  shortly  to  pass 
out.  Seward,  Chase  and  Sumner  had  not  yet  at 
tained  their  full  promise  and  were  busy  during  the 
early  fifties  in  organizing  their  great  party.  Morse 
says  that  the  period  from  1852  to  1860  "  belonged  to 

conspicuous  service  in  national  political  life,  several  sources  of 
considerable  value  may  be  mentioned.  The  Washington  corre 
spondence  of  the  New  York  Tribune  gives  in  the  main  a  sub 
stantially  correct  picture  of  Douglas's  appearance  on  the  floor 
from  day  to  day  under  varying  conditions.  Clark  E.  Carr,  in 
his  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  embodies  in  his  sketch  of  Douglas's  life 
a  considerable  number  of  impressions  as  received  by  contempo 
raries,  including  his  own  views.  Mrs.  Stowe,  in  a  letter  pub 
lished  in  the  New  York  Independent,  has  given  a  graphic  pic 
ture  of  the  man,  and  for  the  later  period  of  his  career  Schurz 
and  Villard  (Sohnrz's  fieminiscenc.es,  and  Villard's  Memoirs) 
are  among  the  most  recent  and  probably  the  most  trust 
worthy  sources  of  information.  Rhodes  (History  of  the  United 
States),  drawing  heavily  upon  contemporary  periodical  material, 
adds  valuable  touches  here  and  there. 


130  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Douglas  more  than  to  any  other  man."  *  And  the 
judgment  thus  expressed  is  obviously  true.  Upon 
his  coming  into  the  Senate  he  was  not  so  much 
overslaughed,  as  to  make  necessary  a  long  period 
of  apprenticeship  ere  he  could  gain  the  permission 
of  some  masterful  leader  to  appear  in  debate,  nor 
was  the  Senate  so  lacking  in  organization  as  to  pre 
vent  the  recognition  of  ability  when  it  was  ex 
hibited.  Fortunate  thus  in  the  personnel  of  his 
colleagues,  he  was  doubly  fortunate  in  the  charac 
ter  of  the  themes  by  which  he  was  confronted. 
There  have  been  times  in  the  history  of  the  United 
States  Senate  when  tjie  character  of  the  topics  de 
manding  attention  has  been  such  as  to  stifle  ambi 
tion,  but  during  the  decade  'after  Douglas's  entry, 
hardly  a  subject  that  was  dealt  with  failed  to  touch 
the  nation's  life  in  its  innermost  cells.  There  was 
not  an  action,  not  a  sentence  spoken  by  a  member 
on  the  floor,  not  a  committee  appointment  that 
might  not  have  unlooked-for  and  far-reaching  in 
fluence.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  Douglas 
seemed  to  have  but  a  limited  conception  of  the  tre 
mendous  tasks  to  which  he  was  now  to  set  his  hand. 

1  Morse,  Abraham  Lincoln,  American  Statesmen  Series,  1899, 
Vol.  I,  p.  106.  "From  1852  to  1860  Douglas  was  the  most 
noteworthy  man  in  public  life  in  the  country.  Webster,  Clay 
and  Calhoun  had  passed  away.  Seward,  Chase,  and  Sumner, 
still  in  the  earlier  stages  of  their  brilliant  careers,  were  organiz 
ing  the  great  party  of  the  future.  This  interval  of  eight  years 
belonged  to  Douglas  more  than  to  any  other  man.  He  had 
been  a  candidate  for  the  Democratic  nomination  for  the  presi 
dency  in  1852  and  again  in  1856  ;  and  had  failed  to  secure  it  in 
part  by  reason  of  that  unwritten  rule  whereby  the  leading 
statesmen  are  so  often  passed  over.  .  ." 


ON  THE  SENATE  THRESHOLD        131 

Calm,  self-assured,  arrogant  in  the  political  success 
which  had  hitherto  attended  his  every  movement, 
he  regarded  the  future  with  no  kind  of  apprehen 
sion.1 

The  portrait  of  Douglas  during  his  earlier  years 
in  the  United  States  Senate  has  been  drawn  by 
many  hands  and  with  substantial  similarity  of 
lines.  It  grew  more  and  more  distinct  as  time  went 
on,  until  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War  there  was 
no  man,  not  even  excepting  Lincoln,  whose  traits  of 
character  were  more  deeply  graven  upon  the  popu 
lar  imagination.  "He  had  high  spirit,  was  ambi 
tious,  masterful,  and  self-confident,"  says  Mr. 
Morse;  " he  was  also  an  aggressive,  brilliant,  and 
tireless  fighter  in  a  political  campaign,  an  orator 
combining  something  of  the  impressiveness  of  Web 
ster  with  the  readiness  and  roughness  of  the  stump 
speaker.  He  had  a  thorough  familiarity  with  all 
the  politics,  both  the  greater  and  the  smaller,  of  the 
times ;  he  was  shrewd  and  adroit  as  a  politician, 
and  he  had  as  good  a  right  as  any  man  then  promi 
nent  in  public  life  to  the  more  dignified  title  of 
statesman.  He  had  the  art  of  popularity  and  upon 


1  "Precocious  in  youth,  marvelously  active  in  manhood,  he 
had  learned  without  study,  resolved  without  meditation,  ac 
complished  without  toil,"  says  William  Garrott  Brown. 
"Whatever  obstacles  he  had  found  in  his  path,  he  had  either 
adroitly  avoided  them  or  boldly  overleaped  them,  but  never 
laboriously  uprooted  them.  Whatever  subject  he  had  taken  in 
hand,  he  had  swiftly  compassed  it,  but  rarely  probed  to  the 
heart  of  it.  ...  His  habits  were  convivial,  and  the  vicious 
indulgences  of  his  strong  and  masculine  appetites  had  caused 
him  frequent  illnesses." 


132  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

sufficient  occasion  could  be  supple  and  accommodat 
ing  even  in  the  gravest  matters  of  principle."  l 

Douglas  was  now  at  an  age  when  his  faculties 
were  in  full  vigor  and  when  his  physical  appear 
ance  had  taken  on  the  aspect  of  maturity.  He  had 
been  born  in  1813  and  upon  his  entry  into  the  Sen 
ate  in  1847  he  was  therefore  barely  thirty-five  years 
old.  The  epithet  of  " Little  Giant,"  which  had 
been  bestowed  upon  him  by  his  affectionate  fol 
lowers,  had  been  retained  and  with  the  lapse  of 
years  had  become  a  more  and  more  suitable  descrip 
tion  of  the  young  politician.2  In  form  he  was  now 
an  exceedingly  short,  thick-set  man,  full  of  vitality 
and  with  remarkable  energy.  Mrs.  Stowe  in  1856 
saw  him  probably  at  his  best  and  vividly  described 
his  good  points  as  well  as  those  in  which  he  was  less 
favored.  "This  Douglas,"  she  wrote,  unable  alto 
gether  to  suppress  her  antagonism,  "is  the  very 
ideal  of  vitality.  Short,  broad  and  thick-set,  every 
inch  of  him  has  its  own  alertness  and  motion.  He 

1  Morse,  ante  cit. 

'Forney,  Anecdotes  of  Public  Men,  p.  146,  describes  him  as 
follows:  "No  character,  certainly  no  candidate  for  our  highest 
office,  was  a  completer  master  of  the  gift  of  securing  tenacious 
friends  than  Stephen  A.  Douglas.  He  had  scarcely  touched  the 
floor  of  Congress  before  he  became  an  object  of  interest.  His 
extreme  youth,  his  boyish  appearance,  his  ready  wit,  his  fine 
memory,  his  native  rhetoric,  above  all,  his  suavity  and  hearti 
ness,  made  him  a  favorite  long  before  he  was  named  for  Presi 
dent.  He  delighted  in  pleasant  company.  Unused  to  what  is 
called  '  etiquette, '  he  soon  adapted  himself  to  its  rules,  and 
took  rank  in  the  dazzling  society  of  the  capital.  Many  a  time 
have  I  watched  him  leading  in  the  keen  encounters  of  the 
bright  intellects  around  the  festive  board.  To  see  him  thread 
ing  the  glittering  crowd  with  a  pleasant  smile  or  a  kind  word 


ON  THE  SENATE  THEESHOLD        133 

has  a  good  head  and  face,  thick  black  hair,  heavy 
black  brows  and  a  keen  eye.  His  figure  would  be 
an  unfortunate  one  were  it  not  for  the  animation 
which  constantly  pervades  it ;  as  it  is,  it  rather 
gives  poignancy  to  his  peculiar  appearance  ;  he  has 
a  small,  handsome  hand,  moreover,  and  a  graceful 
as  well  as  forcible  mode  of  using  it.  .  .  ."  De 
spite  his  l  i  unfortunate '  >  figure  and  his  lowness  of 
stature,  there  is  every  evidence  that  Douglas's  per 
sonality  made  a  strong,  vivid  impression  upon  all  of 
those  with  whom  he  came  into  contact.  He  was  not 
one  of  the  vague,  shadowy  personalities  so  hard  to 
bring  out  in  clear  traits  even  when  the  mind  that 
has  been  at  work  has  left  its  mark  upon  history. 
Indeed,  from  the  beginning  of  his  mature  manhood, 
the  physical  force,  energy  and  effectiveness  of 
Douglas  were  superior  in  their  effect  upon  contem 
poraries  to  the  mere  weight  of  his  argument  or  the 
skill  of  its  presentation. 

Douglas,  however,  had  never  made  up  for  the 

for  everybody,  one  would  have  taken  him  for  a  trained  courtier. 
But  he  was  more  at  home  in  the  close  and  exciting  thicket  of 
men.  That  was  his  element.  To  call  each  one  by  name,  some 
times  by  his  Christian  name ;  to  stand  in  the  centre  of  a  listen 
ing  throng,  while  he  told  some  Western  story  or  defended  some 
public  measure  ;  to  exchange  jokes  with  a  political  adversary  ; 
or,  ascending  the  rostrum,  to  hold  thousands  spellbound  for 
hours,  as  he  poured  forth  torrents  of  characteristic  eloquence — 
these  were  traits  that  raised  up  for  him  hosts  who  were  ready 
to  fight  for  him.  Eminent  men  did  not  hesitate  to  take  their 
stand  under  the  Douglas  flag.  Riper  scholars  than  himself, 
older  if  not  better  statesmen,  frankly  acknowledged  his  leader 
ship  and  faithfully  followed  his  fortunes." 

1  Quoted  in  Rhodes,  Vol.  II,  p.  128,  from  New  York  Independ 
ent,  May  1,  1856. 


134  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

lack  of  a  cultivated  and  gentle  early  environment. 
Some  of  the  formative  years  of  his  life  had  been 
spent  on  the  frontier  in  the  small  country  town 
where  his  chief  forum  of  expression  was  the  corner 
grocery,  the  saloon,  or  at  best  the  dirty  court  room. 
The  necessity  of  the  most  grinding  economy  during 
his  earlier  years  had  left  its  mark  upon  him,  even 
though  this  had  been  partially  erased  by  his  subse 
quent  prosperity.  As  he  had  increased  in  wealth, 
he  had  hardly  increased  correspondingly  in  its 
judicious  use.  He  spent  much  money  upon  rather 
dapper  clothing  and  was  inclined  to  be  lavish  in 
social  entertainment.  On  dissipation  of  various 
kinds  he  perhaps  spent  most  freely  of  all.  But  the 
greatest  lack  in  Douglas's  personal  equipment  was 
the  absence  of  dignity.  Carl  Schurz,  no  friend  to 
Douglas  or  what  he  represented,  recognized  the  es 
sential  parliamentary  ability  of  the  man  but  could 
not  condone  the  personal  characteristics  in  which  it 
was  enveloped.  l '  There  was  something  in  his  man 
ner,"  wrote  Schurz,  "  which  strongly  smacked  of  the 
bar-room.  He  was  the  idol  of  the  rough  element  of 
his  party,  and  his  convivial  association  with  that 
element  left  its  unmistakable  imprint  upon  his  hab 
its  and  his  deportment.  He  would  sometimes  of 
fend  the  dignity  of  the  Senate  by  astonishing  con 
duct.  Once  at  a  night  session  of  the  Senate  I  saw 
him,  after  a  boisterous  speech,  throw  himself  upon 
the  lap  of  a  brother  senator  and  loll  there,  talking 
and  laughing,  for  ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  with  his 
arm  around  the  neck  of  his  friend,  who  seemed  to 


ON  THE  SENATE  THEESHOLD         135 

be  painfully  embarrassed  but  could  or  would  not 
shake  him  off." 

The  same  view  which  had  impressed  itself  upon 
the  mind  of  Schurz  had  also  presented  itself  from  a 
somewhat  different  angle  of  vision  to  another  more 
critical,  though  possibly  less  sincere  and  single- 
minded  observer.  Edwin  L.  Godkin,  keen  critic  as 
he  was  of  men  and  events,  spoke  cuttingly  in  1858 
of  some  of  the  same  things  which  had  offended 
Schurz,  in  a  letter  from  Washington,  written  while 
Douglas  was  at  the  height  of  his  prestige.  "He 
is  a  model  demagogue,'7  said  Mr.  Godkin.  "He 
is  vulgar  in  his  habits  and  vulgar  in  his  ap 
pearance,  'takes  his  drink,'  chews  his  quid,  and 
discharges  his  saliva  with  as  much  constancy  and 
energy  as  the  least  pretentious  of  his  constituents, 
but  enters  into  the  popular  feelings  with  a  tact  and 
zest  rarely  equaled,  and  assails  the  heads  and 
hearts  of  the  multitude  in  a  style  of  manly  and 
vigorous  eloquence  such  as  few  men  can  command. 
There  lies  in  his  bullet  head  and  thick  neck  enough 
combativeness,  courage,  and  ability  for  three  men 
of  his  dimensions.  The  slightest  touch  of  what 
genteel  people  would  call  improvement  would  spoil 
him.  If  he  were  one  degree  more  refined  he  would 
be  many  degrees  less  popular.  When  he  mounts 
the  stump  he  holds  the  crowd  in  front  of  him  in  the 
hollow  of  his  hand."  2 


1  Reminiscences,  Vol.  II,  p.  31. 

3  Life  and  Letters  of  E.  L.  Qodkin,  edited  by  Rollo  Ogden, 
Vol.  I,  p.  175. 


136  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Other  observers  of  foreign  birth  were  more  appre 
ciative.  W.  H.  Eussell,  who  came  to  the  United 
States  as  a  war  correspondent,  was  deeply  im 
pressed  by  him.  "Few  men  speak  better  than 
Senator  Douglas, "  he  wrote;  "his  words  are  well 
chosen,  the  flow  of  his  ideas  even  and  constant,  his 
intellect  vigorous,  and  thoughts  well  cut,  precise, 
and  vigorous — he  seems  a  man  of  great  ambition, 
and  he  told  me  he  is  engaged  in  preparing  a  sort  of 
Zollverein  scheme  for  the  North  American  conti 
nent,  including  Canada,  which  will  fix  public  at 
tention  everywhere,  and  may  lead  to  a  settlement 
of  the  Northern  and  Southern  controversies.  For 
his  mind,  as  for  that  of  many  Americans,  the  aristo 
cratic  idea  embodied  in  Eussia  is  very  seductive  j 
and  he  dwelt  with  pleasure  on  the  courtesies  he  had 
received  at  the  court  of  the  Czar,  implying  that  he 
had  been  treated  differently  in  England,  and  per 
haps  France.  And  yet,  had  Mr.  Douglas  become 
President  of  the  United  States,  his  good-will 
toward  Great  Britain  might  have  been  invaluable, 
and  surely  it  had  been  cheaply  purchased  by  a  lit 
tle  civility  and  attention  to  a  distinguished  citizen 
and  statesman  of  the  republic."  l 

Douglas's  first  marriage  in  1847  was  nearly  syn 
chronous  with  his  entry  in  the  Senate.  It  had 
lasted  only  a  brief  period,  which  however  sufficed 
to  give  him  an  experience  of  happy  family  life  and 
to  exert,  according  to  close  acquaintances,  a  refin 
ing  and  restraining  influence.  His  wife  had  died 

1  My  Diary  North  and  South,  p.  37. 


ON  THE  SENATE  THKESHOLD        137 

in  1853,  leaving  him  with  two  children.  The  por 
trait  of  Mrs.  Douglas  is  not  very  distinct,  although 
Sheahan  describes  her  in  the  usual  eulogistic  terms 
as  a  woman  of  "  gentleness  .  .  .  and  strong  na 
tive  good  judgment,"  who  "  made  home  an  abiding- 
place  of  peace  and  tranquillity,  where  all  the  associ 
ations  were  of  a  refined  and  Christian  character." 
In  entertaining,  she  "  was  judicious  and  yet  munifi 
cent,"  and  "won  the  respect  of  all  his  friends  and 
divided  with  him  their  unbounded  admiration." 
Considerable  sentiment  has  been  expended  upon 
Douglas's  first  marriage  but  apparently  without  an 
adequate  body  of  data.  The  main  significant  fea 
ture  of  this  union  was  seen  in  connection  with  the 
fact  that  his  father-in-law,  Colonel  Eobert  Martin 
of  North  Carolina,  was  a  slave-owner,  and  dying 
shortly  after  Douglas's  marriage,  bequeathed  to 
Mrs.  Douglas  his  plantation  and  the  slaves 
thereon.1 

Much  more  is  known  of  Douglas's  domestic  rela 
tions  during  the  period  of  his  second  marriage. 
Subsequent  to  the  death  of  the  first  Mrs.  Douglas, 
he  appears  to  have  drifted,  during  the  succeeding 
four  years,  into  the  somewhat  nomadic  and  irregu 
lar  existence  which  is  supposed  to  be  characteristic 
of  the  unmarried  man,  deteriorating  also  in  per- 
soual  habits  and  in  mental  traits.  Late  in  1856  he 
married  again,  this  time  Miss  Adele  Cutts  of 
Washington.  The  second  Mrs.  Douglas  was  in 
every  way  a  powerful  moulding  influence  upon 
1  This  incident  has  been  treated  elsewhere,  see  p.  88. 


138  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  career  of  her  husband,  and  it  may  not  be  too 
violent  an  inference  to  believe  that  she  was  partially 
responsible  for  the  changes  of  front  which  occurred 
during  his  later  years  with  reference  to  various 
political  and  party  questions.  He  became,  accord 
ing  to  Schurz,  "  more  tidy  and  trim  in  his  appear 
ance  and  more  careful  in  his  habits,  although  even 
then  there  were  rumors  of  occasional  excesses." 
Mrs.  Douglas  kept  a  close  eye  upon  him  aod  ac 
companied  him  on  electioneering  journeys.  Here 
the  new  influence  which  had  now  entered  his  life 
was  plainly  observed  by  the  impressionable  Villard,1 
who  recorded  the  favorable  notion  which  he  had 
gained  in  his  first  meeting  with  Mrs.  Douglas  at  the 
time  when,  as  a  young  newspaper  correspondent, 
he  was  admitted  to  speech  with  the  great  man  who 
was  then  engaging  Lincoln  in  debate.  This  im 
pression  was  practically  that  of  all  observers  of 
Douglas's  second  union.  It,  in  fact,  tended  much  to 
promote  his  prestige  in  Washington  society  as  well 
as  his  better  self-control.  The  fact  that  Mrs.  Doug 
las  was  a  Eoman  Catholic  while  her  husband  was 
either  an  atheist  or  an  extreme  liberal  in  religion 2 
was  perhaps  the  only  element  of  discord  or  of 
unsuitability  in  the  match.  Mrs.  Douglas's  enter 
tainments  during  the  trying  later  period  of  the 
Lecompton  struggle  did  much  to  overcome  the 
antagonism  which  her  husband's  course  aroused, 
and  to  place  him  at  the  head  of  a  social  coterie 

1  Memoirs,  Vol.  I,  p.  92. 
3  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  97. 


ON  THE  SENATE  THBESHOLD        139 

among  the  most  brilliant,  in  the  technical  sense  of 
the  word,  then  existing  in  Washington.1 

The  refining  influences  thus  thrown  about  Doug 
las  during  the  most  eventful  decade  of  his  life 
were  not,  however,  sufficient  to  remove  all  of  the 
traces  which  his  earlier  career  had  left.  The 
haughty  and,  in  their  own  judgment,  aristocratic 
Southerners,  accepted  Douglas's  aid  in  the  Senate 
but  they  privately  sneered  at  some  of  the  crudities 
which  he  still  from  time  to  time  betrayed.  When 
the  Kansas  struggle  took  place  these  private  stric 
tures,  previously  suppressed,  became  public  and  the 
organs  of  Southern  feeling  referred  to  a  the  rugged 
vulgarities  of  his  early  education, "  which,  it  was 
asserted,  had  been  "  smoothed  down  "  by  ''associa 
tion  with  Southern  gentlemen."  2  Probably  not  too 
much  weight  should  be  given  to  the  statements  of 
such  self-styled  aristocrats,  but  it  was  true  that 
Douglas  had  not  the  traditions  of  ancestral  wealth 
or  the  consciousness  of  family  power  by  which  the 
claims  of  the  Southerners  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate 
were  fortified.  He  was  essentially  a  self-made  man 
and  showed  the  roughnesses  of  his  making  all  too 
plainly,  A  gentler  spirit  would  perhaps  not  have 
succeeded  as  well  in  the  frontier  state  from  which 
he  came,  and  Douglas  stands  favorably  even  in  the 
comparison  with  Lincoln  up  to  the  time  that  the 
latter  had  been  put  into  the  crucible  of  stern  respon- 

1  Sheahan,  Life,  pp.  435  et  seq.,  also  Johnson,  Life,  p.  316. 

2  Quoted  by  Johnson,    Life,   p.  341   from   Richmond   South, 
quoted  in  Chicago  Times,  December  18,  1857. 


140  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

sibility.  Ib  would  be  too  much  to  expect  that 
Douglas,  representative  as  he  was  of  Illinois  condi 
tions,  should  rise  much  higher  than  his  source  or 
be  more  than  a  glorified  and  enlarged  example  of 
the  average  man  upon  whom  his  own  political 
status  directly  depended. 

Perhaps  there  is  nothing  more  noteworthy  about 
Douglas's  whole  career  in  the  Senate  than  his  de 
velopment  of  a  distinct  type  of  oratory,  effective 
and  to  the  point.  It  was  this  which  attracted  the 
attention  of  Mrs.  Stowe  during  the  trying  days  of 
1858.  While  commenting  severely  upon  Douglas, 
with  whose  views  she  had  no  sympathy,  Mrs.  Stowe 
could  not  but  admit  that  he  had  "two  requisites  of 
a  debater— a  melodious  voice  and  a  clear  sharply  - 
defined  enunciation,"  while  she  unwillingly  con 
ceded  to  him  "  the  very  best  of  logic  and  language  " 
in  dealing  with  the  points  he  chose  to  discuss. 
Mrs.  Stowe,  in  common  with  many  others,  noted, 
however,  that  Douglas's  "  forte  in  debating  is  his 
power  of  mystifying  the  point,"  and  others  regarded 
him  as  the  prince  of  special  pleaders.  Even  his 
most  devoted  biographers  have  not  been  able  to 
obscure  the  fact  that  in  many  of  his  greatest  argu 
ments  he  was  purely  technical,  and  that  his  skill 
was  wholly  employed  in  making  the  worse  appear 
the  better  reason.  Withal,  Douglas  had  the  un 
usual  talent  of  being  interesting.  By  some,  this 
was  attributed  to  his  "  piquant  personalities"  ;  by 
others  to  his  wonderful  ability  to  bring  into  an 
argument  or  consideration  of  a  subject  multitudes 


ON  THE  SENATE  THKESHOLD        141 

of  side  issues  which  succeeded  in  holding  the  atten 
tion  even  of  those  who  were  not  directly  interested 
in  the  main  theme ;  by  others  to  his  keen  ability  in 
judging  men  and  in  pitching  his  argument  so  as  to 
harmonize  it  with  the  tone  of  their  minds.  By  all, 
it  is  conceded  that  his  speeches  had  a  wonderful 
clarity  and  force  of  presentation.  Mrs.  Stowe 
thought  he  lacked  in  ' i  wit ' '  and  though  he  had  a 
fair  sense  of  humor,  it  is  certainly  true  that  in  par 
liamentary  debate  there  is  but  little  of  the  light 
allusion  and  gentle  sarcasm  which  his  critic  per 
haps  had  in  mind.  As  a  debater,  his  chief  weak 
ness  was  lack  of  self-control  ;  he  was  too  easily  led 
into  the  use  of  coarse  and  abusive  epithets  and 
personal  references  which  did  not  suit  the  occasion 
and  merely  tended  to  put  discussion  or  colloquy 
upon  a  low  and  offensive  plane.  Of  this  the  most 
unfortunate  example  while  he  was  in  the  Senate 
was  perhaps  his  altercation  with  Sumner — when, 
however,  there  was  but  little  to  choose  between  him 
and  his  antagonist.  On  this  as  on  many  other  occa 
sions,  the  license  to  which  Douglas  resorted  was 
unworthy  of  the  best  traditions  of  the  Senate. 

Throughout  his  senatorial  career,  Douglas's  re 
lations  with  his  colleagues  were  in  the  main  appro 
priate.  His  chief  defect  was  in  personal  familiar 
ities.1  He  could  not  be  expected  to  mingle  famil- 

uln  all  our  accounts  of  him,"  writes  William  G.  Brown, 
u  he  is  represented  as  surrounded  with  intimates.  Not  without 
the  power  of  impressing  men  with  his  dignity  and  seriousness 
of  purpose,  we  nevertheless  hear  of  him  sitting  on  the  knee  of 
an  eminent  judge  during  a  recess  of  the  court,  dancing  from 


142  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

iarly  and  closely  with  the  leaders  of  the  anti-slavery 
party,  for  whom  he  professed  a  loathing  and  con 
tempt  which  was  evidently  more  than  the  mere 
expression  of  noisy  parliamentary  hatred,  and 
which  was  returned  with  interest  by  the  New 
England  men.  Yet  in  times  as  trying  as  those  from 
1850  to  1860  it  is  worthy  of  comment  that,  on  the 
whole,  he  maintained  as  equable  a  poise  as  he  did. 
The  most  regrettable  personal  incident  of  the  decade 
—the  assault  perpetrated  by  Brooks  upon  Sumner 
— was  undoubtedly  looked  upon  by  Douglas  with 
as  much  reprobation  as  by  any  other  man.  This 
incident,  which  occurred  shortly  after  Douglas's 
speech,  the  culmination  of  the  celebrated  contro 
versy  with  Sumner  during  the  struggle  over  Kansas 
in  1858,  was  the  result  of  the  burning  hatred  of  the 
extreme  pro-slavery  men  for  the  bitter  and  austere 
statesman  from  Massachusetts.  Sumner  had  been 
attacked  by  Brooks  while  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate, 
and  was  inclined  to  think  that  just  after  the  assault 
he  saw  Toombs,  Douglas  and  Brooks  standing  by 
him.  But  for  this  there  is  no  support,  and  Storey, 
the  secretary  and  biographer  of  Sumner,  evidently 
thinks  the  charge  unjustified,  for  he  says  that 
Brooks  ' l  had  made  his  purpose  known  to  Edmund- 


end  to  end  of  a  dinner-table  with  the  volatile  Shields — the  same 
who  won  laurels  in  the  Mexican  War,  a  seat  in  the  United 
States  Senate,  and  the  closest  approach  anybody  ever  won  to 
victory  in  battle  over  Stonewall  Jackson  ;  and  engaging,  de 
spite  his  height  of  five  feet  and  his  weight  of  a  hundred  pounds, 
in  personal  encounters  with  Stuart,  Lincoln's  athletic  law 
partner,  and  a  corpulent  attorney  named  Francis." 


ON  THE  SENATE  THKESHOLD        143 

son',  a  representative  from  Virginia,  and  to  Keitt, 
one  of  his  colleagues  from  South  Carolina  and  both 
were  present  in  the  Senate  chamber  at  the  time. 
Edmundson  had  advised  with  Brooks  on  Monday 
and  Wednesday  and  was  present  at  his  request. 
Keitt,  when  the  assault  began,  hurried  up,  flourish 
ing  a  cane  as  if  to  prevent  any  interference  with 
Brooks  until  his  purpose  was  accomplished.'7 
Storey  adds,  "  Senators  Slidell  and  Douglas  were  in 
the  anteroom  when  some  one  rushed  in  and  cried 
out  that  a  man  was  beating  Sumner. "  *  It  was  a 
substantial  tribute  to  Douglas's  known  honesty  of 
purpose  that  when  he  made  his  explanation  on  the 
floor  to  the  effect  that  he  was  in  the  anteroom 
when  the  assault  occurred  and  refrained  from  going 
in  merely  because  he  thought  his  motives  might  be 
misconstrued,  the  explanation  was  accepted  without 
any  question.  No  one  familiar  with  the  facts  sup 
posed  that  he  had  known  of  the  plot  against  Sumner 
in  any  form  or  at  any  time.  The  intimate  relation 
ship  which  Douglas  had  with  many  of  his  col 
leagues  in  a  body  wherein  mutual  suspicion  is 
often  the  prevailing  tone,  was  aided  by  his  great 
memory  for  incidents,  names  and  personalities,  and 
by  the  ability  he  had  of  making  every  one  feel  that 
he  entertained  a  direct  personal  interest  in  their 

1  Storey,  Sumner,  American  Statesmen  Series,  pp.  146-147. 
Douglas  said:  "My  first  impression  was  to  come  into  the 
Senate  chamber  and  help  put  an  end  to  the  affray  if  I  could  ; 
but  it  occurred  to  my  mind  in  an  instant  that  my  relations  to 
Mr.  Sumner  were  such  that,  if  I  came  into  the  hall,  my  motives 
would  be  misconstrued  perhaps,  and  I  sat  down  again. ' ' 


144  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

welfare  and  in  their  doings.  Despite  the  numerous 
encounters  on  the  floor  which  he  could  not  have 
avoided  if  he  would,  and  probably  would  not  have 
avoided  if  he  could,  he  regarded  them  as  part  of 
the  day's  work  and  as  such  not  to  be  too  closely 
borne  in  mind  later  on.  He  had  no  objection  to 
meeting  Greeley,  in  spite  of  the  New  York  Tribune's 
assaults  upon  himself,1  nor  did  he  hesitate  in  spite 
of  the  bitter  words  which  from  time  to  time  passed 
between  him  and  Lincoln,  to  lay  aside  any  personal 
animosity  that  might  have  been  inspired  during 
their  passages  at  arms.  In  all  this  he  showed  himself 
unmistakably  a  great  politician,  and  a  politician  at  a 
time  when  political  ability  received  the  utmost  meas 
ure  of  recognition  and  remuneration  in  popular 
prestige  and  personal  advancement,  and  when 
it  had  never  had  in  American  history,  probably, 
a  more  direct  and  significant  influence  in  national 
affairs. 

Douglas  had  not  lacked  for  personal  prosperity 
since  his  entry  into  Congress.  Though  his  early 
years  had  been  marred  by  the  necessity  for  the  clos 
est  economy,  and  though  his  early  political  endeav 
ors  had  been  more  or  less  expensive,  from  the  time 
he  entered  Congress  he  was  able  to  provide  ade 
quately  for  himself  and  to  lead  a  dignified  and 
comfortable  existence.  His  first  marriage,  as  we 
have  seen,  had  been  fortunate  from  a  pecuniary 
standpoint,  while  to  this  he  had  added  the  results 
of  successful  land  speculation  in  Chicago — specula- 
Johnson,  Life,  p.  320. 


ON  THE  SENATE  THRESHOLD        145 

tion  whose  success  had  been  materially  aided  by 
the  happy  termination  of  the  Illinois  Central  proj  - 
ect.  After  making  a  substantial  gift  to  Chicago 
University1  he  was  able  to  realize  about  $90,000  in 
1856  by  the  sale  of  his  lands.  His  congressional 
salary  was  tolerably  adequate  and  in  his  second 
marriage  he  lost  no  ground  financially.  Though  a 
shrewd  investor  and  speculator,  Douglas  was,  how 
ever,  far  too  keenly  interested  in  politics  for  the 
sake  of  the  game  itself  to  spend  a  great  amount  of 
time  in  the  pursuit  of  wealth.  The  problems  be 
fore  the  Senate  during  his  period  of  greatest  activ 
ity  were  not  those  in  which  questions  of  property 
or  investment  figured  very  largely,  and  the  tempta 
tion  which  has  beset  some  later  statesmen  to  shape 
his  course  in  such  a  way  as  to  advance  his  personal 
interests  or  to  take  advantage  of  official  knowledge 
for  the  purpose  of  speculation,  was  not  very  strong. 
The  Illinois  Central  "deal"  was  the  most  ques 
tionable  act,  perhaps,  in  which  he  was  concerned, 
and  even  this  was  of  a  kind  that  by  many  would 
not  be  considered  at  the  present  day  particularly 
offensive.  He  had  refused  the  cruder  solicitations 
to  speculate  in  Western  lands  from  which  he  might 
have  drawn  great  gain  as  chairman  of  the  Territories 
Committee,  and  in  the  main  continued  throughout 
his  public  life  substantially  clean-handed. 

Although  shrewd  and  far-seeing  in  such  business 
transactions  as  he  undertook,  Douglas  lacked  the 
New  England  instinct  of  frugality.     He  was  fre- 
1  Sheahau,  Life,  p.  442. 


146  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

quently  but  too  careless  in  business  relations.1  He 
poured  his  money  freely  into  his  campaigns  and 
lived  at  times  in  a  rather  prodigal  manner.  As  his 
leadership  in  the  Senate  became  better  and  better 
established,  the  social  demands  of  his  Washington 
life  became  more  and  more  positive,  and  Douglas 
found  himself  compelled  to  meet  these  demands  by 
concessions  both  of  time  and  money  which  he  prob 
ably  would  not  personally  have  sanctioned  from  the 
mere  standpoint  of  social  prestige  or  individual 
pleasure.  The  break  with  the  party,  which  followed 

1 W.  E.  Curtis  (who,  however,  is  a  far  from  trustworthy 
writer)  tells  the  following  anecdote  (True  Abraham  Lincoln,  p. 
74)  :  "  A  singular  story  is  told  of  a  case  in  which  a  good  many 
prominent  men  were  involved  besides  Lincoln.  Abraham 
Brokaw,  of  Bloomington,  loaned  five  hundred  dollars  to  one  of 
his  neighbors  and  took  a  note,  which  remained  unpaid.  Ac 
tion  was  brought,  the  sheriff  levied  on  the  property  of  the  debtor 
and  collected  the  entire  amount,  but  neglected  to  turn  the  pro 
ceeds  over.  Brokaw  employed  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  who  col 
lected  the  amount  from  the  bondsman  of  the  sheriff,  but  re 
turned  to  his  seat  in  the  Senate  at  Washington  without  making 
settlement.  Like  some  other  great  men,  Douglas  was  very 
careless  about  money  matters,  and,  after  appealing  to  him  again 
and  again,  Brokaw  employed  David  Davis  to  bring  suit 
against  the  senator.  Being  an  intimate  friend  and  fellow  Dem 
ocrat,  Davis  disliked  to  appear  in  the  case,  and  by  his  advice 
Brokaw  engaged  the  services  of  Lincoln.  The  latter  wrote  to 
Douglas  at  Washington  that  he  had  a  claim  against  him  for  col 
lection  and  must  insist  upon  prompt  payment.  Douglas  be 
came  very  indignant  and  reproached  Brokaw  for  placing  such  a 
political  weapon  in  the  hands  of  an  Abolitionist.  Brokaw  sent 
Douglas's  letter  to  Lincoln,  and  the  latter  employed  'Long 
John  '  Wentworth,  then  a  Democratic  member  of  Congress 
from  Chicago,  as  an  associate  in  the  case.  Wentworth  saw 
Douglas,  persuaded  him  to  pay  the  money,  and  forwarded  five 
hundred  dollars  to  Lincoln,  who,  in  turn,  paid  it  to  Brokaw 
and  sent  him  a  bill  of  three  dollars  and  fifty  cents  for  profes 
sional  services." 


ON  THE  SENATE  THEESHOLD        147 

his  attack  upon  Buchanan's  endorsement  of  the  Le- 
compton  constitution  in  Kansas,  did  not  diminish  the 
social  pressure  upon  Douglas.  He  was  more  sought 
after  by  curious  callers  and  visitors  to  Washington 
than  ever,  and  it  became  more  necessary  than  ever 
that  he  should  show  a  bold  and  prosperous  front. 
It  was  largely  to  these  social  conditions,  and  to  the 
heavy  expenses  to  which  during  his  struggle  for  ad 
vancement  he  was  compelled  to  submit  in  his  later 
years  that  his  subsequent  financial  embarrassment 
was  due,  yet  the  situation  in  all  probability  could 
not  have  been  avoided  if  he  were  to  play  the  role 
and  live  the  life  that  had  partly  been  achieved  by, 
and  partly  thrust  upon,  him. 

It  cannot  be  other  than  an  interesting  subject  of 
speculation  what  would  have  been  Douglas's  course 
of  personal  development  had  he  not  been  cut  off  in 
the  flower  of  his  maturity.  His  years  in  the  Senate 
had  already  shown  the  power  of  growth,  and  of  at 
least  some  change  in  point  of  view  and  in  those  in 
timate  characteristics  which  make  up  the  fulness 
of  a  man.  Lincoln  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil 
War  had  but  just  started  upon  his  great  career  of 
four  years'  duration.  Douglas  might  have  had  a 
like  experience.  His  personality,  vivid  and  dis 
tinct  as  it  was,  had  not,  at  the  time  of  his  death, 
been  given  an  opportunity  for  complete  expression; 
but,  as  will  now  be  seen,  he  had  been  whirled  on 
ward  by  ambition  and  the  dictates  of  expediency 
which  had  prevented  its  real  development. 


CHAPTEE 

NOETH   AND  SOUTH 

A  CRITICAL  period  in  the  history  of  the  United 
States  was  now  at  hand.  Events  whose  ultimate 
causes  had  long  before  begun  to  have  an  obscure  ef 
fect  succeeded  one  another  with  a  rapidity  which 
called  for  all  the  statesmanship  of  the  ablest  public 
men,  but  which  even  the  wisest  had  not  been  able 
fully  to  forecast,  and  against  which  they  could  not 
provide.  The  chief  factors  in  the  complex  problem, 
which  was  to  occupy  the  attention  of  Congress  for 
ten  years  to  come,  and  to  culminate  then  in  a  dis 
astrous  civil  war,  were  the  new  territories  now  on 
the  eve  of  organization  and  the  relation  which  they 
should  bear  to  the  United  States,  and  the  general 
issue  of  slavery,  partly  with  reference  to  the  exist 
ing  states  but  more  especially  with  regard  to  these 
newly  organized  territories.  These  difficulties  had 
been  brought  to  a  pressing  stage  during  the  years 
1848-1850  by  the  development  of  conditions  in  Cali 
fornia  which  called  for  some  decisive  action  on  the 
part  of  Congress.  Such  action  had  not  been  taken 
at  the  session  of  1848-1849 ;  various  efforts  to  secure 
it  had  been  put  forth  in  vain.  The  territory  which 
had  been  acquired  from  Mexico  under  the  treaty  of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo,  including  what  afterward  be 
came  California,  Utah,  New  Mexico,  etc.,  had  been 


NOETH  AND  SOUTH  149 

left  without  any  definite  form  of  government,  while 
the  rush  of  gold-seekers  to  the  southern  Pacific  coast 
had  brought  into  existence  a  lawless  community  in 
which  the  better  elements  earnestly  desired  the  es 
tablishment  of  a  settled  system  of  social  and  polit  • 
ical  life.  Such,  then,  was  the  immediate  situation 
when  Congress  was  on  the  eve  of  assembling  for  the 
long  session  of  1849-1850. 

It  was  a  remarkable  Senate  before  which  this 
issue  of  the  new  territories  and  their  government, 
with  all  that  it  involved,  was  to  appear.  The  body 
was  essentially  in  a  transitional  stage.  Webster, 
Clay  and  Calhoun  were  about  to  serve  for  the  last 
time  together.  Around  them  a  group  of  younger 
and  less  known  men,  representing  a  new  generation 
of  statesmen,  had  now  sprung  up.  Under  the  care 
of  the  older  statesmen,  and  as  a  result  of  the  unusual 
capacity  and  ability  of  the  generation  before  1850, 
the  Senate  had  been  gradually  assuming  a  place  of 
first  importance  in  the  national  government.  It 
was  then  that  the  foundations  were  laid  for  that  su 
premacy  over  the  House  of  Eepresentatives  which 
has  continued  to  this  day,  subject  to  mutations  and 
reverses.  It  was  then  that  the  Senate  had  indicated 
for  the  first  time,  with  decided  and  definite  tendency, 
its  liability  to  become  receptive  ground  for  the 
peculiar  type  of  interests  which  a  later  generation 
has  denominated  " special,"  as  opposed  to  those 
presumably  representing  the  broader  popular  well- 
being,  although  it  had  not  yet  committed  itself  to 
them.  Douglas  had  already  shown  his  general  dis- 


150  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

position  in  the  questions  that  were  to  be  dealt  with, 
but  there  remained  the  crucial  test  which  would 
definitely  place  him  on  one  side  or  the  other  in  the 
contest. 

In  a  general  way,  events  had  now  so  shaped 
themselves  as  to  develop  with  substantial  distinct 
ness  a  sectional  or  geographical  party  line  between 
the  North  and  the  South.  Slavery  had  of  course 
long  been  a  burning  issue,  but  patriotic  men  had 
hoped  that  it  would  not  necessarily  be  the  cause  of 
division  too  deep  for  reconciliation.  In  substance 
the  issues  now  at  stake  were  as  follows  : 

The  North  demanded  : 

I.  The  establishment  of  governments  for  all  the 
territories  of  the  United  States,  with  a  prohibition 
of  slavery. 

II.  The  admission  of  California. 

III.  The  abolition  of  the  slave  trade  in  the  Dis 
trict  of  Columbia. 

IV.  The  abolition  of  slaveholding  in  the  Dis 
trict  of  Columbia. 

The  South  demanded  : 

I.  An  efficient  fugitive  slave  act. 

II.  The  establish rneut  of  territorial  governments 
for    all  the  territories,    including    California,   but 
without  a  prohibition  of  slavery.1 

It  was  on  this  ground  that  the  contest  was  to  take 
place.  Congress  presented  a  rather  varied  political 
complexion.  In  the  House  there  were  112  Demo- 

1  This  classification  follows  that  given  in  Sheahan's  Douglas, 
p.  126. 


NOETH  AND  SOUTH  151 

crats,  105  Whigs,  and  thirteen  Free  Soilers,1  while 
the  division  of  opinion  in  the  Senate,  although  less 
distinct,  represented  substantially  the  same  lines  of 
demarcation.  In  the  Presidents  message  for  De 
cember,  1849, 2  the  territorial  question  was  called  to 
the  attention  of  Congress.  He  urged  that  action 
which  had  been  taken  by  the  inhabitants  of  Cali 
fornia,  with  a  view  to  organizing  a  territorial  gov 
ernment,  should  be  considered.  He  thought  that  it 
was  not  wise  to  act  on  the  position  of  New  Mexico 
because  its  people  would  probably  soon  seek  admis 
sion  just  as  had  the  people  of  California.  The 
sentiment  in  Congress  was  now  confused  and  deeply 
antagonistic.  The  Northern  states  desired  that 
California  and  New  Mexico  should  be  added  to  the 
free  territory  of  the  Union.  Southerners  desired 
that  there  should  be  no  interference  with  what  they 
considered  their  right  to  take  slaves  into  the  new 
territory.  California  had  held  a  convention  on 
May  6,  1849,  with  the  object  of  forming  a  state,  and 
at  a  later  deferred  meeting  on  September  3d  had 
adopted  a  constitution,  similar  to  the  constitutions 
of  New  York  and  Iowa,  containing  a  bill  of  rights 
in  which  was  a  clause  forever  prohibiting  slavery 
in  the  new  state.  The  convention  had  finished  its 
work  on  the  13th  of  October.  The  President's 
message,  therefore,  amounted  to  an  endorsement  of 
the  action  of  the  convention  in  California,  while  he 

1  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  I,  p.  117. 
'  Messages  and  Papers,  Vol.  V,  pp.  18-19 ;  see  also  Vol.  IV, 
p.  629,  et  seq. 


152  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

reserved  the  New  Mexican  matter  for  the  future. 
Immediately  a  storm  broke  in  Congress.  Resolu 
tions  calling  for  information  were  adopted  in  both 
houses,  and  early  in  January  several  important 
proposals  were  put  into  the  form  of  bills  and  intro 
duced.  Simultaneously  memorials  were  received 
from  various  states  protesting  against  any  action  on 
the  part  of  Congress  which  would  extend  the  sys 
tem  of  slavery.  Among  the  proposals  which  thus 
jostled  one  another  on  the  floor  of  Congress,  were 
schemes  for  the  reorganization  of  the  state  of  Texas 
upon  a  smaller  geographical  basis,  and  a  plan 
creating  governments  for  California,  Deseret,  New 
Mexico  and  San  Jacinto.  New  fugitive  slave  pro 
visions  were  offered,  and  for  a  time  it  seemed  as  if 
Congress  were  about  to  plunge  into  an  indefinitely 
protracted  controversy. 

Events  in  the  House  had  been  such  as  to  stimu 
late  this  belief.  The  mixed  composition  of  the  body 
had  necessitated  a  series  of  struggles  lasting  three 
weeks  before  a  speaker  could  be  chosen,  and  in  the 
course  of  that  time  the  issues  pending  between 
North  and  South  had  been  thoroughly  discussed. 
The  contest  had  culminated  in  the  election  of 
Howell  Cobb  of  Georgia  over  Eobert  C.  Wiuthrop, 
the  New  England  candidate.  Cobb  was  a  strong 
pro-slavery  man  and  his  choice  alarmed  the 
Northern  element.  Clay  and  his  associates  were 
determined,  if  possible,  to  settle  this  threatening 
controversy  without  unnecessarily  widening  the 
breach  between  the  two  sections.  On  the  29th  of 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH  153 

January  Clay  offered  a  series  of  compromise  resolu 
tions,  whose  adoption  he  earnestly  advocated. 
These  resolutions  provided  for  the  admission  of 
California  with  the  prohibition  of  slavery  contained 
in  her  constitution.  They  also  included  a  proposal 
for  the  establishment  of  territorial  governments  in 
the  area  acquired  from  Mexico  without  any  restric 
tion  as  to  slavery.  The  subject  of  prohibiting 
the  slave  trade  in  the  District  of  Columbia  was 
not  neglected,  but  it  was  declared  that  the  abolition 
of  slavery  without  the  consent  of  Maryland  and 
without  compensating  the  owners  would  be  unwise. 
It  was  further  affirmed  that  Congress  had  no 
power  to  interfere  with  the  slave  trade  between  the 
states.  Adequate  legal  means  for  the  recovery  of 
fugitive  slaves  were  demanded.  As  to  the  ques 
tions  affecting  Texas  and  New  Mexico,  provision 
was  made  for  determining  the  boundary  line,  pay 
ing  the  public  debt  of  Texas,  and  ending  the  latter' s 
claim  to  any  portion  of  New  Mexico. 1 

Clay's  speech  in  behalf  of  his  resolutions  was 
powerful  and  convincing,  despite  some  blemishes, 
but  the  time  was  not  one  when  oratory  could  im 
mediately  gain  the  end  in  view.  Douglas,  as  has 
been  noted,2  had  become  the  chairman  of  the  Com 
mittee  on  Territories,  and  he  now  moved  that  the 
constitution  of  the  state  of  California  be  referred  to 
his  own  committee.  An  effort  was  made  to  send  it 

1  These  resolutions  are  fully  analyzed   in  Rhodes,  Vol.  I,  p. 
122 — an  analysis  which  has  been  followed  here. 
"See  ante,  pp.  145,  etc. 


164  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

to  a  select  committee  of  fifteen,  which  should  also 
be  charged  with  the  duty  of  considering  the  general 
question  of  slavery  in  the  territories.  Douglas  won 
his  point  and,  as  he  had  already  secured  the  refer 
ence  to  his  committee  of  bills  establishing  a  state 
or  territorial  government  in  Deseret,  as  well  as 
other  measures  similar  in  character,  he  now  had 
jurisdiction  over  the  whole  problem.  He  was  thus 
the  engineer  in  charge  of  the  machinery  by  which 
the  actual  work  of  the  Senate  was  to  be  done,  al 
though  Clay  and  his  compeers  of  the  older  genera 
tion  were  still  the  spectacular  figures  on  the  floor. 

Clay's  speech  in  defense  of  his  compromise  pro 
posals  was  answered  by  Calhoun  on  the  4th  of 
March  ; !  Webster  followed  on  the  7th  of  the  same 
month.  Calhoun' s  reply  was  in  fact  his  last  public 
utterance,  for  before  the  end  of  the  month  he  had 
been  placed  in  his  grave.  His  argument  was  cogent, 
calling  attention  to  the  necessity  for  union  but  out 
lining  the  causes  of  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  South, 
and  suggesting  the  danger  which  confronted  the 
nation  in  the  future.  He  thought  that  Clay's  com 
promise  plan  would  not  be  effective.  It  was  neces 
sary  that  the  Northern  states,  now  rapidly  growing 
in  power  and  numbers  and  tending  to  surpass  the 
South  in  political  strength,  should  pause  to  consider 
whether  they  were  willing  to  drive  the  opposite 
section  to  a  point  when  it  could  be  longer  held  in 
the  Union  only  by  force.  Might  it  not  be  better  to 
offer  the  South  reasonable  terms?  Such  terms 

1  Congressional  Globe,  1st  Sess.,  31st  Cong.,  p.  451,  et  seq. 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH  155 

would  be  found  in  a  constitutional  amendment 
which  would  give  equal  power  to  the  Southern  as 
against  the  Northern  states,  enabling  them  to  pro 
tect  themselves  from  possible  aggression.  Equal 
rights  must  be  given  to  the  South  in  the  new  terri 
tory,  runaway  slaves  must  be  returned,  and  the  agi 
tation  of  the  subject  must  be  ended.  Calhoun  be 
lieved  that  these  issues  could  now  properly  be  dis 
cussed  because  the  California  question  was  a  test 
issue ;  should  that  state  be  accepted  with  its  free 
constitution,  similar  action  in  the  case  of  other 
territories  might  be  expected.  This  would  pro 
gressively  result  in  a  relative  narrowing  of  the 
borders  of  the  slave  states,  and  in  limiting  their 
powers  in  the  Senate  so  that  ultimately  they  would 
sink  into  a  position  of  insignificance  which  could  not 
be  endured. 

Calhoun' s  prophecies  of  disaster  were,  by  some, 
considered  ridiculous,  while  even  Benton  thought 
the  forebodings  of  the  South  Carolinian  somewhat 
absurd.  Others  agreed  with  his  opinions.  Webster, 
on  March  7th,  while  not  depreciating  the  signifi 
cance  of  Calhoun' s  views,  urged  with  irresistible 
force  the  desirability  of  getting  away  from  all  con 
templation  of  the  prospect  of  secession.  He  would 
have  the  Senate  adopt  a  positive  and  definite  policy 
based  upon  the  immediate  necessities  of  the  case. 
He  reviewed  the  slavery  situation  and  asserted  that 
the  South  had  been  fairly  dealt  with  by  the  estab 
lishment  of  the  existing  boundary  line  for  slavery— 
the  line  of  36°  30'  which  took  in  practically  the 


156  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

whole  of  Texas  and  would  ultimately  create  a  slave 
area  of  substantial  size.  To  the  idea  that  slavery 
might  exist  in  this  area  he  said  the  government 
was  solemnly  pledged.  As  to  California  and  New 
Mexico,  the  character  of  their  industry  and  general 
climatic  conditions  showed  that  they  offered  no 
field  for  slavery.  Both  were  free  states  by  nature 
and  as  such  both  must  be  admitted  to  the  Union. 
The  South  had  a  grievance,  said  Webster,  in  con 
nection  with  the  fugitive  slave  question,  and  this 
must  be  allayed.  The  speaker  gave  wholesome  ad 
vice  to  the  Southern  states.  He  suggested  that 
they  should  not  heed  the  partisan  and  bitter  attacks 
of  Abolitionists  upon  them  and  their  slavery,  and 
intimated  that  some  of  the  writing  and  speech  cur 
rently  tolerated  in  the  South  was  equal  in  virulence 
to  that  of  which  Southerners  complained  as  prac 
ticed  at  the  North. 

Webster's  address  had  a  decidedly  wholesome 
effect,  entirely  apart  from  its  remarkable  oratorical 
success  and  its  bearing  upon  the  future  status  of  the 
speaker  himself.  Northern  men  attacked  him  bit 
terly  because  of  his  endorsement  of  the  idea  that 
they  had  been  unfair  in  the  fugitive  slave  question, 
while  Webster's  acceptance  of  a  drastic  bill  pre 
sented  by  Mason  and  containing  provisions  intended 
to  control  this  whole  matter,  goaded  them  to  irrepres 
sible  irritation.  But  the  savage  denunciations  of 
its  author  offered  by  the  extreme  Abolitionist  ele 
ment  did  not  materially  affect  the  permanent  and 
far-reaching  influence  of  the  7th  of  March  address. 


NOKTH  AND  SOUTH  157 

Douglas  had  wisely  waited  for  the  indications  of 
feeling  in  the  Senate  and  elsewhere  to  become 
marked,  and  now  finding  them  in  conformity  with 
his  own  ideas,  he  moved  forward  with  a  program 
which  he  had  planned  to  develop  in  his  committee. 
He  spoke  strongly  on  the  13th  and  14th  of  March, 
but  confined  himself  largely  to  the  California  question 
and  presented  cogently  the  same  arguments  which 
had  been  urged  by  the  great  figures  on  the  floor  in 
support  of  the  admission  of  that  state.  He  attacked 
Webster  bitterly  for  his  statement  of  the  reasons 
why  California  and  New  Mexico  should  be  admitted 
as  free  states,  but  he  also  rebutted  with  vigor  the 
argument  of  Calhoun,  in  particular  that  portion  of 
it  which  had  been  based  upon  the  idea  of  sectional 
equality  among  the  states  of  the  Union.  The 
amendment  to  the  Constitution  urged  by  Calhoun 
he  stigmatized  as  ridiculous.  The  fears  of  the 
North  about  the  admission  of  New  Mexico  and  Cali 
fornia  as  slave  states  he  waved  aside  with  a  sneer, 
referring  to  his  own  former  position  when  he  had 
predicted  that  California  would  certainly  establish 
a  free  constitution.  He  demanded  for  California 
that  government  which  had  been  selected  by  the 
people,  noting  that  the  insertion  in  the  constitution 
of  the  slavery  or  anti-slavery  provision  was  merely 
an  academic  issue,  since  the  nature  of  the  soil  and 
of  the  industries  of  the  state  would,  under  any 
circumstances,  dictate  a  system  of  free  labor  and 
free  enterprise.  Douglas  did  not  attempt  to  cover 
the  general  field  which  Clay  had  covered  in  his  first 


158  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

great  speech  ;  nor  did  he  definitely  accept  the  com 
promise  program,  although  he  spoke  in  apprecia 
tive  fashion  of  Clay's  action.1 

The  effort,  however,  to  advance  the  bills  in  the 
form  in  which  Douglas  had  reported  them  on  the 
25th  of  March,  i.  e.,  measures  to  admit  California, 
and  to  establish  territorial  governments  in  Utah  and 
New  Mexico,  was  premature.  Some  members  of  the 
Senate  desired  to  have  the  whole  question  of  slavery 
in  the  territories,  the  California  question,  and  the 
other  territorial  issues  dealt  with  in  one  bill,  be 
cause  they  believed  that  such  a  measure  would 
stand  a  better  chance  of  adoption  than  a  series  of 
measures  embracing  the  more  or  less  debatable  prop 
ositions  over  which  men's  minds  were  now  strug 
gling.  Benton,  for  his  part,  was  particularly  desir 
ous  that  the  California  question  should  be  dealt 
with  separately.  He  saw  no  reason  why  it  should 
be  made  a  mere  pawn  in  the  slavery  discussion,  for 
in  his  view  the  Califoruians  presented  a  simple  and 
concrete  issue.  In  this  opinion  Douglas  substan 
tially  agreed,  but  the  final  settlement  was  not  reached 
until  April  18th,  when,  the  subject  having  proven  it 
self  too  troublesome  to  be  adjusted  in  any  other  way,  it 
was  decided  to  establish  a  select  committee  of  thir 
teen  members  to  deal  with  the  whole  problem  of 
slavery.  This  committee,  as  elected  by  ballot  in 
the  Senate,  did  not  include  Douglas,  who  had  failed  to 
align  himself  with  Clay,  Cass,  Webster,  and  the 

1  The  text  of  this  speech  is  found  in  Congressional  Globe, 
31st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Appendix,  p.  364,  et  seq. 


NOBTH  AND  SOUTH  159 

other  great  leaders  or  to  secure  or  accept  a  status 
as  a  distinct  follower  of  any  of  the  senatorial  fac 
tions.  In  spite  of  the  creation  of  the  committee 
Douglas  requested  that  his  bill  for  the  admission 
of  California  should  be  taken  up,  and  when  Clay 
said  that  he  must  in  that  case  seek  to  amend  it 
by  the  insertion  of  extraneous  provisions,  Benton 
threatened  protracted  resistance.  It  was  evident 
that  Douglas's  urgency  could  not  succeed  against 
the  carefully  framed  plans  of  Clay,  who  confessedly 
and  frankly  favored  a  general  or  '  *  omnibus  ' '  meas 
ure. 

Clay,  as  the  chairman  of  the  select  committee, 
finally  reported  a  so-called  "  omnibus  bill  "  consist 
ing  of  Douglas's  two  measures  already  reported  from 
the  Committee  on  Territories,  the  one  providing  for 
the  admission  of  California  and  the  other  for  the  es 
tablishment  of  territorial  governments  in  Utah  and 
New  Mexico.  In  the  latter  the  select  committee 
had  inserted  a  provision,  refusing  to  the  territorial 
legislature  any  right  to  act  upon  questions  involving 
slavery.  Clay  spoke  in  behalf  of  the  measure  on 
the  13th  of  May,  and  two  days  later  Douglas,  with 
characteristic  pertinacity,  insisted  that  a  test  vote 
be  taken  on  the  question  of  dealing  with  the  bills 
separately  or  together.  He  was  defeated  by  a  small 
majority,  and,  Clay's  program  having  been  adopted, 
actual  debate  was  opened.  A  bitter  struggle  over 
slavery  was  now  precipitated.  Jefferson  Davis 
asked  to  have  the  bill  amended  so  as  to  restrain  the 
territorial  legislature  from  interfering  with  rights 


160  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  property  growing  out  of  the  institution  of  Afri 
can  slavery,  but  this  proposal  was  defeated.  Doug 
las  sought  to  strike  out  the  provision  restraining  the 
legislature  from  acting  in  any  way  on  the  slavery 
question,  but  he,  too,  failed.  Many  efforts  were 
made  to  secure  some  amendment  which  would  spe 
cifically  authorize  the  people  of  the  territories  to 
offer  constitutions  with  or  without  slavery,  as  they 
themselves  might  determine,  whenever  they  came 
to  present  their  territories  for  admission  as  states. 
Douglas  definitely  advocated  the  insertion  of  some 
such  provision  and  explained  why  he  had  not 
placed  it  in  the  bill  originally.  He  thought  it  was 
merely  the  assertion  of  an  already  existing,  an  un 
questionable,  an  inextinguishable  constitutional 
right.  He  had  "  always  held  that  the  people  have 
a  right  to  settle  these  questions  as  they  choose  not 
only  when  they  come  into  the  Union  as  a  state  but 
that  they  should  be  permitted  to  do  so  while  a  terri 
tory."  Nevertheless,  he  saw  no  reason  why,  if  it 
were  desired,  an  expression  of  constitutional  princi 
ple  of  this  kind  might  not  be  incorporated  in  the 
bill.  Finally  the  provision  in  the  shape  offered  by 
Soule"  on  the  15th  of  June  was  adopted  by  a  sub 
stantial  majority. 

In  the  subsequent  debate,  Douglas  favored  the 
seating  of  the  California  members  in  the  House  im 
mediately  upon  the  passage  of  the  bill.  He  opposed 
the  plans  of  Soule  and  others  who  desired  to  make 
the  state's  admission  conditional  upon  its  relinquish- 
ment  to  the  Federal  government  of  the  public  do- 


NOKTH  AND  SOUTH  161 

main  within  its  area.  Thus  the  controversy  dragged 
on  until  the  9th  of  July  when  the  death  of  Pres 
ident  Taylor  impended.  Work  was  deferred  until 
the  15th  of  the  same  month.  Discussion  was  then 
resumed  and  continued  throughout  the  remaining 
two  weeks  of  the  month.  On  the  31st  of  July, 
a  long  and  heated  day's  work  resulted  in  strik 
ing  out  of  the  bill  everything  that  related  to  Texas 
and  New  Mexico,  and  then  everything  bearing  upon 
California.  The  territory  of  Utah  was  all  that  now 
remained  and  from  the  provisions  concerning  it 
Douglas  succeeded  in  eliminating,  with  the  consent 
of  the  Senate,  the  amendment,  inserted  by  the  select 
committee,  by  which  the  legislature  would  be  pro 
hibited  from  passing  any  laws  relating  to  African 
slavery.  Upon  a  motion  of  Jefferson  Davis,  con 
curred  in  by  Douglas,  the  Southern  boundary  of 
Utah  was  to  be  fixed  at  36°  30',  and  thus  Utah  was 
to  be  definitely  placed  north  of  the  much  con 
troverted  line.  Upon  objection  by  Hale  and  some 
of  the  extreme  anti-slavery  men,  however,  the  line 
was  set  at  37°,  and  the  Utah  bill  was  passed  and 
sent  to  the  House. 

The  Senate  had  exhausted  itself  with  the  constitu 
tional  controversies  and  other  struggles  which  had 
attended  the  progress  of  this  measure,  but  Douglas 
was  still  fresh  and  unwearied.  Without  hesitating, 
he  immediately  called  up  his  original  bill  for  the 
admission  of  California  and  secured  its  passage  on 
the  13th  of  August.  He  then  called  for  the  New 
Mexico  bill,  framed  upon  the  same  terms  as  the 


162  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Utah  bill,  and  pushed  it  through  with  comparatively 
little  debate.  The  points  in  which  he  was  now  pri 
marily  interested  had  been  disposed  of,  but  he  did 
not  neglect  the  other  features  of  the  Compromise 
originally  urged  by  Clay.  Late  in  August  the 
Fugitive  Slave  Law  was  passed.  Three  Northern 
Democrats  voted  against  this  measure  while  fifteen 
Northern  senators  did  not  vote  at  all.1  The  slave 
trade  was  abolished  in  the  District  of  Columbia  on 
September  15th,  and  the  House  promptly  ratified 
the  work  of  the  Senate  by  moderate  majorities, 
although  there  also  a  large  number  of  Northern  men 
refrained  from  voting. 

To  all  practical  purposes  Clay  had  succeeded  in 
securing  the  adoption  of  his  compromise  plan.  In 
the  attainment  of  this  result  he  had  been  powerfully 
seconded  by  Douglas,  who  had  worked,  and  voted 
for,  every  feature  of  the  general  scheme  except  the 
Fugitive  Slave  Law,  and  he  had  refrained  from 
voting  on  this  only  because  he  was  under  the  neces 
sity  of  being  out  of  Washington  at  the  time.  He 
warmly  favored  the  bill. 

Clay  could  not  have  developed  the  details  of  the 
great  plan  which  his  mind  had  originally  conceived, 
nor  could  he  probably  have  managed  in  the  Senate 
the  various  bills  in  which  the  legislation  was  em 
bodied.  Douglas  was  familiar  with  the  grouping  of 
parties,  and  was  an  incomparable  master  of  the 
peculiar  art  of  congressional  jugglery  by  which  the 
adoption  of  ideas  against  which  there  is  a  substan- 
1  Rhodes,  Vol.  I,  p,  182. 


NOBTH  AND  SOUTH  163 

tial  feeling  of  opposition  can  be  secured.  Although 
eclipsed  by  the  commanding  personality  of  Clay,  he 
nevertheless  reaped  an  ample  measure  of  recognition 
from  his  fellow  senators.  Davis  directly  and  point 
edly  complimented  him,  and  other  Southerners,  now 
that  the  battle  was  over  for  the  time,  were  inclined 
to  feel  that  they  had  emerged  from  the  struggle  very 
satisfactorily,  and  to  accord  due  honor  to  the  man 
ager  whose  efforts  had  so  greatly  contributed  to  what 
they  chose  to  regard  as  a  victory.  Douglas  was  not 
slow  to  accept  the  credit  for  the  work  and  on  the 
23d  of  December,  1851,  plainly  put  himself  on 
record  as  having  "  originated  and  proposed"  the 
measures  contained  in 'the  Omnibus  Bill.1  He  was 
undoubtedly  pleased  with  his  own  success  as  a 
manipulator,  gratified  at  the  apparently  final  dis 
position  of  a  vexed  question,  and  willing  to  stand 
before  the  country  as  a  harmonizer  of  conflicting 
factions. 

Like  many  legislators,  Douglas  had,  however, 
acted  in  the  hazy  political  atmosphere  of  Washing 
ton  without  a  very  clear  perception  of  what  his 
constituency  would  think  of  his  course.  He  now 
found  it  necessary  to  meet  the  views  of  a  body  of 
voters  which  had  its  own  ideas  about  the  slavery 
question  and  the  North's  relations  with  the  South, 
and  which  did  not  value  so  highly  the  arts  of  the 
floor  manager  as  did  the  professional  politicians  at 

1  Congressional  Globe,  1st  Sees.,  32d  Cong.,  Appendix,  p.  65. 
The  speech  is  also  quoted  in  Sheahan's  Douglas,  the  words  used 
above  appearing  on  p.  166. 


164  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Washington.  The  fugitive  slave  act  had  been  bit 
terly  attacked  throughout  the  North.  This  was  in 
line  with  the  denunciation  which  had  been  heaped 
upon  Webster  because  of  the  latter' s  assertion  that  the 
Southerners  had  some  grievances  in  connection  with 
the  recovery  of  their  slaves.  Anti-slavery  feeling 
had  been  growing  rapidly  in  Illinois,  as  elsewhere 
noted,1  and  Douglas  found  himself  out  of  harmony 
with  his  constituency.  He  was  in  a  position  to 
suffer  from  the  misrepresentations  of  political  op 
ponents  who  were  glad  to  find  an  opportunity  of 
successful  attack.  The  City  Council  of  Chicago, 
falling  under  the  control  of  such  influences,  passed 
resolutions  denouncing  as  traitors  those  who  voted 
for  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  as  well  as  those  who 
failed  to  vote  against  it.  Going  somewhat  beyond 
its  sphere,  the  Council  also  released  the  citizens, 
officers  and  police  of  the  city  from  any  obligation  to 
assist  in  the  execution  of  the  law.2  Douglas  himself 
was  present  at  the  meeting  at  which  this  action  was 
taken,  but  desiring  a  better  audience  and  feeling 
that  the  atmosphere  was  unfavorable  to  a  fair  hear 
ing,  he  announced  that  he  would  speak  on  the 
following  evening,  October  23d.  As  promised,  he 
delivered  at  that  time  a  general  defense  of  what  he 
had  done  in  the  Senate,  with  special  reference  to  the 
Fugitive  Slave  Law.  So  successful  was  his  argu 
ment  on  that  occasion,  so  persuasive  his  review  of 
the  conditions  which  led  to  the  action  of  Congress, 
that  the  speaker  carried  all  before  him.  Eising  to 
'Seep.  103.  2Sheahan,  Douglas,  p.  159. 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH  165 

the  spirit  of  the  occasion,  as  he  more  and  more  felt 
the  drift  of  public  sentiment  toward  him,  he  closed 
the  speech  by  offering  resolutions  in  favor  of  carry 
ing  into  effect  the  provisions  of  the  Fugitive  Slave 
Law  and  of  performing  every  other  duty  and  obliga 
tion  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  The 
resolutions  were  adopted  without  dissent  and  only  a 
mild  protest  was  heard  against  further  resolutions 
repudiating  the  action  of  the  City  Council.  It  was 
a  remarkable  personal  victory  but  little  more  ;  for, 
as  Douglas  was  presently  to  discover,  the  dissatis 
faction  in  the  West  and  North  due  to  the  conditions 
at  which  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  was  aimed  was 
too  deep  seated  to  admit  of  easy  extinguishment. 


CHAPTER  IX 

"  AMERICAN7'    FOREIGN  POLICY 

DOUGLAS'S  prestige  was  now  such  that  he  was  an 
obvious  possibility  for  the  presidency.  Up  to  the 
close  of  the  struggle  on  the  compromise  measures 
of  1850,  this  had  been  at  least  doubtful.  He  was 
still  only  thirty-seven  years  old,  and  thus  far  his 
youth  had  decidedly  militated  against  his  chances. 
Moreover,  it  had  been  questioned  whether  his 
abilities  were  those  which  would  warrant  his  party 
in  considering  him  a  figure  of  national  size.  The 
discussions  centring  about  the  Compromise  of 
1850  had  removed  many  of  these  doubts.  They 
had  shown  him  to  be  a  man  keen  and  acute  in 
debate,  skilled  in  congressional  manipulation,  and 
able  to  rally  his  own  constituency  to  his  position, 
instead  of  blindly  listening  with  his  ear  to  the 
ground  for  the  rumblings  of  popular  sentiment  that 
he  might  shape  his  course  as  opportunity  seemed  to 
require.  He  had  shown  himself  to  be  a  man  of 
vigor  and  of  independence,  by  no  means  an  idealist, 
but  governed  by  the  most  practical  of  practical  po 
litical  considerations.  Moreover,  it  was  not  the  least 
significant  occurrence  of  the  session  of  1849-1850 
that  there  were  now  or  soon  after  removed  from  the 
Senate  some  of  the  most  important  national  figures. 
The  overshadowing  dominance  of  the  elder  states 


"  AMERICAN"  FOREIGN  POLICY      167 

men  had  kept  Douglas  from  exhibiting  before  the 
country  as  vigorous  a  growth  as  he  would  have 
liked,  but  he  was  at  last  in  a  position  to  move  for 
ward.  It  was  evident  that  the  Democratic  party,  if 
it  wished  control  for  the  future,  must  have  as  its 
candidate  a  man  who  would  to  an  extent  harmo 
nize  the  conflicting  elements  in  the  party.  There 
was  need  of  a  leader  who  would  in  some  measure 
assure  a  unity  of  spirit  and  purpose.  The  rapid 
growth  of  the  West  and  Northwest  had  ren 
dered  those  sections  politically  important,  and  past 
attachments  yet  sat  so  lightly  upon  the  people  that 
the  vote  of  these  states  might  be  thrown  one  way  or 
the  other  as  circumstances  seemed  to  require. 
They  might  thus  become  the  deciding  factor  in  any 
future  national  campaign. 

Furthermore,  the  controlling  question  in  national 
politics  now  concerned  the  new  territories  which 
were  seeking  admission  to  the  Union,  and  the  status 
of  slavery  therein.  Douglas,  by  reason  of  his  chair 
manship  of  the  Committee  on  Territories  in  the 
Senate,  was  a  foremost  student  of  these  issues  and 
must  be  reckoned  with  in  any  consideration  of 
them.  Finally,  he  came  from  a  state  which  in 
cluded  a  substantial  number  of  slavery  as  well  as  of 
anti-slavery  men,  and  might  be  expected  to  hold  the 
balance  much  more  nearly  even  than  one  who  was 
distinctly  predisposed  by  surroundings  toward  one 
side  or  the  other.  Since  he  had  entered  the  Senate, 
Douglas  had  gained  in  poise,  and  improved  some 
what  in  manner.  Although  he  retained  many 


168  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Western  roughnesses,  having  never  been  able  to 
overcome  the  effect  of  early  circumstances  and 
conditions,  he  was  at  least  adaptable  upon  the 
surface.  The  discriminating  Ehodes l  remarks  that 
he  ' i  took  on  quickly  the  character  of  his  surround 
ings,  and  in  Washington  society,  he  soon  learned 
the  ease  of  a  gentleman  and  acquired  the  bearing 
of  a  man  of  the  world."  Opinions  to  the  con 
trary  were  of  course  not  lacking,2  but  he  had 
at  least  gained  so  far  in  polish  as  to  be  an  available 
man  even  for  the  highest  office.  Although  he  was 
already  u convivial,"  there  was  at  this  time  "no 
authenticated  instance  of  his  having  drunk  to  such 
excess"  as  to  warrant  a  charge  of  addiction  to 
liquor.  Despite  his  small  stature  he  had  attained 
what  was  considered  an  impressive  personality, 
although,  as  his  friends  admitted,  he  was  i  l  a  little 
bit  corpulent" — a  defect  for  which  he  somewhat 
made  up  by  affecting  fashionable  dress. 

Moreover,  Douglas  had  developed  an  almost 
perfect  political  machine.  He  controlled  every 
Federal  office  in  Illinois,3  and  through  his  friends 
he  practically  controlled  almost  every  state  and 
county  office.  In  other  states  he  had  an  active  and 
influential  personal  organization  and  following. 
It  was  not  strange,  then,  that  as  the  great  figures  of 
his  party  fell  away,  he  should  regard  himself  as 
entitled  to  wear  the  mantle  of  leadership.  Al 
though  he  later  declared  that  he  was  not  so  much  of 

1  History,  Vol.  I.  p.  245.  2See  pp.  139.  et  aeq. 

3Carr,  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  p.  61. 


"  AMERICAN"  FOREIGN  POLICY      169 

a  "  sucker  "  as  to  aspire  to  the  presidency,1  there  is 
ample  evidence  that  before  1850  he  seriously  enter 
tained  this  ambition,  and  the  idea  was  now  begin 
ning  to  find  acceptance  in  other  minds. 

It  was  already  time  to  prepare  for  the  forthcom 
ing  campaign.  Among  those  who  might  fairly  be 
considered  his  rivals  for  the  nomination  of  the 
party  in  1852  were  Cass,  Buchanan  and  Marcy.  To 
shape  his  course  in  such  a  way  as  to  pass  the  older 
and  better  known  figures  in  the  race  was  now 
Douglas's  desire.  He  had  first  to  make  up  his 
mind  as  to  the  consequences  of  his  action  in  con 
nection  with  the  Compromise  of  1850,  and  the  lines 
along  which  he  would  guide  himself  in  the  shifts, 
evasions,  plots,  and  trickeries  that  must  intervene 
between  him  and  the  nomination,  if  he  were  to  get 
it.  The  year  1850  was  closing ;  the  campaign 
would  be  actively  begun  early  in  1852.  He  had, 
therefore,  about  a  year  in  which  to  make  his  prepa 
rations.  First  and  foremost  was  the  question  of 
slavery  and  the  ascertainment  whether  the  country 
at  large  would  accept  the  compromise  measures  of 
1850  as,  for  some  reasonable  time  at  least,  a  set 
tlement.  Douglas  looked  anxiously  about  for 
information  on  this  subject.  In  Illinois,  which 
might  be  regarded  as  a  typical  Western  state  where 
opinion  was  still  two-fold,  conditions  did  not  seem  al 
together  promising.  In  New  England  they  appeared 
still  less  so.  Incidents  reported  from  Massachusetts 
in  connection  with  the  application  of  the  Fugitive 
1  Villard,  Memoirs,  Vol.  I,  p.  96. 


170  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Slave  Law  showed  a  degree  of  excitement  which 
augured  ill  for  the  future.  Southerners  were  quick 
to  charge  that  the  North  was  acting  in  bad  faith  j 
that  it  would  not  enforce  the  legislation  of  Congress. 
As  weeks  went  by,  Douglas  became  convinced  that 
his  only  safety  lay  in  definitely  upholding  the 
Fugitive  Slave  Law,  thereby  gaining  the  support  of 
the  Southern  wing  of  the  party  to  which  he  felt 
himself  more  and  more  drawn,  and  in  attacking 
with  vigor  the  purely  Abolition  group  which  had 
already  caused  him  trouble  in  Illinois,  and  was 
threatening  to  disturb  the  artificial  harmony  estab 
lished  at  Washington.  He  was  of  the  opinion  that 
it  was  still  not  too  late  to  make  an  end  of  the  Aboli 
tion  movement,  and  as  soon  as  he  reached  Washing 
ton  for  the  new  session  of  Congress,  he  vigorously 
assailed  those  who  had  attempted  to  stir  up  general 
feeling  against  the  legislation  comprehended  in  the 
Compromise.  In  this  attitude  Douglas  unexpectedly 
found  himself  supported  by  leaders  in  the  opposi 
tion  party,  who,  despite  their  very  hostile  tactics 
of  the  preceding  session  and  their  refusal  to  vote 
either  way  on  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  were  desir 
ous  of  conciliating  public  opinion.  Especially 
were  they  concerned  in  preventing  Democrats  from 
getting  into  a  position  where  they  could  put  for 
ward  the  claim  that  they  were  the  defenders  of  the 
Constitution.  On  both  sides,  then,  the  effort  to 
sustain  the  Compromise  was  pushed  forward. 
Extremists,  like  Surnner,  who  sought  to  reopen  the 
fugitive  slave  question,  were  rebuked  in  open  Con- 


"  AMERICAN"  FOBEIGN  POLICY      171 

gress.  There  was  thus  uo  chance  of  an  issue  in 
connection  with  slavery,  and,  on  the  whole, 
Douglas's  better  judgment  approved,  for  he  felt 
that,  by  his  action  of  the  preceding  year,  he  had 
already  gained  whatever  political  advantages  were 
to  be  had. 

The  question  still  remained  how  he  should  con 
duct  himself  in  reference  to  the  presidential  situa 
tion.  How  could  he  develop  a  personal  policy 
which  would  seem  to  entitle  him  to  the  nomination  ? 
In  looking  for  such  a  policy  Douglas  and  his 
followers  determined  to  put  forward  the  idea  of  an 
American  system  under  which  the  United  States 
should  develop  a  distinct  position  of  its  own  with 
reference  to  foreign  countries,  giving  up,  in  a  meas 
ure,  the  attitude  of  aloofness  which  had  hitherto 
characterized  it.  It  would  not  to-day  seem  that 
any  prospective  candidate  for  the  presidency 
could  very  confidently  base  his  hopes  for  popular 
support  upon  his  attitude  with  respect  to  foreign 
countries,  or  to  the  position  of  the  United  States  in 
its  relations  with  such  countries.  But  conditions 
sixty  years  ago  were  different.  The  Mexican  War 
had  recently  ended,  the  Cuban  question  was  press 
ing  for  solution,  relations  with  Canada  and  Great 
Britain  were  somewhat  uncertain.  Perhaps  Doug 
las  was  right  in  thinking  that  the  foreign  policy  of 
the  country  afforded  the  best  field  for  his  efforts. 
Immigration,  already  beginning  to  excite  serious 
alarm  in  some  minds,  might  necessitate  important 
negotiations  with  other  countries.  To  one  who  be- 


172  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

lieved  that  the  slavery  question  had  been  set  at  rest 
for  some  time,  the  problem  of  foreign  relations  was 
possibly  the  most  immediate  issue. 

At  any  rate,  Douglas  and  his  friends  went  for 
ward  on  this  theory.  The  foreign  policy  upon 
which  they  now  embarked  was  to  be  framed  in  ac 
cord  with  a  so-called  "  American  idea."  Every 
question  which  brought  the  United  States  into  rela 
tions  with  other  countries  was  to  be  viewed  and 
dealt  with  on  an  "  American"  plan.  In  order  to 
throw  discredit  upon  Webster  and  others  who  were 
following  a  conservative  policy,  designed  to  avoid 
the  development  of  difficulty  with  foreign  nations, 
they  were  to  be  charged  with  "old  fogyism."  As 
a  target  for  practice,  a  minor  issue,  raised  by  the 
arrival  of  Kossuth  in  the  United  States  and  his  de 
sire  that  this  country  should  intervene  in  the  Hun 
garian  situation,  was  set  up.  Douglas's  view,  as 
expressed  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  was  that  the 
same  principle  of  states'  rights  which  he  had  sought 
to  apply  in  the  relations  between  the  states  of  the 
Federal  union  might  be  equally  applicable  to  rela 
tions  between  other  countries  or  sections  of  other 
countries.  Without  very  much  acquaintance  with 
foreign  political  conditions,  he  argued  that  wher 
ever  one  nation  sought  to  intervene  concerning  the 
affairs  of  another,  destroying  the  liberties  or  privi 
leges  of  that  other,  a  third  government  might  take 
a  hand  in  the  struggle  in  order  to  support  the  gen 
eral  idea  of  nationality  and  independence.  As  to 
the  treatment  to  be  accorded  by  the  United  States 


"  AMERICAN"  FOREIGN  POLICY      173 

to  Kossuth  as  an  individual,  Douglas  argued  that 
we  had  a  right  to  do  as  we  pleased  without  regard 
to  what  foreign  countries  might  think.  The  United 
States  must  stand  as  an  independent  nation,  sup 
porting  the  general  abstract  principles  upon  which 
it  had  itself  been  organized.  It  should  minimize, 
so  far  as  possible,  the  dictates  of  diplomatic  usage 
and  the  customs  of  international  relationship  as  con 
trolled  by  the  traditions  of  European  practice. 
This  idea  was  promptly  and  enthusiastically  ac 
cepted  by  the  Douglas  party  and  utterances  based 
upon  it,  sometimes  couched  in  rather  abusive  lan 
guage,  were  put  into  circulation.  In  these  declara 
tions  an  effort  was  made  to  discredit  the  element  in 
national  politics  best  represented  by  Webster. 

Coupled  with  the  general  notion  of  pushing  for 
ward  this  "  American  idea"  in  foreign  politics,  was 
the  concrete  plan  to  favor  the  acquisition  of  Cuba, 
probably  on  a  slavery  basis,  shrewdly  designed  to 
secure  Southern  sympathy  and  votes.  Douglas, 
however,  was  now  convinced  that  it  would  not  be 
wise  to  bring  up  the  question  of  slavery  in  too  acute 
a  form  during  his  campaign  for  the  presidency,  but 
he  did  not  conceal  his  desire  for  the  annexation  of 
Cuba — a  policy  which  he  continued  to  advocate  in 
after  years  at  a  time  when  the  idea  of  accepting  the 
island  was  much  more  offensive  to  the  North.  Pro 
vided  thus  with  a  foreign  policy  which  he  intended 
to  use  for  political  purposes,  especially  in  the  South, 
and  with  the  beginnings  of  an  excellent  organiza 
tion  throughout  the  country,  Douglas  now  needed 


174  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

only  the  kind  of  personal  support  which  would 
come  from,  those  who  believed  that  they  could  ad 
vance  their  own  interests  through  a  new  man,  rather 
than  through  an  older  one  who  had  already  pledged 
himself  to  the  fortunes  of  a  great  number  of  de 
pendents.  In  order  to  consolidate  the  support  that 
he  required  in  this  particular  respect,  Douglas 
definitely  committed  himself  to  the  notion  that  a 
general  change  of  Federal  officials  would  be  desir 
able.  He  practically  declared  war  on  the  men  who 
were  then  holding  the  minor  offices  at  Washington, 
particularly  in  cases  where  these  men  had  not  ren 
dered  recent  and  effective  political  service.  It  is 
necessary,  however,  to  acquit  Douglas  of  acting  in 
consistently  in  this  respect.  He  had  been  a  spoils 
man  from  his  youth  up,  invariably  seeking  to  throw 
such  places  as  he  could  control  to  those  who  had 
done  the  work  of  the  party.  True,  his  influence 
had  never  before  reached  the  large  importance  it 
had  recently  assumed,  yet  there  was  no  reason  why 
he  should  have  applied  to  national  affairs  a  prin 
ciple  different  from  that  in  which  he  believed  as  a 
guide  for  state  and  local  conduct.  In  seeking  to 
draw  to  himself  the  unattached  and  newer  elements 
of  the  party  whose  nomination,  he  believed,  would 
put  him  into  the  presidency,  he  was  not  much 
worse  than  other  politicians  of  his  day.  There  is 
no  evidence  that  in  his  pledges  or  in  his  public  ex 
pressions  of  opinion  he  showed  an  undue  brutality 
or  went  farther  than  his  contemporaries  would  have 
gone  under  similar  temptation. 


"AMEBICAN"  FOBEIGN  POLICY      175 

The  work  of  making  Douglas  his  party's  candidate 
was  being  vigorously  pressed  and  at  first  his  pros 
pects  seemed  very  favorable,  for  the  only  mani 
fest  error  of  his  friends  was  in  attempting  to 
discredit  other  competing  candidates  and  to  outline 
too  distinctly  Douglas's  attitude  on  the  slavery 
question.  Although  he  himself  resorted  to  the 
common  political  device  of  repudiating  much  that 
was  done  in  his  behalf  as  matter  about  which  he 
knew  nothing  and  over  which  he  certainly  had  no 
control,  the  conditions  were  such  as  to  alarm  his 
competitors  for  the  nomination.  Douglas's  candi 
dacy  was  a  new  and  difficult  element  in  the  familiar 
problem  of  presidential  politics,  and  it  was  only 
natural  that  all  should  unite  for  the  moment  in 
order  to  crush  the  candidate  who  was  rising  up  to 
defeat  the  plans  of  the  older  groups.  To  do  this, 
however,  required  time,  and  by  the  close  of  the 
year  1851,  after  a  twelvemonth  of  contriving, 
scheming  and  organizing,  Douglas  believed  himself 
well  on  the  road  to  success.  There  is  every  evi 
dence  that  in  the  early  days  of  1852  he  felt  that  he 
had  matters,  potentially  at  least,  very  much  in  his 
own  hands.  In  an  unpublished  letter  to  a  friend,1 
dated  February  25,  1852,  he  said  :  "  Prospects  look 
well  and  are  improving  every  day.  If  two  or  three 
Western  states  will  speak  out  in  my  favor,  the  battle 
is  over.  Can  anything  be  done  in  Iowa  and  Mis 
souri  ?  That  is  very  important.  If  some  one  could 

1  Manuscript  letter  quoted  'by  Johnson,  Stephen  A.  Douglas, 
p.  203. 


176  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

go  to  Iowa,  I  think  the  convention  in  that  state 
would  instruct  for  me.  In  regard  to  our  own  state, 
I  will  say  a  word.  Other  states  are  appointing  a 
large  number  of  delegates  to  the  convention,  .  .  . 
ought  not  our  state  to  do  the  same  thing  so  as  to 
ensure  the  attendance  of  most  of  our  leading  poli 
ticians  at  Baltimore1?  .  .  .  This  large  number 
would  exert  a  great  moral  influence  on  the  other 
delegates." 

These  hopes  soon  faded.  It  became  more  and 
more  evident  that  the  elder  statesmen  had  taken  the 
alarm  and  that  the  existing  organization  of  the 
party  could  not  be  controlled  in  the  interest  of 
Douglas.  A  few  states  in  which  he  had  succeeded 
in  breaking  ground  with  his  own  organization,  and 
in  which  the  errors  made  by  overzealous  followers 
had  not  aroused  very  strong  prejudice,  caused  their 
delegations  to  be  instructed  for  him.  The  con 
vention  was  to  be  held  on  June  1st  in  Balti 
more.1  Fully  a  month  before,  however,  it  had 
become  quite  evident  that  Douglas's  "boom," 
while  lusty  and  vigorous,  must  be  considered  only 
preliminary  to  something  that  might  develop  in  the 
future.  On  the  first  ballot,  the  convention  gave 
Oass  116  votes,  Buchanan  ninety-three,  Marcy 
twenty-seven,  Douglas  twenty,  and  other  candi 
dates  twenty-five.  The  number  necessary  to  a 
choice  was  188.  On  later  ballots  Cass  lost  ground 
and  Douglas  grew  stronger,  his  maximum  being 

1  Stanwood,  History  of  the  Presidency,  p.  248,  and  same  au 
thority  for  ballot  figures. 


"  AMERICAN"  FOEEIGN  POLICY      177 

reached  on  the  twenty -ninth  ballot  when  he  re 
ceived  ninety-one  votes.  In  that  particular  ballot, 
a  ' l  dark  horse ' '  was  brought  into  the  race.  This 
was  Franklin  Pierce,  who  received  fifteen  votes 
from  the  Virginia  delegation.  Douglas  had  been 
pretty  well  aware  of  the  scheme  which  was  now  to 
be  developed,  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  was 
at  all  disappointed  by  the  result.  He  knew  that 
the  regular  leaders  had  brought  forward  the  name 
of  Pierce,  a  good  many  weeks  before  the  convention 
met,  partly  with  a  view  to  crushing  his  own 
chances  and  partly  because  it  was  believed  that  a 
man  of  a  less  decided  position  on  national  issues 
than  the  old-line  candidates  would  have  a  better 
opportunity  to  win.  Douglas's  support  on  the  first 
ballot  had  come  very  largely  from  his  own  state. 
Even  such  states  as  had  promised  their  aid  had  not 
rallied  to  him  at  the  outset,  either  because  he  him 
self  at  the  last  moment  had  given  orders  to  the  con 
trary,  as  some  have  believed,  or  for  other  reasons. 
The  "  dark-horse'7  plan  met  all  the  expectations  of 
its  advocates.  Mr.  Pierce  gradually  gained  in 
strength  until  on  the  forty -ninth  ballot  he  got  a 
practically  unanimous  vote  of  282,  only  six  votes 
being  cast  for  all  other  candidates.  For  Yice-Presi- 
dent,  William  E.  King  of  Alabama  was  unanimously 
named  on  the  second  ballot,  and  it  is  an  interesting 
fact  that  Douglas  was  not  urged  to  accept  the 
second  place  but  reserved  himself,  wisely  it  then 
seemed,  for  the  greater  prize  at  some  time  in  the 
future. 


178  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Having  fully  anticipated  this  defeat  of  his  hopes, 
Douglas  was  able  to  make  the  customary  display  of 
cordiality  which  is  demanded  by  American  politics 
between  two  rival  candidates  for  office,  after  one 
has  succeeded  and  the  other  has  been  defeated.  He 
telegraphed  his  congratulations  to  the  convention  in 
the  usual  terms,  and  immediately  began  to  cast 
about  for  the  future,  believing  that  at  the  end  of 
the  next  four  years  he  would  be  able  to  make  a  bet 
ter  showing.  An  analysis  of  his  maximum  vote  in 
the  convention  indicated  that  his  organization  was 
well  developed  and  wide-spread.  That  it  had  a  pe 
culiar  staying  quality  was  illustrated  by  the  fact 
that  on  the  very  last  ballot  he  still  had  two  votes. 
What  alarmed  the  older  politicians  even  more  was 
that  he  had  not  exhibited  his  greatest  power  ;  but 
had  evidently  masked  it  to  some  extent  as  soon  as 
he  definitely  understood  that  he  could  not  muster 
the  necessary  number  of  votes.  The  point  at  which 
Douglas  seemed  to  be  lacking  did  not  apparently 
lie  where  his  friends  had  feared  a  year  before,  at 
the  time  when  an  effort  was  made  to  equip  him 
with  a  national  policy.  They  believed  that  he 
would  prove  to  be  weak  as  a  figure  in  the  country 
as  a  whole.  Instead,  singularly  enough,  he  seemed 
to  need  strong  sectional  support.  Although  he  had 
a  good  following  in  New  England  and  the  North, 
he  could  not  of  course  rank  as  a  candidate  of  that 
section.  In  the  same  way,  although  he  was  evi 
dently  well  liked  in  the  South,  he  was  not  yet  defi 
nitely  accepted  as  a  Southern  candidate.  It  was 


"AMEBICAN"  FOEEIGN  POLICY      179 

strange,  but  manifest,  that  he  lacked  strength  in 
the  Middle  West,  exactly  the  region  where  he 
ought  to  have  exhibited  it.  This  was  probably  due 
to  an  overconfident  belief  that  local  pride  without 
positive  work  would  carry  him  forward  in  that  sec 
tion.  But  local  pride  was  then  somewhat  scanty  in 
the  Middle  West,  and  it  would  appear  that  the  ex 
perience  with  the  convention  of  1852  had  convinced 
Douglas  that  he  must  get  the  support  of  some  one 
portion  of  the  Union  for  his  candidacy,  while  of 
course  he  continued  to  draw  around  himself  the 
broadly  distributed  reinforcements  which  every 
presidential  candidate  must  have  in  sections  remote 
from  his  main  seat  of  power.  The  more  cordial 
and  hearty  support  of  the  South  was  indicated  as  a 
remedy  for  the  weakness  in  his  organization  which 
had  manifested  itself  at  the  last  moment  before  the 
critical  struggle  in  1852,  and  toward  the  application 
of  this  specific  the  ambitious  aspirant  must  now 
bend  his  energies. 

Meanwhile  he  had  before  him  what  was  for  the 
moment  a  more  important  contest — that  of  securing 
a  reelection  to  the  Senate  wherein  his  term  was 
now  shortly  to  expire.  The  retention  of  his  seat 
would  evidently  be  necessary  to  the  furtherance  of 
his  presidential  ambitions.  This  task,  however, 
proved  not  to  be  difficult.  He  entered  the  cam 
paign  vigorously,  associating  the  move  for  his  re 
election  with  the  effort  of  his  party  to  elect  the 
new  President.  He  emerged  from  the  fall  contest 
in  1852  with  a  new  term  of  office  for  himself  and 


180  .   STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

with  additional  personal  prestige,  due  to  strenuous 
and  ardent  speaking  of  the  usual  partisan  type  over 
a  very  wide  territory.  It  is  an  interesting  fact  that 
the  territory  wherein  he  appeared  seems  to  have 
been  chosen  with  a  view  to  giving  him  a  chance  to 
appeal  to  an  electorate  with  which  his  weakness  at 
the  convention  had  been  most  obvious. 

Douglas's  utterances,  from  the  time  of  his  defeat 
in  the  national  convention  throughout  the  campaign 
and  on  into  the  next  session  of  Congress,  indicated 
no  belief  on  his  part  that  his  position,  while  a 
candidate,  had  been  erroneously  taken.  He  favored 
Cuban  annexation  during  the  summer  and  fall  of 
1852  and  also  urged,  as  opportunity  offered,  his 
"  American  policy"  in  foreign  affairs.  This 
seemed  to  be  a  policy  of  defiance  to  European 
nations  at  every  point  where  their  wishes  came  into 
conflict  with  our  own.  The  questions  thus  raised, 
however,  were  of  no  particular  interest  during  the 
campaign  and  did  not  assume  importance  until 
after  the  opening  of  the  next  session  of  Congress. 
They  were  then  unexpectedly  made  prominent  by  a 
curious  conjunction  of  events. 

The  question  which  was  suddenly  thrust  forward 
was  the  old  one  of  the  extent  to  which  European 
countries  should  be  allowed  to  exert  an  influence 
in  Central  and  South  America,  and  the  attitude  of 
the  United  States  in  view  of  the  so-called  Monroe 
Doctrine,  whose  meaning  was  still  as  obscure  as 
ever.  The  immediate  difficulty  was  due  to  the 
course  of  Great  Britain.  That  country  was  assert- 


"AMEBICAN"  FOBEIGN  POLICY      181 

ing  rights  over  not  only  the  Mosquito  Coast,  but 
also  islands  off  Honduras.  Friction  had  arisen  be 
tween  Englishmen  and  Americans  at  Greytown  and 
shots  had  been  exchanged.  Fundamentally  the 
issue  involved  was  the  interpretation  of  the  Clayton- 
Bui  wer  treaty,  and  the  position  in  which  the  United 
States  should  stand  there  in  connection  with  the 
Monroe  Dofctrine.  The  constant  irritation  existing 
both  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  and  our  own  ad 
ministration  led  to  a  discussion  in  the  Senate,  which, 
instead  of  being  conducted  in  secret  session,  was 
allowed  to  go  on  upon  the  floor  in  the  presence  of 
the  galleries.  There  was  considerably  more  annoy 
ance  over  the  whole  situation  then  than  would 
probably  be  felt  at  the  present  time.  This  was  due 
to  special  reasons.  The  opening  of  California  had 
raised,  in  an  acute  form,  the  question  of  a  trans- 
Isthmian  route  and  this,  it  was  believed,  should 
run  through  Nicaragua,  which  was  largely  under 
the  influence  of  Great  Britain.  The  Clayton-Bui  wer 
treaty,  negotiated  between  England  and  the  United 
States  on  April  19,  1850,  for  the  purpose  of  im 
proving  the  international  situation,  was  little  more 
than  a  compromise.  Both  nations  had  agreed  to 
cease  their  efforts  to  establish  a  dominating  influence 
in  Central  America,  but  the  terms  of  the  treaty  had 
been  both  obscure  and  unsatisfactory.1  In  favor 
of  the  document  had  been  cast,  among  others,  the 
votes  of  Webster,  Clay,  Seward,  and  Cass,  who  had 
all  at  one  time  or  another  shared  in  the  work  of  the 
1  Treaties  in  Force,  1899,  p.  234. 


182  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

State  Department.1  The  differences,  therefore,  had 
apparently  been  settled  and  to  have  the  trouble 
break  out  afresh  was  alarming  in  a  number  of  ways. 
In  the  Senate  the  general  assumption  had  been  that 
everything  was  disposed  of  by  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  but  when  the  question  of  British  control  of 
the  islands  off  Honduras  came  up,  a  new  element 
was  brought  into  the  situation.  In  the  course  of 
the  debate  already  referred  to,  Cass  disclosed  the 
fact  that  before  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  had  been 
accepted,  the  British  representative  had  expressly 
limited  his  action,  stating  that  the  treaty  had  no 
application  to  Honduras  and  must  not  be  so  inter 
preted.  The  announcement  was  unfortunate  be 
cause  of  the  suggestion  that  everything  had  not 
been  perfectly  frank  at  the  time  of  the  ratification 
of  the  treaty.  Cass  said  that  in  his  opinion  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  agreement  had  included  the  Hon- 
duran  question  which  now  came  up  as  an  entirely 
fresh  issue.  In  order  to  make  the  position  of  the 
United  States  clear,  however,  he  offered  a  resolution 
designed  to  define  the  position  of  the  United  States 
in  regard  to  South  and  Central  America.  This  was 
practically  a  restatement  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Thus  an  opportunity  was  offered  for  a  general  de 
bate  upon  the  question  of  the  nation7  s  foreign  policy. 
Could  Douglas's  "  American  "  system  be  developed 
in  connection  with  the  settlement  of  this  dispute  ? 

Here  at  least  was  an  opportunity  for  a  test.     In 
a  speech  in  the  Senate  he  bitterly  assailed  the 

1  Rhodes,  History,  Vol.  I,  p.  201. 


<  <  AMERICAN ' >  FOREIGN  POLICY      183 

methods  pursued  by  the  administration.  He  at 
tacked  Clayton  with  vigor  for  waiving  certain  priv 
ileges,  which  had  been  assured  to  the  United  States, 
in  regard  to  a  trans-Isthmian  canal.  Incidentally 
he  struck  at  Cass  and  alleged  that  the  Monroe  Doc 
trine  was  a  mere  farce,  entitled  to  no  respect,  since 
we  ourselves  did  not  insist  upon  attention  to  its 
provisions.  Of  Nicaragua  he  said  that  "  her  appeal 
to  the  United  States  for  mediation  or  protection 
against  British  aggression  being  unheeded — her  let 
ters  to  our  government  remaining  unanswered, 
their  receipt  not  even  acknowledged — her  hopes  of 
a  closer  relation  to  this  Union  blasted — the  Monroe 
Doctrine  abandoned — the  Mosquito  kingdom  under 
the  British  protectorate  rapidly  absorbing  her  terri 
tory,  she  sinks  in  despair,  and  yields  herself  to  the 
European  partnership  which  was  about  to  be  estab 
lished  over  all  Central  America  by  the  Clayton- 
Bui  wer  treaty."  Douglas  went  on  to  say  that,  at 
the  time  the  treaty  was  ratified  in  the  Senate,  he 
had  been  dissatisfied  with  the  clause  relating  to  the 
British  protectorate  over  the  Mosquito  Coast.1  He 
now  saw  that  he  had  been  correct  in  this  position. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  being  grossly  violated, 
and  violated  in  such  a  way  as  to  establish  a  general 
principle  of  partnership  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  in  regard  to  Central  American 
affairs.  This  could  not  be  endured,  and  he  himself 

1  Congressional  Globe,  2d  Sesa.,  32d  Cong.,  p.  941.  The  salient 
features  of  the  speech  are  given  in  Sheahan's  Doualas,  pp. 
100-111. 


184  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

proposed  to  stand  firmly  for  the  idea  of  a  pure 
American  system,  since  the  whole  plan  of  European 
colonization  rested  "upon  seizure,  violence  and 
fraud."  Partisan  opponents  might  sneer ingly  ap 
ply  the  term  " young  America"  to  the  effort  to  up 
hold  the  past  policy  of  the  Eepublic,  yet  he  would 
stand  his  ground.  He  went  further  ;  for  he  again 
adverted  to  the  Cuban  question,  asserting  that,  de 
spite  the  opposition  of  England  or  any  other  power, 
he  should  hold  himself  ready  to  favor  the  transfer 
of  Cuba  to  the  United  States  so  soon  as  Spain  should 
conclude  that  she  could  not  longer  maintain  her 
control  over  the  island. 

This  argument  had  been  presented  on  the  14th  of 
February.  The  session  would  come  to  a  close  on 
the  4th  of  March  following  and  Congress  would  re 
assemble  on  the  same  day.  In  the  meanwhile  Clay 
ton  had  been  elected  to  the  Senate  and  the  contro 
versy  was  immediately  reopened.  He  seized  the 
occasion  to  repay  some  of  the  compliments  he  had 
received  from  Douglas  on  the  14th  of  February,  and 
on  the  8th,  or  9th  of  March  he  assailed  "the  Little 
Giant,"  as  he  sneeringly  denominated  his  critic, 
applying  to  him  in  opprobrium  the  epithet  which 
his  devoted  followers  had  bestowed  upon  him  in 
token  of  affection.  Cass,  Mason  and  others  also 
came  in  for  their  share  of  the  rebuke.  Douglas  as 
well  as  his  associates  hastened  to  respond.  In  an 
address  on  the  10th  of  March l  he  reviewed  the  re- 

1  Congressional  Globe,  2d  Sess.,  32d  Cong.,  Appendix,  p.  257, 
et  seq.  Also  Sheahan,  pp.  111-114. 


"AMERICAN"  FOREIGN  POLICY     185 

cent  history  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United 
States,  predicted  its  great  future  growth,  and  in 
flamboyant  language  attacked  the  course  of  those 
who  would  have  crippled  and  fettered  the  nation  in 
its  struggle  for  expansion.  It  was  here,  perhaps, 
that  Douglas  most  plainly  and  boldly  assumed  the 
position  of  contemptuous  defiance  of  European 
countries.  In  so  doing,  and  in  mapping  out  his 
own  particular  line  of  foreign  policy,  he  called  down 
upon  himself  not  only  the  wrath  of  Clayton  but  also 
of  some  of  his  own  party  associates.  These  did  not 
hesitate  to  charge  him  with  unfairness,  narrowness, 
and  partisanship.  The  charge  was  true  and  Doug 
las  could  not  but  feel  that  in  taking  his  extreme 
position,  he  had  overshot  the  mark.  The  debate 
did  not  help  him  particularly,  and  it  may  have 
been  that  some  of  the  intimations  of  ignorance  on 
his  part  concerning  European  conditions  operated 
to  create  in  his  mind  a  feeling  that  he  would  do 
well  to  investigate  these  conditions  at  first-hand. 
Whether  this  was  the  real  cause  of  his  visit  to  Eu 
rope  shortly  after  the  adjournment  of  Congress,  or 
whether  he  sought  merely  rest  and  refreshment  is 
not  certain.  It  would  appear,  however,  that  he  be 
lieved  an  observation  of  European  conditions  on  the 
ground  might  enable  him  to  speak  with  more  au 
thority.  He  went  rapidly  through  England  and  the 
continent,  visiting  Eussia  and  various  points  in 
Turkey  and  Asia  Minor.  It  seems  hard  to  believe 
that  this  brief  vacation  could  have  wrought  any 
real  change  in  the  mental  character  of  the  man,  or 


186  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

that  it  could  have  materially  altered  his  view  of 
public  questions.  Yet  it  is  apparent  that  by  the 
time  of  his  return  he  had  quite  positively  changed 
the  direction  of  his  thought.  Perhaps  the  interval 
of  reflection  and  absence  from  the  scene  of  sharp 
combat  had  enabled  him  to  look  at  things  in  a 
larger  way.  Perhaps  it  had  only  enabled  him  to 
realize  more  keenly  that  the  foreign  question  after 
all  could  not  of  itself  suffice  to  stir  public  feeling  in 
the  United  States.  The  issue  must  be  local ;  it 
must  be  national ;  it  must  be  something  that  would 
serve  to  rouse  factional  and  sectional  interest,  yet 
be  handled  in  a  way  to  bind  together  enough  ele 
ments  to  insure  the  success  of  the  cause.  He  re 
turned  to  the  United  States  toward  the  close  of 
1853,  ready  to  enter  once  more  upon  the  campaign 
for  the  presidency,  and  this  time  with  a  new  issue. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  STRUGGLE 

AT  the  openiog  of  1854  there  were,  for  the  Demo 
cratic  presidential  nomination,  at  least  four  prin 
cipal  candidates  who  had  been  disappointed  in  1852 
and  whose  ambition  still  remained  to  be  satisfied. 
Marcy  relied  upon  his  record  and  upon  his  attitude 
with  respect  to  Cuba. l  Buchanan  had  accepted  the 
English  mission,  but,  despite  a  letter  withdraw 
ing  from  active  politics,  few  regarded  him  as 
thoroughly  sincere  in  this  expression.  General 
Cass  was  looking  to  the  presidency  as  the  repre 
sentative  of  the  Northwest.  Pierce,  of  course,  like 
every  other  President,  desired  a  second  term.  The 
question  before  Douglas,  as  in  1852,  was  how,  by 
manipulation  within  the  party,  to  seize  the  prize 
and  make  off  with  it  before  the  eyes  of  his  four  dis 
appointed  competitors. 

As  has  already  been  noted,  Douglas  had  made  ma 
terial  progress  in  consolidating  his  influence  at  the 
South,  yet  he  lacked  the  hearty  support  of  the 
Southern  politicians.  His  first  marriage,  to  a 
Southern  woman,  had  not  been  taken  as  sufficient 
evidence  of  his  complete  allegiance  to  Southern 
ideals,  especially  as  he  had  declined  the  legacy  of 
slaves  whose  ownership  might  have  passed  to  him. 

Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  I,  pp.  423-424. 


188  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Douglas's  manners  and  methods  still  failed  to  ac 
cord  with  the  supposedly  aristocratic  predilections 
of  Southern  leaders,  for  he  was  enough  of  the 
Western  type  of  politician  to  like  to  talk  about  the 
humbleness  of  his  beginnings  and  the  fact  that  he 
had  been  a  cabinet-maker  while  a  youth.  It  was 
apparently  indispensable  to  Douglas  that  he  should 
overcome  the  lurking  sentiment  of  distrust  which 
Southerners  entertained  in  regard  to  him,  and 
should  convince  them  that  only  by  supporting  him 
could  they  gain  a  representative  who  would  com 
mand  Northern  and  Western  votes  and  would  at  the 
same  time  be  sufficiently  friendly  toward  the  main 
tenance  of  slavery  in  those  parts  of  the  country 
where  it  already  existed.  One  hundred  and  seven 
teen  electoral  votes1  would  be  accredited  to  the 
South  in  the  next  national  Democratic  convention. 
It  was  a  fair  inference,  from  existing  conditions, 
that  no  Southerner  could  get  the  nomination  and 
Douglas,  therefore,  regarded  himself  as  essentially 
the  man  of  the  hour.  There  still  remained  the  need 
for  some  issue  upon  which  he  could  demonstrate 
conclusively  his  pro-Southern  sympathies,  his 
power  to  control  a  substantial  following,  and  his 
ability  to  manipulate  and  mold  men  to  his  pleasure. 
The  attempt  to  develop  a  characteristic  foreign 
policy  had  not  succeeded,  but  as  chairman  of  the 
Committee  on  Territories  Douglas  and  his  friends 
believed  that  he  could  create  a  situation  which  he 
could  use  to  his  own  advantage.  With  a  dominat- 

1  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  I,  p.  425. 


THE  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  STRUGGLE    189 

iDg  power  in  his  own  committee  and  with  an  inti 
mate  acquaintance  with  territorial  questions,  it 
might  be  possible  to  make  what  would  probably  be 
a  master-stroke  for  the  presidency. 

The  territory  of  Nebraska  had  been  seeking  or 
ganization  and  a  measure  providing  for  the  crea 
tion  of  the  territory,  which  had  passed  the  House  in 
the  session  of  1852-1853,  had  failed  to  receive  action 
in  the  Senate.  An  identical  measure  was  intro 
duced  early  in  December,  1853,  and  was  of  course 
sent  to  Douglas's  committee  where  it  was  pending 
at  the  opening  of  the  following  January.  The 
question  now  was  what  to  do  with  the  bill.  Imme 
diately  after  the  holiday  recess  on  January  4,  1854, 
Douglas  reported  it.  In  his  report,  he  reviewed 
the  compromise  measures  of  1850,  asserting  three 
fundamental  propositions  which  he  said  inhered  in 
them.  The  first  was  that  all  questions  relating  to\ 
slavery  in  the  territories,  and  the  new  states  to  be 
formed  therefrom,  could  be  determined  only  by  the 
decision  of  the  residents  of  such  states.  The  second 
was  that  all  cases  involving  the  title  to  slaves  must 
be  dealt  with  by  local  tribunals  but  with  the  right 
of  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.  The  third  was  that  the  provision  of 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  regarding  fugitive 
slaves  must  be  faithfully  executed  in  all  the  organ 
ized  territories  just  as  in  the  states  themselves. 

It  seems  impossible  to  avoid  the  belief  that 
this  report  was  intended  to  reawaken  or  at  any 
rate  to  stimulate  the  anti- slavery  controversy,  whose 


190  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

bitterness  had  been  temporarily  allayed.  The 
Missouri  Compromise  had  provided  that  slavery 
should  not  be  allowed  to  exist  north  of  36°  30'  north 
latitude,  outside  of  the  state  of  Missouri,  yet  in  this 
report  Douglas  now  took  the  view  that  t  i  in  the 
opinion  of  those  eminent  statesmen  who  hold  that 
Congress  is  invested  with  no  rightful  authority  to 
legislate  upon  the  subject  of  slavery  in  the  territo 
ries"  the  Missouri  Compromise  was  "null  and 
void."  In  spite  of  this  alleged  view  attributed  to 
"  eminent  statesmen,"  Douglas  did  not  propose  the 
repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  j  he  recom 
mended  that  the  question  of  slavery,  in  the  face  of 
the  terms  of  that  compromise,  should  be  le"flTto  the 
decision  of  the  inhabitanti^of  the  territory  which 
it  was  proposed  to  organize  as  Nebraska.  Ne 
braska  as  then  defined  Tncluded  not  only  the 
present  state  of  that  name  but  also  both  North  and 
South  Dakota,  Kansas,  Wyoming,  Montana  and 
a  part  of  Colorado.  "With  very  nearly  half  a  mil 
lion  square  miles  of  territory  and  with  a  white  pop 
ulation  consisting  of  but  a  few  hundred  settlers 
and  squatters,  the  territory  was  as  yet  a  virgin  field 
whose  character  and  industrial  development  were 
still  to  be  determined.  By  setting  aside  the  Mis 
souri  Compromise,  Douglas  proposed  to  reopen  for 
coming  years  the  agitation  over  the  existence  of 
slavery  in  this  enormous  Western  region.  He  thus 
held  out  to  the  Southern  states  a  possibility  of  gain 
ing,  through  the  exploitation  of  the  West  upon 
slaveholding  principles,  that  final  and  unquestion- 


THE  KANSAS-NEBEASKA  STEUGGLE    191 

able  domination  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
which  they  had  long  desired.  He  therefore  once 
more  opened  the  bitter  dispute  which  seemed  to 
have  been  temporarily  settled  by  the  acceptance  of 
the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  in  the  North  and  by  the  defi 
nite  determination  of  the  status  of  slavery  in  all 
those  regions  where  it  had  become  established. 
Under  these  conditions,  it  seems  not  too  much  to 
assert  that  the  new  proposal  was  intended  to  open  a 
road  to  the  presidency  which  was  to  be  purchased 
at  the  heavy  cost  of  renewed  sectional  warfare. 

It  has  been  charged  that  Douglas  sought  the  re 
peal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  in  order  that  more 
slave  territory  might  be  admitted,  and  that  the 
slave  power  might  ultimately  dominate  the  Con 
gress  of  the  United  States.  There  is  no  evidence 
of  a  satisfactory  character  that  such  was  the  case. 
James  Ford  Ehodes l  suggests  that  Douglas  might 
have  used  the  words  of  Frederick  the  Great  when 
he  began  the  unjust  war  against  Austria  for  the  con 
quest  of  Silesia.  '  '  Ambition,  interest,  the  desire  of 
making  people  talk  about  me,  carried  the  day,  and 
I  decided  "  to  renew  the  agitation  of  slavery.  This 
contention  has  been  well  and  satisfactorily  answered 
by  Allen  Johnson,  one  of  Douglas's  most  sympa 
thetic  biographers,2  who  shows  clearly  that  Douglas's 
general  principles  bound  him  to  the  view  that 
slavery  in  its  successful  and  profitable  application 
was  undoubtedly  circumscribed  by  nature.  Slavery 

1  History  of  the  United  States,  Vol.  I,  p.  430. 
8  Johnson,  Life  of  Douglas,  p.  234. 


192  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

had  proved  a  failure  in  New  England  and  in  every 
Northern  state  in  which  it  had  been  given  a  trial. 
A  peculiar  type  of  industry,  agricultural  and  patri 
archal  in  character,  had  grown  up  in  the  South. 
This  " plantation  system"  had  been  successful 
largely  because  of  the  rapid  expansion  of  the 
factory  system  abroad,  resulting  as  it  did  in  a  direct 
demand  for  raw  products,  particularly  cotton. 
Manufacturing  had  not  developed  sufficiently  in  the 
North  to  make  an  effectual  demand  for  Southern 
products.  Thus  Southerners  fell  into  the  habit  of 
considering  their  states  as  a  separate  " section" — 
economically  far  closer  to  Europe  than  to  the 
Northern  and  Western  members  of  the  Union. 
There  was  no  reason  why  Southerners  should  have 
expected  the  perpetual  maintenance  of  slavery,  and 
in  some  of  the  Southern  states,  notably  in  Virginia, 
there  was  already  a  vigorous  agitation  against  the 
peculiar  institution,  largely  on  economic  grounds, 
since  it  was  already  perceived  that  slave  labor 
would  become  decreasingly  profitable.  To  these 
considerations  should  be  added  the  fact  that  Douglas 
himself  was  always  to  an  eminent  degree  guided  by 
motives  of  temporary  validity.  He  had  but  little 
foresight,  and  few  of  his  policies  were  framed  with 
a  view  to  their  ultimate  effect.  He  had  neither  the 
temper  nor  the  nature  of  the  statesman,  and  he  was 
at  all  times  too  open  to  the  claims  of  personal  ad 
vantage  to  be  willing  to  sacrifice  immediate  gain 
for  the  sake  of  a  principle.  It  was  undoubtedly  so 
in  regard  to  the  Nebraska  bill.  Douglas  looked 


THE  KANSAS-NEBEASKA  STEUGGLE    193 

for  an  immediate  issue  and  lie  found  one  in  the  re 
vival  of  a  controversy  whose  effects  he  could  not 
foresee ;  these  he  would  leave  the  future  to  take 
care  of.  That  the  plan  was  framed  with  the  idea 
of  extending  slave  territory  can  hardly  be  believed. 
The  whole  burden  of  the  proof  goes  to  show  that  it 
was  merely  a  political  manoeuvre  designed  to  secure 
an  immediate  partisan  advantage. ! 

Even  the  severe  critics  of  Douglas  have  admitted 
that  there  was  no  scheming  between  the  would-be 
President  and  the  Southern  interests  whose  support 
he  wished  to  enlist.2  There  had  been  no  prior  con 
sultations.  This  was  the  flat  and  positive  assertion 
of  Douglas  himself  when  he  said  on  February 
23,  1855,  that  the  bill  "  was  written  by  myself,  at 
my  own  house,  with  no  man  present.77  According 
to  his  own  statement  he  first  secured  the  approval 
of  representatives  of  Western  interests.  Later  the 
Western  men  sought  to  get  the  aid  of  the  Southern 
ers  in  Congress.  The  bill  almost  immediately  be 
came  highly  popular  with  the  Southern  element. 
This  fact  impressed  the  anti-slavery  party  and 
Northerners  generally.  The  real  moving  spirit  in 
the  legislation  was  said  by  some  to  be  Toombs,  by 
others  Stephens,  and  by  others  Atchison.  Atch- 
ison,  like  some  more  recent  legislators,  sought  the 
credit  for  a  bill  he  had  never  originated,  and 
boasted  that  Douglas  had  acted  at  his  dictation, 

1  Cf.  A  New  Explanation  of  Senator  Douglas's  Motives,  Ap 
pendix  I,  Ray's  Repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  pp.  237-242. 

2  Rhodes,  History,  Vol.  I,  p.  431. 


194  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

The  Southerners  in  fact  were  ready  to  take  the 
fullest  advantage  of  the  alliance  now  proposed  to 
them,  without  necessarily  committing  themselves  to 
make  any  compensation  for  the  service.  They 
sought  to  graft  upon  the  measure  a  provision 
whereby  citizens  of  any  state  or  territory  might  take 
their  slaves  into  any  of  the  territories  of  the  United 
States  or  states  in  future  to  be  created  out  of  these 
territories.  Such  an  amendment  had  been  offered 
by  Senator  Dixon  of  Kentucky  on  January  16th, 
much  to  the  alarm  of  Douglas,  who  saw  the  control 
of  the  situation  slipping  out  of  his  hands,  and  now 
perhaps  dimly  recognized  the  nature  of  the  tempest 
he  had  stirred  up.1 

Dixon  did  not  yield  to  any  of  Douglas's  urgent 
requests  that  he  withhold  his  amendment,  notwith 
standing  the  strong  and  positive  representations 
made  by  the  author  of  the  new  bill,  who  left  his 
seat  for  that  purpose.  In  response,  Dixon  admitted 
that  unless  the  Missouri  Compromise  was  expressly 
repealed,  it  would  continue  to  operate  in  the  terri 
tory  of  Nebraska.  This  was  good  reasoning,  and 
Douglas  now  saw  himself  obliged  to  accept  the 
logic  of  the  situation  by  incorporating  the  amend 
ment.  He  was  moreover  driven  to  this  concession 
through  the  action  of  Senator  Sumner  of  Massa 
chusetts,  who  on  January  17th,  offered  an  amend 
ment  whereby  the  slavery  clause  of  the  Missouri 

1  Dixon,  True  History  of  the  Repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise, 
p.  458,  et  seq.  Cf .  also  Ray,  Repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise, 
p.  210,  et.  seq. 


THE  KANSAS  NEBEASKA  STEUGGLE    195 

Compromise  was  positively  reaffirmed.  In  choosing 
between  these  two  conflicting  amendments,  Douglas 
necessarily  committed  himself  to  the  Dixon  plan 
and  therefore  accepted  the  duty  of  expressly  repeal 
ing  the  Missouri  Compromise.  Thus  bound  to  an 
extreme  view  of  the  Nebraska  situation,  in  spite  of 
his  original  intent  to  leave  the  bill  in  an  ambiguous 
position  which  would  render  it  available  as  a  sub 
ject  for  future  political  jugglery,  he  saw  the  need  of 
time  for  reflection  and  for  the  rearrangement  of  his 
forces.  Opponents  felt  the  same  need  in  respect  to 
their  forces.  Eemarkable  interest  had  been  mani 
fested  throughout  the  country  at  large,  and  both 
sides  desired  to  get  into  touch  with  their  following 
among  the  voters.  The  anti-slavery  newspapers 
were  quick  to  publish  articles  assuming  the  exist 
ence  of  a  general  conspiracy  on  the  part  of  the 
slavery  men,  while  opponents  were  equally  ready  to 
take  a  partisan  view.  Mingled  with  the  strong  and 
deep  undercurrent  of  feeling  about  slavery  was  the 
effort  to  use  a  little  of  the  power  thus  set  free  for 
the  purpose  of  whirling  one  or  another  of  the  rival 
candidates  into  the  presidential  office.  Already 
there  had  been  efforts  on  the  part  of  others  beside 
Douglas  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity,  and 
to  get  such  credit  as  might  come  from  the  new 
political  situation.  To  gain  time,  Sumner  asked 
that  the  bill  be  deferred  until  January  31st. 
Douglas,  according  to  his  faithful  apologist  Shea- 
han,1  " acquiesced"  in  this  request,  but  there  is 
1  Sheahan,  Life,  p.  193. 


196  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

every  reason  to  suppose  that  he  was  delighted  with 
the  suggestion. 

It  was  now  an  important  question  to  ascertain  the 
position  of  President  Pierce.  Partly  because  of  his 
open  candidacy  for  a  second  term  in  an  office  which 
the  senator  from  Illinois  wished  for  himself  ;  partly 
because  of  the  desire  to  be  the  sole  leader  in  the 
attack  on  the  Missouri  Compromise,  Douglas  had 
had  no  word  with  the  President  prior  to  the  time 
that  the  bill  made  its  appearance  on  the  floor. 
He  now  recognized  that  the  struggle  which  he 
had  precipitated  would  involve  a  much  more  bitter 
political  contest  than  had  been  expected.  His 
personal  following  was  evidently  not  sufficiently 
strong  to  control  the  situation  in  the  House,  and  he 
found  himself  forced  to  enlist  the  President,  if  pos 
sible,  on  his  side.  The  Washington  Uniorij  the 
personal  organ  of  President  Pierce,1  had  already 
given  approval  to  the  original  Douglas  bill,  while 
refusing  it  to  the  Dixon  amendment.  Time  was 
growing  short  and  it  was  determined  to  bring 
the  issue  with  the  temporizing  President  to  a 
head  at  once.  Douglas  was  so  fully  committed  to 
the  extreme  Southern  element  that  he  resolved  to 
work  directly  and  openly  with  them.  He  called 
for  aid  upon  Jefferson  Davis,  then  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  Davis  agreed  to  secure  a  personal  inter 
view  with  President  Pierce  at  a  time  when  they 
could  be  undisturbed.  Pierce  preferred  not  to 
transact  public  business  on  Sunday,  but  Davis 
1  Quoted  by  Rhodes,  Vol.  I,  p.  436. 


THE  KANSAS-NEBBASKA  STBUGGLE    197 

ventured  to  disregard  this  preference,  and  took 
Douglas  and  several  others  to  the  White  House  on 
the  morning  of  the  22d  of  January.  The  bill  was 
read  to  President  Pierce,  and  the  latter  finally 
yielded  to  the  representations  of  his  visitors,  en 
dorsing  not  only  the  Douglas  bill  but  also  the  Dixon 
amendment,  and  thus  committing  himself  to  Davis 
and  the  extreme  Southern  wing  of  the  Senate. 
Pierce,  in  fact,  felt  that  a  crucial  issue  had  been 
presented  to  him,  and  that  to  refuse  to  meet  the 
ideas  of  the  Southerners  represented  by  Davis  would 
enable  Douglas  and  the  other  aspirants  for  the 
presidency  to  control  some  support  which  he 
deemed  necessary  to  his  own  political  fortunes. 
Pierce,  moreover,  was  strongly  friendly  to  Davis  in 
a  personal  way,  and  saw  an  opportunity  to  secure 
the  further  approval  of  the  officer  upon  whom  he  so 
heavily  leaned. 

With  the  support  of  the  President  assured,  and 
with  Davis  and  the  Southern  element  behind  him, 
Douglas  prepared  to  make  a  decisive  step.  On  the 
23d  (Monday)  he  offered  a  bill  to  take  the  place 
of  that  which  he  had  first  introduced.  The  new 
bill  positively  conceded  the  points  raised  by  South 
ern  interests.  It  asserted  that  the  slavery  clause 
of  the  Missouri  Compromise  was  "  superseded, " 
and  was  therefore  "  declared  inoperative."  A 
division  of  Nebraska  into  two  territories,  the 
northern  to  be  called  Nebraska,  the  southern 
Kansas,  was  a  new  feature  of  the  plan. 

The  proposal  to  create  two  territories  instead  of 


198  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

one  is  of  obscure  origin.  Some  have  asserted  that 
the  arrangement  looked  forward  to  the  creation  of 
a  slave  state  and  a  free  state.  Others  have  believed 
that  it  was  intended  to  render  more  easily  possible 
the  extension  of  slavery  at  a  future  time,  since  the 
slave  interest  was  stronger  in  the  proposed  terri 
tory  of  Nebraska  than  in  Kansas.  Others  have 
contended  that  the  scheme  was  designed  merely  to 
give  better  promise  to  local  politicians  in  adjoining 
states,  and  to  advance  the  pretensions  of  separate 
Northern  and  Southern  transcontinental  railways 
instead  of  a  single  route  passing  through  the  centre 
of  the  territory.  No  conclusive  evidence  seems  to 
be  available  as  to  which  of  these  considerations  led 
to  the  proposed  division,  although  more  recent 
investigators  have  taken  the  view  that  it  was  the 
railroad  situation,  rather  than  considerations  affect 
ing  slavery.  The  bill  at  all  events  was  satisfactory 
to  the  Southern  interests,  as  was  evidenced  almost 
immediately  upon  the  floor.  A  formidable  coali 
tion  had  been  brought  about,  including  the  per 
sonal  following  of  Douglas,  the  Western  interests 
which  liked  the  proposed  measure  independent  of 
its  slavery  feature,  the  Southern  group  of  senators, 
and  the  Pierce  administration — the  last,  however, 
being  counted  upon  principally  for  its  influence  in 
the  House  of  Eepresentatives.  The  President  at 
once  carried  out  the  first  part  of  what  he  had 
bargained  to  do  by  inspiring  an  article  in  the 
Washington  Union  in  support  of  the  new  measure. 
Under  such  circumstances,  it  was  plainly  necessary 


THE  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  STRUGGLE    199 

that  the  anti-slavery  men  should  be  looking  about 
them  if  they  expected  to  prevent  the  realization  of 
the  enemy' s  plans. 

The  opposition's  call  to  action  was  prepared  by 
Chase,  Sunnier,  Giddings  and  Gerrit  Smith  who, 
with  two  representatives  from  Ohio  and  Massa 
chusetts,  signed  a  paper  called  the  i  i  Appeal  of  the 
Independent  Democrats  in  Congress  to  the  People 
of  the  United  States."  This  was  printed  in  the 
Congressional  G-lobe  under  date  of  January  19th,  but 
it  was  really  written  on  the  23d,  at  least  in  part. 
Its  preparation  had  probably  occupied  most  of  the 
Saturday  and  Sunday  preceding.  It  was  a  strong 
partisan  address  to  the  anti- slavery  men  of  the 
country,  based  upon  the  assertion  that  the  Douglas 
bill  would  open  to  slavery  all  the  unorganized 
territory  of  the  Union.  The  bill,  thought  the 
authors  of  the  a  Appeal,"  was  framed  in  gross  dis 
regard  of  a  pledge,  and  was  an  effort  to  cancel  an 
agreement  for  many  years  regarded  as  an  inviolable 
American  law,  the  Missouri  Compromise.  The 
11  Appeal"  was  particularly  severe  in  its  references 
to  Douglas,  and  according  to  the  latter's  principal 
biographer  "  roused  the  tiger  "  in  him.  Whatever 
may  be  thought  of  this  euphemistic  description,  it 
is  certainly  true  that  in  his  rejoinder  on  the  30th 
of  January  Douglas  showed  himself  at  his  worst. 
Not  only  did  he  indulge  in  childish  personal  taunts 
directed  against  the  authors  of  the  "  Appeal,"  but 
he  resorted  to  unfounded  and  ill-judged  efforts  to 
demonstrate  the  inaccuracy  of  the  historical  por- 


200  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

tioiis  of  the  document.  He  was  considerably 
stronger  when  he  passed  to  a  discussion  of  actual 
conditions  in  the  Nebraska  Territory,  and  predicted 
the  unsuitability  of  slavery  as  a  system  of  industry 
for  that  part  of  the  country. 

The  bitterness  of  Douglas's  rejoinder  and  the  per 
sonalities  in  which  he  indulged  indicated  that 
the  supporters  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  were 
by  no  means  so  strongly  united  as  some  had  sup 
posed.  In  fact,  there  was  already  doubt  about  the 
wisdom  of  so  extreme  a  measure.  Douglas's  speech 
on  the  floor  was  not  well  received  at  the  time  and 
was  described  by  listeners  as  i  i  senatorial  billings 
gate,"  " intemperate  violence,"  and  as  " more  be 
coming  a  pot-house  than  the  Senate."  l  Most  of 
the  criticisms  at  the  time  came  from  those  hostile  to 
Douglas  and  friends  said  little.  Apart  from  the 
abusive  language  that  had  been  employed,  he 
had  perhaps  done  about  as  well  as  could  have 
been  expected  under  the  circumstances.  The  re 
ply  of  Chase  was  considered  by  Douglas's  party 
as  "a  lame  apology,"  but  the  incident,  coupled 
with  the  popular  favor  granted  to  the  "  Appeal," 
had  alarmed  many  members  of  the  Northern  Demo 
cratic  party  who  were  personally  attached  to  Doug 
las.  The  shrewder  Southern  men  thought  it  best 
to  take  heed  and  to  remain  content  with  what  they 
had  in  hand  without  seeking  to  push  slavery 
farther  toward  the  North.  Some  concession  was 

1  Quoted  from  contemporary  newspapers  by  Rhodes,  Vol.  I, 
p.  445. 


THE  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  STKUGGLE    201 

deemed  wise,  and  it  was  finally  agreed  that  a  clause 
should  be  inserted  recognizing  that  the  Constitu 
tion  was  of  controlling  authority  in  the  matter ;  no 
effort  would  be  made  to  change  the  constitutional 
position  of  slavery.  On  the  7th  of  February,  there 
fore,  Douglas,  yielding  to  the  opinion  of  his  Demo 
cratic  associates  as  expressed  in  caucus,  proposed 
an  amendment  to  the  fourteenth  section  of  the  bill 
providing  "that  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the 
United  States,  which  are  not  locally  inapplicable, 
shall  have  the  same  force  and  effect  within  the  said 
Territory  of  Nebraska  as  elsewhere  within  the 
United  States  except  the  eighth  section  of  the  Act 
preparatory  to  the  admission  of  Missouri  into  the 
Union,  ...  it  being  the  true  intent  and  mean 
ing  of  this  Act  not  to  legislate  slavery  into  any 
territory  or  state,  nor  to  exclude  it  therefrom,  but 
to  leave  the  people  thereof  perfectly  free  to  form 
and  regulate  their  domestic  institutions  in  their 
own  way,  subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States." l  On  the  15th  this  amendment 
was  accepted  by  a  vote  of  thirty-five  to  ten.  Chase 
immediately  moved  to  add  after  the  clause  already 
quoted  the  following  words  :  ' '  Under  which  the 
people  of  the  territory  through  their  appropriate 
representatives  may,  if  they  see  fit,  prohibit  the  ex 
istence  of  slavery  therein."  On  this  proposal,  after 
some  discussion,  debate  continued  in  general  chan 
nels  until  March  2d,  when  it  was  rejected.  By 
those  who  voted  against  the  amendment,  it  was 
1  Congressional  Globe,  1st  Sess.,  33d  Cong.,  p.  421. 


202  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

urged  that  no  such  clause  ought  to  be  incorporated 
because,  while  it  permitted  the  people  of  Nebraska 
to  prohibit,  it  did  not  allow  them  to  introduce, 
slavery  and  was  therefore  an  entirely  partisan  pro 
posal. 

Clayton  next  sought  to  secure  an  amendment  to 
the  bill.  He  had  complained  that  the  non-inter 
ference  of  Congress  with  the  affairs  of  the  territory 
would  amount  to  nothing,  if  a  member  of  Congress 
could  propose  the  repeal  of  any  territorial  law 
which  might  be  submitted  to  the  legislative  body 
for  its  approval.  Douglas,  therefore,  finally  pro 
posed  to  make  territorial  legislation  non-submis- 
sible  to  Congress ;  but  Clayton  was  still  dis 
satisfied.  He  moved  to  deprive  all  persons  within 
the  territory,  not  fully  naturalized,  of  the  privi 
lege  of  voting,  and  this  amendment  was  carried 
against  the  wish  of  Douglas  by  a  vote  of  twenty - 
three  to  twenty-one.  After  a  few  other  minor 
changes,  the  bill  was  reported  from  the  Committee 
of  the  Whole.  All  the  amendments  made  by 
that  committee  were  concurred  in,  save  only  the 
Clayton  amendment  which  again  passed  by  a 
recorded  vote  of  twenty -two  to  twenty.  On  March 
3d  the  bill  was  put  upon  its  passage  and  the  debate 
continued  until  long  after  midnight,  being  adopted 
at  about  5  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  March  4th 
by  a  vote  of  thirty-seven  to  fourteen.  It  then 
went  to  the  House  and  was  there  advanced  by 
the  use  of  the  influence  of  the  administration, 
passing  on  May  22d  by  a  vote  of  113  to  100.  From 


THE  KANSAS-NEBKASKA  STBUGGLE    203 

the  House  it  went  directly  back  to  the  Senate 
where  it  was  discussed  on  the  24th  and  25th. 
Finally  the  debate  was  closed  by  Douglas  on  the 
morning  of  the  26th  and  the  measure  was  adopted 
without  division. 

Douglas  had  still  to  hear  from  the  people.  He 
had  already  been  alarmed  by  the  excessive  violence 
of  his  opponents,  and  by  the  vigorous  protest  that 
had  been  received  from  the  country  at  large.  The 
"  Appeal"  had  aroused  an  extraordinary  amount 
of  sympathy  throughout  the  North  and  West.  Keso- 
lutions  denouncing  the  bill  had  been  adopted  by  the 
legislature  of  Ehode  Island *  early  in  the  discussion, 
while  numerous  petitions,  remonstrances  and  reso 
lutions  from  all  classes  and  conditions  of  men,  from 
societies  and  associations,  and  from  large  bodies 
of  clergymen,  had  been  transmitted  to  Congress. 
Douglas  was  accustomed  to  such  ebullitions  and 
under  ordinary  circumstances  probably  would  not 
have  noticed  them.  The  expression  of  public  feel 
ing  had,  however,  been  so  remarkable  and  insistent 
that  probably  no  man  gifted  with  the  power  to  rec 
ognize  public  sentiment  as  he  was  could  have  failed 
to  understand  the  unpopularity  of  the  measure.  But 
he  had  early  seen  that  there  was  no  way  of  retreat. 
He  paid  little  heed  to  the  expressions  of  Boston 
anti-slavery  agitators  or  to  the  burnings  in  effigy 
to  which  he  was  subjected.  He  was,  however,  very 
much  worried  about  the  situation  in  Chicago.  In 
that  city,  the  testimony  of  the  clergy  had  been 
,  Life,  p.  198. 


204  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

almost  unanimously  against  him.  As  early  as  the 
27th  of  March,  in  a  public  meeting  in  Chicago,  at 
which  twenty -five  clergymen  were  present,  resolu 
tions  denouncing  Douglas  had  been  passed — in  part 
because  of  his  sneers  at  the  protest  submitted  to  the 
Senate  by  more  than  3,000  New  England  clergymen. 
Douglas  thought  it  worth  while  to  write  an  elab 
orate  letter  in  reply,  but  the  fact  that  he  had  no 
newspaper  which  would  act  as  a  personal  organ  in 
Chicago  made  the  task  of  rebutting  the  current  at 
tacks  difficult.  The  press  was  almost  unanimous  in 
denouncing  his  course.  The  passage  of  the  bill  set 
him  free  to  attempt  to  rehabilitate  himself. 

Congress  had  adjourned  about  the  1st  of  August, 
and  Douglas  reached  Chicago  about  the  25th  of 
the  month.  He  there  found  himself  attacked  by 
a  vigorous  and  widely  organized  opposition  which 
resorted  to  radical  measures  for  the  purpose  of 
venting  its  displeasure.  It  seemed  necessary  to 
attempt  some  public  reply  to  the  extreme  ex 
pressions  of  disapproval  with  which  he  had  been 
greeted,  and  he  therefore  announced  that  on  the 
1st  of  September  he  would  make  an  effort  to  answer 
his  critics.  The  notice  was  in  the  usual  form  of  a 
promise  to  address  his  constituents,  and  the  place 
named  was  the  square  in  front  of  North  Market 
Hall.  It  would  probably  have  been  better  if  he 
had  waited  until  public  feeling  had  become  some 
what  less  intense.  Hardly  had  the  announcement 
been  made,  when  absurd  stories  began  to  be  circu 
lated  with  reference  to  the  arrangements  for  the 


THE  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  STRUGGLE    205 

meeting.  Douglas  had  written  to  friends  outside 
the  city  asking  as  many  of  them  as  possible  to  come 
to  Chicago  and  be  present.1  But  this  request,  and 
other  utterances  of  the  same  sort,  were  distorted, 
and  it  was  stated  that  a  substantial  body-guard 
armed  and  ready  to  compel  silence  would  attend. 
There  was  no  evidence  that  any  armed  demonstra 
tion  had  been  planned.  The  situation,  however, 
was  such  as  might  have  been  thought  to  demand 
something  of  the  kind.  Sheahan  graphically  de 
scribes  the  half-masting  of  flags  and  the  doleful 
tolling  of  the  bells  of  numerous  churches  as  even 
ing  closed  in.  At  the  appointed  hour,  Douglas 
tried  to  address  the  mob  but  the  abuse,  hisses,  out 
cries  and  offensive  conduct  generally  were  such 
that  he  was  not  able  to  offer  any  connected  ar 
gument.  After  two  hours  of  effort  to  get  a  hear 
ing,  he  lost  the  composed  and  determined  man 
ner  which  had  characterized  him  from  the  outset 
and  which  had  had  a  powerful  effect  even  upon  his 
opponents-  He  was  obliged  at  last  to  give  up  the 
attempted  vindication  and  with  a  final  outburst  of 
ill-temper,  he  passed  through  the  hostile  crowds  to 
his  hotel. 

The  Kansas- Nebraska  Act,  brought  forward  as  a 
political  game,  had  reacted  upon  its  originator  and 
had  almost  proved  his  undoing.  The  law  in  fact 
had  opened  a  new  phase  of  Douglas's  career,  for 
from  this  time  until  the  open  break  with  the  South 
he  was  hopelessly  identified  with  slavery,  certainly 
1  Manuscript  letter  quoted  by  Johnson,  Life,  p.  258. 


206  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

in  the  minds  of  all  his  opponents,  and  to  a  much 
larger  degree  than  heretofore  in  the  view  of  his 
friends.  Ehodes1  describes  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
Act  as  "the  most  momentous  measure  that  passed 
Congress  from  the  day  that  the  senators  and  repre 
sentatives  first  met  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil 
War."  The  law,  he  thinks,  " sealed  the  doom  of 
the  Whig  party ;  it  caused  the  formation  of  the 
Eepublican  party  on  the  principle  of  no  extension 
of  slavery ;  it  roused  Lincoln  and  gave  a  bent  to 
his  great  political  ambition ;  it  made  the  Fugitive 
Slave  Law  a  dead  letter  at  the  North  ;  it  caused  the 
Germans  to  become  ^Republicans  ;  it  lost  the  Demo 
crats  their  hold  on  New  England  ;  it  made  the 
Northwest  Eepublicau  ;  it  led  to  the  downfall  of 
the  Democratic  party. "  The  historian  might  add 
that  it  also  rendered  Douglas  permanently  impos 
sible  as  a  presidential  aspirant ;  placed  him  in  an 
anomalous  position  as  a  pro  slavery  leader,  in  de 
fiance  of  the  sentiment  of  his  own  state  ;  allied  him 
almost  until  his  death  with  a  losing  cause ;  and 
committed  him  to  the  advocacy  of  principles  which 
he  was  obliged  later  practically  to  repudiate.  The 
passage  of  the  bill  had  been  almost  solely  due  to 
Douglas.  He  alone  had  had  the  daring  to  attempt 
its  adoption  in  the  face  of  the  wishes  of  the  country  ; 
only  he  possessed  the  skill  in  political  manipula 
tion  that  made  it  possible  to  unite  the  warring  fac 
tions  in  Congress  and  to  throw  the  administration 
solidly  behind  the  measure.  It  was  his  personal 

1  History,  Vol.  I,  p.  490. 


THE  KANSAS-NEBRASKA  STRUGGLE    207 

achievement ;  and,  as  he  afterward  admitted,  he 
possessed  practically  the  power  of  a  u  dictator " 
during  the  period  of  its  discussion.  This  the  country 
could  not  but  recognize  and  this  inevitably  deter 
mined  Douglas's  status  as  a  politician  during  his 
later  life  and  subsequently  his  place  in  history. 

"It  is  interesting  to  reflect,"  says  one  of  his  per 
sonal  friends,1  "upon  what  might  and  upon  what 
might  not  have  been,  but  for  the  repeal  of  the  Mis 
souri  Compromise.  Had  that  Compromise  not  been 
repealed,  it  is  probable  that  the  Democratic  party 
would  have  gone  on  in  control  of  the  government  as 
it  had  done  so  long.  In  1856,  at  farthest  in  1860, 
Stephen  A.  Douglas  would  have  become  President. 
The  old  Whig  party  would  still  have  dragged  its 
lazy  length  along.  Ulysses  S.  Grant  would  have 
continued  to  weigh  raw  hides  on  the  back  alley  of  a 
leather  store  at  Galena,  and  Abraham  Lincoln  would 
have  continued  to  ride  the  circuit  and  tell  stories  in 
central  Illinois.  There  would  have  been  no  Repub 
lican  party,  no  secession,  and  no  war." 

1  Carr,  Douglas,  pp.  56-57. 


CHAPTER  XI 

SHIFTING   PARTY   LINES 

IT  was  now  plain  to  all  that  a  rearrangement  of 
party  lines  was  about  to  occur,  and  that  the  issues 
which  had  been  raised  in  the  course  of  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  discussion  would  be  the  subject  of  a  far 
greater  struggle  than  any  Douglas  had  anticipated 
when  he  decided  to  reopen  the  slavery  dispute. 
Short-sighted  as  he  was  with  reference  to  large 
national  questions,  because  of  his  habitual  tendency 
to  underestimate  the  strength  of  idealistic  in 
fluences  in  human  nature,  no  one  ever  thought  him 
else  than  the  keenest  of  analysts  of  contemporary 
conditions.  He  saw  that  a  realignment  of  voters 
was  imminent ;  and,  simultaneously,  he  understood 
that  his  own  position  was  seriously  threatened.  The 
bitterness  of  his  reception  in  Chicago,  the  intolerable 
transition  from  an  atmosphere  of  political  adulation 
to  one  of  contempt  and  hatred  at  once  roused  in 
Douglas  not  only  his  combative  instincts  but  also  a 
poignant  sense  of  the  change  in  his  own  immediate 
political  situation.  He  determined  to  engage  the 
enemy  at  once,  and  to  solidify  without  delay  so  far 
as  possible  the  broken  ranks  of  his  party.  To  this 
end  he  immediately  started  upon  a  speaking  tour 
extending  over  almost  the  whole  of  northern  and 
central  Illinois. 


SHIFTING  PARTY  LINES  209 

What  Douglas  learned  on  this  tour  was  most  dis 
couraging  to  him.  At  least  two  important  polit 
ical  forces  were  now  coming  prominently  forward. 
These  were  the  Abolitionists  and  the  so-called  Na 
tive  Americans.  The  Abolitionists  were  the  product 
of  a  trend  of  thought  which  Douglas  could  well  un 
derstand  and  estimate.  The  Native  Americans  or 
"  Know-Nothings "  were  a  factor  in  the  situation 
much  harder  to  weigh.  Both  groups  were  united  in 
their  opposition  to  Douglas  and  to  all  that  he  rep 
resented.  The  Whigs  of  course  remained  a  more 
or  less  compact  body.  They  would  gladly  have 
united  with  the  other  two  groups,  but  it  was  doubt 
ful  whether  the  latter  would  be  willing  to  merge 
themselves  in  the  older  party.  Now  for  the  first  time 
did  it  appear  as  if  state  contentions  were  to  become 
a  direct  and  important  element  in  national  affairs. 
Here  locally  was  mirrored  a  movement  which  later 
took  place  upon  the  larger  stage  of  Federal  politics. 

The  Native  American  or  Know -Nothing  party  was 
nominally  based  upon  a  desire  to  restrict  foreign 
immigration  and  to  prevent  the  domination  of  aliens 
(now  coming  to  the  United  States  in  large  numbers) 
over  men  of  American  birth.  As  Ehodes  conserva 
tively  expresses  it,1  "  ignorant  foreign  suffrage  had 
grown  to  be  an  evil  of  immense  proportions  ;  " 
there  was,  therefore,  substantial  basis  for  the  general 
ideas  for  which  the  Native  Americans  stood.  But 
with  an  element  of  justice,  there  had  come  to  be 
mingled  a  large  element  of  religious  prejudice  and 
1  Rhodes,  Vol.  II,  p.  52. 


210  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

an  unreasonable  hostility  to  conditions  which  were 
either  likely  to  correct  themselves,  or  were  not 
responsible  for  the  problems  which  the  Native 
Americans  wished  to  solve.  The  Know-Nothing 
party  had  early  committed  itself  to  a  crusade  against 
the  Roman  Catholic  Church  as  the  source  of  most  of 
what  was  thought  to  be  evil  in  national  affairs,  al 
though  statistics  showed  that  the  Catholics,  what 
ever  else  might  be  said  of  them,  were  not  then  set 
tled  in  America  in  sufficient  numbers  to  exercise 
political  control.  Because  of  this  element  of  re 
ligious  antagonism,  a  kind  of  secret  character  was 
given  to  the  Know-Nothing  party  and  branches  with 
absurd  machinery  were  created  in  each  state.  Ob 
jectionable  methods  flourished  under  such  a  type  of 
organization  and  Douglas  had  perhaps  rightly 
divined  that  the  demonstration  against  him  in 
Chicago,— flags  at  half-mast,  the  tolling  of  bells,  and 
the  uproarious  manifestations  during  the  meeting, — 
had  been  the  work  of  Know -Nothing  emissaries. 

The  Abolitionists,  while  not  secret  in  their  meth 
ods,  were  as  wild  in  their  utterances  as  were  the 
Native  Americans.  Garrison  had  already  (early  in 
1854)  burned  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  in 
public  at  Framingham,  Mass.1  Disturbances  of  a 
similar  kind  had  taken  place  elsewhere  and  extreme 
violence  had  been  displayed  on  all  sides  by  the  anti- 
slavery  men.  The  fact  that  many  of  them  had 
joined  the  Know-Nothings,  combined  with  the 
similarity  of  the  methods  employed  by  the  two 

1  Life  of  Garrison,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  412. 


SHIFTING  PAETY  LINES  211 

bodies,  bad  given  Douglas  some  warrant  for  declar 
ing  on  July  4,  1854,  that  the  Know-Nothing  move 
ment  was  nothing  more  than  Abolitionism  in  an 
altered  form.  In  this  judgment  he  was  probably 
mistaken — to  the  extent  at  least  that  though  anti- 
slavery  ideas  were  of  considerable  weight  with  the 
Know-Nothing  group,  it  was  not  the  latter' s  desire 
to  lay  special  stress  upon  them  for  the  moment, 
while  to  the  Abolitionists  the  question  of  ending 
the  existing  system  of  slavery  was  of  overwhelming 
importance,  dwarfing  everything  else.  However 
theories  might  differ  with  reference  to  the  composi 
tion  and  relationship  of  these  various  groups,  it  was 
perfectly  plain  to  all  that  the  formation  of  a  new 
party,  gaining  the  support  of  the  various  scattered 
and  isolated  groups,  and  uniting  local  disaffected 
elements  for  a  strong  stand  against  the  further  ex 
tension  of  slavery  was  not  only  possible  but  almost 
unavoidable.  "Kepublican"  had  already  been 
suggested  as  the  name  of  the  new  party,1  and  at  a 
gathering  at  Jackson,  Mich.,  on  July  6,  1854,  a 
declaration  of  principles  had  been  adopted.  Most 
of  these  u  principles "  had  a  bearing  upon  slavery 
in  some  way  as  was  shown  in  the  ticket  which  was 
put  into  the  field  by  the  Michigan  convention.  Five 
candidates  were  Whigs,  two  were  Democrats  who 
had  opposed  the  Nebraska  bill,  and  three  were  anti- 
slavery  men.  The  future  of  this  new  party  was  still 
obscure  but  apparently  promising.  Its  prospect  of 
success  lay  in  continuing  to  emphasize  the  one  sub- 

1  Stan  wood,  History  of  the  Presidency,  p.  260. 


212  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ject  which  constituted  a  bond  of  union  between  the 
opposition  groups,  and  dn  bringing  home  to  the 
people  the  necessity  of  presenting  a  united  front  if 
they  wished  to  defeat  the  Democratic  organization. 
The  fate  of  the  Republican  party  was,  however,  still 
quite  unknown,  and  there  was  yet  no  certainty  that 
it  could  become  national  in  its  scope. 

The  elections  in  the  autumn  of  1854,  while 
mainly  adverse  to  the  Kansas-Nebraska  legislation, 
were  various  in  their  meaning  ;  they  differed  a  good 
deal  from  state  to  state  by  reason  of  local  conditions 
and  prejudices.  This  was  the  general  situation  ; 
Illinois  formed  no  exception  to  the  rule.  Douglas's 
early  experiences  in  the  northern  counties  speedily 
convinced  him  that  his  party  organization  would 
gain  success,  if  at  all,  only  by  the  most  strenuous 
efforts.  In  several  congressional  districts  he  found 
the  Democratic  candidates  very  hard  pressed,  and 
although  a  much  more  friendly  reception  greeted 
him  in  central  Illinois,  it  lacked  the  spontaneity  to 
which  he  had  become  accustomed. 

Douglas  was  especially  disturbed  by  the  activity 
of  his  future  senatorial  colleague,  Trumbull,  and  of 
Abraham  Lincoln.  Although  for  five  years  he  had 
led  a  life  apart  from  politics  because  current  prob 
lems  had  largely  ceased  to  interest  him,  Lincoln  had 
been  recalled  to  the  struggle  through  his  feeling  that 
now  an  issue  like  to  none  with  which  he  had  previ 
ously  dealt  was  at  hand  demanding  a  settlement.1 
Douglas  crossed  his  path  during  the  campaign  and 

1  Oberholtzer,  Abraham  Lincoln,  p.  85. 


SHIFTING  PARTY  LINES  213 

near  its  end,  on  October  3,  1854,  they  met  at  Spring 
field  for  direct  personal  combat.  The  debate  which 
ensued  was  the  first  real  opportunity  given  to  the 
two  men  for  measuring  each  other's  strength.  The 
issue  was  plainly  drawn  between  them  on  the 
slavery  question.  Douglas  spoke  in  the  State 
House  and  on  the  following  day  Lincoln  answered 
him  at  the  same  place.  On  the  same  evening, 
Douglas  appeared  in  rebuttal,  protracting  the  ses 
sion  of  the  day  to  almost  six  hours.  The  text  of 
the  speeches  is  lacking,  but  the  testimony  of  con 
temporaries  is  to  the  effect  that  Lincoln  showed  re 
markable  familiarity  with  the  history  of  the  slavery 
question.  He  attacked  Douglas's  position  by  pre 
senting  a  review  of  the  steps  by  which  the  existing 
situation  had  been  brought  about.  Lincoln  had 
busied  himself  during  the  summer  in  analyzing  the 
Nebraska  law.  He  was  well  able  to  find  the  weak 
places  in  his  opponent's  armor.  Somewhat  net 
tled  by  Lincoln's  evident  mastery  of  the  subject, 
and  his  own  consciousness  of  the  nature  of  the  de 
vices  by  which  the  bill  had  been  passed,  Douglas 
failed  to  make  a  good  showing  in  his  rejoinder.1 
He  was  worn  by  months  of  speaking,  in  an  exciting 
campaign,  and  by  the  apparent  fact  that  he  was 
steadily  losing  ground.  The  inconclusive  character 
of  the  result  at  Springfield  led  to  another  passage 
at  arms  at  Peoria  two  weeks  later.  Douglas  opened 

xThis  is  generally  conceded  by  biographers  both  of  Lincoln 
and  Douglas.  Cf.  Oberholtzer,  Lincoln,  p.  88,  and  Johnson, 
Douglas,  p.  266. 


214  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  discussion  in  a  three-hour  speech,  and,  after  an 
intermission  for  supper,  Lincoln  answered,  also  oc 
cupying  three  hours.  In  later  years,  Lincoln  spoke 
of  this  address  as  the  ablest  he  had  ever  made, 
while  Douglas  but  little  improved  on  the  presenta 
tion  of  the  subject  which  he  had  offered  at  Spring 
field.  Lincoln,  in  fact,  with  his  usual  insight,  now 
foresaw  the  probability  of  a  renewal  of  the  battle 
with  Douglas  and  with  the  forces  which  he  repre 
sented,  and  was  already  preparing  himself  for  such 
a  contest.  Douglas  was  still  somewhat  contemp 
tuous  of  an  opponent  whose  ability  and  popular 
support  he  did  not  fully  realize,  though  he  clearly 
detected  a  new  kind  of  opposition,  since  Lincoln  did 
not  merely  ring  the  changes  upon  slavery  and  its 
cruelties,  but  devoted  himself  to  a  cold,  cutting 
legal  analysis  of  the  basis  for  slavery  and  of  the  ac 
tion  taken  in  violating  the  Missouri  Compromise. 
Douglas  also  found  himself  bereft  of  one  of  his  prin 
cipal  weapons,  because  Lincoln  left  open  few  points 
against  which  he  could  aim  his  shafts  of  denuncia 
tion  of  Abolitionism.  The  unsuccessful  struggles 
with  Lincoln  at  Springfield  and  Peoria,  both  times 
in  the  presence  of  immense  audiences,  undoubtedly 
had  much  to  do  with  his  partial  failure  at  the 
autumn  elections.  Opponents  of  the  Nebraska 
legislation  secured  five  out  of  nine  members  of  Con 
gress,  their  total  majority  in  the  state  on  the  con 
gressional  ticket  being  over  17,000.  They  were  in 
control  of  the  legislature,  which  assured  the  election 
of  Lynian  Trumbull,  who  had  cooperated  with  Lin- 


SHIFTING  PAKTY  LINES  215 

coin  in  cutting  the  ground  from  under  Douglas's 
feet,  as  Douglas's  colleague  in  the  Senate  ;  and  they 
had  with  them  the  evident  sympathy  of  the  people 
at  large.  In  but  one  quarter  did  Douglas's  con 
tinuous  and  almost  unprecedented  efforts  result  fa 
vorably.  The  Democrats  succeeded  in  electing  the 
state  treasurer  and  some  other  state  officers. 

Moreover,  the  Illinois  situation  was  but  one 
element  in  a  national  situation.  Iowa  had  per 
manently  abandoned  the  Democratic  party  by 
electing  as  governor  James  W.  Grimes,  a  bitter 
opponent  of  the  Nebraska  legislation.  Maine  and 
Vermont  sent  large  anti-Nebraska  delegations  to 
Congress,  the  issue  being  mainly  that  of  slavery. 
In  Pennsylvania,  the  Whigs  and  the  anti-slavery 
Democrats  chose  a  governor  through  the  assistance 
of  the  Know-Nothing  party  and  sent  an  over 
whelmingly  large  anti-Nebraska  delegation  to 
Congress.  An  even  more  striking  outcome  was 
that  in  Ohio,  and  elsewhere  the  results  were  similar. 
There  could  be  no  doubt  that  Douglas  had  wholly 
failed  in  his  effort  to  create  a  winning  issue.  He 
had  been  the  unmistakable  cause  of  forcing  upon 
his  party  the  principle  which  had  resulted  in  its 
downfall  in  a  great  territory  where  formerly  it  had 
been  in  supreme  control.  The  efforts  of  Douglas  to 
make  it  appear  that  the  victory  of  his  opponents 
was  due  largely  to  their  junction  with  the  some 
what  questionable  Know -Nothing  party  were  of 
little  significance,  and  were  thrown  into  an  almost 
absurd  light  by  the  fact  that  the  next  House  of 


216  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Bepresentatives  would  show  a  majority  of  seventy- 
five  votes  against  the  Democrats.  The  situation 
and  the  evident  responsibility  of  Douglas  for  it, 
were  forces  tending  strongly  to  weaken  his  control 
of  the  party,  and  at  times  during  the  succeeding 
short  session  of  Congress  it  seemed  that  he  might 
lose  much  or  all  of  the  immense  personal  prestige 
which  he  had  earlier  enjoyed  in  Washington. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  Douglas's  personal  for 
tunes,  probably  the  most  important  result  which 
grew  out  of  his  unfortunate  advocacy  of  the  Ne 
braska  bill,  was  the  fact  that  at  last  he  appeared  to 
be  fully  committed  to  the  cause  of  slavery.  If 
there  had  been  any  doubt  in  the  popular  mind  on 
this  question  prior  to  the  election  of  1854,  foes  now 
left  nothing  undone  whereby  they  could  identify 
him  with  the  Southern  pro -slavery  party.  Just  as 
he  had  sought  to  attach  the  then  odious  epithet  of 
Abolitionist  to  every  one  who  attempted  to  stand 
in  his  way  in  politics,  so  opponents  now  sought  to 
make  it  appear  not  only  that  he  was  united  with 
the  slavery  party  in  sympathy,  but  also  that  his 
personal  interests  had  guided  him  toward  the 
support  of  an  institution  from  which  he  might  de 
rive  personal  profit.  There  was  probably  little 
basis  for  such  charges,  because,  as  we  have  else 
where  seen,1  Douglas  had  refrained  from  becoming 
a  slaveholder  and  was  far  too  astute  a  politician 
to  leave  open  so  manifest  an  avenue  of  attack.  Yet 
it  was  true  that  the  logic  of  events  drove  him  more 
1  See  p.  88,  et  seq. 


SHIFTING  PARTY  LINES  217 

and  more  to  the  side  of  slavery.  His  new  colleague 
in  the  Senate  was  an  an ti -slavery  man  whom  he 
heartily  despised.  Trunibull  had  been  supported 
by  the  Abolitionists  and  the  Know-Nothings. 
Douglas  found  himself  confronted  by  groups  of 
opponents  who  were  united  by  the  single  fact  of 
hostility  to  slavery.  He  himself  had  formed  family 
associations  with  slave-owners,  was  on  friendly 
terms  with  the  slavery  party  in  Congress,  and, 
though  he  knew  it  to  be  a  weakness  among  his 
own  constituents,  his  own  type  of  mind  inclined 
him  more  and  more  to  the  acceptance  of  the  general 
philosophy  by  which  the  slavery  advocates  were 
dominated.  More  and  more  he  had  allowed  his 
early  Democratic  principles  to  slip  into  the  back 
ground  ;  more  and  more  he  had  become  involved 
in  the  attempt  to  justify  distinct  party  measures 
rather  than  to  expound  clear  party  principles. 

Perhaps  the  bitterest  element,  to  Douglas,  in  a 
bitter  situation  was  the  fact  that  to  him,  more  than  to 
any  other  man  in  public  life,  must  now  be  ascribed 
the  responsibility  for  the  development  whereby  a 
new  party  of  protest,  embodying  all  of  the  opposi 
tion  elements  and  bearing  the  objectionable  name 
"  Republican,"  had  been  founded.  The  name  had 
been  more  and  more  generally  recognized  through 
out  the  latter  half  of  1854  and  the  early  part  of  1855, 
as  the  most  available  designation  for  the  new  party. 
It  was  recognized  that  party  organization  and  the 
acceptance  of  popular  issues  were  necessary  in  order 
to  maintain  the  start  which  had  been  so  auspiciously 


218  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

made  through  Douglas's  overplaying  his  hand  in 
1854.     Almost  at  once,  clever  leaders  set  to  work 
to  bring  about  a  higher  state  of  discipline  than 
had  yet  been  possible.     In  this,    they   were  con 
siderably    aided    by    circumstances.     The    Know- 
Nothing  party,  pleased  with  the  showing  made  in 
the  fall  of  1854,  held  toward  the  end  of  the  year 
at  Cincinnati1   a  national   council,    but  the  very 
growth  of  the  group  called  down  upon  it  opposition 
from  some  who  had  begun  to  fear  its  special  and 
peculiar    proclivities.      One    or    two    unfavorable 
elections  early  in  1855  preceded  another  meeting  of 
the  Council  at   Philadelphia.     There  the  slavery 
question  was  bitterly  discussed,  the  debate  result 
ing  in  a  breach  between  the  Northern  and  Southern 
wings  of  the  organization.     This  tended  to  drive 
the  Northern  section   into  the  ranks  of  the  Ee- 
publicans.     Anti-slavery  men  of  the  more  reason 
able  type  also  began  to  give  their  allegiance  to  the  Ke- 
publican  party  as  the  most  available  means  of  push 
ing  forward  their  ideas,  even  though  the  progress 
made    by    the    party    along    their    lines  was  not 
sufficiently  rapid  to  please  them.     Beside  this  tend 
ency  it  was  now  notable  that  the  Whig  party  was 
losing  ground,  and  that  its  branches  were  gradually 
dying  and  falling  off.     Lines  of  cleavage  between 
the  Eepublicau  party   and  the  extreme  Abolition 
group  on  the  one  hand,   and  the  reactionary  ele 
ments  among  the  Whigs  and  Know-Nothings  on 
the  other,  were  daily  growing  more  and  more  evi- 

Rhodes,  History,  Vol.  II,  p.  87  ff. 


SHIFTING  PARTY  LINES  219 

dent,  while  Northern  Democrats  were,  in  many 
instances,  recognizing  the  Republican  party,  for 
the  time  being  at  least,  as  the  party  of  progress 
and  the  only  body  to  which  they  could  look  for 
the  presentation  of  their  ideas  in  moderate  form, 
in  opposition  to  the  compact  slavery  interest.  It 
was  under  such  conditions  that  the  presidential 
nominating  conventions  rapidly  approached. 

Douglas  had  been  slow  to  accept  the  designation 
of  Republican  for  the  new  party.  He  attacked  it 
bitterly  on  the  floor,1  noting  that  the  party  was 
tending  to  drop  the  word  "  national "  ;  he  suggested 
the  substitution  of  the  word  "black"  on  the 
ground  that  it  substantially  represented  the  idea  of 
negro  equality  and  of  Abolition.  But  long  before 
the  nominating  conventions  met,  Douglas  had  come 
to  understand  his  mistake  and  to  recognize  the  new 
party  as  a  genuine  political  factor  with  which  he 
must  reckon.  This  he  was  at  last  ready  to  do.  In 
fact,  it  seemed  to  many  that  despite  his  apparent 
failure  to  see  his  blunder  in  connection  with  the 
Nebraska  Act,  he  must  continue  his  leadership. 
He  who  had  brought  the  party  to  its  present  diffi 
cult  straits  could  best  extricate  it.  He  had  origi 
nally  embarked  upon  the  experiment  of  the 
Nebraska  Act  through  a  desire  for  a  presidential 
issue.  He  was  not  now  minded  to  forego  his  pur 
pose.  He  looked  eagerly,  therefore,  to  the  national 
convention  which  was  to  meet  on  June  2,  1856, 
hoping  that  it  would  vindicate  him  by  giving  him 
1  Globe,  34th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  p.  390,  etseq. 


220  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  nomination  for  the  presidency.  The  outcome 
was  a  severe  disappointment.  At  the  outset,  sup 
port  was  considerably  divided.  Buchanan  had  135 
votes,  Pierce  122,  Douglas  thirty-three,  and  Cass 
five.  Douglas's  maximum  strength  was  exhibited 
on  the  fifteenth  ballot  when  he  received  118  votes 
against  Buchanan's  168.  Douglas  had,  however, 
taken  most  of  the  Southern  votes  of  his  rivals  and 
it  was  plain  to  all  of  his  supporters  that  he  had 
done  his  utmost.  The  party  stood  waiting  for  the 
rivals  to  sink  personal  prejudice  and  personal 
interest,  and  this  Douglas  reluctantly  concluded  to 
do  after  the  sixteenth  ballot.  At  that  time  a  dis 
patch  from  him  announced  his  withdrawal,  and 
practically  transferred  his  votes  to  Buchanan,  ac 
tion  which  was  now  unavoidable  arid  was  the  less 
gracefully  taken  on  that  account.1 

An  analysis  of  the  balloting  in  the  convention 
seems  to  indicate  a  recognition  on  the  part  of  the 
delegates  that  under  the  lead  of  Douglas  they  had 
gone  much  too  far  along  the  lines  laid  down  by  the 
slavery  party.  The  party  as  a  whole  not  only 
turned  from  Douglas's  personality,  at  length  so 
thoroughly  and  so  unfortunately  identified  with 
extreme  slavery  views,  but  it  selected  one  who  had 
already  pledged  himself  to  moderation  if  not  almost 
to  opposition  to  Douglas.  Buchanan  had  under 
taken  to  see  that  Kansas  was  fairly  treated,  while 
some  believed  that  he  looked  forward  to  the  admis 

1  Rhodes,  History,  Vol.  II,  p.  171,  et  seq.  and  Stanwood,  His 
tory  of  Presidential  Elections,  pp.  199-200. 


SHIFTING  PARTY  LINES  221 

sion  of  the  territory  as  a  free  state.  He  had  the 
favor  of  New  England  Democrats  and  was  not  un 
favorably  regarded  by  some  of  the  aristocratic  ele 
ment  in  the  South.  On  his  first  ballot  in  the 
nominating  convention  he  had  received  the  votes 
of  all  the  delegates  from  Virginia  and  Louisiana. 
Fie  was  more  available  than  Douglas  because  he 
had  made  fewer  enemies  ;  but  more  significant  than 
this  was  the  fact  that  he  also  represented  the  con 
servative  element  which  had  been  antagonized  by 
the  Nebraska  Act  and  which  believed  that  Douglas 
had  injured  the  position  of  the  party. 

It  was  doubtless  even  more  displeasing  to  Doug 
las  to  realize  that  while  the  party  turned  away  from 
him  in  its  convention,  it  laid  down  a  platform 
which  was  intended  to  satisfy  the  Southern  element, 
and  to  avoid  the  charge  that  the  party  had  deserted 
the  principles  to  which  its  foremost  leaders  had 
been  committed  during  the  Nebraska  contest.  This 
action,  of  course,  still  left  Douglas  a  possible  candi 
date  for  the  future,  since  it  approved  the  position  he 
had  taken  and  to  that  extent  it  was  gratifying. 
Buchanan,  in  fact,  in  his  speech  of  acceptance,  en 
dorsed  the  platform  and  expressed  sentiments 
which  were  satisfactory  to  the  Southern  delegates 
who  had  voted  for  him.  He  asserted  that  the 
slavery  question  was  " paramount"  and  he  be 
lieved  that  the  Kansas- Nebraska  Act  had  furnished 
a  necessary  supplement  to  the  Compromise  of  1850. 
This  view,  formally  expressed,  was  further  ex 
tended  in  private  conversation,  and  thus  Douglas 


222  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

had  at  least  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  the  party 
recognize  the  principle  which  he  had  sought  to 
make  dominant  and  continue  to  advocate  the  policy 
which  he  more  than  any  one  else  had  sought  to  de 
velop  and  to  render  coherent.  Douglas  himself 
was  thus  left  with  practically  nothing  to  say.  Al  - 
though  unused  to  defeat,  he  had  always  been  the 
most  outspoken  advocate  of  those  views  which 
place  party  regularity  before  everything  else.  It 
was  not  possible  for  him,  then,  to  utter  a  word 
against  a  convention  which  had  sinned  only  in 
refusing  to  accept  his  personality.  Moreover,  his 
future  was  now  bound  up  with  that  of  the  party. 
He  pledged  himself  unequivocally  to  Buchanan  and 
was  apparently  content  with  retaining  his  position 
as  the  foremost  Democratic  leader,  notwithstand 
ing  that  the  party  was  now  nominally  headed  by 
another. 

The  action  of  the  Republicans  in  their  national 
convention  at  Philadelphia  in  nominating  Fremont 
and  denouncing  "  polygamy  and  slavery"  was  not 
happy,  while  Fill  more,  nominated  some  time  pre 
viously  as  a  Native  American,  and  endorsed  by 
other  minor  groups,  tended  to  draw  off  the  support 
which  should  have  gone  to  Fremont.  In  this  way 
the  election  of  Buchanan  was  made  unavoidable. 
After  the  Eepublicau  convention  had  separated,  it 
was  safe  to  guess  that  the  Democrats  would  remain 
in  control  of  the  government,  notwithstanding  the 
enthusiasm  and  excitement  which  marked  the  cam 
paign  of  the  new  party.  Buchanan  was  declared 


SHIFTING  PAETY  LINES  223 

elected  by  174  electoral  votes,  while  Fremont  received 
114  aud  Fillmore  but  eight.  Buchanan's  popular 
vote  was  1,838,169  and  that  of  Fremont  1,341,264, 
while  Fillmore  had  874, 534. l  Thus  it  was  true  that 
the  Democracy  remained  by  far  the  largest  political 
group  in  the  community  though  a  junction  of  all 
the  opposing  elements  would  have  defeated  it.  To 
prevent  such  a  junction  was  plainly  the  problem  of 
the  party  leaders,  and  it  was  with  this  problem  dis 
tinctly  in  mind  that  Douglas  entered  upon  a  new 
period  of  his  political  life.  Though  it  had  been 
clear  that  the  Republicans  were  not  yet  in  a  posi 
tion  to  win  the  presidency,  it  was  also  clear  that  a 
continuance  of  existing  conditions  would  render  the 
continuance  of  the  Democrats  in  power  out  of  the 
question.  This  made  it  necessary  to  see  how  far 
the  Democratic  party,  now  so  largely  dominated  by 
the  pro-slavery  element,  could  maintain  itself  in 
national  politics  upon  that  basis,  and  whether  the 
party,  if  it  should  attempt  to  modify  its  position, 
could  do  so  without  alienating  from  it  the  Southern 
element  which  was  identified  with  a  strong  pro- 
slavery  policy  at  Washington.  Now  for  the  first 
time,  perhaps,  was  it  clear  to  Douglas  that  the 
slavery  question  must  be  dealt  with  definitely  in 
the  near  future,  and  that  upon  this  question  hung 
not  only  all  his  personal  chances  of  advancement 
but  also  all  the  prospects  of  his  party  as  a  national 
force.  Slavery  prior  to  the  manifestation  of  Eepub- 

1  Rhodes,  History,  Vol.  II,  p.  235  and  Stanwood,  History  of 
Presidential  Elections,  p.  210. 


224  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

lican  strength  had  not  been  identical  with  Demo 
cratic  party  existence.  The  need  of  concession  to 
the  Northern  Democrats,  dissatisfied  as  they  were 
with  the  inroads  of  the  slavery  element  in  Congress, 
had  been  abundantly  established  by  the  outcome 
at  the  polls,  since  it  was  plain  that  the  loss  of  the 
Northern  men  whose  following  had  been  secured  by 
the  selection  of  Buchanan  might  have  led  to  defeat. 
To  the  old- line  leaders  of  the  Democratic  party, 
this  situation  gave  much  ground  for  anxiety,  and 
Douglas  himself,  confronted  with  the  hostility  of 
his  own  state  on  the  slavery  question,  undoubtedly 
felt  that  he  must  guide  his  steps  with  great  care 
unless  he  were  willing  to  be  isolated  politically, 
perhaps  to  be  retired  from  the  Senate,  and  there 
with  to  lose  his  chances  of  the  presidential  suc 
cession.  A  retrograde  movement,  or  at  all  events 
a  refusal  to  advance  further  along  the  extreme  line 
of  attack,  into  which  he  had  been  led  by  his  advo 
cacy  of  the  Nebraska  law,  was  becoming  almost 
imperative. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS 

THE  unfriendly  reception  accorded  to  Douglas 
upon  his  return  to  his  adopted  state,  and  the  re 
verses  which  both  his  party  and  he  personally  had 
met  with  in  the  course  of  the  fall  campaign  had 
been  merely  the  forerunners  of  a  difficult  experience 
in  Congress.  Douglas  understood,  by  the  end  of 
November,  that  the  Kansas- Nebraska  Act  had  cre 
ated  a  tumult,  and  that  its  consequences  could 
not  be  evaded,  even  if  he  were  willing  to  retreat 
from  the  attitude  which  he  had  assumed.  A  posi 
tion  had  been  taken  and  the  party  must  press  for 
ward  along  the  line  which  had  been  indicated. 
The  question  was  still  open  how  far  it  should  go, 
and  what  should  be  its  plan  of  action  with  respect 
to  the  problems  immediately  facing  it,  but  it  was 
not  possible  to  escape  the  issue  which  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  Act  forced  upon  the  Democratic  party. 
Douglas  was  therefore  confronted  with  the  task  of 
putting  into  operation  the  law  which  he  had  per 
sonally  driven  through  Congress.  The  difficulty 
was  the  more  genuine  in  that  the  measure  was  one 
which  could  not  be  allowed  to  rest  as  a  dead  letter. 
It  dealt  with  the  most  active  and  most  controverted 
question  of  the  day,  and  this  must  be  further  dis- 


226  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

posed  of  by  a  Congress  in  which,  one  house  was 
under  the  control  of  the  opposition. 

The  Kansas- Nebraska  Act,  as  has  been  seen,  had 
provided  for  the  erection  of  two  territories,  Kansas 
and  Nebraska.  As  we  have  noted,1  there  were  va 
rious  interpretations  of  the  causes  of  this  two-fold  or 
ganization,  among  them  one  which  found  the  divi 
sion  to  be  the  fruit  of  a  desire  to  secure  the  admission 
of  one  territory,  ultimately,  as  a  free  state,  and  the 
other  as  a  slave  state.  Whether  such  an  idea  was 
cherished  by  Douglas  or  not,  it  did  gain  a  place  in 
the  minds  of  many  pro -slavery  men.  With  affairs 
in  this  unsettled  position,  the  passage  of  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  Act  opened  the  way  to  a  great  tide  of  im 
migration  into  the  new  territories.  The  settlers  had 
been  held  back  by  treaties  with  the  Indians,  but 
at  last  all  obstacles  were  removed  and  the  popu 
lation  of  the  great  domain,  which  had  been  placed 
at  the  disposal  of  the  land-seeking  immigrants,  rose 
steadily.  It  was  necessary  to  organize  governments 
in  both  territories.  The  situation  had  been  ren 
dered  the  more  difficult  by  the  introduction  of  con 
flicting  elements  of  population.  In  July,  1854,  a 
party  had  started  from  New  England  with  the 
avowed  object  of  making  Kansas  a  free  state.  This 
company  consisted  of  500  emigrants,  who  were  later 
followed  by  additional  parties  numbering  2,500 
more.2  Other  bands  of  settlers  came  from  elsewhere 

1  See  p.  198. 

8Thayer,  The  Kansas  Crusade,  p.  170,  et  seq.  ;    also   Khodes, 
History,  Vol.  II,  p.  78. 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         227 

in  the  North  and  this  led  to  an  effort  in  western  and 
northern  Missouri  to  offset  the  movement.  Secret 
organizations  were  formed  in  that  state  with  the  idea 
of  extending  slavery  into  Kansas.  Settlers  began 
to  pass  over  the  border  and  soon  the  material  was 
at  hand  for  a  sharp  struggle.  Edwin  Eeeder  had 
been  designated  by  the  President  as  governor  of  the 
territory,1  and  his  arrival  was  almost  simultaneous 
with  the  entry  of  the  new  and  hostile  groups  of  col 
onists.  Feeling  was  running  high.  It  was  not  true 
that  there  had  been  an  effort  on  the  part  of  the  New 
England  men  to  prepare  for  actual  warfare  by  arm 
ing  their  pioneers,  but  their  admitted  and  concerted 
effort  to  gain  control  by  settling  enough  men  in  the 
state  to  carry  the  territorial  elections,  had  led  to 
threats  of  violence  on  the  part  of  the  secretly  or 
ganized  pro-slavery  men  in  Missouri.  Eeeder' s  ar 
rival  encouraged  the  Missourians,  and  was  corre 
spondingly  disheartening  to  the  New  England  im 
migrants.  He  was  strongly  Southern  in  his  princi 
ples  and  fully  believed  in  the  idea  underlying  the 
Kansas- Nebraska  Act.  Moreover,  he  had  already 
committed  himself  to  the  opinion  that  the  main  source 
of  trouble  in  the  territory  would  be  found  in  the  New 
England  settlers.  The  election  of  a  territorial  dele 
gate  took  place  on  November  29,  1854.  Whitfield, 
the  candidate  of  the  Missourians,  was  chosen,  a  re 
sult  which  was  brought  about  by  importing  a  large 
number  of  pro -slavery  voters  from  across  the  line. 
The  situation  attracted  very  little  attention,  com- 
1  On  November  29,  1854. 


228  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

paratively  speaking,  in  other  parts  of  the  country, 
because  the  act  under  which  the  election  was  held 
extended  the  ballot  to  all  male  inhabitants  of  free 
birth  and  of  the  white  race,  twenty-one  years  of  age 
and  over,  who  were  living  in  the  territory  at  the 
time  of  the  election  though  not  necessarily  at  the 
time  of  the  passage  of  the  act. 

In  the  spring  of  1855,  however,  the  issue  was 
much  more  sharply  drawn  in  connection  with  the 
choice  of  a  territorial  legislature.  An  army  of  5,000 
Missourians  marched  into  Kansas  to  aid  in  electing 
their  candidates,  and  distributed  themselves  over 
the  doubtful  districts.1  The  New  Englanders  saw 
their  chances  of  success  disappearing,  although  the 
governor  sought  to  prevent  fraud  so  far  as  the 
difficult  conditions  permitted.  Moreover,  he  gave 
only  three  weeks'  notice  of  the  election,  which  was 
to  occur  on  March  30th,  thus  curtailing  as  much  as 
possible  the  time  within  which  the  outside  voters 
could  recross  into  Kansas.  The  current  of  Missouri 
influence  was,  however,  far  too  strong  to  permit  of 
its  being  resisted,  and  the  pro-slavery  candidates 
were  returned  to  the  legislature  by  a  large  majority. 
Where  doubt  as  to  the  result  arose,  new  elections 
were  ordered  by  the  governor,  but  these  were  ren 
dered  of  no  avail  by  the  action  of  the  pro-slavery 
managers  in  seating  the  bulk  of  original  candidates.2 
In  complete  control  of  the  legislature,  the  pro-slav 
ery  men  immediately  proceeded  to  enact  a  series 

1  Rhodes,  History,  Vol.  II,  p.  81 ;  Spring,  Kansas,  pp.  44-47. 

2  Spring,  Kansas,  p.  50,  et  seq. 


THE  ADMISSION  OP  KANSAS         229 

of  extreme  laws,  arid  Eeeder,  who  had  been  strongly 
friendly  to  the  slavery  side  because  of  his  difficult 
and  hazardous  experience  during  the  winter  and 
spring,  1854-1855,  now  completely  shifted  his  posi 
tion.  He  came  back  to  the  East  and  told  his  story 
to  the  President,  while  the  New  England  element  in 
Kansas  called  a  series  of  conventions  for  the  purpose 
of  drafting  a  constitution  in  opposition  to  slavery 
and  applied  for  admission  to  the  Union  as  a  free 
state. 

Eeeder  was  superseded  and  the  case  was  now  be 
fore  Congress.  Douglas  had  been  detained  at  home, 
but  he  reached  Washington  not  long  after  the  open 
ing  of  the  session  of  1855-1856.  He  found  that 
President  Pierce  had  already  sent  two  messages  to 
Congress  in  which  he  had  discussed  the  Kansas 
situation.1  In  his  annual  message,  he  had  laid 
down  the  rule  that  resistance  to  territorial  law  must 
and  would  be  promptly  suppressed  ;  while  on  Jan 
uary  24th,  in  a  special  message,  he  had  upheld  the 
Kansas- Nebraska  Act  which  he  said  made  it  clear 
that  the  general  provision  for  political  organization 
of  the  territories  lay  within  the  powers  of  the  Fed 
eral  government,  and  that  the  inhabitants  of  any 
territory  had  the  right  to  determine  what  should  be 
their  local  laws,  subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.  He  referred  to  the  action  of  the 
New  England  men  who  had  drafted  a  constitution 
of  their  own,  and  recommended  that  the  inhabitants 

1  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents  of  the  U.  S.,  Vol.  V, 
pp.  342  and  352  ff. 


230  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

be  authorized  to  form  a  state  government  and  to 
seek  admission  to  the  Union  whenever  they  became 
sufficiently  numerous  to  elect  delegates  to  a  conven 
tion  called  for  that  purpose. 

Douglas  had  not  been  able  to  present  himself  in 
the  Senate  until  the  llth  of  February.  He  resumed 
his  place  at  the  head  of  the  Committee  on  Terri 
tories.  In  a  month  he  was  ready  to  report  upon  the 
Kansas  situation  apropos  of  the  recommendations  of 
the  President  and  of  various  documents  which  had 
been  transmitted  to  his  committee.  His  report, 
and  a  speech  accompanying  it,  offered  a  complete 
history  of  Kansas  affairs  as  well  as  a  discussion  of 
the  power  of  Congress  over  the  territories.  The 
minority  submitted  its  report  also.  This  was  fol 
lowed  by  a  bill  which  Douglas  reported  on  the  17th 
of  March,  authorizing  the  people  of  the  territory  to 
form  a  constitution  and  state  government,  and,  on 
the  20th,  by  a  speech  in  support  of  the  bill.  The 
debate  was  opened  in  good  earnest  by  a  sharp  per 
sonal  encounter  between  Douglas  and  his  colleague, 
Trumbull,  who  had  taken  occasion  to  speak  upon 
the  report  in  the  absence  of  Douglas,  and  continued 
until  June  25th.  Mr.  Seward  had  introduced  a  bill 
which  he  offered  as  a  substitute  for  the  Douglas  bill 
and  in  which  he  proposed  to  admit  Kansas  as  a 
state  under  the  anti-slavery  constitution  drafted  at 
Topeka.  Several  other  bills  had  been  proposed  by 
various  members,  but  on  June  25th  Senator  Toombs 
of  Georgia  offered  a  substitute  for  all  bills  then 
pending  and  the  whole  set  of  measures  was  referred 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         231 

back  to  the  Committee  on  Territories  for  considera 
tion.  On  the  30th  of  June  Douglas  made  a  report 
in  which  he  accepted  the  Toombs  bill  as  a  general 
substitute,  and  reopened  the  debate,  the  measure 
passing  at  8  o'clock  A.  M.  on  July  3d,  after  a  twenty- 
hour  session. 

It  was  during  this  protracted  debate,  covering 
the  whole  of  the  spring  and  early  summer  of  1856, 
that  Douglas's  theory  of  popular  sovereignty  and 
territorial  rights  received  its  most  authoritative 
and  clear-cut  exposition.  In  his  first  report  of 
March  12th,  he  had  defended  the  Kansas- Nebraska 
Act  upon  familiar  grounds,  and  had  made  the  point 
with  considerable  force  that  Congress  could  not  im 
pose  on  any  territory  restrictions  which  would  pre 
vent  it  from  becoming  a  state  upon  the  same  terms 
and  with  the  same  privileges  as  were  enjoyed  by 
other  states.  He  could  not,  therefore,  believe  that 
Congress  could  admit  a  territory  which  had  been 
organized  with  the  previous  understanding  or  re 
quirement  that  there  should  not  be  slavery  or  any 
other  system  of  labor  within  its  borders.  The 
speech  of  March  20th  went  farther  than  the  report, 
and  discussed  the  general  question  of  slavery,  as  well 
as  its  special  status  in  Kansas.  Much  of  the  discus 
sion  contained  in  the  report  was  devoted  to  a  more 
or  less  partisan  and  very  detailed  view  of  events  in 
the  territory.  The  portions  of  it  which  were  of 
most  interest,  however,  did  not  deal  with  current 
politics  but  sought  to  present  the  speaker's  theory 
of  the  broader  question  at  issue.  "  The  leading 


232  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

idea  and  fundamental  principle  of  the  Kansas- Ne 
braska  Act  as  expressed  in  the  law  itself,"  he 
noted,  i  i  was  to  leave  the  actual  settlers  and  bona 
fide  inhabitants  of  each  territory  4  perfectly  free  to 
form  and  regulate  their  domestic  institutions  in 
their  own  way  subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.'  "  1  The  restrictions  of  the  Con 
stitution,  he  held,  were  "  few,  specific  and  uniform, 
applicable  alike  to  all  the  states  old  and  new. 
There  is  no  authority  for  putting  a  restriction  upon 
the  sovereignty  of  a  new  state  which  the  Constitu 
tion  has  not  placed  on  the  original  state.  Indeed 
if  such  a  restriction  could  be  imposed  on  any  state, 
it  would  instantly  cease  to  be  a  state  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Federal  constitution,  and  in  conse 
quence  of  the  inequality,  would  assimilate  to  the 
condition  of  a  province  or  dependency." 

In  examining  the  extent  of  the  prerogatives  or 
sovereign  rights  of  the  several  states,  Douglas  urged 
that  "  African  slavery  existed  in  all  the  Colonies 
under  the  sanction  of  the  British  government  prior 
to  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  When  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  was  adopted,  it- 
became  the  supreme  law  and  bond  of  union  between 
twelve  slaveholding  states  and  one  non-slavehold- 
ing  state  ;  each  state  reserved  the  right  to  reserve 
the  question  of  slavery  for  itself,  to  continue  it  as 
a  domestic  institution  as  long  as  it  pleased,  and  to 
abolish  it  when  it  chose."  2  The  report  took  a 

1  Senate  Report,  No.  34;  1st  Sess.,  34th  Cong.,  p.  39. 
9 Ibid.,  p.  2. 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         233 

view  adverse  to  the  anti- slavery  party  in  Kansas, 
and  sought  to  avert  the  threatened  conflict  there 
by  recommending  that  the  holding  of  a  constitu 
tional  convention  be  deferred  until  "the  territory 
contains  93,420  inhabitants,  that  being  the  number 
required  by  the  present  ratio  of  representation  for 
a  member  of  Congress."  The  speech  of  the  20th 
of  March  developed  these  same  ideas  and  included 
a  running  colloquy  of  the  keenest  kind  between 
Douglas,  Seward  and  Sumner.  Douglas  went  back 
to  the  compromise  legislation  of  1850,  and  at 
tempted  to  make  good  the  historical  and  constitu 
tional  position  which  he  had  then  taken.  This, 
however,  was  more  by  way  of  controversy  than 
anything  else,  for  his  speech  did  not  add  materially 
to  the  value  of  the  argument  already  developed  in 
his  report,  although  he  rebutted  with  unusual  skill 
the  cutting  criticisms  of  his  opponents.  Sumner 
now  came  into  remarkable  prominence  because  of 
his  success  in  replying  to  Douglas,  and  because  of 
the  special  vigor  and  effectiveness  with  which  he 
met  Douglas's  peculiar  style  of  oratory.  The  con 
flict  between  Douglas  and  Sumner  became  very 
bitter  and  finally  degenerated  into  personal  criti 
cism  and  retort.  In  fact  the  acrimony  during  the 
weeks  succeeding  Douglas's  opening  speech  fairly 
surpassed  anything  that  had  ever  been  displayed 
on  the  floor  of  the  Senate.  Sumner  charged  Douglas 
with  being  a  "  squire  of  slavery,  its  very  Sancho 
Panza,"  and,  after  his  personal  objurgations, 
asserted  that  Douglas' s  report  and  speech  showed 


234  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

that  their  author  had  "  constrained  himself 
to    unfamiliar    decencies   of   speech. " l    This    ex 
cessively  bitter  onslaught    had  been  induced  by 
constant    offensive    comment    directed    personally 
against  himself,  charging  among  other  things  that 
he  was  guilty  of  the  manufacture  of  stories  about 
Kansas  for  his  own  ends.     Douglas,  in  answering, 
asserted  that  Suniner's  insulting    references    had 
been  drafted  at  leisure,  practiced,  and  prepared  in 
order  to  make  the  proper   impression.     He  suc 
ceeded  in  turning  against  Sumner  the  laughter  and 
ridicule  of  many  of  the  members  of  the  Senate,  and 
the  incident  closed  with    offensive    epithets    and 
taunts  on  both   sides.     Storey,    the  secretary  and 
biographer  of  Sumner,  quotes  the  correspondent  of 
a  Missouri  newspaper  who  was  probably  no  over- 
friendly  critic,  to  the  effect  that  Sumner  "  was  abused 
and  insulted  as  grossly  as  any  man  could  be,  but 
he  replied  successfully  to  the  unmeasured  vitupera 
tion  of  Douglas,  and  the  aristocratic  and  withering 
hauteur  of  Mason."  2    Conflict  between  Sumner  and 
Douglas  seemed  to   be  in  certain  prospect  when 
Brooks  of  South  Carolina  made  his  nearly  murderous 

1  Storey,   Life  of  Charles  Sumner,  American  Statesmen  Series 
1900,  p.  140. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  144.  The  correspondent  wrote  as  follows  :  "That 
snmner  displayed  great  ability  and  showed  that  in  oratorical 
talent  he  was  no  unworthy  successor  of  Adams,  Webster,  and 
Everett,  no  one  who  heard  him  will  deny.  In  vigor  and  rich 
ness  of  diction,  in  felicity  and  fecundity  of  illustration,  in 
>readth  and  completeness  of  view,  he  stands  unsur 
passed.  ...  In  his  reply  to  Caas,  Douglas,  and  Mason, 
who  stung  him  into  excitement,  he  was  more  successful  than 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         235 

assault  upon  the  senator  from  Massachusetts,1 — an 
incident  for  which,  fortunately,  Douglas  was  wholly 
free  of  responsibility. 

As  finally  reported  by  Douglas  and  passed  by  the 
Senate,  the  Toombs  bill  had  made  some  concession 
to  the  opposing  sentiment  which,  it  was  recognized, 
was  running  so  high  that  further  hostilities  would 
be  unwise.  The  measure  had  carried  with  it  a  pro 
vision  that  there  should  be  a  census  of  the  popula 
tion  of  Kansas,  and  that  delegates  to  a  constitutional 
convention  should  be  elected  subsequent  to  the 
taking  of  the  census.  In  order  to  assure  fairness, 
it  was  provided  that  the  President  should  select 
five  men  whose  choice  should  be  ratified  by  the 
Senate.  These  men  were  then  to  make  the  enumer 
ation  and  see  that  the  population  which  it  indicated 
was  duly  registered  for  voting.  When  this  had 
been  done,  an  election  by  these  duly  registered 
voters  was  to  be  held  on  the  same  date  as  the 
November  presidential  election.  Granting  the 
general  position  of  Douglas,  it  was  evident  that 
these  provisions  were  essentially  just  ;  the  only 
question  was  whether  the  commissioners  would  be 
fairly  and  disinterestedly  chosen.  And  on  this 
point  the  attitude  already  adopted  both  by  Douglas 
and  by  the  President  might  give  rise  to  reasonable 

at  any  other  time.  The  collision  knocked  fire  from  him;  and 
well  it  might,  for  he  was  abused  and  insulted  as  grossly  as  any 
man  could  be  ;  but  he  replied  successfully  to  the  unmeasured 
vituperation  of  Douglas,  and  the  aristocratic  and  withering 
hauteur  of  Mason." 
1  See  p.  143. 


236  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

doubts.  Such  doubts  were  entertained  by  the  op 
position,  and  were  in  some  instances  directly  voiced 
by  them,  although  the  measure,  as  already  noted, 
was  finally  passed — the  vote  standing  thirty- three 
to  twelve. 

Meantime,  however,  the  House  of  Bepresenta- 
tives,  dominated  by  the  opposition,  had  passed 
a  bill  for  the  admission  of  Kansas  on  the  same 
day  on  which  the  Senate  acted — the  vote  stand 
ing  ninety -nine  to  ninety -seven.  This  action 
sent  the  House  bill  to  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Territories,  whence  it  was  reported  on  the  8th  of 
July  with  an  amendment  resubstituting  the  Senate 
bill  (the  Toombs  bill),  while  in  the  House  the 
measure  sent  there  by  the  Senate  (the  Toombs  bill) 
was  tabled.  Douglas's  report  to  the  Senate  with 
reference  to  the  House  bill  explained  and  criticized 
that  measure.  The  House,  however,  deferred  all 
action  until  the  29th  of  July  when  a  new  measure 
was  substituted  for  a  relatively  unimportant  bill 
annulling  certain  acts  of  the  legislative  assembly 
of  Kansas  that  had  been  pending.  This  substitute, 
the  so-called  Dunn  Bill,  was  brought  before  the 
House  by  a  special  parliamentary  mano3uvre,  and 
the  title  was  made  to  read  aan  act  to  reorganize 
the  territory  of  Kansas,  and  for  other  purposes." 
The  measure  received  an  almost  unanimous  vote 
from  the  House  Republicans  and  was  without  doubt 
an  extraordinary  and  extreme  proposal  offered  for 
purely  party  purposes.  After  a  long  delay,  during 
which  Douglas  had  time  on  the  llth  of  August  to 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         237 

report  against  this  new  form  of  the  House  plan,  the 
effort  to  secure  any  sort  of  compromise  was  aban 
doned  and  Congress  adjourned  without  action  on 
the  subject. 

Just  at  the  juncture  when  Douglas  was  most 
keenly  feeling  the  consequences  of  his  course  on  the 
Kansas- Nebraska  question,  his  position  had  been 
rendered  even  more  difficult  by  the  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  so-called 
Dred  Scott  case.  This  decision  was  a  sorry  blow 
for  Douglas,  so  much  so  that  by  some  it  is  coupled 
with  the  accession  of  James  Buchanan  to  the  presi 
dency — two  fatal  events  in  this  period  of  his  career. 
Dred  Scott  was  a  negro  who  had  several  years  be 
fore  sued  for  his  own  freedom  and  for  the  freedom  of 
his  family  from  slavery.  The  case  drifted  through 
the  lower  courts,  and  finally,  after  the  customary 
tedious  delays,  worked  its  way  to  the  Supreme 
Court.  Its  interest  was  entirely  constitutional  and 
impersonal,  because  it  had  been  brought  up  as  a 
test  case  and  because  Dred  Scott  and  his  family, 
after  being  enslaved  by  order  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
were  freed  by  their  owner,  a  congressman  from 
Massachusetts.  It  raised  two  important  issues  :  the 
one  whether  a  negro  whose  progenitors  had  been 
slaves  could  be  a  citizen  of  any  state  in  the  United 
States ;  the  other  whether  the  Missouri  Compromise 
was  constitutional. 

Dred  Scott  came  of  slave  parents  and  had  spent 
most  of  his  life  in  Missouri.  Afterward  his  owner 
took  him  to  Minnesota  where  he  lived  for  two  years. 


238  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

The  Missouri  Compromise  had  prohibited  slavery 
in  that  part  of  the  country  and  hence  arose  the 
question  whether  a  negro  slave  who  had  lived  there 
two  years  had  gained  his  freedom.  Connected  with 
this  was  the  question  whether  Congress  could  pro 
hibit  slavery  in  the  territories.1  The  importance  of 
the  case  was  quickly  seen  and  the  Supreme  Court 
was  placed  under  very  heavy  pressure,  the  result 
being  that  the  court  hesitated  and  discussed  the  issue 
in  an  almost  unprecedented  way.  There  was  no 
suggestion  of  any  irregular  or  illegitimate  influence, 
but  it  was  an  undoubted  fact  that  the  personal  sym 
pathies  and  sectional  prejudices  of  the  justices,  five 
of  whom  were  Southerners,  were  actively  aroused. 
Chief-Justice  Taney  delivered  the  opinion  of  the 
court  on  the  6th  of  March,  1857.  He  held  that 
negroes  were  not  included  as  citizens  under  the 
Constitution,  hence  could  claim  no  constitutional 
immunities.  Furthermore,  Congress  had  never 
been  warranted  in  passing  the  Missouri  Com 
promise  Act  which  was  therefore  invalid.2  Dis 
senting  opinions  were  presented,  but  there  was  no 
doubt  about  the  meaning  of  the  opinion  of  the 
majority  of  the  court. 

It  was  no  wonder  that  the  decision  was  received 
with  joy  by  the  pro-slavery  Democrats  who  imme 
diately  printed  and  distributed  it  as  a  campaign 
document.  To  Douglas,  who  had  fought  fiercely  on 

1  Of.  Rhodes,  Vol.  IT,  pp.  251-264. 

2  Supreme  Court  Reports,  Dred  Scott  v.  Sandford,  19  Howard 
p.  393,  et  seq. 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         239 

the  basis  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  the  decision 
came  as  a  severe  blow.  His  often-repeated  princi 
ple  of  obedience  to  a  mandate  of  the  Supreme  Court 
must  now,  however,  determine  his  course.  He  saw 
that  he  must  accept  and  seek  to  vindicate  the  ac 
tion  of  the  court.  Because  of  this  decision,  he 
argued,  there  was  the  more  reason  why  stress 
should  be  placed  upon  the  necessity  of  preserving 
the  absolute  power  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  given 
region  to  determine  what  their  position  with  refer 
ence  to  slavery  should  be.  Since  the  Supreme 
Court  had  thrown  to  the  winds  the  basis  upon 
which  the  geographical  extension  and  restriction 
of  slavery  had  been  founded,  there  remained  now  as 
the  sole  guide  the  disposition  of  the  inhabitants  of 
any  territory,  as  recorded  in  their  constitutions  and 
laws.  For  Congress  to  attempt  to  control  would 
henceforward  more  than  ever  be  unconstitutional 
and  unwise.  In  every  case  the  decision  must  be 
made  to  depend  upon  the  carefully  ascertained 
views  of  the  voters. 

The  situation  in  Kansas  meanwhile  had  remained 
unsettled  and  unsatisfactory.  President  Buchanan 
had  sent  Eobert  J.  Walker  of  Mississippi  to  the 
state  as  governor.  Walker  had  arrived  there  on 
the  26th  of  May,  1857,  and  published  an  inaugural 
address  which  had  previously  been  submitted  to 
both  Douglas  and  Buchanan.  As  a  Southern  man 
he  would  gladly  have  seen  Kansas  a  slave  state, 
but  as  a  fair-minded  man  he  recognized  that  this 
1  Rhodes,  Vol.  II,  p.  273. 


240  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

was  out  of  the  question.  Only  about  two  or  three 
hundred  slaves  were  now  in  the  territory  and  it  was 
the  belief  of  Walker  that,  by  making  Kansas  a  free 
state,  it  would  be  possible  to  unite  the  opposing 
factions  in  a  way  that  would  nevertheless  give  its 
votes  to  the  Democratic  party,  and  would  conse 
quently  place  the  state  in  the  Senate  on  the  side  of 
the  Southern  group.  Walker  urged  all  good 
citizens  to  join  in  the  election  of  June  15th,  which 
was  to  name  delegates  to  a  constitutional  conven 
tion,  but  with  meagre  result ;  for  the  men  who  be 
lieved  in  the  anti-slavery  doctrine  practically 
refused  to  respond  to  the  appeal  of  the  governor,  so 
that  only  a  small  percentage,  less  than  one-quarter 
of  the  total  number  of  registered  voters,  cast  ballots. 
Those  who  did  vote  were  largely  pro- slavery  advo 
cates,  and  the  men  whom  they  elected  were  of 
course  of  their  own  way  of  thinking.  The  outcome 
was  the  choice  of  a  convention  strongly  biased  in 
one  direction,  and  from  which  little  that  was  satis 
factory  to  the  men  who  had  foolishly  refrained  from 
participating  in  the  election  could  be  expected. 

The  Free- Soil  men  saw  their  error  too  late,  and 
set  themselves  earnestly  to  work  to  control  the 
autumn  elections  at  which  a  territorial  legislature 
was  to  be  chosen.  In  this  effort  they  were  success 
ful,  electing  a  large  majority  of  members,  and  thus 
the  singular  condition  existed  that,  though  a  pro- 
slavery  constitutional  convention  had  been  chosen, 
an  anti-slavery  legislature  was  in  control  of  the 
affairs  of  the  territory.  It  had  become  apparent  to 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         241 

most  of  the  cooler-headed  pro-slavery  men,  as  it  had 
to  Governor  Walker,  that  the  sentiment  of  the  state 
would  not  endorse  a  pro-slavery  constitution.  The 
convention,  however,  proceeded  along  its  own  lines, 
and  a  trick  was  relied  upon  to  avoid  a  defeat  when 
the  constitution  should  be  submitted  to  popular 
vote.  Meeting  at  a  place  called  Lecompton,  in 
September,  the  convention  had  reassembled  after 
the  election,  on  the  19th  of  October,  under  the  pro 
tection  of  Federal  troops.  In  the  final  draft  of  the 
document  appeared  this  clause:  "The  right  of 
property  is  before  and  higher  than  any  constitu 
tional  sanction  and  the  right  of  the  owner  of  a  slave 
to  such  slave  and  its  increase  is  the  same  and  as  in 
violable  as  the  right  of  the  owner  of  any  property 
whatever."  The  constitution  could  not  be  amended 
until  after  1864,  and  even  at  that  time  there  was  to 
be  no  alteration  that  would  * *  affect  the  rights  of 
property  in  the  ownership  of  slaves."  The  election 
was  to  take  place  on  December  21st  when  the  people 
might  vote  for  the  i  l  constitution  with  slavery,  or 
the  constitution  with  no  slavery."  There  was  to  be 
no  opportunity  to  vote  against  the  constitution,  and 
even  if  the  a  constitution  with  no  slavery  "  received 
a  majority,  the  situation  was  not  hopeless  from 
slavery's  point  of  view.  It  was  provided  simply 
that  slavery  should  "no  longer  exist  in  the  state  of 
Kansas,  except  that  the  right  of  property  in  slaves 
now  in  this  territory  shall  in  no  measure  be  inter 
fered  with."  l 

1  Rhodes,  Vol.  II,  p.  279. 


242  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

This  action  of  the  Lecompton  convention  brought 
to  a  head  all  those  elements  of  disorder  which  had 
been  temporarily  scattered  in  Kansas.  The  scheme 
was  recognized  throughout  the  Union  as  one  of  those 
contemptible  tricks,  common  in  American  politics 
and  too  patiently  endured,  contrived  for  the  object 
of  advancing  some  temporary  or  local  cause.  In 
this  instance,  however,  it  was  the  general  opinion 
that  the  ruse  affected  matters  of  too  great  moment 
to  be  accepted  either  in  Kansas  itself  or  anywhere 
throughout  the  Union.  Governor  Walker  denounced 
the  scheme  as  "  a  vile  fraud,  a  base  counterfeit,  and 
a  wretched  device  ; "  l  while  all  the  decent  people  of 
Kansas,  whether  anti-slavery  or  pro-slavery  in  sym 
pathy,  exerted  every  effort  to  bring  about  the  re 
jection  of  the  proposition,  thus  avoiding  the  neces 
sity  of  submitting  to  a  scheme  which  had  been  pre 
pared  in  this  dishonest  way. 

The  real  nature  of  the  trick  had  been  hidden  for 
a  time  from  the  eyes  of  the  country,  owing  partly 
to  the  limited  means  then  available  of  transmitting 
intelligence.  During  the  time  that  the  true  situa 
tion  was  thus  obscured,  some  ground  had  been  re 
gained  by  the  Democrats,  who  had  won  pretty  gen 
erally  at  the  autumn  elections  (1857),  and  were 
nervously  anxious  not  to  sink  back  into  the  gulf  of 
defeat.  As  soon  as  the  facts  began  to  leak  out,  as 
they  did  about  the  time  that  Congress  assembled, 
there  was  an  immediate  outburst  of  public  opinion. 
Throughout  the  northern  section  of  the  Democratic 
1  Rhodes,  Vol.  II,  p.  280. 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         243 

party,  the  Leconiptou  plan  was  denounced ;  even 
some  of  the  most  hide -bound  partisans  declared  that 
it  was  not  to  be  tolerated.  In  Illinois  particularly, 
there  was  strong  sentiment  against  the  action  of  the 
convention,  and  pressure  was  put  upon  Douglas  to 
oppose  it.  He  would  thereby  separate  himself  from, 
the  extreme  pro-slavery  group  to  which  he  had  be 
come  an  ally  and  commit  himself  to  the  views  and 
policies  of  the  Northern  Democrats  and  the  moderate 
slavery  men. 

Thus  a  most  serious  alternative  was  placed  before 
Douglas.  During  the  past  two  years  he  had  already 
seen  his  personal  power  in  Illinois  wavering,  due  to 
the  general  feeling  that  he  had  gone  too  far  in  his 
advocacy  of  the  wishes  of  the  slavery  party  in  Con 
gress.  Yet  should  he  now  break  with  those  who 
were  endeavoring  to  make  Kansas  a  slave  state? 
If  he  should  do  so,  would  he  not  thereby  forfeit  the 
support  of  what  was  possibly  the  most  closely  or 
ganized  body  of  men  in  Congress  !  Would  he  not 
hopelessly  alienate  friends  and  retainers  who  were 
necessary  in  the  approaching  presidential  contest 
upon  which  his  attention  was  now  fixed?  The 
choice  was  difficult,  and  it  was  rendered  more  so  by 
reason  of  the  intellectual  complexities  which  beset 
him.  He  had  advocated  the  right  of  citizens  of  the 
state  to  settle  the  slavery  question  as  they  pleased. 
T-he  constitutional  convention  had  been  elected,  al 
though  by  a  minority  of  the  voters.  Why  should 
there  be  outside  interference  intended  to  prevent 
the  inhabitants  from  dealing  with  their  own  prob- 


244  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

lems  as  they  saw  fit?  Oil  the  other  hand,  if  this 
constitution,  with  its  double-faced  provision  as  to 
slavery,  should  be  foisted  upon  the  people,  would 
the  real  spirit  and  meaning  of  the  Kansas- Nebraska 
legislation  be  maintained?  Douglas  was  particu 
larly  embarrassed  by  the  fact  that  he  had  already 
spoken  in  public  on  several  occasions,  eulogizing 
the  action  of  Walker  and  asserting  that  the  Presi 
dent  would  unquestionably  carry  out  the  spirit  of 
the  Kansas- Nebraska  act  in  every  detail. 

Difficult  as  was  the  situation,  there  could  be  but 
one  logical  outcome.  If  Douglas  now  adopted  a 
course  of  action  which  would  reduce  his  personal 
popularity  in  his  own  state  and  perhaps  deprive 
him  of  its  direct  support,  he  would  lose  an  indis 
pensable  asset  in  his  presidential  aspirations.  It 
was  unfortunate  to  have  to  break  with  the  extreme 
wing  of  his  Southern  support,  but  this  was  a  loss 
that  might  possibly  be  overcome,  while  to  cut  the 
ground  from  beneath  his  own  feet  at  home  would 
be  impossible.  He  decided  upon  a  positive  course, 
calculated  to  resist  and  condemn  the  action  of  the 
Lecompton  convention,  and  in  this  mind  he  started 
for  Washington  in  December,  1857,  first  giving  out, 
at  Chicago,  a  statement  that  he  would  oppose  the 
pro-slavery  scheme.  Douglas,  nevertheless,  was  not 
disposed  to  go  unnecessarily  far  in  the  role  of  re 
former.  On  reaching  Washington  he  hastened  to 
the  White  House  and  communicated  his  views  to 
Buchanan.  Buchanan,  beset  by  some  of  the  same 
doubts  and  embarrassments  which  had  harassed 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         245 

Douglas,  but  directed  by  no  such  imperative  ne 
cessity  as  had  governed  the  action  of  the  senator 
from  Illinois,  told  the  latter  that  he  intended  to 
throw  his  influence  to  the  side  of  the  slavery  advo 
cates  and  of  the  Lecompton  convention.  Douglas 
remonstrated,  without  avail.  What  happened  at 
the  interview  has  been  variously  described,  but 
there  is  no  difference  regarding  the  main  features. 
According  to  Mcolay  and  Hay1  "  Buchanan  in 
sisted  that  he  must  recommend  it"  [the  Lecomp 
ton  constitution]  "in  his  annual  message.  Doug 
las  replied  that  he  would  denounce  it  as  soon  as  it 
was  read.  The  President  excited,  told  him  l  to  re 
member  that  no  Democrat  ever  yet  differed  from  an 
administration  of  his  own  choice  without  being 
crushed.  Beware  of  the  fate  of  Tallmadge  and 
Bives.'  'Mr.  President,'  retorted  Douglas,  1 1  wish 
you  to  remember  that  General  Jackson  is  dead/  " 
Douglas  had  thus  definitely  accepted  the  idea  of  a 
breach  with  Buchanan,  whose  weakness  and  reac 
tionary  tendencies  he  correctly  estimated.2  He 


1  Abraham  Lincoln,   A  History,  1890,  Vol.  II,  p.  120. 

2 Flint,  Douglas,  pp.  91-92  says:  "The  President,  however, 
would  tolerate  no  difference  of  opinion  among  friends  on  this 
question.  Upon  the  tariff — upon  specific  and  ad  valorem  du 
ties — upon  the  Pacific  Railroad — upon  the  Homestead  Bill — 
upon  the  Neutrality  Laws — and,  indeed,  on  any  and  every 
other  question,  Democratic  senators  and  representatives,  and 
cabinet  officers,  were  at  liberty  to  think  and  act  as  they  pleased, 
without  impairing  their  personal  or  political  relations  with  the 
President.  But  on  the  Kansas  question,  having  determined  to 
abandon  the  principles  and  reverse  the  policy  to  which  he  had 
pledged  the  administration  and  the  party,  he  regarded  Mr. 
Douglas's  refusal  to  follow  him  in  his  change  of  principles  and 


246  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

himself  had  no  mind  to  become  the  champion  of 
a  losing  cause,  for  success  was  now  his  cardinal 
principle,  and  he  had  none  of  the  Bourbon  spirit 
which  carried  the  extreme  Southern  slavery  party 
forward  even  to  the  shedding  of  blood.  He  was 
as  good  as  his  word,  and  hardly  had  Buchanan 
sent  in  a  message  in  which  he  weakly  indicated ' 
that  in  case  the  Lecomptou  constitution  was  pre 
sented  he  would  advise  the  admission  of  Kansas 
under  its  provisions,  when  Douglas  on  the  follow 
ing  day  (December  9th)  instituted  a  bitter  attack 
upon  that  constitution,  and  incidentally  upon  the 
President.2  After  some  rather  scathing  remarks 
directed  at  Buchanan  and  his  recommendations,  he 
restated  the  principle  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill 
as  having  been  that  of  treating  the  slavery  question 
like  every  other,  and  consequently  of  leaving  it  to 
the  inhabitants  of  each  and  every  would-be  state  to 
settle  for  themselves.  This  idea  had  been  violated 
by  the  Lecompton  convention  which  proposed  to 
u  force  .  .  .  down  the  throats  of  the  people  of 
Kansas,  in  opposition  to  their  wishes  and  in  viola 
tion  of  our  pledges,  a  constitution  which  was  repug- 

policy  as  a  serious  reflection  upon  his  own  conduct.  All  free 
dom  of  judgment  and  action  was  denied.  Implicit  obedience 
to  the  behests  of  the  President  was  demanded.  The  senator 
was  required  to  obey  the  mandate  of  the  Executive,  instead  of 
to  represent  the  will  of  his  constituency.  The  representatives 
of  the  states  and  of  the  people  were  required  to  surrender  their 
convictions,  their  judgments  and  their  consciences  to  the  Ex 
ecutive,  and  to  receive  instructions  from  him  instead  of  them." 

1  Messages  and  Papers,  Vol.  V,  p.  471. 

2  Globe,  1st  Sess.,  35th  Cong.,  pp.  14-18. 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS          247 

nant  to  them.  "  He  rejected  the  views  of  those  op 
portunists  who  urged  that  Congress  should  await 
the  result  of  the  election  on  the  21st  of  December. 
The  Lecompton  constitution,  he  showed,  made  it 
impossible  to  have  "  a  fair  vote  on  the  slavery 
clause"  and  therefore,  he  asked,  "  why  wait  for  the 
mockery  of  an  election,  when  it  is  provided  unal 
terably,  that  the  people  cannot  vote — when  the 
majority  are  disfranchised?" 

The  outcome  of  the  election,  he  protested,  was  of 
no  particular  importance  from  the  present  stand 
point,  because  there  was  no  more  reason  for  forcing 
upon  Kansas  a  free  state  constitution  than  a  slave 
state  constitution.  Passing  definitely  to  the  side 
of  the  Northern  Democrats,  he  asserted: — "It  is 
none  of  my  business  which  way  the  slavery  clause 
is  decided.  I  care  not  whether  it  is  voted  down  or 
voted  up."  The  operations  in  Kansas,  whereby 
the  Lecompton  constitution  had  been  brought  to 
the  front,  he  denounced  as  "  a  system  of  trickery  and 
jugglery  to  defeat  the  fair  expression  of  the  will  of 
the  people. ' '  The  only  way  to  get  an  honest  decision, 
he  thought,  was  to  recur  to  the  Toombs  bill,  or  some 
other  similar  in  character,  and  to  enact  legislation 
which  would  render  it  possible  to  get  a  fair  ballot. 

Douglas's  defection  was  bitterly  resented  by  the 
pro -slavery  men  who  had  supposed  that  he  was 
hopelessly  bound  to  them  by  his  presidential  aspi 
rations.1  Instantly  he  was  attacked  by  Bigler  of 

1  The  powerful  impression  made  upon  the  mind  of  John 
Sherman  by  Douglas's  leadership  has  been  expressed  in  his 


248  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Pennsylvania  and  by  Mason.  He  at  once  answered 
Mason,  and  then  engaged  in  an  interchange  of  shots 
with  Bigler,  based  upon  a  suggestion  of  the  latter 
that  at  certain  secret  meetings  in  Douglas's  own 
house,  Douglas  had  advocated  the  Lecompton  con 
stitution.  Bigler  asserted  that  the  question  of  sub 
mitting  the  constitution  to  the  people  was  dis 
cussed  at  his  opponent's  house,  but  he  professed  to 
be  somewhat  hazy  in  his  recollection  whether 
Douglas  himself  had  taken  a  definite  stand  upon 
the  question  of  direct  submission.  Others,  however, 
recalled  that  in  former  speeches  and  documents 
he  had  advocated  leaving  the  slavery  question  to 
the  people  through  delegates  chosen  for  that  pur 
pose.  Douglas  emerged  from  the  debate  with  sub 
stantial  success,  notwithstanding  the  skill  of  some 


Recollections,  Vol.  I,  p.  149  ff. — "  When  Congress  assembled,  the 
Lecompton  scheme  became  the  supreme  subject  for  debate. 
Mr.  Douglas  assumed  at  once  the  leadership  of  the  opposition 
to  that  measure.  He  said  :  '  Up  to  the  time  of  meeting  of  the 
convention,  in  October  last,  the  pretense  was  kept  up,  the  pro 
fession  was  openly  made,  and  believed  by  me,  and  I  thought 
believed  by  them,  that  the  convention  intended  to  submit  a 
constitution  to  the  people,  and  not  to  attempt  to  put  a  govern 
ment  into  operation  without  such  a  submission.'  But  instead 
of  that,  '  All  men  must  vote  for  the  constitution,  whether  they 
like  it  or  not,  in  order  to  be  permitted  to  vote  for  or  against 
slavery.'  Again  he  said:  'I  have  asked  a  very  large  number 
of  the  gentlemen  who  framed  the  constitution,  quite  a  number 
of  delegates,  and  still  a  larger  number  of  persons  who  are  their 
friends,  and  I  have  received  the  same  answer  from  every  one 
of  them.  .  .  .  They  say  if  they  allowed  a  negative  vote 
the  constitution  would  have  been  voted  down  by  an  overwhelm 
ing  majority,  and  hence  the  fellows  shall  not  be  allowed  to 
vote  at  all. '  He  denounced  it  as  '  a  trick,  a  fraud  upon  the 
rights  of  the  people.'  " 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         249 

of  his  antagonists.  The  applause  from  the  galleries 
of  the  Senate  chamber  was  tremendous,  while  anti- 
slavery  men  hardly  knew  what  to  make  of  the 
situation.  They  saw,  of  course,  that  Douglas  would 
shortly  have  to  enter  upon  a  campaign  for  reelection 
in  Illinois,  and  they  marked  with  satisfaction  the 
growth  of  the  an ti- slavery  feeling  in  that  state. 
They  knew  that,  if  defeated  for  the  Senate,  he  would 
be  politically  dead  for  the  time  being  at  least.  For 
all  these  and  other  obvious  reasons,  they  did  not 
trust  Douglas  or  in  any  measure  believe  in  his  new 
position  ;  they  felt  that  with  a  shifting  of  political 
conditions  he  would  shortly  appear  once  more  as 
the  shrewd  pettifogging  advocate  he  had  seemed 
during  the  early  stages  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
bill. 

While  Douglas  was  thus  failing  to  get,  among 
anti-slavery  men,  the  recognition  which  some  might 
have  expected,  but  which  he  himself  would  prob 
ably  have  detested,  he  had  also  failed  in  a  more 
vital  respect.  He  did  not  obtain  the  favor  of  the 
Northern  Democratic  wing  in  Congress,  or  of  mod 
erate  Democrats  anywhere.  Save  for  a  few  scatter 
ing  supporters,  he  was  now  isolated,  while  the  less 
courageous  Northern  Democratic  senators,  long 
jealous  of  Douglas's  preeminent  position,  set  them 
selves  at  the  task  of  harassing  and  annoying  him 
on  the  floor.  The  change  of  front  had  succeeded 
admirably  at  home,  and  had  retrieved  what  seemed 
to  have  been  an  almost  hopeless  situation  in  Illinois. 
The  conspicuous  position  which  Douglas  had  as- 


250  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

suined  flattered  the  vanity  of  the  voters,  while 
those  who  had  feared  that  he  was  too  close  to  the 
Southern  slaveholders  were  now  convinced  that 
their  suspicions  had  been  wrong.  "  An  immense 
mass-meeting  was  held  in  Chicago,"  says  Sheahan, 
"and  resolutions  of  the  most  unqualified  approba 
tion  of  the  doctrines  of  the  speech  were  enthusi 
astically  adopted."  1  Douglas  had  once  more  shown 
himself  a  master  in  the  political  game,  turning  a 
threatened  defeat  into  a  brilliant  personal  victory, 
although  by  so  doing  demoralizing  the  forces  which 
he  had  been  leading  in  the  Senate. 

The  contest  in  Congress  now  opened  vigorously. 
In  Kansas,  the  Lecompton  constitution  was  of 
course  adopted.  The  an  ti  slavery  men  regarded 
the  election  as  a  sham  and  remained  absent.  Hence 
the  legislature  provided  for  another  election  on 
January  4,  1858.  This  had  been  done  by  reason  of 
the  action  of  Stanton,  then  acting  governor  in  the 
absence  of  Walker,  in  convening  a  special  session 
of  the  legislature  which  was  under  the  control  of 
the  an  ti- slavery  party.  Stanton  was  immediately 
removed  by  Buchanan,  but  the  second  election  was 
held  in  the  meanwhile,  and  resulted  in  the  casting 
of  a  large  vote  against  the  constitution  under  any 
conditions,  thus  making  it  clear  that  there  was 
a  substantial  majority  against  its  adoption. 
Buchanan,  however,  in  a  message  of  February  2d,2 
sent  the  Lecompton  constitution  to  the  Senate, 
recommending  the  admission  of  Kansas  under  it. 

1  Life,  p.  324.  3  Messages  and  Papers,  Vol.  V,  p.  471. 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         251 

This  message  was  referred  to  the  Committee  on 
Territories,  which  in  the  meanwhile  had  been  re- 
appointed  with  Douglas  as  chairman,  and  a  bitter 
debate  was  opened  on  the  floor.  The  President  had 
also  sent  to  Congress  the  constitution  of  the  state  of 
Minnesota  which  had  been  referred  to  the  Commit 
tee  on  Territories  and  was  now  pending,  along 
with  the  Kansas  question.  Douglas's  attitude  had 
led  his  colleagues,  while  refraining  from  deposing 
him  as  chairman,  to  make  up  the  membership  of 
the  committee  in  a  way  that  insured  opposition. 
The  membership  included  beside  Douglas,  Jones  of 
Iowa,  Sebastian  of  Arkansas,  Fitzpatrick  of  Ala 
bama,  Green  of  Missouri,  Collamer  of  Vermont, 
and  Wade  of  Ohio.  This  practically  insured  three 
distinct  groups  in  the  Committee.  The  Southern 
or  pro-slavery  group  comprised  Sebastian,  Fitzpat 
rick  and  Green,  while  the  small  Northern  anti- 
slavery  group  included  Collamer  and  Wade.  Doug 
las  was  practically  isolated,  although  he  had  the 
tentative  support  of  Jones  of  Iowa,  who,  however, 
finally  attached  himself  to  the  Southern  section. 

Under  the  leadership  of  Green,  a  majority  of  the 
Committee  reported  a  bill  to  admit  Kansas  into  the 
Union.  This  was  on  February  18th,  and  at  the 
same  time  Douglas  reported  against  the  measure, 
while  Collamer  and  Wade  united  in  another  com 
mittee  report.  Douglas's  report  developed  little 
that  was  novel,  but  followed  the  same  line  as  the 
speech  which  he  had  delivered  on  the  floor  at  the 
time  of  his  breach  with  the  administration.  The 


252  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Lecompton  constitution  had  been  adopted  and  sub 
mitted  in  a  way  that  was  out  of  harmony  with  the 
spirit  of  the  Kansas- Nebraska  act,  and  therefore  it 
was  proper  for  Congress  to  intervene,  and  to  exer 
cise  its  superior  power  with  a  view  to  guaranteeing 
a  true  expression  of  the  will  of  the  people.  While 
the  report  was  made  purely  upon  Douglas's  own 
individual  authority,  and  while  he  had  evidently 
little  personal  following  in  Congress,  it  was  plainly 
evident  that  his  position  was  of  considerable  im 
portance,  since  it  was  influencing  many  along  lines 
which  they  had  previously  refused  to  follow.  To 
the  whole  country  it  was  a  great  and  shining  ex 
ample  of  personal  courage,  and  in  that  light  it 
caused  special  annoyance  to  the  ringsters  in  Con 
gress  who  regarded  nothing  as  more  odious  than  in 
dependent  thought  and  action.  Every  effort  was 
made  to  entrap  Douglas  into  some  inconsistent  posi 
tion,  and  this  result  was  specially  sought  in  connec 
tion  with  the  constitution  of  Minnesota,  where  the 
issue  of  direct  submission  to  the  people  was  like 
wise  raised.  Douglas,  however,  took  his  stand 
upon  the  broad  ground  of  a  desire  to  have  every 
state  constitution  represent  merely  the  manifest 
wish  of  the  majority  of  those  who  were  to  live  under 
it,  and  no  progress  was  achieved  in  suppressing  his 
personality  on  the  floor,  although  he  did  not  take 
his  usual  conspicuous  part  in  the  debate.  The 
effort  was  made,  therefore,  to  attack  him  on  purely 
political  lines.  The  Democratic  administration  was 
then  thoroughly  and  absolutely  in  control  of  all  the 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         253 

apparatus  of  government,  and  the  usual  form  of  dis 
cipline  was  now  applied  for  the  purpose  of  break 
ing  up  his  personal  "  machine."  Appointments 
that  should  have  gone  to  him  were  made  without 
reference  to  his  wishes,  while  his  own  political  ad 
herents  were  dismissed  and  proscribed.  The  local 
offices  in  Illinois  which  by  custom  he  had  been 
allowed  to  fill,  were  taken  from  him,  and  the  effort 
was  made  to  cut  away  the  ground  that  had  been 
gained  by  his  change  of  front  in  connection  with 
the  Kansas  question. 

None  of  these  manoeuvres,  however,  was  suc 
cessful  and  the  discussion,  punctuated  by  efforts  to 
force  a  vote,  dragged  on  until  March  23d,  when  Crit- 
tenden  presented  a  substitute  measure.  It  provided 
in  substance  that  Kansas  should  be  admitted  with 
the  Lecompton  constitution,  but  admission  was 
made  conditional  upon  the  prior  submission  of  the 
instrument  to  a  direct  vote  of  the  people,  and  a 
majority  vote  in  its  favor.  In  case  the  constitution 
should  be  approved,  the  President  was  to  declare 
Kansas  a  state.  This  plan  was  rejected,  however, 
by  a  moderate  majority,  and  then  the  original 
measure,  reported  by  Green  and  his  colleagues  of 
the  committee,  simply  providing  for  the  admission 
of  Kansas  with  the  Lecompton  constitution,  was 
adopted. 

This  action  was  taken  after  Douglas,  on  the 
evening  of  the  22d  of  March,  had  delivered  a  long 
speech,  having  risen  from  a  sick  bed  in  order  to  be 
present.  In  it  he  reviewed  his  position  and  general 


264  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

attitude  on  the  Kansas  question.  The  speech  was 
frequently  interrupted  and  was  far  more  desultory 
than  most  of  his  efforts,  closing  with  a  weak  form 
of  apology  for  the  personalities  he  had  indulged  in. 
As  we  have  seen,  it  did  not  change  the  course  of  the 
Senate's  action.1  The  Senate  bill  had  been  passed 
by  a  vote  of  thirty -three  to  twenty-five.  It  now 
went  to  the  House  and  on  the  1st  of  April  the  Crit- 
tenden  amendment,  which  had  failed  in  the  Senate, 
was  substituted  by  a  vote  of  120  to  122.  After  dis 
cussion,  a  conference  committee  representing  both 
bodies  reported  a  bill  prepared  by  Mr.  English  of 
Indiana  and  known  as  the  English  bill.  This  was  a 
compromise  which  made  a  large  grant  of  govern 
ment  lands  to  Kansas,  and  provided  that  the  peo 
ple  should  vote  upon  the  question  of  accepting  the 
lands  and  entering  the  Union  under  the  Lecompton 
constitution,  while  in  case  they  rejected  the  lauds 
and  the  constitution  they  should  not  be  admitted  as 
a  state  until  there  was  a  sufficient  population  to 
conform  to  the  congressional  requirements  for  a 
representative.  This  proposal  was  accepted  in  both 
houses  although,  after  some  hesitation,  Douglas 
voted  against  it  in  the  Senate.  When  the  proposi 
tion  was  presented  to  the  people  of  Kansas  on 
August  2d,  an  overwhelming  majority  (11,300 
out  of  13,088  votes)  was  cast  against  the  EDglish 
bill.  Slavery  had  thus  been  defeated,  and  the 
Kansas  question,  although  partially  settled,  re- 

*For   text  of  this  speech  see  Globe,  1st  Sess.,  35th  Cong., 
Appendix,  pp.  194-202. 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         255 

inained ;  while  the  saving  of  Douglas's  personal 
fortunes  had  again  disorganized  the  Democratic 
party  in  Congress.  It  was  a  melancholy  outcome 
of  his  movement  for  the  presidential  nomination, 
which  had  been  the  origin  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
act. 

Attention  was  now  more  and  more  closely  con 
centrated  upon  Douglas's  personal  future.  Not 
only  had  his  own  commanding  position  focussed 
public  notice,  but  he  was  regarded  by  increasing 
numbers  as  embodying  the  prospects  of  the  Demo 
cratic  party.  As  early  as  July,  1858,  Godkin  had 
already  written:  "In  the  political  world  every 
body's  attention  is  absorbed  by  the  canvass  for  the 
Illinois  election  in  the  autumn,  when  Senator 
Douglas  will  have  to  struggle  against  a  host  of  foes. 
It  was  rumored  at  one  time  that  the  Lecomptonites 
were  disposed  to  forgive  him  his  bad  conduct  last 
winter,  and  in  order  to  preserve  the  unity  of  the 
party  receive  him  once  more  into  the  Democratic 
fold.  These  expectations  are,  however,  now  at  an 
end,  and  it  is  ascertained,  beyond  all  question,  that 
he  will  have  to  encounter  the  unrelenting  hostility 
of  his  old  friends,  as  well  as  of  the  Republicans. 
With  the  latter  his  services  to  the  Free  Soil  cause 
during  the  last  session  of  Congress  have  not  sufficed 
to  wipe  out  the  recollection  of  the  Missouri  Com 
promise,  and  a  hundred  other  stabs  administered  to 
freedom  by  the  same  nervous  arm.  Douglas  made 
his  entry  into  Chicago  on  Saturday,  and  delivered 
a  long  address,  reviewing  his  recent  course.  He 


256  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

was  received  with  mixed  demonstrations  of  ap 
plause  and  disapprobation.  In  spite  of  his  treason, 
his  chances  of  victory  are  probably  greater  than 
those  of  any  other  man  in  the  Union  would  be 
under  the  same  circumstances.  This  division  in 
the  ranks  of  the  Democrats  gives  the  Eepublicaus  a 
better  chance  of  victory  in  Illinois  than  ever  they 
have  had  before  ;  and  a  Eepublican  victory  in  Illi 
nois,  the  headquarters  of  Douglas,  would  create  the 
most  tremendous  ' sensation7  of  latter  days,  and 
would  very  materially  influence  the  next  presiden 
tial  election. " l 

No  one  was  more  keenly  alive  to  the  responsibili 
ties  resting  upon  him  than  Douglas  himself.  He 
now  had  at  issue  not  only  the  presidency,  his  hopes 
for  which  had  already  received  some  very  serious 
blows,  but  also  his  seat  in  the  Senate,  since  it  was 
necessary  that  he  should  seek  reelection  at  the 
hands  of  a  constituency  profoundly  dissatisfied  with 
the  position  he  had  taken  during  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  struggle  and,  it  seemed,  only  partially 
reassured  by  the  change  of  front  which  he  himself 
had  shrewdly  made  in  connection  with  the  Lecomp- 
ton  question.  Should  he  be  defeated  for  the  Senate, 
Douglas  could  not  hope  for  any  future  whatever  in 
national  politics.  The  verdict  against  a  man  who 
could  not  carry  his  own  state  would  be  unhesi 
tatingly  unfavorable.  Moreover,  it  would  be  a 
note  of  warning  that  would  be  heard  all  over  the 
country  and  would  call  every  doubting  voter  to 

lLife  ofE.  L.  Godkin,  Vol.  I,  pp.  177-178. 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         257 

arms  against  the  Democratic  party.  On  all  ac 
counts,  then,  it  was  incumbent  upon  Douglas  to  do 
his  utmost.  At  all  hazards,  he  must  win  the  battle 
in  Illinois,  and  he  must  win  it  in  a  way  that  would 
give  him  what  might  pass  for  a  triumphant  vindica 
tion.  Nothing  less  than  this  would  suffice. 

There  were,  however,  some  hopeful  indications. 
Not  a  few  men  of  Eepublican  sympathies  were 
inclined  to  think  that  the  best  thing  possible 
would  be  to  unite  on  Douglas  and  positively 
draw  to  his  support  the  Northern  Democrats,  the 
more  liberal  Southerners,  and  the  doubters  who  felt 
that  something  must  be  done  to  check  the  excesses 
of  the  extreme  slavery  men  as  well  as  the  extreme 
Abolitionists.  Even  Horace  Greeley  thought  that 
because  of  Douglas's  meritorious  service  against  the 
Lecompton  constitution  and  the  resulting  effect  of 
that  struggle  in  making  Kansas  a  free  state,  the 
Republicans  of  Illinois  ought  to  testify  their  appro 
bation  by  giving  Douglas  a  unanimous  nomination 
for  the  senatorship.1  Many  other  influential  Ee- 
publicans  had  the  same  thought,  but  such  was  not 
the  feeling  within  the  state.  In  Illinois  itself,  local 
issues  had  played  an  important  part  in  Douglas's 
career  and  his  action  upon  purely  national  ques 
tions  was  considered  of  decidedly  minor  importance. 
Those  who  were  close  to  him  at  home  could  alone 
judge  of  his  tremendous  resource,  and  they  more 
than  others  realized  that  his  change  of  front  on  the 
Lecompton  question  had  been,  in  part  at  least,  ani- 
1  Carr,  Life  of  Douglas,  p.  72. 


258  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

mated  by  the  necessity  of  controlling  the  current  of 
events  in  Illinois.  They  were  not  inclined  to  ac 
cept  the  more  or  less  sentimental  suggestions  of 
Greeley  and  others,  and  besides,  unlike  outsiders, 
they  realized  that  they  had  among  them  one  who 
was  in  many  respects  Douglas's  equal  as  a  politi 
cian,  while  possessing  a  vastly  deeper  fund  of 
moral  power  and  high  determination.  Abraham 
Lincoln  had  only  recently  returned  to  active  polit 
ical  life,  yet  he  had  often  crossed  swords  with  Doug 
las — as  attorney,  as  stump  speaker,  and  in  other 
ways.  He  had  felt  Douglas's  powerful  influence 
throughout  the  state  militating  against  everything 
in  which  he  himself  believed,  and  Douglas,  too, 
had  been  conscious  that  in  the  ungainly  form  of 
Lincoln  there  lay  possibilities  of  statesmanship  and 
political  skill  that  might  well  give  him  reason  for 
alarm,  should  he  ever  be  forced  to  meet  such  an 
antagonist  in  open  battle. 

It  was  soon  evident  that  Douglas  had  behind  him 
the  united  Democratic  strength  of  the  state.  Early 
in  April  the  state  convention  endorsed  him 
heartily,1  notwithstanding  heavy  pressure  from 

1  Flint,  Douglas,  pp.  94-95,  sketches  the  views  of  the  Douglas 
men  as  follows  :  "  Notwithstanding  the  ferocity  with  which 
the  warfare  was  continued  against  Mr.  Douglas  and  his  friends 
during  the  Lecompton  controversy,  all  fair-minded  men  took  it 
for  granted  that  hostilities  would  cease  with  the  settlement  of 
the  question  out  of  which  the  contest  arose.  Mr.  Douglas  and 
the  Illinois  Democracy  seem  to  have  entertained  this  reasonable 
expectation,  as  appears  from  tjhe  proceedings  of  the  Illinois 
Democratic  State  Convention,  which  assembled  at  Springfield, 
on  the  21st  of  April,  1858,  for  the  nomination  of  candidates  for 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS          259 

Buchanan  and  a  political  massacre  of  his  per 
sonal  followers,  who  were  ruthlessly  sacrificed  to 
build  up  a  u  machine "  that  could  successfully 
create  a  diversion  against  the  hated  antagonist  of 
the  administration.  Douglas,  however,  was  so 
strong  that  it  was  plain  to  all  he  would  repeat  his 
customary  successes  unless  a  man  of  unusual  fibre 
should  be  put  into  the  field  against  him.  About 
the  middle  of  June,  a  Republican  convention  nomi 
nated  Lincoln  in  opposition  to  Douglas,  basing 
hope  of  success  upon  the  fact  that  Buchanan's  ef 
forts  would  probably  divide  the  Democratic  party 
into  at  least  two  sections.  Buchanan  in  fact  had 
sent  Francis  J.  Grund  to  Chicago  to  begin  vigorous 
war  against  Douglas.  He  undertook  active  work, 
not  only  displacing  the  occupants  of  the  better 
Federal  offices,  but  also  endeavoring  to  mobilize 
the  postmasters  of  the  state  for  operations  against 
Douglas.  In  the  latter  attempt,  he  was  only  par 
tially  successful,  and  before  long  the  effort  of  the 

state  offices.  While  the  resolutions  were  explicit  and  firm  in 
the  assertion  of  the  principles  on  which  they  had  rejected  the 
Lecompton  constitution,  they  were  conciliating  in  spirit  and 
respectful  in  language.  They  contain  no  assault  on  the  Presi 
dent,  no  attack  upon  the  administration,  and  indulge  in  no 
complaint  at  the  unprovoked  and  vindictive  warfare  which 
had  been  waged  against  them.  They  maintain  a  dignified  and 
manly  silence,  a  generous  forbearance  on  all  these  points,  with 
a  view  to  the  preservation  of  the  organization,  the  usages,  and 
the  integrity  of  the  Democratic  party  upon  its  time-honored 
principles,  as  enunciated  in  the  Cincinnati  platform.  The 
resolutions  adopted  by  the  convention  were  introduced  into  the 
Senate  by  Mr.  Douglas  on  the  25th  of  April,'  as  furnishing  the 
platform  on  which  the  Illinois  Democracy  stand,  and  by  which 
I  mean  to  abide.'  " 


260  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

administration  was  largely  centralized  upon  secur 
ing  the  nomination  of  anti-Douglas  state  officials 
rather  than  in  direct  opposition  to  the  candidate 
himself.  It  began  to  look  as  if  the  effort  of 
Buchanan  would  be  ultimately  to  defeat  as  many  as 
possible  of  the  Democratic  nominees  for  the  legis 
lature,  and  possibly  for  Congress  as  well.1 

Douglas,  bringing  with  him  his  family,  hastened 
to  Chicago  as  soon  as  his  senatorial  duties  would 
permit.  He  reached  the  city  on  the  9th  of  July 
and  was  met  by  a  procession  which  escorted  him, 
with  salvos  of  artillery,  cheers  and  boundless  en 
thusiasm,  to  his  hotel.  Lincoln,  meanwhile,  had 
already  begun  his  campaign,  declaring  the  dangers 
of  slavery  and  charging  Douglas  in  veiled  terms 
with  double-dealing  or  at  least  with  not  knowing 
his  own  mind.  The  cause  of  progress,  said  Lincoln, 
must  be  entrusted  only  to  those  who  were  unques 
tionably  its  friends.  Douglas  readily  took  up  the 
gauntlet,  accepting  Lincoln's  innuendoes  and  attacks 
as  directed  immediately  at  himself.  Lincoln  in 
accepting  the  Eepublican  nomination  had  delivered 
a  written  speech — good  evidence  that  the  offer 
was  no  surprise  to  him.  In  this,  he  had  em 
phatically  put  forward  the  view  that  slavery  and 
the  question  of  its  continuance  must  be  the  real 
issue  in  the  campaign.  That  point  was  met  by 
Douglas  in  his  answer  to  the  welcome  which 
awaited  him  at  Chicago.  He  denied  that  .slavery 
must  be  wiped  out  and  that  Abolitionism  must  be 

1  Sheaban,  Life,  p.  396  ft. 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         261 

forced  upon  the  inhabitants  of  those  states  which 
from  the  beginning  had  maintained  the  peculiar 
institution,  any  more  than  that  slavery  must  be 
forced  upon  those  states  which  disliked  it  or  whose 
economic  institutions  made  it  an  unsuitable  and 
inapplicable  method  of  industry.  The  speech  was 
on  the  whole  decidedly  effective  and  was  well 
received,  though  it  was  evident  that  there  was  a 
very  sharp  division  of  opinion.  Much  buncombe 
had  been  added  by  Douglas  in  an  effort  to  catch 
the  crowd,  but  the  principal  issues  were  clearly  set 
forth  and  could  not  be  mistaken.  Lincoln  could 
not  fail  to  note  the  effect  on  public  sentiment  pro 
duced  by  his  opponent's  speech  and  answered  it  on 
the  following  night  in  an  address  of  less  self-posses 
sion  and  assurance  than  that  with  which  he  had 
opened  the  contest.  Douglas  undoubtedly  felt  that 
he  had  gained  the  advantage  of  Lincoln  in  the 
first  round  of  the  battle,  and  he  hastened  to  follow 
up  the  victory.  He  went  to  Springfield  on  the  16th 
of  July,  attended  by  constant  demonstrations  of  pop 
ularity  and  good-will,  stopping  at  Joliet  where  he 
spoke  again,  and  at  Bloomington,  where  Lincoln, 
determined  that  his  rival  should  not  anticipate 
him,  boarded  the  same  train.  Sheahan  remarks, 
with  satisfaction  and  some  malice,  that  "  Lincoln 
was  perhaps  the  only  Lincoln  man  on  the  train." 
But  there  were  many  who  differed  from  this 
view.  Douglas's  effort  at  Springfield  was  im 
mediately  answered  by  Lincoln  himself  in  a  speech 
which  was  received  in  a  way  that  indicated 


262  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

vigorous  and  wide-spread  support  of  the  latter 's 
doctrines. 

Douglas  was  now  thoroughly  alive  to  the  danger 
by  which  he  was  confronted.  He  sat  with  the 
State  Democratic  Committee  and  mapped  out  a 
long  list  of  meetings,  extending  until  the  end  of 
October ;  to  these  he  subsequently  added  about 
twenty  others.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  people 
gathered  at  the  places  on  his  regular  list  of  ap 
pointments  almost  invariably  listened  to  speeches 
of  about  two  and  a  half  hours  in  length.  Lincoln 
had  not  neglected  a  move  in  his  opponent's  game. 
The  list  of  appointments  had  been  published  almost 
immediately  in  Democratic  newspapers  all  over  the 
state.  He  saw  that  Douglas,  with  his  tremendous 
energy,  his  close  alliance  with  the  railroads,  and 
his  splendid  organization,  would  be  able  to  reach 
the  voters  in  a  way  and  to  an  extent  that  he 
himself  could  hardly  hope  to  rival,  unless  some 
positive  step  were  taken.  He  had  full  confidence 
that,  if  given  the  opportunity,  he  could  offset 
the  effect  of  Douglas's  argument  since  no  man 
ever  believed  more  firmly  than  did  he  himself  in 
the  righteousness  of  his  cause.  To  match  his 
antagonist  and  to  obtain  in  some  measure  an  equal 
opportunity  of  reaching  the  same  constituency,  he 
resolved  to  propose  to  Douglas  a  series  of  joint 
debates. 

Douglas  had  left  Springfield,  after  working  out 
the  plans  for  the  campaign,  and  had  returned  to 
Chicago  on  the  24th  of  July.  On  that  same  day, 


THE  ADMISSION  OF  KANSAS         263 

Lincoln  addressed  him  in  a  very  brief  note  in 
which  he  asked  whether  his  opponent  would 
"  divide  time  and  address  the  same  audiences." 
In  answer,  Douglas  responded  that  his  appoint 
ments  were  now  made  and  that  he  could  not  accept 
the  proposal,  though  he  was  willing  to  arrange  for 
a  discussion  at  one  point  in  each  congressional 
district  except  the  second  and  sixth  districts,  where 
both  had  already  spoken.  He  suggested  that  the 
debates  take  place  at  Freeport,  Ottawa,  Galesburg, 
Quincy,  Alton,  Jonesboro  and  Charleston.  In  a 
letter  of  July  29th,1  Lincoln  showed  some  heat, 
answering  rather  sharply  the  cutting  remarks  of 
Douglas's  letter  of  the  24th,  but  he  accepted  the 
arrangement  to  speak  at  the  seven  places  desig 
nated.  Under  date  of  the  30th  of  July  Douglas 
confirmed  his  original  proposal  and  fixed  the  dates 
and  places  as  follows :  Ottawa,  August  21st ; 
Freeport,  August  27th ;  Jouesboro,  September 
15th ;  Charleston,  September  18th  ;  Galesburg, 
October  7th  ;  Quincy,  October  13th  ;  Alton,  Octo 
ber  15th.  He  further  suggested  that  he  himself 
should  open  with  an  hour's  speech  at  Ottawa, 
Lincoln  to  follow  with  an  hour  and  a  half  and  he  to 
close  with  half  an  hour,  the  order  to  be  alternately 
reversed  at  the  succeeding  meetings.  In  a  brief 
note  of  July  31st  Lincoln  referred  somewhat  pet 
tishly  to  the  fact  that  this  gave  his  opponent  four 

lrrhis  correspondence  is  given  in  full  in  Political  Debates 
between  Hon.  Abraham  Lincoln  and  Hon.  Stephen  A.  Douglas, 
Columbus  ;  Follett,  Foster  &  Co.,  1860,  pp.  64-66. 


264  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

opening  and  four  closing  speeches  to  his  own  three, 
but  he  nevertheless  accepted  the  conditions  of  the 
debate.  Thus  the  issue  was  joined  and  an  historic 
forensic  struggle  was  at  hand. 


CHAPTEE  XIII 

THE  JOINT  DEBATES 

THE  first  debate  of  the  series  had  been  set  for  the 
21st  of  August  at  Ottawa,  in  LaSalle  County. 
Douglas  arrived  on  the  scene  with  a  considerable 
flourish,  in  a  special  train,  one  car  of  which  carried 
a  gun  for  the  purpose  of  firing  salutes  en  route. 
Lincoln  made  the  journey  in  his  accustomed  modest 
style.  There  was  the  same  difference  between  the 
appearance  of  the  contestants  on  the  platform.  The 
speeches  were  out-of-doors  in  the  public  square  of 
the  town  with  "an  immense  concourse  of  people 
from  all  parts  of  the  state  "  in  attendance.1  Others 
had  come  from  a  greater  distance  for  the  purpose 
of  witnessing  what  they  expected  to  be  one  of  the 
critical  struggles  of  the  campaign.  Henry  Villard, 
then  a  newspaper  correspondent  and  later  to  be  the 
promoter  and  builder  of  one  of  the  country's  great 
railways  ;  Carl  Schurz,  the  young  German  idealist 
who  was  within  a  few  years  to  play  so  conspicuous 
a  part  in  moulding  public  opinion,  and  others, 
either  then  or  subsequently  influential  in  shaping 
national  destinies,  were  listeners. 

Another  eye-witness,  deeply  attached  to  Doug 
las,  has  vividly  described  the  scene:  "It  was  a 
curious  sight  to  look  upon  when  the  vast  crowd 

1  Villard,  Memoirs,  1904,  Vol.  I,  p.  92. 


266  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  earnest  men  and  women  of  both  parties  were 
wedged  in  together  before  the  grand  stand.  There 
was  the  usual  jostling  and  crowding  to  get  good 
places.  There  was  taunting  and  jeering  between 
the  representatives  of  each  party,  but  very  few 
breaches  of  the  peace.  When  the  speaking  began 
there  was  almost  perfect  order.  If  the  pent-up 
feelings  of  either  party  caused  an  angry  demon 
stration,  its  representative  on  the  platform  would 
rise  and  beg  his  friends  to  desist.  When  they 
applauded  a  speaker,  he  would  beg  them  to  cease 
as  it  would  be  taken  out  of  his  time.  The  time 
keepers,  made  up  from  both  political  parties,  seated 
upon  the  platform,  were  inexorable.  The  speakers 
alternated  at  the  different  places  in  opening  and 
closing.  At  the  precise  moment  in  which  the  time 
for  opening  arrived,  the  first  speaker  must  begin. 
A  speaker  was  given  an  hour  for  his  opening  ;  then 
his  competitor  had  an  hour  and  a  half ;  and  he  who 
opened  was  given  half  an  hour  to  close.  Time  was 
called  at  the  moment  a  speaker  should  conclude,  and 
he  could  only  finish  the  sentence  he  was  upon  and 
could  not  begin  another.'7  ' 

Upon  discerniug  men  the  effect  of  the  speakers  in 
this  crucial  contest  was  far  from  being  that  which 
some  over-enthusiastic  chroniclers  have  described. 
The  aureole  later  to  become  firmly  fixed  about  the 
head  of  Lincoln,  had  not  yet  begun  to  form,  and  to 
the  eyes  of  those  who  were  not  too  deeply  tinged 
with  anti-slavery  feeling  the  future  President  offered 

1  Carr,  Douglas,  p.  84. 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  267 

anything  but  a  dignified  figure.  Schurz,  who  ac 
companied  him  to  the  place  of  meeting,  had  already 
found  it  hard  to  think  of  Lincoln  as  a  great  man, 
while  Villard  in  contrasting  the  two  noted  "  noth 
ing  in  favor  of  Lincoln,"  who  "used  singularly 
awkward,  almost  absurd,  up  and  down  and  sidewise 
movements  of  his  body  to  give  emphasis  to  his 
arguments."  Schurz  was  annoyed  by  Lincoln's 
habit  of  shooting  up  into  the  air  upon  tiptoe  to 
emphasize  a  point,  and  was  equally  displeased  with 
Douglas,  notwithstanding  the  latter7 s  more  dapper 
costume,  since  he  found  that  the  u Little  Giant" 
"  smacked  of  the  bar-room."  The  audience,  how 
ever,  was  not  greatly  troubled  by  the  personal  peculi 
arities  of  the  two  speakers,  nor  were  they  over-nice 
in  their  weighing  of  constitutional  and  ethical 
questions.  Perhaps  little  blame  can  be  attached  to 
either  of  the  debaters  for  recognizing  the  peculiar 
ities  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  audience,  and  for 
occasionally  drifting  off  from  the  slavery  question 
and  other  public  issues  to  indulge  in  personal  abuse, 
somewhat  coarse  stories  and  charges  of  falsehood, 
misrepresentation  and  early  low  associations. 
There  are  probably  few  who  at  the  present  day 
are  either  willing  to  read  through  the  text  of  the 
debates  or  can  endure  with  patience  the  style  of  ar 
gument  which  forms  their  basis. 

Douglas    led   off  with   an  hour's  speech.1     His 

1  The  matter  for  discussion  of  Douglas's  debates  with  Lincoln 
must  be  drawn  primarily  from  the,  text  of  the  speeches  them 
selves.  That  which  has  been  used  in  the  preparation  of  this 


268  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

main  point  was  an  effort  "to  put  the  question  to 
Abraham  Lincoln  .  .  .  whether  he  now  stands 
and  will  stand  by  each  article  in  the  [Eepublican] 
creed  and  carry  it  out." l  He  asked  pointedly 
whether  Lincoln  was  willing  to  stand  "  as  he  did  in 
1854,  in  favor  of  the  unconditional  repeal  of  the 
Fugitive  Slave  Law  ' '  ;  whether  he  stood  pledged  to 
the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia, 
or  to  the  prohibition  of  the  slave  trade  between  the 
different  states,  or  to  the  prohibition  of  slavery  in 
all  the  territories,  and  whether  he  was  opposed  to 
the  acquisition  of  more  territory  unless  slavery 
should  be  prohibited  therein.  From  these  ques 
tions,  Douglas  passed  rapidly  to  personal  abuse  of 
Lincoln  couched  in  the  form  of  ironical  compli 
ment.2  Later  he  charged  Lincoln  with  "  following 
the  example  of  all  the  little  Abolition  orators  who 
go  around  and  lecture  in  the  basements  of  schools 
and  churches,"  in  asserting  that  all  men  are 
created  equal.  Douglas  did  not  regard  the  negro  as 
his  equal  and  positively  denied  that  uhe  is  my 
brother  or  any  kin  to  me  whatever."  3 

In  answer  Lincoln  made  little  or  no  effort  to  meet 
the  questions  of  his  opponent.     It  is  probable  he 

chapter  is  the  text  published  by  Follett,  Foster  &Co.,  Colnra- 
bus,  I860,  which  includes  not  only  the  debates  but  also  some  of 
the  more  important  speeches  by  both  men  immediately  preced 
ing  and  immediately  following.  The  most  vivid  recollections 
of  eye-witnesses  to  the  struggle  between  the  two  men  are 
those  of  Schurz  (Reminiscences),  Villard  (Memoirs),  and  a  few 
others.  Contemporary  newspaper  matter  is  of  comparatively 
little  service  during  the  period  of  the  debates. 

1  Debates,  p.  68.  *Ibid.,  p.  69.  *  Ibid.,  p.  71. 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  269 

had  not  expected  so  keen  and  direct  an  onslaught. 
The  speech  of  rebuttal  in  fact  was  almost  painfully 
wandering  and  tedious,  beginning  with  some 
display  of  irritation  at  the  personal  charges  of 
Douglas,  and  with  a  suggestion  of  inability  on  his 
opponent's  part  to  tell  the  truth.  From  this, 
Lincoln  passed  to  a  lengthy  review  of  his  own 
position  on  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  explaining 
incidentally  his  relationship  to  certain  resolutions 
on  that  subject  said  to  have  been  adopted  at  the 
Eepublican  convention  in  Springfield  which  Doug 
las  had  read.  He  flatly  denied  that  he  had  even  been 
in  Springfield  at  the  time  when  the  alleged  resolu 
tions  were  accepted.  Few  points  of  principle  were 
developed  in  the  discussion.  In  answer  to  Douglas's 
charge  about  the  supposed  claim  of  negro  equality, 
Lincoln  answered  with  force  that  while  he  made  no 
pretense  of  supporting  any  claim  to  such  equality, 
he  believed  that  the  negro  "in  the  right  to  eat  the 
bread  [he  had  earned]  without  the  leave  of  anybody 
else  .  .  .  is  my  equal  and  the  equal  of  Judge 
Douglas  and  the  equal  of  every  living  man."  A 
long  and  rather  tiresome  discussion  of  the  Nebraska 
bill  with  some  references  to  the  Dred  Scott  decision, 
interrupted  by  an  impatient  Irish  auditor,  who 
bawled  out,  "Give  us  something  besides  Drid 
Scott, "  closed  what  was  undoubtedly  an  unsatis 
factory  rejoinder. 

Douglas's  sur-rebuttal  of  half  an  hour's  length 
did  not  add  much  to  the  matter  in  hand.  He  dealt 
chiefly  with  the  alleged  facts  about  the  Springfield 


270  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

resolutions  and  charged  Lincoln  with  an  effort  to 
dodge  the  question.1  Strongly  confident  in  the 
good  impression  which  he  believed  he  had  produced 
upon  his  hearers,  Douglas  did  not  hesitate  to  reit 
erate  with  force  the  position  he  had  taken  in  his 
opening  speech.  As  usual,  however,  on  such  occa 
sions,  neither  orator  convinced  any  one  who  had 
already  made  up  his  mind.  Hoots  and  shouts  of 
derision  or  approval  had  punctuated  the  speeches  as 
the  partisans  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  men 
saw  or  believed  that  his  own  favorite  was  gaining 
the  advantage  in  the  argument.  The  debate  had 
barely  closed  when  two  ardent  admirers  of  Lincoln, 
rushing  to  the  platform,  seized  their  idol  and  ele 
vated  him  to  their  shoulders,  affording  to  the 
humorously  minded  a  " ludicrous  sight"  as  the 
' '  grotesque  figure ' '  of  the  future  statesman  was 
carried  from  the  scene,  the  hands  frantically  grasp 
ing  the  heads  of  his  supporters,  his  legs  dangling 
from  their  shoulders,  while  in  the  scuffle  his 
trousers  had  been  so  far  pulled  up  as  to  expose  his 
underclothing  almost  to  the  knees.2  Douglas  was 
not  subjected  to  so  undignified  a  form  of  approval, 
a  fact  upon  which  he  laid  some  stress  in  the  next 
debate,  ridiculing  his  opponent  and  getting  from 
him  the  familiar  charge  of  falsehood  by  way  of 
rejoinder. 

At  the  second  debate  in  Freeport  in  Stephenson 
/  County,  on  August  27th,  the  discussion  was  really 
opened.     Lincoln  sought  to  meet  categorically  the 
1  Debates,  p.  84.  2  Villard,  Memoirs,  Vol.  I,  p.  93. 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  271 

issues  that  had  been  raised  by  Douglas  at  the  open 
ing  of  his  first  speech  on  the  platform  at  Ottawa. 
As  already  noted,  Douglas  had  there  asked  whether 
Lincoln  was  "pledged"  to  opposition  to  the  ad 
mission  of  more  slave  states,  following  this  with 
other  questions.  Lincoln  now  took  up  the  ques 
tions  put  by  Douglas  seriatim,  answering  each 
with  the  statement  that  he  was  not  "  pledged"  to 
anything  of  the  sort.  The  weakness  of  this  kind  of 
special  pleading,  however,  was  perceived,  even  by 
its  author,  and  he  presently  noted  that  while  he  was 
not  technically  pledged  on  any  of  the  points  in 
question,  he  entertained  more  or  less  definite  ideas 
about  them.  He  believed  that  the  people  of  the 
Southern  states  were  entitled  to  a  fugitive  slave 
law,  although  he  thought  the  existing  law  should  be 
remodeled  "  without  lessening  its  efficiency."  l  As 
to  whether  he  would  favor  the  admission  of  more 
slave  states,  he  said  that  he  i '  would  be  exceedingly 
sorry  ever  to  be  put  in  a  position  of  having  to  pass 
upon  that  question."  The  abolition  of  slavery  in 
the  District  of  Columbia  was,  he  said,  within  the 
power  of  Congress,  yet  if  in  Congress  he  would  not 
himself  endeavor  to  abolish  the  institution  except 
gradually  and  with  compensation  to  owners.  Turn 
ing  the  tables  upon  Douglas,  he  put  some  questions 
of  his  own,  inquiring  whether  his  opponent  would 
favor  the  admission  of  Kansas  into  the  Union  with 
less  than  93,000  inhabitants,  whether  the  people  of 
any  United  States  territory  could  exclude  slavery 

1  Debates,  p.  89. 


272  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

prior  to  the  formation  of  a  state  constitution, 
whether  his  opponent  would  accept  a  Supreme 
Court  decision  to  the  effect  that  states  cannot  exclude 
slavery  from  their  limits,  and  whether  he  would 
favor  the  acquiring  of  additional  territory  without 
regard  to  the  question  how  such  acquisition  might 
affect  the  nation  on  the  slavery  question.1  Revert- 
ing  to  the  personal  phases  of  the  controversy,  he 
took  up  the  question  of  the  alleged  Springfield 
resolutions  and  charged  Douglas  with  a  gross 
blunder  in  mistaking  the  resolutions  of  a  minor 
convention  in  Kane  County  for  resolutions  passed 
by  the  Republican  convention  at  Springfield.  He 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  there  was,  in  the 
fall  of  1854,  no  convention,  holding  a  session 
in  Springfield,  which  called  itself  a  Republican 
State  Convention.  The  earlier  suggestion  of  a  con 
spiracy  with  reference  to  the  Nebraska  bill,  in 
tended  to  make  slavery  perpetual  and  national,  was 
reiterated,  and  the  speech  was  closed  by  an  ad 
captandum  appeal  to  the  prejudice  of  the  voters  of 
the  northern  counties  of  Illinois  who  constituted 
the  rank  and  file  of  his  audience.  Lincoln's  ques 
tions  had  been  intended  to  put  Douglas  into  a  diffi 
cult  position  by  compelling  him,  if  possible,  to  say 
that  in  the  event  of  a  Supreme  Court  decision,  such 
as  had  been  outlined,  he  would  advocate  the  accept 
ance  of  the  verdict.  Should  this  reply  be  made, 
the  effect  would  naturally  be  to  produce  a  breach  be 
tween  the  ambitious  man  who  was  now  eagerly  look- 
1  Debates,  p.  90. 


THE  JOUST  DEBATES  273 

ing  to  the  presidential  nomination  and  some  influen 
tial  group  among  his  supporters.  In  the  event  of  a 
reply  adverse  to  the  final  authority  of  the  court, 
much  of  Douglas's  general  argument  with  reference 
to  the  location  of  sovereignty  would  be  set  at 
naught,  and  in  either  case  a  distinct  point  would  be 
scored. 

There  was,  however,  no  such  equivocation  in  his 
opponent's  rejoinder  as  had  characterized  Lincoln's 
method  of  meeting  the  first  set  of  questions.  As  to 
Kansas,  Douglas  answered  at  once  that  since 
Kansas  had  people  enough  for  a  slave  state,  it  had 
in  his  opinion  enough  for  a  free  state.1  As  to 
whether  the  people  of  a  territory  could  exclude 
slavery  from  their  limits,  Douglas  stated  plainly 
that  in  his  opinion  there  were  lawful  means  whereby 
that  end  could  be  attained.  As  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  and  its  verdict,  Douglas 
answered  with  indignation  that  Mr.  Lincoln's  ob 
ject  was  "to  cast  an  imputation  upon  the  Supreme 
Court."  Unquestionably  the  court  would  never 
reach  a  decision  so  violative  of  the  Constitution  as 
to  hold  that  the  states  could  not  exclude  slavery. 
This  he  said  "  would  be  an  act  of  moral  treason 
that  no  man  on  the  bench  could  ever  descend  to."  2 
And  finally,  said  Douglas,  regarding  the  increase 
in  territory,  he  was  in  favor  of  an  enlargement  of 
the  nation's  boundaries  without  any  reference  to  the 
question  of  slavery,  leaving  the  inhabitants  to  make 
it  slave  or  free  territory  as  they  chose.3 

1  Delates,  p.  94.  2  Ibid.,  p.  96.  3  Ibid.,  p.  96. 


274  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

It  was  the  position  taken  by  Douglas  with  refer 
ence  to  the  Supreme  Court  and  its  relation  to  the 
slavery  question  that  gave  to  the  debate  at  Freeport 
more  significance  than  was  assigned  by  the  country 
at  large  to  any  of  the  other  meetings.  So  broad  and 
deep  an  interest  did  his  utterances  on  this  question 
of  jurisdiction  arouse,  that  the  reasoning  then  put 
forward  by  him  shortly  came  to  be  known  as  the 
"  Freeport  doctrine" — a  name  which  it  has  since 
retained.  Lincoln  had  embarrassed  Douglas  most 
seriously  by  asking  whether  the  people  of  a  United 
States  territory  could,  in  any  lawful  way,  exclude 
slavery  from  their  limits  prior  to  the  formation  of  a 
state  constitution — a  question  whose  bearings  upon 
the  Dred  Scott  case  made  it  hard  for  him  to  an 
swer  without  in  some  measure  compromising  or  con 
tradicting  himself.  The  best  he  could  do  was  to 
carry  his  doctrine  of  local  rights  to  its  extreme,  not 
withstanding  that  this  action  necessitated  his  mini 
mizing  the  powers  of  the  Supreme  Court  itself.  The 
hypothetical  position  of  the  court  in  future  cases 
was  of  no  moment  even  in  the  abstract,  he  urged, 
since  "the  people  have  the  lawful  means  to  intro 
duce  it  or  exclude  it  [slavery],  as  they  please,  for 
the  reason  that  slavery  cannot  exist  a  day  or  an 
hour  anywhere  unless  it  is  supported  by  local  police 
regulations.  Those  police  regulations  can  only  be 
established  by  the  local  legislature,  and  if  the  peo 
ple  are  opposed  to  slavery  they  will  elect  represent 
atives  to  that  body  who  will  by  unfriendly  legisla 
tion  effectually  prevent  the  introduction  of  it  into 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  276 

their  midst.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  for  it, 
their  legislature  will  favor  its  extension.  Hence  no 
matter  what  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  may 
be  on  that  abstract  question,  still  the  right  of  the 
people  to  make  a  slave  territory  or  a  free  territory 
is  perfect  and  complete  under  the  Nebraska  bill." 

Having  thus  met  the  direct  inquiries  of  Lincoln, 
Douglas  attempted  to  explain  the  errors  into  which 
he  had  been  betrayed  with  reference  to  the  alleged 
Springfield  resolutions  of  1854.  He  stated  that  he 
had  obtained  the  information  from  Charles  H. 
Lanphier,  editor  of  the  State  Register  at  Springfield, 
and  that  he  had  supposed  the  resolutions  were  as 
represented.  Whether  they  were  or  not,  they  were 
at  all  events  the  principles  of  the  * i  black  Bepub- 
lican  party" — an  assertion  in  which  he  was  sup 
ported  by  one  of  the  men  who  had  originally  drawn 
the  resolutions  and  who  happened  to  be  present. 
From  this,  Douglas  passed  to  a  diatribe  against  the 
position  of  the  extreme  advocates  of  Abolition,  and 
closed  with  a  charge  that  Lincoln  in  his  argument 
had  suggested  corruption  on  the  part  of  the  Supreme 
Court  and  of  two  Presidents  of  the  United  States. 

Opening  with  a  few  words  of  personal  vindication, 
Lincoln  in  rebuttal  addressed  himself  chiefly  to  per 
sonalities  and  minor  charges,  thereby  seriously 
weakening  the  strong  impression  which  he  had  pro 
duced  in  his  earlier  argument.  The  main  point  in 
Douglas's  discussion  was  shirked,  and  the  audience 
was  left  with  the  decided  feeling  that  Douglas  had 
scored  as  great  a  success  in  the  second  round  of  the 


276  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

I  battle  as  in  the  first.  The  apparent  unwillingness 
of  Lincoln  to  express  himself  with  vigor  on  the 
slavery  question,  his  abandonment  of  his  own 
natural  weapon— the  simple  and  forceful  enuncia 
tion  of  broad  principles, — and  his  acceptance  of  the 
hair-splitting,  logic-chopping  methods  of  his  oppo 
nent,  in  which  the  latter  was  far  his  superior,  annoyed 
and  disturbed  the  advocates  who  had  expected  that, 
long  before  the  end  of  the  second  meeting,  the  posi 
tion  of  Douglas  would  have  been  turned  and  his 
weak  pro-slavery  flank  and  rear  subjected  to  a  keen 
fire  of  criticism. 

The  third  debate  of  the  series  had  been  set  for 
September  15th  at  Jonesboro,  Union  County,  in  the 
/  southern  portion  of  the  state.  It  was  now  Douglas's 
/  turn  to  open.  He  and  his  opponent  had  been  grad 
ually  working  southward,  during  the  weeks  which 
had  intervened  since  the  meeting  at  Freeport,  and 
both  were  worn  and  weary  with  almost  continual 
rough  travel  and  political  warfare.  As  the  north 
ern  part  of  the  state  had  been  that  of  which  Lin 
coln  had  been  surest,  and  the  central  that  in  which 
the  issue  was  most  doubtful,  so  Douglas  was  gener 
ally  considered  to  be  substantially  assured  of  the 
support  of  the  southern  counties.  The  inhabitants 
of  southern  Illinois,  never  particularly  intelligent, 
were  included  in  a  district  locally  known  as 
"  Egypt,"  apparently  from  the  mental  darkness 
supposed  to  prevail  there.  Although  the  audience 
was  biased  and  practically  predetermined  in  its  hos 
tility  toward  Republican  ideas,  the  meeting  at 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  277 

Jonesboro  was  the  least  satisfactory  of  the  series  up 
to  that  time,  both  in  point  of  attendance  and  in  the 
lack  of  interest  displayed.  In  opening,  Douglas 
gave  a  brief  review  of  the  political  alignment  of  the 
country  prior  to  1854,  which  he  said  had  been 
based  upon  the  Whig  and  Democratic  parties.  Kest- 
less,  ambitious  and  disappointed  politicians  had 
in  1854  taken  advantage  of  the  temporary  excite 
ment  caused  by  the  Nebraska  bill  to  create  an  Abo 
lition  party,  founding  their  hopes  upon  the  belief 
that  they  could  control  the  country  by  appealing  to 
Northern  prejudice.1  Coupled  with  this  partisan 
interpretation  of  politics,  Douglas  presented  a 
charge  that  Lincoln  had  participated  in  a  scheme  to 
divert  members  of  the  Whig  party  to  the  new 
group,  pretending  that  he  himself  was  as  good  a 
Whig  as  ever.  Taking  up  the  issues  of  the  current 
campaign,  he  said  that  Lincoln  had  made  war  upon 
the  Supreme  Court  and  its  decision  in  the  Dred 
Scott  case.  He  himself  was  content  to  accept  the 
Supreme  Court's  view.  He  was  in  favor  of  preserv 
ing  the  government  u  as  our  fathers  made  it."5  The 
question  of  the  negro's  rights  and  privileges  was  a 
question  which  must  be  determined  by  every  state 
in  the  TJDion  for  itself.  He  was  utterly  opposed  to 
negro  suffrage  anywhere  and  under  any  circum 
stances,  yet,  since  the  Supreme  Court  had  decided 
in  the  Dred  Scott  case  that  a  state  had  a  right  to 
confer  the  privilege  of  voting  upon  free  negroes,  he 
had  nothing  to  say  in  criticism.  Only  by  maintain- 
1  Debates,  p.  111.  *2bid.,  p.  117. 


278  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ing  in  each  state  the  right  of  each  state  to  do  as  it 
pleased  without  meddling  with  its  neighbors,  could 
the  Union  continue  upon  its  old  basis. 

When  Lincoln  rose  to  reply,  he  was  obliged  to 
admit  that  Douglas  had  presented  a  substantially 
strong  case.  More  tactful  than  in  his  former  open 
ings,  he  conceded  that  he  "  cordially  approved"  of 
very  many  of  the  principles  of  his  opponent.  He 
agreed  " entirely"  with  Douglas's  doctrine  "that 
all  the  states  have  a  right  to  do  exactly  as  they 
please  about  all  their  domestic  relations  including 
that  of  slavery,"  and  added  that  he  had  no  disposi 
tion  to  interfere  with  them.  Inconsistently,  how 
ever,  he  continued  that  it  was  impossible  that  the 
Union  could  permanently  endure  half  slave  and  half 
free.  Eeferring  in  an  uncomplimentary  way  to 
Brooks,  the  assailant  of  Sumner,  and  to  the  latter' s 
statement  that  no  one  had  expected  the  institution 
of  slavery  to  last  as  long  as  it  had,  he  insisted  that 
the  time  had  come  when  an  effort  should  be  made  to 
get  back  to  the  early  conditions  regarding  slavery 
which  had  been  contemplated  by  the  founders  of 
the  Constitution.  Without,  however,  explaining 
how  this  was  to  be  done,  Lincoln  drifted  into  along 
reply  to  the  partisan  and  unfair  political  diatribe 
which  had  consumed  so  much  of  Douglas's  hour 
and  a  half,  and  from  this  he  drew  the  conclusion 
that  all  the  trouble  and  confusion  of  the  time  had 
not  arisen  from  the  effort  to  maintain  the  rights  of 
the  states  to  do  with  slavery  as  they  pleased,  but 
had  flowed  from  the  effort  to  spread  slavery  gen- 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  279 

erally  throughout  the  Union.  Eecurring  then  to 
the  substance  of  the  Freeport  discussion,  Lincoln 
quoted  numerous  resolutions,  questions  and  answers 
that  had  come  up  in  the  local  politics  of  Illinois 
during  the  years  since  1850,  and  nearly  equaled 
Douglas  in  his  appeal  to  prejudice.  He  twitted  his 
opponent  with  failure  to  discuss  further  the  inter 
rogatories  which  had  been  offered  at  the  Ottawa 
meeting  and  which  he  himself  had  answered  at 
Freeport.  Closing  his  wandering  and  unwise 
remarks,  he  referred  to  the  incident  at  Ottawa  in 
which  the  two  young  farmers  had  carried  him 
sprawling  from  the  platform  and  at  length  charged 
his  opponent  with  misrepresentation. 

Douglas's  sur-rebuttal  developed  little  that  was 
new  or  valuable  but  was  undoubtedly  in  better 
temper  than  his  opening  address.  The  burden  of 
his  argument  lay  in  the  assertion  that  Lincoln 
was  still  unwilling  to  meet  the  question  of  Aboli 
tionism,  and  with  great  force  he  called  attention  to 
the  fact  that  an  agreement  existed  among  certain 
members  of  the  Eepublican  party  in  favor  of  the 
exclusion  of  slavery  from  the  territories. 

At  Charleston  on  September  18th,  only  three 
days  after  the  meeting  at  Jonesboro,  the  debaters 
met  for  a  fourth  time.  Charleston  was  situated  in 
a  district  whose  vote  was  unsettled  and  where  the 
interest  was  much  more  intense  than  that  which  had 
been  exhibited  in  the  more  southerly  region. 
Attendance  was  much  better,  partly  due  to  the 
existence  of  a  state  fair  at  Centralia  not  far  away, 


280  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  the  intelligence  with  which  the  discussion  was 
followed  was  substantially  higher.  The  privilege 
of  opening  had  now,  in  the  process  of  alternation, 
fallen  to  Lincoln.  He  had  been  impressed  with  the 
belief  that  the  doctrine  of  "social  equality"  had 
been  too  definitely  fastened  upon  the  party  he 
represented,  and  that  he  had  indulged  in  too  much 
personality  toward  his  opponent  with  probably  too 
little  specific  political  accusation.  He  began,  there 
fore,  by  declaring  his  attitude  upon  the  social  posi 
tion  of  the  negro.  A  "  physical  difference  "  existed 
between  the  white  and  black  races  which,  Lincoln 
believed,  would  "  forever  forbid  the  two  races  living 
together  on  terms  of  social  and  political  equality. "  l 
This  necessarily  meant,  said  he,  that  the  "  su 
perior  position"  must  fall  to  the  white  race, — 
a  view  which  left  some  of  the  speaker's  previous 
assertions  and  doctrines  much  clouded  by  doubt. 
From  this  positive  statement  of  his  convictions 
upon  the  delicate  issue  of  the  negro's  relation  to  the 
white  man,  Lincoln  passed  to  a  series  of  definite 
political  charges  against  Douglas.  Primarily  he 
discussed  a  controversy  which  had  been  carried  on 
between  Douglas  and  Trumbull,  the  other  senator 
from  Illinois.  He  reviewed  the  history  of  the 
Toombs  bill,  and  charged  that  in  its  original  form 
the  measure  had  directed  that  the  constitution  to  be 
drafted  by  the  Kansas  convention  should  be  sub 
mitted  to  a  vote  of  the  people.  Douglas  had,  said 
Lincoln,  been  instrumental  in  cutting  out  the  provi- 
1  Debates,  p.  136. 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  281 

sion  for  a  vote.  In  answer-lug  Trumbull  on  the 
point,  he  also  charged  that  Douglas  had  failed  to 
meet  this  accusation  though  it  could  be  supported 
by  a  "  pretty  fair  show  of  proof"  that  the  senator 
from  Illinois  had  entered  into  "a  plot  to  put  in 
force  a  constitution  for  Kansas  without  giving  the 
people  any  opportunity  of  voting  on  it.'7  l  This 
charge  Lincoln  elaborated  at  great  length,  and  when 
Douglas  rose  for  reply  he  displayed  manifest  irrita 
tion. 

Congratulating  his  rival  upon  having  defined  his 
position  as  to  negro  citizenship  and  eligibility  to 
office,  he  plunged  into  the  question  of  the  Toombs 
bill  and  his  relation  to  it.  He  read  from  the  report 
he  himself  had  made  at  the  time  when  he  reported 
the  Toombs  substitute  to  the  Seriate,  asserting  that 
he  "took  it  for  granted  that  the  [Kansas]  constitu 
tion  was  to  be  submitted  to  the  people,  whether  the 
bill  was  silent  on  the  subject  or  not."  2  There  was, 
he  said,  "  a  conspiracy  to  carry  this  election  for  the 
black  Republicans  by  slander  and  not  by  fair 
means."  Lincoln  had  misrepresented  the  situation, 
and  Trumbull  had  deliberately  lied  about  the  mat 
ter.  In  bitter  personal  invective,  he  attacked 
Lincoln  and  Trumbull  jointly,  though  asserting  that 
he  had  no  charges  to  make  against  them.  Then, 
plunging  into  the  usual  political  discussion,  he 
devoted  himself  for  a  time  to  local  affairs  in  their 
relation  to  existing  national  issues,  presenting  both 
Lincoln  and  Trumbull  as  disreputable  figures  but 

1  Debates,  p.  138.  J  Ibid.,  p.  146. 


282  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

closing  with  the  usual  vague  appeal  to  his  hearers 
in  behalf  of  a  government  founded  upon  the  prin 
ciples  laid  down  by  the  fathers  of  the  Constitution. 

Lincoln's  sur-rebuttal  met  the  charge  that  he  had 
been  evasive  in  regard  to  the  position  of  the  negro 
by  the  statement  that  he  had  never  been  questioned 
on  that  point.  He  even  went  further  and  declared 
that  he  was  "not  in  favor  of  negro  citizenship."  l 
He  showed  bad  temper  because  of  the  insinuation 
made  by  Douglas  that  there  was  a  difference  between 
his  utterances  in  the  northern,  and  what  he  had  said 
in  the  southern,  counties.  The  effort  to  pin  the  whole 
controversy  to  Kansas  he  objected  to,  saying  that 
if  Kansas  were  to  sink  beneath  the  earth,  the  real 
question  would  still  remain.  He  insinuated  that 
Douglas  desired  to  a  plant  slavery  over  all  the 
states,"  and  leading  forward  one  Orlando  B.  Fick- 
lin,  who  was  seated  on  the  platform,  said  that  Mr. 
Ficklin  knew  that  a  charge  made  by  Douglas  about 
the  Mexican  War  and  Lincoln's  conduct  therein 
was  "a  lie."  2 

The  bad  feeling  which  had  been  developed  in  the 
third  and  fourth  debates  was  prominent  in  the  fifth 
discussion,  held  this  time  at  Galesburg,  Knox 
County,  on  October  7th,  although  the  language  of 
the  speakers  was  somewhat  more  in  harmony 
with  the  usages  of  decent  society.  Douglas,  open 
ing  the  discussion  as  was  now  his  privilege,  de 
scribed  retrospectively  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill 
and  the  so-called  English  bill  relating  to  the  admis- 

1  Debates,  p.  156.  '  Ibid.,  p.  158. 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  283 

sion  of  Kansas  as  a  state.  He  sketched  the  origin 
of  the  Eepublicau  party,  and  pointedly  asked 
whether  the  country  had  any  interest  in  maintaining 
a  sectional  organization  of  this  type.  The  harm  of 
sectionalism  was  feelingly  referred  to,  and  the  charge 
already  made,  that  Lincoln  varied  his  opinions  to 
suit  his  audience,  was  reiterated  in  detail.  Lincoln 
countered  with  an  elaborate  rejoinder  to  the  allega 
tion  of  sectionalism  and  then  reviewed  the  Com 
promise  of  1850.  He  referred  again  to  the  error_ — - 
made  by  Douglas  in  quoting  the  alleged  Springfield 
resolutions,  and  charged  his  critic  with  acting  in 
the  same  way  as  did  the  fisherman's  wife  whose 
drowned  husband  was  brought  home  with  his  body 
full  of  eels.  When  asked  what  was  to  be  done  with 
him  she  said,  "Take  the  eels  out  and  set  him 
again," — a  characteristic  Lincolnian  anecdote  which 
the  speaker  applied  to  the  repetition  of  the  "stale 
fraud  "  of  the  Springfield  resolutions.  A  new  point 
was  raised  by  Lincoln  in  connection  with  the  further 
acquisition  of  territory  and  its  probable  relation  to 
the  slavery  question.  Douglas  in  his  closing  answer 
paid  no  attention  to  this  matter,  but  devoted  him 
self  largely  to  the  Springfield  resolutions  and  his 
own  attitude  toward  slavery. 

There  was  not  much  advance  in  the  process  of 
developing  the  real  merits  of  the  controversy 
during  the  sixth  joint  debate,  which  took  place  at 
Quincy  on  the  13th  of  October.  Lincoln  opened 
with  another  discussion  of  the  position  of  the  negro, 
referred  again  to  the  Dred  Scott  decision  and  closed 


284  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

with  a  more  positive  and  explicit  statement  of 
the  wrong  involved  in  slavery  than  he  had  yet 
offered. 

Douglas  answered  with  more  remarks  about  the 
Springfield  resolutions,  passed  to  the  question  of 
slavery  in  the  territories,  reiterated  his  charge  about 
Lincoln's  inconsistency,  admitted  that  he  was  un 
willing  to  discuss  the  question  whether  slavery  was 
right  or  wrong  in  the  abstract,  because  slavery  al 
ready  existed  and  must  be  dealt  with  by  the  several 
states  as  they  saw  fit,  again  referred  to  the  Dred  Scott 
decision  and  the  Kansas- Nebraska  bill,  and  closed 
by  making  his  customary  appeal  for  the  mainte 
nance  of  the  Union  upon  traditional  lines. 

Lincoln's  final  answer  called  attention  to  an 
alleged  admission  of  Douglas  that  his  system  of 
policy  with  regard  to  slavery  contemplated  the 
permanent  establishment  of  that  institution  and 
again  brought  forward  the  question  of  inconsistency. 
There  had  been  little  novelty  in  the  discussion,  and 
no  advance  in  the  development  of  the  merits  of  the 
issues  at  stake. 

The  last  debate  of  the  series  was  now  to  occur  at 
Alton  on  the  15th  of  October.  Douglas  opened  this 
last,  as  he  had  the  first,  debate,  thus  gaining  the 
advantage  for  which  he  had  shrewdly  arranged  in 
the  original  correspondence.  It  was  logical  that 
both  men,  although  speaking  to  new  audiences, 
should  endeavor  in  this  concluding  passage  at  arms 
to  summarize  what  they  had  already  said  in  their 
preceding  meetings.  This  to  the  reader  causes  the 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  285 

text  of  the  speeches  to  seem  little  more  than  bare 
repetition,  but  to  the  audience  made  the  discus 
sion  perhaps  more  interesting  than  any  of  those 
that  had  gone  before.  Douglas's  main  point  was 
again  seen  in  his  effort  to  show  that  Lincoln, 
despite  his  disclaimers,  had  accepted  the  idea  of 
negro  equality  and  was  disposed  to  introduce 
into  the  constitutional  system  of  the  United  States 
innovations  which  would  result  in  weakening  the 
powers  of  the  several  commonwealths.  He  first 
sketched  the  history  of  his  opponent's  position  and 
his  own  reply,  then  charged  that  Lincoln,  sub 
sequent  to  the  Ottawa  meeting,  had  begun  "  to 
crawfish  a  little  and  let  himself  down,"  and  had 
finally  passed  to  a  position  radically  opposed  to  that 
which  he  had  first  adopted.  Taking  his  stand  upon 
the  belief  that  his  opposition  to  the  Lecompton 
constitution  was  not  due  to  the  slavery  clause,  but 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  it  was  not  the  willing 
opinion  of  the  people  of  Kansas,  he  maintained  that 
"  there  is  no  power  on  earth  under  our  system  of 
government,  which  has  the  right  to  force  a  con 
stitution  upon  an  unwilling  people."  l  This  issue 
he  placed  above  the  question  of  slavery  and  all 
other  issues.  In  closing,  Douglas  laid  special  stress 
upon  the  immediate  need  of  a  united  Democracy 
and  of  the  necessity  for  white  supremacy.  Perhaps 
this  presentation  was  the  most  effective  that  he  had 
yet  offered  although  here  as  elsewhere  he  was 
galled  by  the  factional  strife  within  his  own  party, 
1  Debates,  p.  218. 


286  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  fell  at  times  into  more  or  less  acrimonious 
attack  upon  his  antagonist. 

Lincoln,  in  answering,  clearly  showed  his  appreci 
ation  of  the  merits  of  Douglas's  opening.  He 
rebutted  the  interpretation  of  the  position  he  had 
himself  assumed  on  the  question  of  negro  equality, 
charging  Douglas  with  building  up  a  "  beautiful 
fabrication"  by  a  process  of  "garbling."  This 
restatement  of  his  own  position  Lincoln  then 
followed  with  a  review  of  the  arguments  he  had 
previously  developed.  Growing  stronger  as  he  pro 
ceeded,  and  as  he  abandoned  the  personal  recrimi 
nation  which  had  so  greatly  marred  his  earlier 
efforts,  Lincoln  brought  forward  his  really  effective 
point  in  connection  with  the  slavery  question.  He 
showed,  with  more  force  perhaps  than  ever  before, 
that  the  great  issue  in  the  controversy  lay  in  the 
question  whether  slavery  was  a  wrong,  and  if  so 
whether  it  should  be  treated  as  a  wrong  by  han 
dling  it  in  such  a  way  that  it  should  grow  no 
larger.  Nothing,  said  Lincoln,  had  ever  threatened 
the  existence  of  the  Union  save  slavery.  If  that 
were  true,  he  asked  with  crushing  force,  how  could 
the  posture  of  affairs  be  improved  by  enlarging 
slavery?  Yet  Democrats  regarded  slavery  as  not 
wrong.1  They  insisted  upon  avoiding  it  in  discus 
sion,  although  the  issue  could  not  be  avoided  in 
fact.  Douglas,  after  all,  by  the  very  nature  of  his 
argument  upon  constitutional  questions,  was  the 
greatest  Abolitionist  in  the  country,  since  any 

1  Debates,  p.  233. 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  287 

argument  that  would  justify  unfriendly  legislation 
to  deprive  a  slaveholder  of  his  right  to  hold  his 
slaves  in  a  territory  would  furnish  an  equally 
strong  argument  for  nullifying  the  Fugitive  Slave 
Law. 

The  last  word  in  the  discussion  now  fell  to 
Douglas,  yet  of  this  opportunity  he  made  but  poor 
use.  Seeking  to  establish  the  fact  that  Lincoln  had 
fallen  into  inconsistencies,  he  charged  that  his 
opponent  was  also  historically  wrong  in  asserting 
that  slavery  had  been  the  only  cause  of  serious 
internal  strife.  Nullification,  said  Douglas,  had 
been  as  great  an  issue.  Disunion  had  appeared 
during  the  last  war  with  Great  Britain.  Sectional 
ism  was  as  great  a  danger.  The  interference  of  one 
section  with  the  rights  of  individual  states  was 
farther  reaching  in  its  implications  than  the  effect 
of  any  position  taken  on  a  concrete  question  such  as 
that  of  slavery.  But  acceptance  of  the  funda 
mental  constitutional  ideas  would  bring  about 
peace  between  North  and  South,  and  incidental 
issues  would  settle  themselves  upon  broad  lines  of 
principle. 

That  Douglas  had  had  decidedly  the  better  of 
Lincoln  in  the  joint  debates  was  pretty  generally 
admitted  by  the  time  the  contest  was  over.  This 
was  variously  explained.  Douglas  and  his  fol 
lowers  had  undoubtedly  struggled  with  the  ferocity 
of  men  who  recognized  the  absolute  necessity  of 
winning,  while  to  Lincoln,  as  has  already  been 
noted,  the  contest  was  merely  the  first  battle  in  a 


288  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

great  campaign  which  was,  if  necessary,  to  last  in 
definitely.  Douglas's  organization,  too,  was  vastly 
superior  to  that  of  his  antagonist  which  had  as  yet 
not  had  time  to  perfect  itself.  Douglas,  however, 
was  not  content  with  the  apparent  growth  of  his 
movement  and  the  seemingly  satisfactory  success 
which  he  had  enjoyed  in  the  debates.  No  sooner 
was  the  last  round  with  Lincoln  over,  than  he 
resumed  his  own  independent  canvass,  continuing 
this  up  to  the  last  moment  and  averaging  consider 
ably  more  than  one  speech  a  day  for  a  period  of  one 
hundred  successive  days.  The  usual  number  of 
falsehoods  were  circulated  to  his  disadvantage,  as 
might  have  been  expected  in  an  election  where  so 
much  was  at  stake,  and  every  effort  was  made  to 
get  the  full  list  of  voters  out  on  election  day. 
When  the  ballots  had  been  counted,  it  appeared 
that  the  Democrats  would  be  able  to  cast  about 
forty  votes  in  the  lower  house  of  the  legislature 
against  the  Eepublicans'  thirty-five,  while  in  the 
upper  chamber  with  fifteen  contested  districts  they 
got  eight  votes  and  the  Eepublicaus  the  other 
seven.  The  final  ballot  in  the  legislature  gave 
Douglas  only  eight  more  votes  than  Lincoln,  the 
ballot  standing  fifty-four  to  forty-six.  Had  the 
issue  been  based  upon  popular  majorities,  Lincoln 
would  easily  have  carried  the  state,  as  the  candi 
dates  who  were  pledged  to  him  totaled  about 
17,000  votes  more  than  did  Douglas's  members,  the 
latter  receiving  in  all  about  174,000  votes.  The 
candidates  who  had  been  put  forward  at  the  in- 


THE  JOINT  DEBATES  289 

stance  of  Buchanan  to  vex  Douglas  secured  hardly 
any  support.  In  substance,  the  election  meant  that 
Douglas  had  succeeded  in  uniting  the  Democrats 
solidly  behind  him,  and  that  with  the  state  ar 
ranged  as  it  was  he  was  tolerably  safe.  The  fact 
that  Douglas  had  a  popular  majority  against  him 
was  made  much  of  at  the  time  but  was  little  to  the 
purpose.  Many  votes  would  unquestionably  have 
been  differently  cast  had  the  issue  been  reduced  to 
that  of  getting  a  mere  majority.  Some  districts 
were  from  the  outset  hopelessly  in  Lincoln's  favor 
just  as  others  were  solidly  pro -Douglas.  The  state 
had  been  gerrymandered  a  long  time  before  as  the 
result  of  political  necessity,  or  what  was  then 
considered  to  be  such.  This  fact  fixed  the  con 
ditions  under  which  the  Lincoln -Douglas  struggle 
must  be  made  and  drove  the  candidates  to  their 
utmost  efforts  upon  the  debatable  ground.  It  was 
on  this  ground  that  the  issue  was  determined,  and 
by  the  vote  in  the  doubtful  districts  that  the  result 
must  be  fairly  judged.  The  election,  however, 
undoubtedly  indicated  a  vigorous  growth  of  the 
radical  anti-Southern  and  anti-slavery  sentiment, 
and  showed  that  Illinois  was  no  longer  to  be  con 
trolled  by  the  elements  on  which  Douglas  had 
relied  in  former  years.  While,  therefore,  it  was 
unquestionably  a  Douglas  victory  in  every  sense,  it 
was  a  victory  which  had  been  achieved  by  the 
hardest  work  and  which  depended  very  much  more 
upon  the  personal  hold  he  had  succeeded  in  getting 
than  upon  his  ability  to  take  the  voters  with  him. 


290  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

He  was  already  approximating  to  the  dangerous 
position  of  the  politician  who  is  without  a  party, 
and  who  must  rely  upon  personal  admiration  or 
sympathy  in  order  to  maintain  his  place. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

BREAKING  WITH  THE  SOUTH 

ALTHOUGH  Douglas  had  apparently  achieved  a 
triumph  over  Lincoln,  the  victory  was  not  as  satis 
factory  and  conclusive  as  he  had  hoped  to  make 
it.  This  was  for  the  reason  that  Douglas  had 
been  battling  for  his  political  existence,  while  Lin 
coln,  with  his  eyes  on  the  future,  had  merely  par 
ticipated  in  the  first  campaign  of  a  great  struggle 
to  which  the  remainder  of  his  life  was  now  to  be 
given.  Had  Douglas  failed  to  secure  his  reelection, 
he  would  have  been  for  the  time  at  least  hopelessly 
out  of  the  race.  Presidential  aspirations  might 
then  have  been  regarded  as  only  a  chapter  of  pri 
vate  personal  history.  Douglas,  although  so  great 
a  figure  on  the  national  stage,  would  undoubtedly, 
like  so  many  other  defeated  senators,  have  slowly 
and  with  difficulty  taken  up  the  profession  from 
which  he  had  been  lured  away  by  the  prizes  of 
politics,  or  would  have  spent  his  time  in  plotting 
and  contriving  to  get  back  again  into  the  life  from 
which  he  had  been  excluded.  He  had  staked  far 
more  than  Lincoln,  and  his  victory  left  him  in  a  less 
favorable  position  than  he  had  previously  occupied. 
The  admissions  he  had  made  during  the  campaign, 
the  slightly  but  fundamentally  altered  position  he 
had  taken  as  a  result  of  the  constant  pressure  of  his 


292  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

antagonist,  had  materially  changed  his  relation  to 
national  affairs.  It  was  a  striking  commentary 
upon  the  result  of  the  election  that  it  was  not  on  the 
whole  distasteful  to  those  Republican  newspapers 
which  were  far  enough  from  the  scene  of  action  to 
view  things  from  a  broad  general  standpoint.  Such 
observers  held  that  the  election  of  Douglas  was  per 
haps  a  good  thing,  because,  in  his  present  attitude 
of  revolt,  he  would  be  able  to  do  much  harm  to  the 
party  which  he  represented  and  would  undoubt 
edly  inflict  such  injury.  There  was  truth  in  this 
philosophy,  for  Douglas  like  every  man  of  strong 
and  virile  temperament  had  his  personal  following 
which  regarded  his  interpretations  of  Democratic 
principle  as  the  right  ones.  To  such  a  personal  fol 
lowing  appeal  could  and  would  still  be  made  for  the 
aid  that  was  necessary  in  maintaining  and  continu 
ing  the  ascendency  of  the  leader's  personality.  The 
effect  could  not  be  other  than  slowly  to  widen  the 
rift  which  had  already  appeared  within  the  previ 
ously  compact  Democratic  organization. 

It  was  but  too  true  that  Douglas's  position  in  the 
electoral  contest,  while  it  had  strengthened  him 
locally,  had  diminished  the  devotedness  of  his 
Southern  following.  Shortly  after  the  election  he 
started  upon  a  trip  through  the  Southern  states  in 
tending  to  visit  Cuba  and  to  return  by  way  of  New 
York.  The  trip  was  essentially  political,  notwith 
standing  that  it  was  nominally  for  the  purpose  of 
restoring  a  good  condition  of  health,  his  physical 
state  being  far  from  satisfactory.  The  journey  took 


BKEAKING  WITH  THE  SOUTH        293 

him  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  and  from  there 
to  Havana,  from  which  point  he  sailed  for  New 
York,  and  then  traveled  to  Washington  via  Phila 
delphia  and  Baltimore.  With  his  eye  upon  the 
forthcoming  presidential  contest,  Douglas  wished  to 
estimate  the  probable  strength  of  his  candidacy  in 
the  Southern  states,  while  the  question  of  Cuban 
annexation,  then  acute,  suggested  to  him  the  possi 
bility  of  another  '  *  issue ' J  which  might  be  used  as  a 
basis  for  political  activity  in  the  near  future.  He 
returned  to  Washington  somewhat  reassured  as  to 
the  attitude  of  the  Southern  states  toward  him.  He 
had  spoken  in  several  of  the  principal  Southern 
cities  as  well  as  at  points  between  New  York  and 
Washington  and  had  been  very  cordially  heard. 
Yet  it  was  manifest  that  the  sentiments  which  called 
forth  the  strongest  approval  from  Southern  listeners 
were  those  party  generalities  which  would  have  been 
acceptable  almost  anywhere.  The  slavery  position 
that  he  had  assumed  during  the  Lincoln  debate  was 
unacceptable  to  the  extremists,  who  felt  that  he  had 
not  made  good  his  Kansas  attitude  or  sufficiently 
supported  the  views  with  respect  to  the  South  which 
he  more  than  any  other  man  in  the  Senate  had  de 
veloped  prior  to  the  Lecompton  controversy.  The 
effervescent  greetings  of  audiences  in  the  Southern 
states  were  apparently  not  too  seriously  taken  by 
Douglas,  for  he  much  more  accurately  than  many 
later  statesmen  had  gauged  the  meaning  of  South 
ern  hospitality,  and  recognized  the  distinct  line 
that  was  drawn  between  personal  regard  and  civil- 


294  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ity  on  the  one  hand  and  political  support  on  the 
other.  He  was  in  fact  far  more  inclined  to  consider 
the  Southern  wing  of  the  United  States  Senate  as 
the  real  index  of  his  political  support  in  the  South 
ern  states.  In  this  slavery  group  in  the  Senate, 
Douglas  found  but  cold  comfort  on  his  return,  for 
the  memory  of  the  Lecompton  controversy  was  fresh 
and  vivid,  while  the  President  was  exceedingly  em 
bittered  against  him.  So  far  had  the  hostility  to 
Douglas  developed,  that  during  his  absence  he  had 
been  deposed  from  his  chairmanship  of  the  Commit 
tee  on  Territories,1  a  position  he  had  held  through 
out  the  whole  period  of  his  membership  in  the 
Senate.  That  he  did  not  find  in  the  Southern 
states  sufficient  popular  feeling  to  warrant  him  in 
appealing  from  the  Southern  congressional  leaders 
to  their  constituents  was  indicated  by  his  silence 
under  this  marked  and  unusual  affront. 

While  Douglas  thus  thought  it  best  to  ignore  an 
incident  which  might  have  been  used  as  the  basis  of 
an  effort  to  define  his  own  position  in  Congress 
more  exactly,  for  the  sake,  if  possible,  of  recover 
ing  lost  ground  in  a  quiet  and  steady  process  of 
growth,  the  position  of  the  party  was  not  such  that 
it  could  successfully  waive  its  differences  of  opinion 
and  await  the  healing  which  time  might  bring. 
The  differences  within  the  party  were  seemingly  as 
irreconcilable  as  were  those  dividing  the  two  great 
parties  in  national  affairs.  Cuban  annexation  now 
presented  itself  as  an  issue  for  settlement.  It  of- 

1  Rhodes,  Vol.  II,  p.  355. 


BBEAKING  WITH  THE  SOUTH        295 

fered  in  many  particulars  the  same  problems 
which  had  been  thrusting  themselves  upon  the  Sen 
ate  for  years  and  which  taken  together  now  def 
initely  pointed  to  an  "  irrepressible  conflict."  A 
bill  for  the  purchase  of  Cuba  had  been  framed  by 
the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  the  appropriation 
carried  for  that  purpose  being  $30,000,000,  and  this 
received  the  earnest  support  of  Douglas,  who  bent 
himself  to  work  under  the  leadership  of  Senator 
Slidell,  the  chairman  of  the  committee  and  a  lead 
ing  figure  in  the  anti- Douglas  faction  of  the  party. 
Douglas  had  already  attempted  to  gain  Southern 
support  by  reasserting  that  Cuba  naturally  be 
longed  to  the  American  continent,  a  statement  he 
had  made  during  his  stay  in  New  Orleans.  The 
fair  inference  from  what  was  then  said  was  that 
slavery  would  naturally  exist  in  Cuba  and  might  be 
established  there,  subject  to  the  terms  and  condi 
tions  of  the  constitutional  doctrine  as  to  the  local 
control  of  slavery  which  he  himself  had  expounded. 
The  discussion  of  Cuba  and  the  question  of  its  an 
nexation  with  or  without  slavery  would  have  been, 
as  Douglas  undoubtedly  saw,  a  far  better  and  more 
promising  basis  on  which  to  continue  the  slavery 
controversy  than  was  afforded  by  the  Kansas  situa 
tion.  Had  it  been  possible  "to  occupy  the  short 
session  of  1858-1859  with  Cuban  discussion,  par 
ticularly  in  its  bearing  upon  slavery,  much  would 
have  been  gained  from  the  tactical  standpoint,  and 
Douglas  would  have  been  afforded  as  good  an  op 
portunity  as  he  could  have  wished  for  regaining  his 


296  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

hold  upon  the  waning  sympathy  of  the  Southern 
section  of  the  party. 

This  was  not  to  be.  Interesting  as  the  question 
of  Cuban  annexation  was,  the  immediate  imminence 
of  the  slavery  question  as  applied  to  the  mainland 
of  the  United  States  gave  it  a  commanding  position 
and  importance  which  could  not  be  transferred  to 
any  other  issue.  Late  in  February,  when  it  was 
hoped  that  the  session  might  expire  without  the 
further  exploitation  of  party  differences,  the  clash 
of  factions  was  renewed.  Senator  Hale  of  New 
Hampshire  had  offered  an  amendment  to  an  appro 
priation  bill  as  a  means  of  reviving  the  slavery  dis 
cussion  and,  as  if  by  preconcerted  signal,  the  bitter 
controversy  was  resumed.1  The  question  was 
whether  adequate  protection  was  to  be  afforded  to 
slave  property  existing  in  the  territories.2  Senator 
Brown  of  Mississippi  undertook  to  discuss  this  mat 
ter  and  to  take  issue  with  Douglas's  "Freeport 
doctrine ' '  in  which  he  had  affirmed  the  idea  that 
"slavery  cannot  exist  a  day  or  an  hour  anywhere 
unless  it  is  supported  by  local  police  regulations. 
Those  police  regulations  can  only  be  established  by 
the  local  legislature  ;  and  if  the  people  are  opposed 
to  slavery,  they  will  elect  representatives  to  that 
body  who  will  by  unfriendly  legislation  effectually 
prevent  the  introduction  of  it  into  their  midst." 
Brown  felt  that  this  was  not  an  adequate  view.  He 
desired  that  full  protection  should  be  guaranteed 

1  Rhodes,  Vol.  II,  p.  355. 

« Congressional  Globe,  2d  Sess.,  35th  Cong.,  p.  1244. 


BEEAKING  WITH  THE  SOUTH        297 

by  the  Federal  government  to  slave  property  in  the 
territories.  This  he  said  was  an  "  obligation 
.  .  .  upon  Congress. ' '  Menacingly,  he  remarked 
that,  in  case  he  could  not  obtain  the  rights  guar 
anteed  in  this  respect  under  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  he  should  be  forced  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  Constitution  was  a  failure,  the  Union  a 
despotism,  and  under  those  conditions  he  would  be 
u  prepared  to  retire  from  the  concern." 

It  was  now  necessary  for  Douglas  to  determine 
in  his  own  mind  upon  a  choice  of  conduct  which  he 
had  undoubtedly  hoped  to  avoid  making.  Were  he 
to  remain  silent,  the  "Freeport  doctrine"  might 
stand  or  fall  as  best  it  could,  leaving  its  defense  to 
other  Northern  Democrats  of  whom  Brown  had  re 
quested  an  expression  of  opinion.  It  is  not  likely 
that  any  one  of  these  Democrats  would  have  rushed 
to  the  defense,  in  any  satisfactory  way,  of  a  peculiar 
doctrine  developed  by  Douglas  as  the  result  of  his 
own  special  political  necessities.  Silence,  therefore, 
would  have  permitted  the  party  practically  to 
repudiate  the  1 1  Freeport  doctrine. ' '  It  was  neces 
sary,  if  he  were  to  maintain  his  leadership,  to  sup 
port  the  doctrine,  and  Douglas,  perceiving  this 
situation,  took  the  floor  in  answer.  In  plain 
language,  he  told  the  Southerners  that  he  could  not 
accept  the  view  of  the  extreme  pro-slavery  party, 
and,  voicing  in  so  many  words  what  others  were 
only  thinking,  he  distinctly  foreshadowed  the  elec 
tion  of  1860,  remarking  that  it  was  impossible  to 
carry  a  Northern  Democratic  state  for  a  principle 


298  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

which  would  compel  the  people  of  a  territory  to  ac 
cept  slavery  when  they  were  opposed  to  it. 

With  much  force,  Jefferson  Davis,  the  former 
ally  of  Douglas,  hastened  to  point  out  the  inconsist 
ency  of  the  senator  from  Illinois  in  refusing  to  dis 
criminate  between  various  classes  of  property  as 
such.  Douglas  had  asserted  that  there  could  be  no 
distinction  between  the  protection  accorded  to  dry- 
goods,  horses,  cattle  or  slaves  in  the  territories,  but 
Davis  noted  that  the  question  went  far  beyond  this 
interpretation  and  raised  the  fundamental  issue  of 
the  right  of  citizens  to  hold  slaves.  Non-interven 
tion,  he  said,  was  no  longer  possible  as  a  practical 
guide  for  national  conduct,  nor  would  he  vote  for 
any  candidate  who  stood  upon  a  platform  so  con 
structed.  The  issue  was  more  and  more  clearly 
drawn,  and  the  colloquy  between  Davis  and  Douglas 
increased  in  bitterness,  until  Davis  plainly  said  to 
his  antagonist  that  with  the  views  he  now  advocated, 
the  vote  of  Mississippi  would  necessarily  be  with 
held  from  him  in  any  future  struggle  for  the  presi 
dency.  Commenting  sharply  upon  the  heretical 
tenets  which  Douglas  had  been  obliged  to  embrace 
during  his  struggle  with  Lincoln,  he  keenly  noted 
that  although  Douglas  had  been  given  a  chance  to 
recant  or  to  explain  away  what  he  had  said  on  the 
stump  in  Illinois,  he  was  now  ' l  as  full  of  heresy  as 
he  once  was  of  adherence  to  the  doctrine  of  pop 
ular  sovereignty."  Douglas  in  this  debate  was  tol 
erably  well  supported  by  the  Northern  and  Western 
Democrats  and  the  incident  went  far  toward  indicat- 


BKEAKLKG  WITH  THE  SOUTH         299 

ing  with  greater  clearness  than  ever  before  the 
ultra-radical  position  of  the  extreme  Southern  ele 
ment  in  the  Senate.  Party  policies  were  now  per 
mitted  to  suifer  as  a  result  of  the  absorption  in  the 
all-consuming  slavery  controversy  and  of  the  exten 
sion  of  party  differences  on  that  question  to  other 
issues  for  the  purpose  of  striking  factional  blows. 
It  had  been  hoped  to  pass  the  Pacific  Railroad  bill 
which  Douglas  had  favored,  but  this  failed,  while 
an  advance  in  the  tariff  proved  to  be  impracticable 
in  spite  of  what  was  considered  an  urgent  party  ne 
cessity.1  The  whole  scheme  of  legislation  went 
awry,  and  it  was  more  and  more  accepted  as  a  ne 
cessity  that  the  party  should  reach  some  conclusion 
within  itself  about  the  great  controlling  question  of 
the  dividing  line  between  Federal  and  local  au 
thority  in  its  bearing  upon  sovereignty  in  the  terri 
tories,  or,  in  other  words,  should  reach  a  decision 
upon  slavery  and  its  future. 

Douglas  had  been  far  too  closely  pressed  during 
the  debate  to  neglect  the  weak  points  in  his  own 
position.  The  taunts  of  Davis  and  others  had  cut 
him.  He  knew  that  it  was  necessary  in  some  way 
to  ensure  the  general  acceptance  of  his  "  Freeport 
doctrine."  In  the  Senate  he  had  done  what  he 
could,  but  with  little  success,  despite  the  nominal 
adherence  of  the  Northern  and  Western  Democrats. 
In  Illinois,  his  ideas  had  received  some  favor,  but 
Illinois  was  only  a  single  state.  Douglas  deter 
mined  to  prepare  a  careful  exposition  of  his  doc- 
1  Rhodes,  Vol.  II,  pp.  359-360. 


300  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

trine  and  this  he  finally  set  forth  in  Harper's  Monthly 
Magazine1  in  an  article  which  bore  the  signifi 
cant  title  "The  Dividing  Line  between  Federal  and 
Local  Authority."  The  proper  principle  to  be  ac 
cepted  was  there  stated  by  Douglas  to  be  as  follows  : 
"That  every  distinct  political  community,  loyal  to 
the  Constitution  and  the  Union,  is  entitled  to  all 
the  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  of  self-govern 
ment  in  respect  to  their  local  concerns  and  internal 
polity,  subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States." 3  In  support  of  this  principle, 
Douglas  rehearsed  with  detail  the  conditions  under 
which  the  Colonies  had  dealt  with  African  slavery, 
and  then  coming  down  to  more  recent  times  he  dis 
cussed  the  compromise  measures  of  1850  and  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  act  of  1854.  He  sought  to  vindi 
cate  his  own  action  on  the  Kansas-Nebraska  act 
with  special  reference  to  the  section  which  pre 
scribed  and  defined  the  power  of  the  territorial  legis 
lature,  and  he  struck  a  blow  at  the  position  of  Pres 
ident  Buchanan  by  quoting  from  the  latter' s  com 
munication  accepting  the  nomination,  in  which  he 
had  asserted  the  right  of  the  people  of  the  territo 
ries  to  "decide  for  themselves  whether  slavery 
shall  or  shall  not  exist  within  their  limits."  Be 
ferring  to  the  position  assumed  by  Davis,  Douglas 
showed  that  he  had  distinctly  drawn  a  line  between 
those  who  contended  for  the  right  to  carry  slaves 
into  the  territories  and  to  hold  them  in  defiance  of 

1  September,  1859,  Vol.  19,  pp.  519-537. 
9  Ibid.,  p.  537. 


BBEAKING  WITH  THE  SOUTH        301 

the  local  law,  and  those  who  contended  that  such 
right  was  subject  to  the  local  law  of  the  territory. 
He  quoted  from  Davis  paragraphs  in  which  the 
latter  admitted  that  national  legislation  could  not 
"  confer  power  beyond  that  which  exists  in  Con 
gress,"  although  he  had  also  argued  that  "if  our 
right  to  carry  slaves  into  these  territories  be  a  con 
stitutional  right,  it  is  our  first  duty  to  maintain 
it." 

Although  the  magazine  article  was  naturally 
much  more  carefully  prepared  than  the  ex  tempore 
speeches  which  Douglas  had  delivered  on  the 
stump  and  in  the  Senate,  and  was  better  supported 
by  citation  and  illustration,  it  was  not  of  a  charac 
ter  that  would  command  general  attention.  The 
publication  of  the  article  had  undoubtedly  been 
intended  to  appeal  to  the  thinking  popular  audi 
ence  among  which  Harper's  was  supposed  to 
circulate,  but  if  it  was  read  by  the  rank  and  file  of 
the  subscribers  it  attracted  no  particular  notice. 
As  usual,  however,  an  article  by  a  man  of  national 
prominence  in  a  current  publication  led  to  reply, 
and  there  were  rebuttals  and  sur-rebuttals,  Douglas 
himself  finally  falling  back  from  the  calmer  heights 
of  the  constitutional  lawyer  to  the  lower  ground  of 
the  political  controversialist.  The  discussion,  more 
over,  was  too  minute  and  detailed  to  gain  public 
interest  and  the  most  important  result  of  this 
revival  of  the  slavery  question  was  the  attention 
which  it  provoked  from  Lincoln.  So  far  as  the 
article  had  secured  readers  it  had  obtained  them 


302  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

among  the  Northern  and  Western  Democrats  and 
Republicans,  so  that  the  essay  was  rather  more 
truly  another  round  in  the  Lincoln-Douglas  battle 
than  a  further  prolongation  of  the  controversy  with 
Davis.  In  the  autumn  election  contest  in  Ohio 
both  Lincoln  and  Douglas  were  given  prominent 
places,  and  Lincoln  particularly  sought  to  under 
mine  the  argument  in  the  Harper's  Monthly  article. 
Ehodes  expresses  the  opinion  that  he  "  utterly  de 
molished  "  the  basis  of  Douglas's  reasoning,  while 
Nicolay  and  Hay  properly  regard  the  controversy 
as  a  continuation  of  the  debates  of  the  preceding 
year,  and  note  that  Lincoln  merely  added  "  search 
ing  comments  on  the  newer  positions  and  points  to 
which  Douglas  had  since  advanced."  *  Lincoln 
held  that  Douglas  was  insidiously  laying  a  founda 
tion  for  slavery  in  the  territories  and  the  newer 
states,  and  scathingly  criticized  Douglas  for  regard 
ing  the  slavery  question  as  of  relatively  small  im 
portance.  He  particularly  complained  of  Douglas's 
view  that  there  was  no  necessary  wrong  in  slavery, 
and  added:  "We  must  not  interfere  with  the 
institution  of  slavery  in  the  states  where  it  exists, 
because  the  Constitution  forbids  it.  ...  We 
must  not  withhold  an  efficient  fugitive  slave 
law  .  .  .  but  we  must  prevent  the  outspread 
ing  of  the  institution  .  .  .  the  revival  of  the 
African  slave  trade  and  the  enacting  by  Congress  of 
a  territorial  slave  code."  2 

1  Abraham  Lincoln,  A  History,  Vol.  II,  p.  185. 

2  The  speeches  of  Lincoln  at  Columbus  and  Cincinnati  are 


BBEAKING  WITH  THE  SOUTH        303 

With  Lincoln  pressing  him  hard  in  Ohio,  Doug 
las  was  equally  hard  pressed  by  the  administration, 
which  set  Attorney -General  Black  to  work  with  an 
anonymous  pamphlet  deprecating  Douglas's  Har 
per's  Magazine  essay  as  a  crude  production  lacking  in 
legal  ability.  This  reply  was  published  in  Wash 
ington  and  received  a  considerable  circulation.  In 
the  Southern  states,  however,  Douglas  was  likewise 
sharply  criticized  and  in  California  the  debate  upon 
his  positions  surpassed  in  bitterness  that  which  was 
carried  on  in  any  other  part  of  the  Union.  Senator 
Broderick,  the  leader  of  one  section  of  the  Cali 
fornia  Democrats,  and  Gwin,  the  leader  of  the 
other,  engaged  in  a  struggle  which  finally  resulted 
in  a  duel  to  the  death  between  Broderick  and 
Judge  Terry  of  the  California  Supreme  Court. 
Douglas's  doctrine  played  a  commanding  part  in  the 
campaign  there,  despite  the  prominence  of  local 
issues  and  bitter  personalities.  The  Southern  ele 
ment  in  the  long  run  was  substantially  worsted,  the 
Douglas  Democrats  and  the  Republicans  being 
emphatically  in  the  majority  and  later  guiding  the 
state  into  the  path  of  allegiance  to  the  Union  when 
war  had  become  inevitable.  In  spite  of  some 
tentative  and  partial  successes  in  places  where  local 
issues  aided,  or  where  personal  allegiance  advanced 
his  cause,  or  where  peculiarly  favorable  conditions 
prevailed,  Douglas  evidently  lost  ground  during 

quoted  in  part  in  Nicolay  and  Hay  and  are  given  in  fnll  in 
Political  Debates  between  Hon.  Abraham  Lincoln  and  Hon. 
Stephen  A.  Douglas,  pp.  240-268. 


304  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  campaign  of  1859.  It  was  a  bad  omen  for  the 
outcome  which  he  hoped  for  in  the  approaching 
national  convention,  and  before  the  year  had  closed 
it  was  plain  that  only  some  unusually  fortunate 
turn  could  restore  the  prestige  of  the  Democrats  or 
secure  to  Douglas  that  position  as  titular  leader  of 
the  party  to  which  he  had  so  long  aspired.  But 
history  was  making  fast  and  this  unexpected  turn 
was  promptly  given. 

John  Brown  had  gradually  developed  the  idea  of 
an  invasion  of  the  South  and  had,  during  the  years 
1856-1859,  secured  a  supply  of  arms  and  ammuni 
tion  for  use  in  his  prospective  attempt.  In  Kansas, 
he  had  had  the  rough  border  experience  and  had 
gained  the  hatred  of  the  South  which  both  ani 
mated  and,  as  he  believed,  fitted,  him  for  his  at 
tempt  to  begin  a  civil  war  designed  to  liberate  the 
slaves. 

On  July  4,  1859,  Brown  had  finally  settled  in 
Maryland  near  Harper's  Ferry,  establishing  there  a 
depot  of  ammunition  and  supplies.  On  October  16, 
1859,  he  attacked  Harper's  Ferry,  cutting  the  tele 
graph  wires  and  taking  possession  of  the  town,  but 
a  small  body  of  about  eighty  marines  from  the 
Washington  Navy  Yard,  under  command  of 
Colonel  Eobert  E.  Lee,  was  at  once  dispatched  to 
the  scene  and  made  short  work  of  the  "  invaders," 
killing  ten  and  capturing  seven.  Brown  was 
promptly  tried,  convicted,  sentenced  and  hanged, 
his  death  occurring  on  December  2d,  while  Con 
gress  with  its  usual  ineptitude  promptly  appointed 


BEEAKIXG  WITH  THE  SOUTH        305 

an  investigating  committee  to  look  into  facts  with 
which  the  whole  country  was  instantly  familiar. 
The  incident  was  in  itself  of  no  importance  except 
as  it  furnished  a  spark  to  set  off  the  high  explosives 
with  which  national  politics  were  then  undermined. 
The  committee  appointed  by  Congress  included  Jef 
ferson  Davis  of  Mississippi,  Mason  of  Virginia,  and 
Fitch  of  Indiana,  all  Democrats  of  course,  together 
with  Collamer  of  Vermont  and  Doolittle  of  Wis 
consin.  As  usual  the  effort  was  made  by  the  ma 
jority  of  the  committee  to  fasten  the  unlawful  acts 
of  Brown7 s  followers  upon  the  Eepublican  party, 
while  the  Eepublicans  regarded  the  occurrence  as 
an  aftermath  of  the  slavery  controversy  in  Kansas. 
The  undoubted  effect  of  the  incident  and  of  the 
lucubrations  of  the  committee  was  to  sharpen  the 
political  discussion  and,  more  important  still,  to 
concentrate  it  ever  more  pointedly  upon  slavery. 

The  congressional  committee  was  not  able  to 
recommend  any  legislation  designed  to  prevent 
similar  raids  in  the  future  because,  as  the  report 
ran,  it  found  the  invasion  of  Virginia  to  be 
a  simply  the  act  of  lawless  ruffians  under  the  sanc 
tion  of  no  public  or  political  authority," l  but 
Douglas,  unable  to  keep  out  of  the  controversy, 
hastened  to  urge  the  passage  of  a  bill  which  would 
punish  conspiracies  in  one  state  or  territory  against 
the  government,  people  or  property  of  another. 
Lincoln  withheld  his  judgment  for  a  time,  but  as 
soon  as  he  had  had  opportunity  to  gauge  the  feeling 
1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  210. 


306  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  the  nation,  said  in  a  speech  at  Cooper  Institute 
on  February  27,  1860,  that  the  John  Brown  in 
vasion  was  u  absurd,"  the  result  of  the  efforts  of  an 
"enthusiast"  who  had  brooded  over  the  " oppres 
sion  of  a  people  till  he  fancied  himself  commis 
sioned  by  heaven  to  liberate  them."  Lincoln  ex 
pressly  repudiated  responsibility  for  the  John 
Brown  affair,  but  it  had  an  undoubted  effect  in  em 
bittering  a  section  of  public  feeling  against  the 
Eepublican  party,  and  in  driving  some  to  the 
opinion  that  a  conservative  Democrat  of  the  Doug 
las  type  would  be  safer  as  a  presidential  choice  than 
a  Bepublican.  Within  the  Democratic  party  itself, 
the  effect  of  the  incident  upon  the  more  conserva 
tive  minds  seems  to  have  been  mainly  that  of  pro 
ducing  alarm  and  enforcing  the  necessity  of  reach 
ing  some  accommodation  by  moderate  means.  Ex 
treme  Southern  Democrats  considered  the  episode 
practically  a  threat  of  war  and  as  justifying  their 
own  radical  position.  They  were,  however,  not 
yet  ready  for  war,  and  many  men  who  had  unthink 
ingly  gone  with  Davis,  Brown  and  the  other  ex 
tremists  in  threats  of  violence  and  secession  hesi 
tated  when  the  final  step  was  suggested.  On  the 
whole,  the  Harper's  Ferry  episode  and  the  circula 
tion  of  certain  partisan  documents  like  Helper's 
Impending  Crisis,  which  was  endorsed  by  numerous 
influential  Bepublicans,  operated  to  aid  Douglas, 
because  they  aggravated  the  issue  between  the  ex 
treme  anti-slavery  wing  of  the  Bepublicau  party 
and  the  extreme  pro-slavery  wing  of  the  Democrats. 


BBEAKING  WITH  THE  SOUTH        307 

Thereby  the  necessity  of  electing  a  Democratic 
President  upon  a  platform,  of  moderate  character 
which  would  to  some  extent  unite  the  Northern  and 
Southern  wings  of  the  party,  was  emphasized. 
The  election  of  a  Bepublican  candidate,  it  seemed 
probable,  would  drive  the  country  still  nearer  to 
war,  by  putting  in  charge  of  the  government  a 
group  which  had  already  shown  a  distinct  sectional 
and  partisan  bias. 

Under  these  conditions,  it  was  obviously  true  that 
Douglas  was  the  logical  candidate  of  the  Democratic 
party.  There  had,  however,  been  no  reconciliation 
between  him  and  the  ultra- Southern  senators  on  the 
floor  and  they  continued  to  denounce  him  for  his  he 
retical  compromising  with  the  opponents  of  slavery. 
But  the  extreme  tendencies  of  the  Southerners  were 
now  growing  so  marked  that  Douglas,  stronger  in  the 
confidence  of  popular  support  than  he  had  been,  felt 
able  to  defy  them.  On  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  he 
boldly  stated  his  position,  asserting  his  willingness 
to  accept  the  nomination,  but  refusing  to  recant  or 
to  give  pledges  of  a  change  of  heart  with  reference 
to  slavery.  Efforts  to  force  him  to  commit  himself 
were  made  both  by  the  pro-slavery  extremists  and 
by  New  England  and  other  anti-slavery  propagan 
dists,  but  to  no  purpose.  Douglas  definitely  settled 
back  upon  the  "Freeport  doctrine7'  and  more  and 
more  indicated  his  reluctance  to  discuss  the  slavery 
question  in  its  general  aspects,  insisting  that  it  be 
dealt  with  everywhere  as  a  local  issue.  This  posi 
tion  commended  itself  strongly  to  conservative  voters 


308  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

in  the  Northern  and  Western  states  in  whom  the 
abstract  spirit  of  reform  was  not  very  pronounced. 
During  the  early  weeks  of  1860,  the  Western  section 
of  the  party  rallied  to  his  aid,  electing  Douglas 
delegations  to  the  forthcoming  national  convention. 
This  still  further  confirmed  him  in  maintaining  his 
own  position.  Signs  of  weakness,  however,  ap 
peared  in  New  York  and  Illinois,  where  contesting 
delegations  were  chosen,  and  it  was  early  apparent 
that  his  success  in  gaining  the  approval  of  public 
opinion  could  be  made  fruitful  only  by  means  of  a 
most  bitter  struggle  in  the  convention.  For  this 
Douglas  was  fully  prepared,  realizing  as  he  did  that 
the  crucial  moment  of  his  career  had  come  and  that, 
unless  he  now  secured  his  party  nomination,  it 
would  probably  never  be  his  portion.  He  therefore 
determined  to  accept  the  issue. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  LAST  BATTLE 

THE  convention  was  to  be  held  at  Charleston, 
S.  C.  Delegates  from  the  North  and  West  made  it 
a  point  to  pass  through  Washington  on  their  way 
to  the  place  of  meeting,  and  adherents  of  Douglas 
who  were  not  regularly  appointed  delegates  also 
resorted  to  Charleston  in  great  numbers.  It  was 
recognized  that  the  party  was  now  at  a  turning- 
point,  while  the  career  of  Douglas,  with  all  that  it 
meant  to  his  followers,  was  in  an  equally  critical 
position.  He  must  go  on  and  must  succeed.  Prob 
ably  most  Democrats,  even  among  the  extreme 
Southern  men,  believed  that  they  could  carry  the 
election  with  him  as  their  candidate,  but  they  were 
not  willing  to  accept  him  in  that  capacity.  They 
preferred  to  take  the  chances  with  some  other  who 
would  be  more  sympathetic  with  their  ideas  and 
who  would,  if  elected,  assure  them  of  the  carrying 
out  of  their  policies. 

On  the  whole,  the  Democratic  convention  at 
Charleston  was  a  representative  gathering.  Ac 
cording  to  Rhodes,1  "  the  politicians  who  came  were 
of  the  better  class ;  lawyers,  men  of  business  and 
planters  of  large  influence  and  high  character  in 
their  respective  communities,  though  little  known 
Rhodes,  Vol.  II,  pp.  441-442. 


310  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

beyond  their  own  states,  were  glad  to  have  the 
honor  of  assisting  in  the  deliberations  of  their 
party's  national  council.  The  selections  had  for 
the  most  part  been  made  with  care,  and,  except  in 
New  York  and  Pennsylvania,  the  action  of  the 
minor  conventions  that  met  to  choose  delegates  was 
little  disturbed  by  the  operations  of  machine 
politics."  A  Tammany  delegation  from  New  York 
and  a  few  congressmen  constituted  the  representa 
tion  of  the  routine  political  element,  but  they  were 
relatively  weak.  In  such  a  meeting,  composed  of 
minds  of  good  average  quality,  it  was  possible  to 
test  the  sentiment  of  the  country  with  unusual 
accuracy,  and  while  the  meeting  was  not  charac 
terized  by  the  same  technical  bickerings  that  had 
marked  scenes  in  both  the  Senate  and  the  House,  it 
was  soon  evident  that  Northern  and  Southern 
Democrats  were  not  harmonious ;  the  Northerners 
because  of  the  presence  of  slavery  which  some  of 
them  now  saw  for  the  first  time  in  real  life,  the 
Southerners  because  of  the  comparative  plainness 
and  lack  of  culture  which  they  found  in  the  North 
ern  delegates.  In  all,  about  six  hundred  members 
were  present  in  the  convention,  three  hundred  and 
three,  the  number  of  electors,  being  the  total  vote, 
each  state  casting  votes  equal  to  its  electoral  vote.1 
Early  in  the  discussions  it  became  plain  that 
Douglas  by  his  recent  changes  of  position  had 
practically  consolidated  the  Northwest  behind  him, 
and  would  be  able  to  control  the  whole  party, 
Rhodes,  Vol.  II,  pp.  441-442. 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  311 

barring  its  extreme  Southern  section,  but  that  his 
attitude  on  the  question  of  Kansas  and  the  issues 
that  had  later  been  linked  with  it,  had  hopelessly 
alienated  that  section.  Deliberations  had  begun  on 
the  23d  of  April  and  canvasses  showed  that  Douglas 
had  a  majority  of  the  delegates  numerically,  but  that 
his  opponents  had  seventeen  out  of  thirty-three 
states.  Caleb  Gushing  became  the  president  of  the 
convention,  and  as  there  was  no  disagreement  about 
the  desirability  of  determining  the  platform  before 
the  candidate  was  named,  the  Resolutions  Committee 
began  its  sessions  in  earnest.  Hardly  had  the  work 
of  the  committee  been  started,  when  it  appeared 
that  among  its  members  there  was  the  same  division 
of  opinion  as  had  already  appeared  in  the  conven 
tion  itself,  and  in  Congress.  Douglas  dominated  one 
faction  in  the  committee  while  Jefferson  Davis  con 
trolled  the  other,  determined  as  the  latter  was  to 
stand  by  the  resolutions  which  Davis  had  sub 
mitted  to  the  Senate  on  the  2d  of  February,  1860. 
In  one  of  these  resolutions  he  had  asserted  that 
there  was  no  power  either  in  Congress  or  in  a  ter 
ritorial  legislature,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  curtail 
the  constitutional  right  whereby  citizens  of  slave 
states  were  entitled  to  take  slaves  into  the  territories, 
and  had  laid  down  the  principle  that  it  was  incum 
bent  upon  the  Federal  government  to  furnish  to 
slave-owners  just  as  to  the  proprietors  of  every  other 
kind  of  property,  the  protection  they  required  for 
safeguarding  it. 
Five  days  of  heated  discussion  on  the  part  of  the 


312  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Besolutions  Committee  led  only  to  the  rendering  of 
majority  and  minority  reports,  on  April  27,  1860, 
the  former  asserting  the  substance  of  the  Davis 
resolutions,  the  latter  reaffirming  the  Cincinnati 
platform  of  June  2,  1856,  in  which  it  was  declared 
that  "the  Democratic  party  will  resist  all  attempts 
at  renewing  in  Congress  or  out  of  it,  the  agitation 
of  the  slavery  question,"  endorsing  the  Dred  Scott 
decision,  and  upholding  the  authority  of  the 
Supreme  Court  When  the  two  reports  appeared 
on  the  floor,  the  controversy  resulted  in  the  asser 
tion  by  the  Southern  delegates  that  they  would  not 
allow  their  interests  to  be  overwhelmed  by  the  men 
of  the  North  and  West.  They  would  not  suffer 
what  they  called  the  poison  of  Abolitionism  to 
spread  throughout  the  party,  and  they  charged  that 
the  admission  of  the  wrongful  character  of  slavery, 
tacitly  made  by  many  of  the  Northern  Democrats, 
lay  at  the  root  of  all  the  evil.  The  minority  of  the 
committee,  though  at  first  calm  and  dispassionate 
in  their  argument,  finally  reached  somewhat  the 
same  level  of  passion  that  had  been  early  arrived 
at  by  the  men  of  the  extreme  South.  A  long 
debate  which  filled  the  rest  of  the  week,  including 
the  sending  back  of  the  rival  platforms  to  the 
Besolutions  Committee,  resulted  in  no  compromise, 
save  the  suggestion,  made  near  the  beginning  of  the 
convention  by  the  Southerners  and  now  renewed 
with  great  force,  that  in  case  the  platform  of  the 
minority  must  be  accepted  in  order  to  carry  the 
Northern  Democratic  states,  Southerners  would 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  313 

consent  upon  condition  that  they  should  be  given  a 
candidate  who  would  be  sound,  according  to  their 
own  ideas,  upon  the  slavery  question.  To  this 
proposal  Douglas  and  his  followers — determined  as 
they  were  to  win  the  reward  of  their  labors — op 
posed  a  united  front.  Aside  from  the  purely  per 
sonal  element  for  which  they  were  straggling,  they 
had  some  basis  of  logic  in  the  assertion  that  their 
platform  and  their  candidate  were  inseparable,  and 
that  to  attempt  to  run  a  pro-slavery  man  upon  the 
Douglas  platform  would  expose  them  to  ridicule  as 
well  as  defeat.  The  Douglas  platform  was  finally 
accepted,  165  to  138,  on  Monday,  April  30th.  A 
round  dozen  delegates  from  slavery  states  voted  in 
its  favor,  while  there  were  thirty  from  free  states 
who  voted  against  it ;  this  was  the  result  of  Bu 
chanan's  anti-Douglas  efforts  in  the  Northern  con 
stituencies.  The  action  was  at  once  followed  by 
the  withdrawal  from  the  convention  of  Alabama, 
Mississippi,  Louisiana,  South  Carolina,  Florida, 
Texas  and  Arkansas,  and  finally  Georgia.  This 
great  defection  left  but  253  votes  in  the  convention 
and  of  these  202  were  necessary  to  a  choice.  Doug 
las,  however,  could  not  get  at  any  time  above  1521, 
although  balloting  was  continued  for  several  days 
and  no  fewer  than  fifty-seven  distinct  ballots  were 
taken.  Adjournments,  on  the  part  of  the  Douglas 
wing  of  the  convention  to  meet  in  Baltimore  on 
June  18th,  and  of  the  slavery  wing  to  meet  in 
Eichmond  somewhat  earlier,  were  at  length  taken 
and  the  convention  broke  up. 


314  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

The  disappointing  outcome  at  Charleston  might 
well  have  moved  Douglas  to  retire  from  the  contest, 
had  he  been  more  given  to  vacillation  or  less 
certain  of  his  own  sufficiency.  But  the  result  of  the 
convention  had  merely  strengthened  his  determina 
tion  to  maintain  his  own  position  ;  he  believed  that 
he  might  draw  away  from  the  Eepublican  party  the 
more  conservative  elements  which  had  passed  over 
to  it  from  the  Democrats. 

Davis  was  now  once  more  put  forward  by  the 
extreme  Southern  element  in  the  Senate  to  hamper 
and  embarrass  Douglas,  and  to  assail  the  moderate 
platform  which  his  friends  had  endeavored  to  have 
adopted  by  the  Charleston  convention.  A  savage 
attack  by  Davis  upon  the  platform,  coupled  with 
unpleasant  allusions  to  Douglas  himself,  was  the 
striking  incident  of  May  17th,  and  was  the  signal 
for  a  long  and  bitter  rejoinder  by  Douglas  in 
which  he  considered  the  recent  history  of  the  party l 
and  asserted  that  the  attempt  to  nominate  him  was 
necessary,  if  only  as  a  vindication  from  the  charges 
openly  made  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  as  well  as 
implied  in  the  action  taken  when  he  had  been 
removed  from  the  chairmanship  of  the  Committee 
on  Territories.  While  the  personal  portions  of  this 
speech,  and  the  review  of  the  constitutional  ques 
tions  centring  around  slavery  were  wearisome  and 
tedious  to  the  last  degree,  there  were  parts  which 
had  vital  interest.  Douglas  at  last  openly  admitted 
that  the  position  of  the  Southern  pro-slavery  wing 

1  Congressional  Globe,  1st  Sess.,  36th  Cong.,  pp.  2145-2156. 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  315 

of  the  party  at  the  Democratic  convention  could 
mean  only  secession  and  the  breaking  up  of  the 
Union.  He  warned  the  Southerners  that  they  were 
better  off  under  existing  conditions  than  they  could 
ever  hope  to  be  again,  and  Davis,  stung  by  the 
manner  of  Douglas,  disclaimed  a  desire  for  seces 
sion,  charging  his  antagonist  with  being  respon 
sible  for  the  threat  of  disunion  through  his  con 
tinued  effort  to  press  his  own  candidacy  and  his 
own  theory  of  slavery  under  the  Constitution  upon 
a  reluctant  party. 

The  resolutions  of  Davis,  offered  on  February 
2d,  to  which  reference  has  been  made  in  con 
nection  with  the  Charleston  convention,  were 
adopted  by  the  Democratic  senators  against  the 
wishes  of  Douglas  and  of  Pugh  of  Ohio  who  alone 
opposed  them.  Many  voted  for  the  resolutions 
without  actually  believing  in  them,  but  with  the 
idea  of  placating  the  Southern  element  and  giving 
an  appearance  of  party  harmony  which  did  not 
exist.  A  further  attempt  to  make  the  action  thus 
taken  entirely  nugatory  that  it  might  appear  to  the 
country  as  a  purely  academic  proposition,  was  the 
acceptance  of  a  resolution  to  the  effect  that  slave 
property  in  the  territories  was  already  safe  without 
the  interference  of  Congress.  In  spite  of  the 
attempt  to  rob  the  action  of  most  of  its  significance, 
however,  the  adoption  of  the  Davis  resolutions  was 
a  source  of  alarm  to  the  country,  while  the  course 
of  the  Eepublican  convention  at  Chicago  in  nomi 
nating  Abraham  Lincoln  made  the  situation  still 


316  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

more  acute.  This  step  had  been  taken l  on  the 
18th  of  May,  Lincoln  receiving  364  votes,  and  the 
nomination  was  promptly  made  unanimous. 

Douglas,  with  genuine  political  insight,  recog 
nized  that  the  party  of  his  opponents  had  taken  the 
course  which  was  most  calculated  to  endear  it  to 
the  public  mind,  and  that  Lincoln,  whose  power  he 
had  felt  in  the  Illinois  debates,  would  prove  a 
formidable  foe  in  those  very  states  where  his  own 
strength  was  supposed  to  be  greatest.  He  realized 
also  that  the  choice  of  so  distinct  and  positive  an 
opponent  of  Southern  ideas  would  render  his  own 
pro-slavery  antagonists  more  insistent  than  ever 
upon  a  candidate  of  equally  positive  views,  and  less 
inclined  to  accept  one  whom  they  considered  a 
compromiser  or  trimmer  like  himself.  He  told  his 
political  friends  in  Washington  that  he  recognized 
Lincoln  as  both  able  and  honest,  and  in  reviewing 
conditions  in  his  own  mind  he  found  them  so 
difficult  as  to  render  it  necessary  that  he  should  at 
least  make  some  offer  of  withdrawal  before  the 
Baltimore  convention  on  the  18th  of  June.  Think 
ing  thus,  he  reluctantly  and  ungraciously  wrote  to 
the  controlling  members  of  the  Tammany  delega 
tion  from  New  York,  that  if  his  retirement  could 
preserve  the  unity  of  the  party,  he  would  prefer  to 
see  his  name  dropped  and  that  of  some  more  suit 
able  Democrat  substituted.  The  New  York  delega 
tion  was  in  a  peculiarly  significant  position,  because 
of  an  effort  which  was  now  making  to  admit  to  the 
1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Vol.  II,  p.  277. 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  317 

convention  some  of  the  delegates  who  had  with 
drawn  at  Charleston,  and  who,  having  repented, 
wished  to  resume  their  places  at  Baltimore,  as 
well  as  sundry  delegations  pledged  to  Douglas 
which  had  meanwhile  been  appointed  in  certain 
other  states.  The  Tammany  men,  after  carefully 
considering  the  situation,  determined  to  stand 
by  Douglas  and  the  new  delegations  from  the 
Southern  states  were  admitted.  This  practically 
settled  the  contest l  and  at  once  further  withdrawals 
began.  Men  from  the  border  states  like  Kentucky 
and  Maryland,  as  well  as  some  from  North  Carolina 
and  Tennessee,  now  retired,  and  Douglas's  nomina 
tion  promptly  followed.  The  men  who  had  with- 


1  Halstead,  Caucuses  of  1860,  p.  227,  gives  the  best  survey  of 
the  situation  : 

"  When  the  seceders  appeared  at  Baltimore,  pursuant  to  the 
program  of  the  Southern  congressmen,  advertised  in  their 
manifesto  and  perfected  at  Richmond,  the  contest  between  the 
antagonisms  which  had  been  fully  developed  at  Charleston, 
resolved  itself  into  a  simple  one  on  credentials,  between  the 
original  Charleston  delegates,  and  the  delegations  from  several 
states,  provided  to  fill  up  the  gaps  caused  by  secession,  with 
the  deciding  vote  in  the  hand  of  Dean  Richmond,  chairman  of 
the  New  York  delegation.  Richmond  &  Co.,  while  able  to  say 
whether  the  convention  should  be  consolidated  by  admitting  the 
original  Southern  delegates,  or  disrupted  by  excluding  the 
seceders,  could  not  say,  in  case  of  consolidation,  who  should  be 
the  nominee.  The  friends  of  Douglas  were  without  confidence 
in  Richmond  ('the  Dean'),  and  were  only  prevented  from 
denouncing  him  by  the  appreciation  of  their  dependence  upon 
him.  If  he  slaughtered  Douglas,  they  had  the  power  and  will 
to  slaughter  his  man,  and  would  have  prevented  the  nomi 
nation  of  any  candidate  for  whom  he,  in  connection  with  the 
South,  might  have  thrown  his  influence.  Hence  the  hesitation 
of  New  York — her  long  consultations,  her  vacillation,  and 
retrograde  movements.  She  struggled  for  a  compromise,  but 


318  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

drawn  were  joined  by  the  majority  of  those  who 
had  originally  retired  from  the  Charleston  con 
vention  and  hastened  to  nominate  Breckinridge  for 
the  presidency,  selecting  Lane  of  Oregon  as  a  vice- 
presidential  candidate,  while  the  Douglas  wing  of 
the  party  added  Johnson,  a  Georgian,  as  his  associ 
ate. 

Douglas's  letter  of  acceptance  sought  to  make  the 
point  that  the  pro-slavery  men  were  essentially 
sectional  in  their  appeal,  and  that  his  own  branch 
of  the  party  was  the  true  national  Democratic 
organization.  This  idea  he  based  on  the  view  that 
special  Federal  protection  of  slavery  was  essen 
tially  a  sectional  issue,  and  a  demand  for  the  con- 
both  sides  were  so  fierce  that  compromising  was  out  of  the 
question.  The  Southerners  thought  they  had  compromised 
enough  in  coming  to  Baltimore,  and  condescending  to  ask 
admission  into  the  convention  from  which  they  had  seceded. 
The  friends  of  Douglas  could  not  be  expected  to  throw  away 
the  last  chance  for  their  candidate,  by  making  up  the  con 
vention,  so  far  as  possible,  out  of  its  original  materials.  Such 
a  compromise  as  that  would  have  been,  not  a  capitulation,  but 
a  surrender  at  discretion.  They  did,  at  the  solicitation, 
indeed,  the  dictatorial  demand  of  New  York,  back  out  from 
two  propositions,  and  were  sorry  for  it  afterward.  They  had 
taken  the  ground  that  no  delegate  accredited  to  the  Richmond 
convention  should  be  allowed  to  enter  that  at  Baltimore. 
They  were  drawn  from  this  point  by  the  strong  case  of 
Mississippi.  They  had  also  declared  the  necessity  of  a  pledge 
or  understanding,  that  all  delegates  entering  the  convention 
should  make  or  assent  to,  to  the  effect  that  they  would  support 
the  nominees  of  the  convention.  After  urging  this  for  a  few 
hours,  and  observing  the  explosive  excitement  engendered  by 
it,  they  withdrew  it.  They  also,  or  rather  New  York,  suc 
cumbed  respecting  their  delegation  from  Georgia.  Yet  it  was 
impoasible  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  South  and  preserve  the 
unity  of  the  convention,  without  passing  under  the  yoke  of 
Yanoey,  and  they  could  not  consent  to  that  humiliation." 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  319 

si  deration  of  one  group  of  states  to  the  disadvan 
tage  and  against  the  wishes  of  the  main  body  of 
states.  The  trouble  in  Douglas's  letter  lay  in  the 
fact  that  the  whole  question  at  issue  in  national 
politics  was  now  essentially  a  sectional  issue  and 
could  not  be  made  anything  else.  Sectionalism  had 
itself  become  a  national  question.  The  utter  im 
possibility  of  ignoring  slavery,  or  the  constitutional 
issues  which  had  become  associated  with  it,  was 
seen  in  connection  with  the  efforts  of  the  so-called 
Constitutional  Union  party,  which  in  a  convention 
at  Baltimore  had  put  forward  a  ticket  with  Bell  of 
Tennessee  and  Everett  of  Massachusetts  as  candi 
dates  for  President  and  Vice -President  respectively, 
while  it  entirely  ignored  the  slavery  question.  Its 
platform  was  ' '  the  Constitution  of  the  country,  the 
union  of  the  states,  and  the  enforcement  of  the 
laws."  That  the  time  was  now  past  when  any  such 
platitudinous  evasion  would  serve  the  purposes  of 
national  politics  was  promptly  seen  in  the  fact  that 
the  Constitutional  Union  party  attracted  little  sup 
port.  It  received  fewer  votes  in  the  election  than 
did  any  of  the  other  tickets  now  in  the  field.  The 
effort  to  disclaim  a  desire  to  break  up  the  Union 
was,  however,  characteristic  of  every  one  of  the 
parties,  and  Douglas  still  continued  to  urge  the 
necessity  of  reuniting  the  Democrats  upon  broad 
national  lines,  designed  to  maintain  the  Union. 
Lincoln  insisted  upon  the  inviolability  of  the  Con 
stitution  while  Breckinridge  and  Bell  adopted  the 
same  attitude,  Breckinridge  urging  "the  Constitu- 


320  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

tion  and  equality  of  the  states'7  and  Bell  "the 
maintenance  of  the  Constitution  and  the  Union." 
Buchanan  promptly  attached  himself  to  Breckin- 
ridge  and  his  personal  followers  began  a  bitter 
onslaught  upon  Douglas.1 

The  disastrous  result  of  the  conventions  at 
Charleston  and  Baltimore  had  for  the  moment  been 
exceedingly  discouraging  to  Douglas.  He,  however, 
soon  rallied.  His  success  in  political  contests,  al 
most  uniform  throughout  his  whole  life,  had  given 
him  a  rare  self-confidence  and  he  saw  in  the  division 
of  his  antagonists  into  three  parties  a  decided  hope 
for  himself  as  the  head  of  a  group  laying  claims  to 
national  character,  boasting  many  adherents  in 
practically  every  state  in  the  Union,  and  appealing 
strongly  to  conservative  men  everywhere.  He  fore 
saw  a  possibility  that  the  election  might  be  thrown 
into  the  House  of  Representatives,  and  gave  orders 
to  his  followers  to  cultivate  the  friendship  of  the 
Constitutional  Union  party,  while  showing  no 
quarter  to  the  Breckinridge  group.  In  the  East 
and  in  New  Eugland  he  thought  he  had  ex 
cellent  chances,  and  in  New  York  the  outlook 
seemed  hopeful,  owing  to  the  friendship  of  some  in 
fluential  newspapers  and  the  power  of  the  Tammany 
organization.  Douglas,  moreover,  understood  that 
his  campaign  would  lack  something  of  the  support 
and  vigor  possessed  by  the  Democratic  national  or 
ganization  in  former  days  and  he  determined  to 

1  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Vol.  II,  Chap.  16,  give  a  clear  account  of 
the  political  situation. 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  321 

take  the  stump  himself,  thus  violating  precedent, 
but  arousing  the  popular  enthusiasm  which  he  had 
usually  been  able  to  inspire  by  his  appealing  and 
overmastering  personality.  He  traveled  through 
New  England,  speaking  at  Boston,  Cambridge, 
Springfield,  Concord  and  at  Troy,  K  Y.,  as  well  as 
elsewhere.  He  addressed  the  crowds  sometimes 
without  primary  reference  to  politics,  but  usually 
managing  to  inject  some  acute  comments  on  the 
national  situation,  while  at  other  times  he  delivered 
out-and-out  political  speeches  along  his  own  favor 
ite  lines.  Later  he  started  for  the  South,  passing 
through  Virginia,1  North  Carolina,  and  other  states, 
and,  returning  to  the  West,  he  spoke  in  Ohio, 


1  Mr.  Henry  Adams  (Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Pro 
ceedings,  April-June,  1910,  p.  665)  has  given  an  unfamiliar 
explanation  of  this  trip  which,  from  one  point  of  view,  places 
Douglas  in  a  very  favorable  light.  Says  Mr.  Adams:  ''A 
wide-spread  and  intricate  conspiracy  existed  against  the  govern 
ment  ;  so  much  was  undoubted.  Mr.  Douglas  and  his  friends 
denounced  it  openly,  and  traced  it  up  to  its  source.  For  many 
years  past,  there  has  been,  it  is  true,  a  class  of  men  in  the 
Southern  states  as  in  the  Northern  who  have  wished  for  disun 
ion  as  a  thing  good  in  itself.  But  this  class  was  always  small 
and  could  never  have  obtained  the  control  of  a  single  state  as 
long  as  the  slave  power  ruled  the  country.  But  according  to 
Mr.  Douglas,  when  it  became  evident  at  the  dissolution  of  the 
Baltimore  Convention  in  the  spring  of  1860  that  the  Democratic 
party  were  to  lose  their  omnipotent  voice  in  the  affairs  of  the 
nation,  the  leading  statesmen  in  the  Southern  states  framed  a 
plan  for  the  dissolution  of  the  Union.  ...  To  defeat  this 
conspiracy  had  been  the  object  of  Mr.  Douglas's  journey  to 
Virginia  and  the  South.  .  .  .  His  object  was  to  break  up 
this  Southern  combination  and  to  throw  the  state  of  Virginia 
.  into  the  hands  of  the  Southern  Whigs.  His  manoeuvre 
was  only  partially  successful.  .  .  .  Still  the  main  object 
was  gained/' 


322  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Indiana,  Illinois,  Iowa,  and  elsewhere.  Still  later, 
on  the  19th  of  October,  he  turned  southward  again, 
speaking  in  Mississippi,  Alabama,  Louisiana  and  at 
points  en  route. 

The  journey  through  the  South  was  from  the  first 
discouraging.  He  had  been  interrogated  about  se 
cession  almost  as  soon  as  he  stepped  upon  the  soil  of 
Virginia.  There,  however,  he  had  struck  a  blow 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  Union,  by  answering 
one  who  asked  him  at  Norfolk  what  the  South 
should  do  in  case  of  the  election  of  Lincoln,  that  the 
choice  of  the  Eepublican  candidate  would  not  justify 
any  attempt  at  dissolution  ;  while  to  a  second  ques 
tion,  whether  in  case  of  secession  such  action  should 
be  resisted,  he  responded  that  everything  should  be 
done  to  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  laws.  Al 
though  he  had  been  favorably  treated  at  Richmond, 
as  he  moved  farther  South  he  felt  more  keenly  the 
force  of  the  growing  spirit  of  secession  and  was  less 
and  less  disposed  to  look  with  hope  to  the  future. 
As  he  turned  northward  again  and  westward,  there 
was  a  renewal  of  the  enthusiastic  scenes  of  earlier 
days.  At  Kalamazoo,  Mich.,  he  was  met  by  an  im 
mense  crowd  1  which  escorted  him  through  the  prin 
cipal  streets,  and  in  his  later  speeches  in  the  North 
west  the  personal  endorsement  greeting  him  was 
very  strong.  Keturning  to  the  South  as  election 
time  drew  near,  he  again  encountered  strong  per- 

1  New  York  Tribune,  Oct.  17,  1860.  References  to  local  condi 
tions  contained  in  the  preceding  pages  are  chiefly  drawn  from 
the  reports  of  the. TVz June's  correspondents. 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  323 

sonal  hostility,  and  at  times  even  ran  the  risk  of 
violence.  That  an  effort  was  made  to  wreck  his 
train  was  his  individual  belief.1  Although  the  per 
sonal  conduct  of  his  canvass  had  been  objected  to 
at  the  beginning,  men  became  accustomed  to  it 
after  a  time  and  criticism  partly  ceased.  The 
strain,  however,  was  terrific,  and  Douglas  returned 
to  the  bad  habits  which  had  been  growing  upon  him 
for  some  years.  He  drank  freely,  and  at  a  point 
in  Indiana  through  which  a  train  bearing  two 
political  acquaintances  was  passing  he  entered  the 
car  late  at  night  and  sought  to  have  the  men  join 
him  in  a  bottle  of  whiskey  which  he  brought  with 
him.  Upon  their  refusal  he  partially  consumed  it 
alone.  It  could  not  be  possible  that  a  lack  of  dig 
nity  so  pronounced  as  this  would  be  favorably  re 
garded  even  by  the  somewhat  rough  and  ready  con 
stituency  to  which  Douglas  spoke  in  many  of  the 
places  where  he  had  journeyed.  Perhaps  the  rec 
ognition  which  had  come  to  him  comparatively 
early  in  the  autumn  that  Lincoln  would  certainly 
win,  had  altered  his  own  view  of  himself  as  a  prob 
able  President  and  had  led  him  to  the  adoption  of  a 
kind  of  conduct  from  which  he  would  otherwise 
have  abstained.  During  the  later  days  of  the  cam 
paign,  after  certain  state  elections  had  been  carried 
by  the  Republicans,  the  conviction  deepened  in 
Douglas's  mind  that  hope  was  now  gone  and  that 
his  only  mission  in  the  contest  must  be  that  of 
creating  sentiment  against  secession,  and  so  far  as 
1  Johnson ,  Douglas,  p.  439. 


324  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

possible  of  neutralizing  the  dangerous  influence  of 
Jefferson  Davis  and  his  followers. 

The  first  word  of  Douglas's  conclusive  defeat 
reached  him  while  he  was  in  Mississippi.  His  mind 
had  already  grown  so  thoroughly  accustomed  to  the 
idea  that  the  event  did  not  then  have  the  stunning  ef 
fect  it  would  otherwise  have  had.  He  started  for  the 
North  almost  immediately,  speaking  at  a  few  places 
en  route  and  urging  acquiescence  in  the  verdict  at 
the  polls.  He  freely  admitted  his  regret  for  the 
election  of  Lincoln  and  his  dislike  of  Lincoln's  anti- 
slavery  views.  As  the  returns  of  the  election  came 
in,  it  was  possible  for  him  to  urge  with  much  force 
that  the  South  had  comparatively  little  to  fear  after 
all,  since  the  Kepublican  party  was  in  the  minority 
and  Lincoln  had  simply  won  by  a  plurality  instead  of 
by  a  majority.  He  wisely  refrained  from  calling 
much  attention  to  the  fact  that  had  Breckinridge  and 
the  extreme  pro-slavery  wing  supported  him  instead 
of  breaking  away  from  the  party,  the  day  might  have 
been  carried.  Douglas  was  far  too  sagacious  polit 
ically  to  try  to  aggravate  the  intense  feeling  of  the 
South,  for  the  sake  of  the  cheap  satisfaction  of  es 
tablishing  the  accurate  character  of  his  own  predic 
tions.  Yet  in  private  conversations  he  admitted 
that  he  was  losing  courage,  and  this  discouragement 
deepened  as  further  details  of  the  election  came  in. 
Douglas  had  received  a  total  of  1,376,957  in  the 
popular  vote  against  Lincoln's  1,866,452,  Breckin- 
ridge's  849,781,  and  Bell's  588,879.  In  the  electoral 
vote,  however,  one  hundred  and  eighty  went  to 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  325 

Lincoln,  seventy -two  to  Breckinridge,  thirty -nine 
to  Bell,  and  only  twelve  to  Douglas.  Douglas  had 
obtained  nine  votes  in  Missouri,  and  three  in  New 
Jersey.  The  outcome  showed  his  actual  position 
exceedingly  well.  He  had  represented  the  general, 
wide-spread  opinion  of  those  whose  minds  revolted 
from  warfare,  and  who  would  have  preserved  the 
Union  at  any  cost,  even  that  of  a  principle.1  Yet, 
as  the  returns  also  showed,  these  conservatives  were 
not  sufficiently  numerous  to  control  the  wild  forces 
which  were  now  working  toward  war,  and  prac 
tically  at  no  point  throughout  the  whole  country 
were  they  superior  to  the  combined  extremists  who 
would  rule  or  ruin. 

It  had  now  become  the  foremost  question  with  all 
thinking  men  how  they  were  to  shape  their  courses 
in  the  fierce  battle  that  was  impending.  Above  all 
else  what  should  be  done  with  reference  to  the  ques 
tion  of  secession  ?  On  that  point,  Douglas  had  al 
ready  firmly  and  definitely  committed  himself.  Se 
cession  would  not  be  justified  and  must  not  take 
place  ;  but  should  it  be  attempted,  it  must  be  put 
down  by  force.  This  view  the  defeated  candi 
date  firmly  set  himself  to  uphold.  He  passed  rap 
idly  to  Washington,  where  he  delivered  an  address 
in  support  of  Lincoln,  the  newly-elected  Pres 
ident.  Secession  had  already  been  begun  by  the 
taking  of  preliminary  steps  in  South  Carolina. 
These  had  been  so  menacing  as  to  alarm  the  com 
manders  in  charge  of  Federal  garrisons,  who  called 
1  Stanwood,  A  History  of  the  Presidency,  pp.  296-297,  for  figures. 


326  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

for  aid  in  order  that  an  actual  clash  might  be 
avoided,  but  who  found  themselves  blocked  by  the 
treacherous  inertness  of  the  reactionary  President 
who  still  occupied  the  White  House. 

The  indications  of  secession  were,  however,  thus 
far  no  more  serious  than  had  been  observed  in  other 
parts  of  the  country  at  previous  crises,  and  Doug 
las,  in  common  with  many  other  conservative  men, 
still  believed  that  the  differences  could  somehow  be 
reconciled.     But  the  opening  of  Congress  showed 
that  the  difference  of  opinion  had  become  practi 
cally  hopeless.     Davis  and  others  reiterated  their 
former  views  and  now  plaintively  added  that  seces 
sion  was  unavoidable  because  of  their  fear  of  Lin 
coln  and  what  he  might  do.     Some  of  the  extreme 
Southerners  made  plain  and  direct  statements  that 
their  states  would  leave  the  Union  in  the  near  fu 
ture,  and  if  obliged  to  do  so  would  resort  to  force  to 
establish  their  position.     In  the  hope  of  a  possible 
reconciliation,   Douglas  now  adopted  a  new  role. 
He  no  longer  appeared  on  the  floor  in  vituperation, 
nor  did  he  engage  with  his  customary  pleasure  and 
spirit  in  acrimonious  discussion  about  the  constitu 
tional  aspects  of  slavery.     He  sought  to  promote 
peace  by  asking  the  Southerners  for  a  detailed  state 
ment  specifying  the  points  at  which  they  took  ex 
ception  to  the  existing  status,  and  when  some  mat 
ters  were  tentatively  mentioned  he  joined  heartily 
with  his  former  pro-slavery  associates  in  denounc 
ing  the  conditions  at  the  North  of  which  they  com 
plained.      The  more  reasonable  slavery   men   an- 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  327 

swered  to  his  call,  and  proposed  the  appointment  of 
thirteen  members  of  the  Senate  who  should  suggest 
measures  that  would  be  acceptable  to  all  parties, 
and  would  serve  as  a  basis  of  a  reconciliation.  The 
men  selected  for  this  committee  were  chosen  in 
the  usual  fashion — so  as  to  represent  all  opinions, 
a  photograph  of  the  same  irreconcilable  and  con 
flicting  mood  of  mind  in  which  Congress  at  the  mo 
ment  found  itself. 

The  committee  included  five  Republicans  headed 
by  the  extreme  and  self-important  Seward,  the  two 
fire-eaters  of  the  bourbon  Southern  group,  Davis  and 
Toombs,  and  three  lay  figures  from  the  slavehold- 
ing  but  still  doubtful  commonwealths  which  wished 
to  save  the  Union  if  they  could,  while  Douglas  him 
self  with  two  satellites  stood  for  the  conservative 
Democracy  of  the  North  and  South.  Various  reso 
lutions  were  submitted  to  the  committee  and  a  con 
siderable  number  of  constitutional  amendments 
came  before  them.  Conspicuous  in  this  program 
were  the  plans  of  compromise  which  had  been  urged 
by  Senator  Crittendeu  of  Kentucky,  himself  now  a 
member  of  the  newly  appointed  committee.  An 
integral  feature  of  Critteuden's  plan  was  the  ree's- 
tablishrnent  and  extension  of  the  boundary  line 
which  had  been  set  in  the  Missouri  Compromise. 
Here,  however,  the  extreme  partisans  showed  that 
compromise  was  to  them  but  another  name  for  in 
sistence  upon  their  own  views.  The  Eepublicans 
voted  against  the  amendments,  and  these  of  course 
were  equally  unsatisfactory  to  the  extreme  South- 


328  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

erners.  Douglas  supported  the  whole  of  the  pro 
gram  of  compromise,1  but  without  being  in  the  least 
able  to  impress  his  views  upon  his  associates. 

The  outcome  of  the  committee's  work  seems  to 
have  convinced  him  of  one  thing  about  which  he  had 
previously  been  uncertain.  He  fully  believed  that 
the  extreme  Republicans  of  New  England  were  as 
ready  for  war  as  were  the  men  of  the  extreme  South. 
So  strongly  did  he  hold  this  view  that  he  was  in 
clined  to  ascribe  the  tactics  followed  by  the  North 
ern  Eepublicans  to  a  desire  to  goad  the  South  into 
secession,  in  order  that  they  themselves  might  have 
unquestioned  control  in  the  Senate.  As  a  last  hope, 
Douglas  submitted  to  the  committee  a  scheme  of 
his  own  for  the  settlement  of  the  slavery  question, 
which  he  now  properly  regarded  as  vital  and  not  as 
an  indifferent  matter  that  might  be  settled  by  local 
communities  as  they  pleased.  In  assenting  to  the 
report  of  the  committee  to  the  effect  that  no  general 
compromise  or  scheme  of  reconciliation  could  be  de 
termined  upon,  Douglas,  however,  urged  that  a 
popular  vote  be  taken  with  reference  to  the  plan 
of  adjustment  suggested  by  Senator  Crittenden.  In 
speaking  on  this  matter,  he  reverted  to  his  original 
theory  of  slavery  in  its  constitutional  bearings  and 
again  asserted  views  designed  to  soothe  the  Southern 
extremists.  His  advance  over  former  positions  was 
seen  in  his  frank  recognition  that  the  time  had  come 
when  some  disposition  should  be  made  of  the  issue, 

1  The  report  of  this  committee  may  be  found  in  Congressional 
Globe,  2d  Sess.,  36th  Cong.,  p.  114. 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  329 

and  that  it  had  become  too  large  and  difficult  to  be 
further  used  as  the  basis  for  partisan  struggles. 
The  great  and  controlling  problem  now  was  how  to 
maintain  the  United  States  intact.1  To  this  every 
thing  else  must  be  subordinated. 

Yet  while  beseeching  and  entreating  all  to  give 
up  partisanship,  Douglas  himself  was  unable  to  con 
trol  his  own  partisan  tendencies.  He  charged  the 
Eepublicans  on  the  compromise  committee  with 
causing  the  whole  trouble,  and  attempted  to  throw 
upon  them  the  responsibility  for  the  conditions 
which  obtained  as  a  result  of  the  disagreement,  and 
for  the  impending  armed  struggle.  His  arguments 
had  no  effect  either  upon  the  New  England  men  and 
their  followers  or  upon  Davis,  Toombs,  and  the 
others.  Although  secession  was  very  evidently  al 
ready  becoming  an  accomplished  fact,  Douglas 
hoped  against  hope,  and  throughout  the  session 
sought  to  regard  so  far  as  possible  the  wishes  of  the 
Southern  clique.  Kansas  had  now  once  more  ap 
plied  for  admission  to  the  Union,  presenting  a  con 
stitution  which  had  been  duly  framed  and  which 
would  have  added  the  state  to  the  list  of  non-slavery 
commonwealths.  Douglas  attempted  to  secure  the 
acceptance  of  the  constitution,  but  perhaps  in  order 
to  offset  the  effect  of  this  action  to  which  his  former 
position  necessarily  bound  him,  he  also  offered  a 
measure  intended  to  amend  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law, 
strengthening  that  enactment  at  the  point  where  it 
had  proved  weak.  This  olive  branch  was  far  from 

1  Congressional  Globe,  2d  Sess.,  36th  Coiig.,  passim. 


330  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

acceptable  to  the  South,  and  Douglas's  efforts  only 
brought  him  into  ridicule.  So  also  when  it  came 
to  creating  the  new  territories  of  Colorado  and 
New  Mexico,  a  bill  had  been  offered  wherein  the 
line  had  not  been  sharply  drawn  between  slave  and 
free  territory  and  which  would  have  left  unsettled 
several  doubtful  points.  It  had  been  carelessly 
drafted,  although  it  was  framed  upon  the  lines  of  a 
previous  measure  for  which  Douglas  himself  had 
been  the  sponsor.  He  desired  to  have  accepted  in 
place  of  it  a  substitute  measure  wherein  practically 
all  power  was  bestowed  upon  the  people  of  the  terri 
tory  and  the  authority  of  the  Federal  government 
was  greatly  narrowed.  Under  the  conditions  the 
proposal  was  a  decided  concession  to  the  Southern 
states,  and  was  unquestionably  objectionable  to  the 
Eepublicaus.  Nothing  came  of  it,  for  the  growing 
power  of  the  Eepublicaus  enabled  them  to  press 
their  own  plans  forward  to  success,  while  the  South 
erners  were  less  and  less  interested  in  the  legisla 
tion  of  a  nation  in  which  they  more  and  more  felt 
that  they  had  no  part.1 

Douglas's  concern  for,  and  active  discussion  of, 
the  territorial  measure,  however,  was  rather  a 
reminiscence  of  former  days — the  outcome  of  habits 
long  formed,  overflowing  in  a  renewal  of  action  of  a 

1  Mr.  Henry  Adams,  then  a  contemporary  observer  in  Wash 
ington,  said  :  "The  New  Mexico  proposition  was  defeated  by 
Southern  union  votes.  ...  It  had  been  proposed  and 
adopted  merely  as  a  means  of  crushing  the  Crittenden  meas 
ures." — Proceedings  of  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  April- 
June,  1910,  p.  683. 


THE  LAST  BATTLE  331 

kind  which  had  already  become  familiar — than 
the  result  of  a  healthy  interest  in  contemporary 
politics.  As  the  disastrous  Buchanan  administra 
tion  drew  to  a  close,  Douglas  more  fully  realized 
that  the  question  was  now  one  of  genuine  war 
fare  and  the  best  way  of  conducting  it.  Although 
secession  had  actually  been  decreed  in  some  cases, 
the  Southern  senators  were  holding  their  places  in 
Congress  as  long  as  possible,  partly  for  reasons  of 
their  own  and  partly  to  give  time  for  their  states  to 
take  further  action.  Davis  and  some  of  his  associ 
ates  from  the  far  South  had  determined  not  to  with 
draw  until  they  had  regular  notification  of  the 
secession  of  their  states,  and  their  formal  farewell 
did  not  come  until  the  21st  of  January,1  when  he  as 
the  leader,  finally  regretting  the  step  toward  which 
he  had  long  been  tending  and  working,  made  a 
speech  in  the  Senate  expressive  of  his  mental  suf 
fering.  Various  states  followed  from  time  to  time. 
Mississippi,  Florida,  Alabama,  Georgia,  Louisiana, 
and  Texas  successively  left  the  Union.2  The  first 
attempt  at  a  Southern  Confederacy  came  early  in 
February,  and  on  the  8th  of  that  month  Davis 
and  Stephens  were  elected  President  and  Vice- Pres 
ident  of  the  new  government  in  a  congress  held  at 
Montgomery,  Ala.  By  this  time,  the  Senate  had 
been  considerably  depleted  in  numbers,  and  Doug 
las's  fast-fading  hopes  of  peace  had  been  entirely 
disappointed.  War  seemed  to  be  unavoidable,  for 
as  early  as  the  9th  of  January  the  Star  of  the  West, 
Rhodes,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  271.  *lbid.,  p.  272. 


332  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

bearing  a  relief  expedition  for  Fort  Sumter,  had 
been  driven  away  by  cannon  shot,  while  other 
armed  demonstrations  had  followed.  Douglas  saw 
that  the  question  of  actual  war  might  depend  in 
part  upon  the  attitude  of  the  new  President  and 
that  there  was  at  least  a  theoretical  possibility  of 
reaching  an  agreement  with  the  Confederacy  with 
out  the  shedding  of  blood.  He  hoped  that  Lincoln 
as  he  took  office  would  inspire  confidence,  and  that 
it  might  be  possible  to  hold  a  firm  hand  upon  the 
South. 

Thus  the  Buchanan  administration  drew  to  a 
close,  Douglas  himself  placing  more  and  more  re 
liance  upon  the  personality  of  his  former  rival  and 
antagonist  who  was  shortly  to  assume  the  direction 
of  national  affairs. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

WITHOUT  A  PARTY 

A  NEW,  and  unhappily  the  last,  phase  of  Douglas's 
stormy  career  in  national  politics  had  now  opened. 
Like  every  other  man  in  American  public  life,  he 
had  still  to  think  of  himself,  and  of  himself  in  re 
lation  to  a  local  constituency.  It  was  this  that  had 
recalled  him  at  the  crucial  moment  from  his  pursuit 
of  the  pro-slavery  support  which  he  had  hoped  to 
use  in  his  presidential  aspirations.  He  was  now 
left  practically  without  a  party,  for,  though  his 
popular  vote  had  been  second  only  to  that  of  Lin 
coln,  he  was  unable  to  secure  a  following  in  Con 
gress  and  was  isolated.  His  popular  vote  had  been 
based  upon  general  considerations  rather  than  upon 
his  advocacy  of  particular  measures,  and  the  test 
which  he  had  made  during  the  last  short  session  of 
the  Buchanan  administration  had  convinced  him 
that  the  game  he  had  been  playing  was  no  longer  pos 
sible.  Moreover,  he  was  now  aware  that  the  senti 
ment  of  the  country  would  not  longer  tolerate 
slavery  upon  the  basis  it  had  heretofore  occupied, 
and  he  recognized  that  Illinois  with  its  own  Eepub- 
lican  President,  who  had  received  a  materially  larger 
vote  than  himself  and  the  eleven  ballots  of  the  state 
in  the  electoral  college,  would  not  be  hospitable 


334  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

toward  a  man  who  would  show  antagonism  to  the 
administration.  With  this  personal  interest  in 
maintaining  himself  as  a  national  figure,  potentially 
at  least  the  leader  of  the  opposition  in  Congress 
when  that  opposition  should  have  had  time  once 
more  to  draw  together  its  scattered  forces,  was  com 
bined  the  appeal  of  consistency  and  patriotism. 
Douglas  had  plainly  said  during  the  campaign  that 
he  thought  secession,  if  attempted,  should  be  put 
down  by  armed  force.  Support  of  the  administra 
tion,  therefore,  was  both  the  personal  and  patriotic 
dictate  of  the  moment.  If  possible,  the  President 
must  be  saved  from  the  control  of  the  extreme  re 
form  element  which  would  make  him  a  crusader 
against  slavery  and  would  commit  him  firmly  to  the 
idea  that  his  mission  was  to  correct  the  moral 
wrongs  done  by  the  continued  existence  of  the  slave 
system  since  the  founding  of  the  Constitution.  As 
an  administration  Democrat,  Douglas  would  be 
consistent  and  patriotic,  and  would  further  his  own 
personal  and  political  ends.  It  was  in  this  direc 
tion,  therefore,  that  he  now  shaped  his  course. 

The  election  of  Lincoln  had  been  succeeded  by  the 
usual  feeling  of  doubt  concerning  a  new  figure  in  the 
White  House  which  is  most  keen  between  the  choice 
of  a  President  and  the  time  of  his  taking  office. 
This  familiar  hesitancy  and  question,  ordinarily 
characteristic  of  the  period  when  a  nation  is  making 
its  first  real  acquaintance  with  the  new  leader,  had 
been  deepened  in  the  case  of  Lincoln  by  certain  un 
toward  facts.  His  election  found  him  in  many 


WITHOUT  A  PARTY  335 

ways  more  free  from  personal  influences  and  pledges 
than  Presidents  commonly  are.  One  result  was  an 
unusual  gathering  of  politicians  and  place-seekers 
at  Springfield  where  they  made  their  clamorous  de 
mands  and  urged  their  claims  upon  the  President 
elect.  l  Lincoln  was  still  a  narrow  man,  untried  by 
the  exigent  demands  of  great  emergency.  He  was 
still  sectional  and  local,  uncertain  how  to  move, 
lacking  in  personal  dignity  upon  occasion,  and  to 
those  who  did  not  know  him  and  who  were  unaware 
of  his  mighty  moral  power,  unimpressive.  Yield 
ing  to  the  advice  of  detectives,  Lincoln  quietly 
slipped  into  Washington  incognito,  changing  a  pro 
gram  that  had  been  definitely  set  in  advance  and 
thus  presumably  avoiding  the  danger  of  assassina 
tion.  To  some  observers  who  met  him  soon  after 
his  arrival,  he  seemed  weak,  vacillating  and  uncer 
tain.  Douglas  regretted  these  impressions,  and 
thought  that  another  way  of  reaching  Washington 
would  have  been  better.  He  admitted  that  Lincoln 
was  still  local  and  sectional,  but  he  recognized  his 
capacity  for  growth  and  believed  he  would  throw  off 
the  influences  of  the  cliques  and  groups  by  which 
he  was  surrounded.  Mrs.  Douglas  hastened  to  offer 
the  proper  social  attention  to  Mrs.  Lincoln,  while 
Douglas  himself  as  early  as  possible  paid  his  re 
spects  to  the  President-elect.  Douglas  stated  to 
Lincoln  his  own  views  about  the  posture  of  affairs 
in  Washington,  inveighed  against  the  efforts  of  ex 
tremists  on  both  sides  to  bring  on  war,  urged  that  the 
1  Oberholtzer,  Abraham  Lincoln,  p.  161  ft. 


336  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Constitution  be  amended  at  a  national  convention 
to  be  called  by  the  President,  and  placed  himself  at 
the  disposal  of  the  new  administration  in  a  non-par 
tisan  way. 

Lincoln  seemed  to  be  uncertain,  for  the  crisis  was 
such  as  to  chill  the  determination  of  even  the  most 
resolute  man.  He  refused  to  accept  Douglas's  sug 
gestions,  although  he  appreciated  the  spirit  in 
which  they  were  made,  and  without  definitely  re 
jecting  them  reserved  them  for  consideration. 
Congress  closed  in  a  whirlwind  of  debate  and 
recrimination,  in  the  course  of  which  compromise 
proposals  of  all  kinds  were  defeated.  Douglas  did 
not  stay  throughout  the  all-night  session  which  pre 
ceded  March  4th,  the  date  falling  that  year  on 
Monday.  He  discussed  with  Lincoln  up  to  the  last 
moment  some  of  the  ideas  to  be  brought  forward 
in  the  inaugural  address,  stood  close  to  the  new 
President  while  he  delivered  it,  and  immediately 
afterward  spoke  in  high  terms  of  its  content.  He 
emphasized  his  friendly  attitude  toward  the  Presi 
dents  immediate  family,  and  sought  in  every  way 
to  support  and  defend  both  the  personality  of  the 
new  incumbent  of  the  first  office  in  the  land,  and 
the  ideas  by  which  he  was  now  animated.  Lincoln 
was  in  need  of  aid.  The  radical  Eepublican  sena 
tors  were  not  altogether  pleased  with  the  tone  of  the 
inaugural  address,  while  the  extreme  Southerners 
sought  for  a  basis  of  interpretation  that  would 
enable  them  to  represent  it  as  a  call  to  war.  Doug 
las  thought  that  the  extremes  on  both  sides 


WITHOUT  A  PAETY  337 

should  be  avoided  and  that  a  middle  course  should 
be  steered.  Immediately  after  the  inauguration 
day,  he  stepped  forward  as  the  champion  of  the 
administration  in  Congress,  though  he  refrained 
from  admitting  his  own  personal  approval  and 
commendation  of  what  President  Lincoln  had  said. 
His  views  as  a  public  man  with  reference  to  the  ad 
dress  were  set  forth  in  a  speech  of  March  6th. 

Lincoln's  address1  had  been  regarded  by  the 
Southern  sympathizers  in  the  Senate  as  a  threat  of 
war.  The  truth  was  that  in  its  general  tone  the 
address  was  probably  as  friendly  and  as  moderate 
as  the  conditions  of  the  times  demanded  or  the 
platform  upon  which  Lincoln  had  been  elected 
would  have  permitted.  This  is  the  opinion  of  Lin 
coln's  latest  biographers,2  who  have  written  in 
cooler  temper  and  with  less  partisanship  than  those 
who  had  early  followed  the  career  of  the  great 
President.  Lincoln  was,  in  fact,  distinctly  con 
ciliatory  in  certain  respects.  His  view  of  the  exist 
ing  situation  was,  from  a  practical  standpoint,  now 
singularly  close  to  that  of  Douglas,  notwithstanding 
that  nothing  had  been  done  to  bridge  the  chasm  of 
theory  and  constitutional  doctrine  by  which  the 
two  men  were  separated.  They  were  at  one  in 
their  view  that  the  Union  was  perpetual  and  that 
no  state  upon  its  own  mere  motion  could  break  the 
bond.  With  Douglas,  too,  Lincoln  held  that  the 
act  of  secession,  if  seriously  undertaken  by  any 

1  Messages  and  Papers,  Vol.  VI,  p.  5. 

'See,  for  instance,  Oberholtzer,  Abraham  Lincoln,  p.  182. 


338  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

state  or  body  of  states,  could  not  be  indifferently 
regarded  by  the  Federal  government,  and  that  such 
effort  must  be  put  down  by  force.  This  harmony 
of  belief  was  not,  as  some  overzealous  admirers  of 
Douglas  have  wished  to  show,  the  result  of  Doug 
las's  influence  on  Lincoln.  It  was  the  outcome  of  a 
state  of  facts  which  could  lead  to  but  one  conclusion 
among  those  with  whom  sectionalism  was  not  a  con 
trolling  idea  or  attachment  to  a  peculiar  institution 
superior  to  love  of  country.  It  was,  too,  the  result 
of  the  prevailing  opinion  of  the  great  Northwest 
and  Middle  West  from  which  both  Lincoln  and 
Douglas  drew  their  strength.  Both  were  politicians 
of  phenomenal  immediate  insight,  and  Lincoln  was 
already  passing  to  the  level  of  statesmanship.  This 
level  Douglas  himself  had  sometimes  attained,  and 
he  was  now  maintaining  his  position  with  what  was 
for  him  an  unusual  degree  of  steadiness.  There  was 
thus  a  common  ground  of  sympathy  between  the  two 
men.  Lincoln,  in  declaring  that  there  should  be  no 
violent  attack  upon  any  state  unless  such  attack 
could  not  be  avoided  by  the  Federal  government, 
did  indeed  tacitly  but  clearly  indicate  that  an  ap 
peal  to  arms  would  be  forthcoming  if  circumstances 
compelled.  In  this  he  took  no  stronger  ground 
than  Douglas  himself  in  his  speeches  in  the  South 
ern  states,  when  he  had  flatly  said  that  secession, 
should  it  be  attempted,  must  be  put  down. 

It  was  not  strange,  then,  that  when  Douglas  rose 
in  the  Senate  on  the  6th  of  March,  he  should  do  so 
with  the  firm  intent  of  defending  the  inaugural  ad 


WITHOUT  A  PAETY  339 

dress.  He  properly  pointed  out  that  there  was  no 
ground  for  regarding  the  paper  as  unduly  extreme. 
Rather  it  was  conciliatory. l  The  President  intended, 
it  was  true,  to  apply  force,  if  force  were  demanded. 
Yet  the  tone  of  the  address,  thought  Douglas, 
opened  a  door  for  peaceful  settlement  of  pending 
controversies  along  legitimate  lines.  He  even  went 
further,  and  attributed  to  Lincoln  a  definite  accept 
ance  of  the  idea  of  amending  the  Constitution  in  the 
way  which  he  himself  had  urged — a  suggestion 
which  had,  at  the  utmost,  a  basis  in  interpreta 
tion  rather  than  in  fact.  It  was  one  of  the  strong 
est  features  of  Douglas's  endorsement  of  the  inau 
gural  address  that  he  limited  it  entirely  to  those 
portions  which  dealt  with  the  question  of  pre 
serving  the  Union.  Frankly  and  honestly  he  an 
nounced  that  he  was  still  at  war  with  Mr.  Lincoln 
upon  broad  questions  of  party  principle,  although 
as  to  the  preservation  and  continuation  of  the 
United  States  upon  its  original  lines,  perhaps  with 
some  amendment  of  the  Constitution,  he  was  in  har 
mony  with  the  new  President  and  expected  to  sup 
port  him.  As  to  the  immediate  question  of  the 
policy  to  be  pursued  with  reference  to  the  Federal 
garrisons  in  Southern  states,  which  had  now  be 
come  acute  in  the  case  of  Fort  Sumter,  Douglas  did 
not  know  what  to  say,  and  when  pressed  by  seces 
sionists  could  only  answer  that  he  knew  nothing 
about  what  was  to  be  done.  He  was  in  no  position, 
therefore,  to  make  suggestions  on  this  subject. 
1  Congressional  Globe,  2d  Sess.,  36th  CoDg.,  p.  1438. 


340  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

The  address  was  among  Douglas's  most  effective 
efforts,  and  had  a  very  wholesome  influence.  Lin 
coln  knew  its  importance.  He  had  already  begun  to 
realize  the  difficulties  by  which  he  was  beset  on  all 
sides  and  was  in  no  mind  to  throw  himself  into  the 
arms  of  the  zealous  reformers  represented  by  the 
New  England  group  in  the  Senate.  As  a  practical 
politician,  he  was  able  to  appreciate  to  the  full  the 
value  of  such  a  supporter  as  Douglas  in  the  upper 
House  of  Congress,  even  though  that  support  were 
limited  to  the  one  question  which  above  all  others 
would  test  his  administration — the  preservation  of 
the  Union.  In  consultations  with  Douglas,  he  now 
took  the  leader  of  the  Democratic  opposition  still 
further  into  his  confidence  and  sought  his  advice 
about  the  points  of  actual  policy  which  were  still 
awaiting  a  settlement.  He  particularly  asked 
Douglas  what  the  latter  would  advise  with  reference 
to  the  garrisons  in  South  Carolina,  and  Douglas 
gave  him  counsel  based  upon  the  immediate  ex 
pediencies  of  the  situation.  Eecognizing  that  a  mis 
step  at  the  opening  of  the  administration  might  lead 
to  a  serious  tactical  defeat,  he  was  inclined  to  sug 
gest  that  before  taking  positive  action,  something 
should  be  attempted  with  a  view  to  getting  at  the 
existing  feeling  in  the  Senate.  The  time  was  press 
ing  and  action  could  not  be  longer  delayed.  He 
determined  to  bring  matters  to  a  crucial  test  by 
forcing  a  vote  that  would  not  only  develop  senti 
ment  in  the  upper  House  of  Congress,  but  would 
also  commit  to  the  support  of  the  President  the 


WITHOUT  A  PAETY  341 

wavering  members  who  would  like  to  equivocate 
and,  in  case  things  went  wrong,  throw  the  blame 
upon  the  Executive.  Lincoln  from  the  start  had 
intended  to  hold  both  Sumter  and  Pickens,1  and  if 
possible  to  keep  general  control  of  the  border  slave 
states.  This  was  the  broad  generalization  of  the 
outsider,  who  had  not  yet  come  face  to  face  with  the 
real  problem.  As  soon  as  he  had  assumed  office,  he 
found  the  question  much  more  difficult  and  was  con 
fronted  by  a  statement  from  those  in  charge  of 
Sumter  that  20,000  good  men  would  be  needed  if 
the  fort  were  to  be  retained.  Several  advisers  sug 
gested  evacuation,  and  Lincoln  himself  was  dis 
tressed  by  the  swarms  of  hungry  Eepublican  office- 
seekers  who,  as  Stanton  said,  filled  the  "  grounds, 
halls,  stairways,  and  closets"  of  the  White  House 
to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  it  hard  to  get  out  of 
or  into  the  structure.  Lincoln,  therefore,  was  very 
glad  to  leave  to  Douglas  the  task  of  finding  out  how 
things  stood. 

The  matter  was  brought  to  a  head  on  the  floor, 
apropos  of  a  resolution  offered  by  Douglas  on  the 
13th  of  March,  in  which  he  asked  for  information 
about  the  forts,  and  inquired  whether  reinforce 
ments  were  necessary.3  This  afforded  opportunity 
for  a  discussion.  Douglas  felt  impelled  to  explain 
why  he  had  offered  such  a  resolution  and  pointed 
out  that  the  customs  duties  could  not  be,  and  were 
not  being,  collected  in  the  Southern  states.  The 

Rhodes,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  325. 
2 Congressional  Globe,  2d  Sess.,  36th  Cong.,  p.  1452. 


342  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

question  therefore  arose  whether  the  President 
could  establish  a  blockade  of  Charleston,  and  in 
general  what  would  be  the  appropriate  method  of 
enforcing  the  laws  in  the  states  affected  by  the 
secession  movement.1  Congress  had  as  yet  done 
nothing.  Why  should  it  seek  in  this  way  to 
hamper  the  President  ?  Was  it  not  ready  to  sup 
port  him  by  bestowing  proper  authority  and  giving 
power  to  do  whatever  was  necessary?  The  in 
quiries  were  resented  by  the  Eepublicans.  They 
disliked  to  see  a  Democrat  thus  rising  to  the 
occasion  and  convicting  them  of  indifference  or 
lukewarmness  while  they  sat  silent,  unready  to 
take  the  necessary  action  and  supinely  throwing 
upon  the  President  the  responsibility  for  every 
thing  that  must  be  done.  The  appeal,  therefore,  was 
of  no  effect  and  Lincoln,  who  had  meanwhile, 
on  the  15th  of  March,2  referred  the  matter  to  the 
Cabinet  without  getting  any  satisfactory  answer, 
felt  obliged  to  make  up  his  mind  alone.  He  sent  a 
confidential  agent  to  Charleston  with  a  view  to 
finding  out  whether  there  was  any  latent  Federal 
feeling  in  the  state,3  and  the  reply  which  he 
received  showed  that  such  sentiment  was  al 
most  entirely  dead.  The  question  dragged  on  for 
some  days  while  Seward  was  negotiating  with 
representatives  of  the  Confederacy  and  hoping  that 
things  would  work  themselves  into  a  better  situa- 

1  Congressional  Globe,  2d  Seas.,  36th  Cong.,  p.  1458. 

2  Rhodes,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  327. 

3  Ibid,  p.  328. 


WITHOUT  A  PAETY  343 

tion.  Nothing  came  of  the  discussion,  and  on  the 
4th  of  April  Lincoln  finally  resolved  to  send 
troops  to  Sumter,  notifying  Governor  Pickens  to 
expect  an  attempt  to  supply  the  fort  with  pro 
visions.  The  expedition  at  last  started,  arriving  at 
Charleston  on  the  morning  of  April  12th,  when  it 
was  found  that  an  attack  upon  Sumter  had  begun. 
The  war  had  thus  definitely  opened,  unless  Davis 
and  his  associates  should  make  some  entirely 
unexpected  change  in  their  plans. 

Douglas,  on  the  whole,  approved  of  the  course 
that  was  being  pursued,  although  during  the  dis 
cussion  late  in  March  he  had  understood  that  the 
troops  were  to  be  withdrawn  from  Sumter,  and  had 
publicly  stated  that  he  believed  this  was  the  better 
course.  The  subsequent  two  weeks,  however,  con 
vinced  him  that  his  own  hope  of  gathering  support 
in  the  doubtful  states  and  waiting  for  the  Con 
federacy  to  attack  was  not  based  upon  fact  and  that 
Lincoln  had  probably  done  about  the  only  thing 
possible  under  the  circumstances.  There  is  no 
evidence  that  this  view  was  changed  by  the  capitu 
lation  of  Sumter  two  days  after  the  bombardment 
had  begun.  The  logical  conclusion  of  everything 
that  he  had  said  within  the  preceding  months  could 
be 'only  that  all  must  now  unite  in  holding  up  the 
President's  hands,  and  in  waging  a  successful  war. 

Those  who  had  been  doubtful  or  hesitating,  and 
who  had  embarrassed  the  President  by  their  lack  of 
courage  saw  at  last  that  Douglas's  position  since 
the  inauguration  had  been  the  correct  one.  They 


344  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

hastened  to  support  Lincoln  in  calling  for  troops 
and  Douglas  was  not  slow  to  join  them  with  hearty 
concurrence  in  such  measures  as  the  President 
might  deem  best.  He  went  to  the  White  House  on 
the  14th  of  April  and  assured  Mr.  Lincoln  that  the 
time  for  action  had  come.  Lincoln  read  him  the 
proclamation  which  he  had  drafted l  and  in  which 
he  asked  for  75,000  men.  Douglas  recommended 
that  the  number  be  made  200,000,  and  when  he  left 
the  White  House  he  told  the  newspaper  corre 
spondents  that  the  defense  of  Washington  and  the 
taking  of  active  measures  for  the  preservation  of 
the  government  even  to  the  extent  of  war  was 
necessary  and  that  he  fully  supported  the  admin 
istration.  This  position  he  now  continued  to 
sustain,  laying  aside  the  formal  attitude  of  opposi 
tion  on  theoretical  questions  which  he  had  adopted 
immediately  after  the  inauguration,  in  the  Senate, 
perhaps  for  the  purpose  of  concealing  to  some 
extent  just  how  closely  he  felt  allied  in  sympathy 
to  Lincoln.  Preparations  for  war  went  on  more 
vigorously  and  Douglas  aided,  in  so  far  as  he 
could,  with  counsel  and  suggestion,  especially 
exerting  his  power  to  prevent  the  development  of  a 
Southern  party  in  the  North  which  by  passive 
opposition  to  the  administration,  or  perhaps  by 
active  sympathy  with  the  South,  might  obstruct 
the  successful  prosecution  of  the  conflict.2  In  this 
connection  his  aid  was  invaluable.  Even  in  the 

1  Nioolay  and  Hay,  Vol.  IV,  p.  80. 
5  Oberholtzer,  Lincoln,  p.  194. 


WITHOUT  A  PAETY  345 

capacity  of  an  administration  supporter,  however, 
Douglas  still  sought  the  conservative  side  and 
urged  upon  the  President  that  in  protecting  Wash 
ington  he  should,  so  far  as  possible,  avoid  measures 
which  might  bring  the  oncoming  troops  into  con 
flict  with  the  disaffected  population  of  Baltimore 
and  the  adjacent  districts.1 

He  did  not,  however,  continue  very  long  in  the 
capital,  for  news  from  Illinois  led  him  to  think  that 
he  could  better  serve  the  Union  in  the  Middle  West 
and  Southwest  where  his  popularity  was  great.  He 
started  for  home,  therefore,  with  the  idea  of  visit 
ing  the  southwestern  section  of  his  state,  to  investi 
gate  the  conditions  which  existed  there.  Lincoln 
gave  his  approbation  to  the  scheme  and  Douglas 
left  him,2  with  the  distinct  understanding  that  he 
was  henceforward  an  administration  man,  likely 
to  play  an  increasingly  important  part  in  the  de 
velopment  of  the  war  policy  of  the  President.  The 
journey  to  Illinois  was  slow  and  gave  opportunity 
for  some  political  speaking  en  route.  Douglas  did 

1  Johnson,  Life,    p.    478,    also  Forney's  Anecdotes,  Vol.  I,  p. 
225. 

2  Nicolay  and  Hay,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  82-84.    Also  Herndon-Weik, 
Lincoln,  Vol.  II,  p.  249  (footnote).     Henry  C.  Whitney  wrote 
thus  (MS.  letter)  Nov.  13,  1866  :     "  Lincoln  then  told  me  of  his 
last  interview  with  Douglas.      '  One  day  Douglas  came  rushing 
in,'  he  related,  'and  said   he  had  just  got  a  telegraph  dispatch 
from   some  friends  in  Illinois  urging  him  to  come  out  and  help 
set   things   right   in    Egypt,  and   that  he  would  go,  or  stay  in 
Washington,  just  where  I    thought   he  could  do  the  most  good. 
I  told  him  to  do  as  he  chose,  hub  that  he  could  probably  do  best 
in   Illinois.     Upon   that  he  shook  hands  with  me  and  hurried 
away  to  catch  the  next  train.     I  never  saw  him  again.'  " 


346  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

his  utmost  to  convert  such  wavering  hearers  as  he 
could  to  a  belief  in  the  honest  purpose  of  the  Presi 
dent,  as  well  as  to  faith  in  and  support  of  the 
Union.1  He  did  not  arrive  at  Springfield  until  near 
the  end  of  the  month  of  April  and  there  he  deliv 
ered  a  noteworthy  address.  In  this  he  strongly 
vindicated  the  policy  of  the  administration  and  the 
invoking  of  war,  though  with  due  recognition  of 
the  seriousness  of  the  step  and  with  foreboding  ad 
mission  that  the  struggle  could  be  nothing  short  of 
a  tremendous  national  calamity.  Neither  in  this 
address  nor  in  that  which  he  shortly  after  delivered 
in  Chicago,  before  a  huge  audience  which  loaded 
him  with  applause  and  praise,  did  he  even  suggest 
a  feeling  of  vindictiveness  or  attempt  to  arouse  fac 
tional  passions.  He  spoke  of  the  war  as  a  terrible 
but  unavoidable  remedy,  which  must  be  applied 
with  as  much  conservatism  and  as  gently  as  the  na- 

1  J.  D.  Cox,  in  Military  Reminiscences  of  the  Civil  War,  Vol.  I, 
pp.  5-6,  says  of  a  speech  delivered  by  Douglas  at  Columbus : 
"  Stephen  A.  Douglas  passed  through  Columbus  .  .  .  a  few 
days  after  the  surrender  of  Sumter,  and  in  response  to  the  calls  of 
a  spontaneous  gathering  of  people,  spoke  to  them  from  his  bed 
room  window  in  the  American  House.  There  had  been  no 
thought  for  any  of  the  common  surroundings  of  a  public  meet 
ing.  There  were  no  torches,  no  music.  A  dark  crowd  of  men 
filled  full  the  dim-lit  street,  and  called  for  Douglas  with  an 
earnestness  of  tone  wholly  different  from  the  enthusiasm  of 
common  political  gatherings.  He  came  half-dressed  to  his  win 
dow,  and  without  any  light  near  him,  spoke  solemnly  to  the 
people  upon  the  terrible  crisis  which  had  come  upon  the  nation. 
Men  of  all  parties  were  there  :  his  own  followers  to  get  some 
light  as  to  their  duty  ;  the  Breckinridge  Democrats  ready,  most 
of  them,  repentantly  to  follow  a  Northern  leader,  now  that 
their  recent  candidate  was  in  the  rebellion  ;  the  Republicans 
eagerly  anxious  to  know  whether  so  potent  an  influence  was  to 


WITHOUT  A  PAETY  347 

ture  of  the  case  would  permit.  It  must  be  carried 
on  with  as  much  self-restraint  and  humanity  as  war 
could  ever  be.  Only  in  denunciation  of  those  who 
had  made  use  of  the  slavery  question  as  an  excuse 
for  the  dissolution  of  the  Union  did  the  politician, 
always  present  in  Douglas,  show  himself.  He  still 
believed  that  the  secession  movement  was  the  out 
come  of  a  conspiracy  and  that  there  was  no  good 
reason  for  the  inauguration  of  such  a  movement  at 
the  present  moment.  The  Southern  leaders,  he 
thought,  had  resolved  upon  it,  and  against  them  he 
believed  popular  feeling  should  be  directed.  They 
were  in  fact  traitors  against  whom  only  force  and 
warlike  measures  would  avail. 

Douglas  was  again  fully  reestablished  in  popular 
affection.  His  own  appeals  and  injunctions  to  the 
people  had  been  heeded.  They  had  sunk  their  per 
sonal  prejudices,  their  doubts  about  constitutional 
issues,  in  the  immediate  necessity  of  saving  the 

be  unreservedly  on  the  aide  of  the  country.  I  remember  well 
the  serious  solicitude  with  which  I  listened  to  his  opening  sen 
tences  as  I  leaned  against  the  railing  of  the  State  House  park, 
trying  in  vain  to  get  more  than  a  dim  outline  of  the  man  as  he 
stood  at  the  unlighted  window.  His  deep  sonorous  voice  rolled 
down  through  the  darkness  from  above  us, — an  earnest,  meas 
ured  voice,  the  more  solemn,  the  more  impressive,  because  we 
could  not  see  the  speaker,  and  it  came,  too,  literally  as  '  a  voice 
in  the  night,' — the  night  of  our  country's  unspeakable  trial. 
There  was  no  uncertainty  in  his  tone  :  the  Union  must  be  pre 
served  and  the  insurrection  must  be  crushed, — he  pledged  his 
hearty  support  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration  in  doing  this. 
Other  questions  must  stand  aside  till  the  national  authority 
should  be  everywhere  recognized.  I  do  not  think  we  greatly 
cheered  him — it  was  rather  a  deep  amen  that  went  up  from  the 
crowd." 


348  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Union.  There  could  be  no  question  about  Doug 
las's  position  on  that  point.  Those  who  had  been 
wavering  in  Illinois  were  carried  along  by  the  great 
personal  force  of  the  man  and  now  at  length  gave 
their  adherence  not  only  to  the  Union  policy,  but  to 
Douglas's  position  in  reference  to  it.  Those  who 
had  hated  the  man  himself  saw  in  him  one  who  had 
already  rendered  signal  service  to  the  Union  and 
who  had  proved  that  he  could  be  trusted.  They 
believed  that,  whatever  had  been  his  past  offenses, 
it  would  be  wisest  to  overlook  them  and  to  accept 
him  for  what  he  was— an  earnest  upholder  of  the 
policy  of  Lincoln  with  respect  to  the  Confederacy. 
To  Douglas  himself  it  must  have  seemed  the  open 
ing  of  a  new  era  in  his  political  career.  For  the 
present,  probably  for  the  future,  his  aspirations  to 
the  presidency  must  be  laid  aside.  But  that  con 
viction  had  already  come  to  him  at  the  time  of  the 
election,  and  he  undoubtedly  admitted  in  his  own 
mind  that  if  this  highest  of  all  political  preferments 
were  ever  to  be  open  to  him  it  must  be  at  some  far- 
distant  day.  For  the  present  he  had  behind  him  a 
united  state  and  he  was  in  a  position  to  make  his 
judgments  as  effective  in  national  politics  as  almost 
any  man  except  the  President  himself. 

But  Douglas  was  unable  either  to  perform  the 
service  to  the  country  by  which  he  might  in  a 
measure  have  repaired  the  evil  wrought  by  his 
earlier  ambition  or  to  press  forward  into  the  new 
fields  of  personal  achievement  that  were  opening 
before  him.  The  habit  of  heavy  drinking  which 


WITHOUT  A  PAETY  349 

had  increased  upon  him  had  greatly  impaired  his 
constitution.  Contemporaries,  generalizing  perhaps 
too  broadly  or  hastily,  said  that  he  was  killing  him 
self  with  "  cheap  whiskey."  Others  assigned  the 
serious  disorders  which  now  attacked  him  to  the 
overwork  of  the  campaign  and  the  excitement  and 
stress  of  the  six  months  which  followed  it.  Both 
influences  doubtless  had  their  part  in  his  undoing. 
Douglas's  personal  business,  moreover,  was  in  con 
fusion,  and  to  political  anxiety  was  added  the 
fear  that  his  own  entangled  financial  affairs  could 
not  be  set  straight.  He  had  borrowed  very  heavily 
upon  his  land  to  meet  the  expenses  of  the  cam 
paign,  and  was  now  faced  with  the  alternative  of 
paying  what  he  owed  or  of  selling  his  property. 
The  combination  of  untoward  conditions  proved 
too  much  for  him  and  early  in  May  he  was  obliged 
to  take  to  his  bed.  The  sickness  did  not  prove  im 
mediately  fatal  but  gradually  reduced  his  strength 
until  on  the  3d  of  June  the  end  came. 

The  removal  of  Douglas  at  this  particular  junc 
ture  was  properly  and  generally  regarded  as  a  seri 
ous  blow  to  the  Lincoln  administration.  Even 
Greeley  spoke  of  it  as  a  "  national  calamity,"  '  and 
others  though  less  positive  in  their  assertions  held 
the  same  view.  The  Northern  Democratic  party 
had  become  little  more  than  a  personal  conserva 
tive  group  led  by  Douglas  and  quite  generally 
recognizing  the  necessity  of  a  reconstruction  of  its 

*New  York  Tribune,  June  1,  1860,  quoted  by  Rhodes,  Vol. 
Ill,  p.  414. 


350  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

principles  to  suit  the  altered  Federal  conditions 
which  were  near  at  hand.  Entirely  apart  from 
any  share  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  Douglas's 
most  conspicuous  service  to  the  country  would 
probably  have  been  the  development  of  Democratic 
ideas  in  such  a  way  as  to  avoid  too  great  a  breach 
with  the  past  and  their  adjustment  to  the  new 
problems  which  were  presenting  themselves.  Death 
thus  left  the  party  without  a  head,  and  without  a 
controlling  mind  sufficiently  identified  with  its  in 
ner  history,  or  sufficiently  forceful  in  its  grasp  of 
measures  and  its  knowledge  of  men,  to  compel  dis 
cipline.  While  Lincoln,  therefore,  lost  a  valuable 
coadjutor  and  the  country  an  important  factor  in 
the  work  of  sustaining  national  unity,  the  Demo 
cratic  organization,  thoroughly  broken  as  it  was  by 
the  war,  was  deprived  of  the  man  who  above  all 
others  would  have  been  competent  and  courageous 
in  bringing  about  its  reestablishment.  There  was 
thus  lacking  at  a  crucial  moment  the  check  upon 
national  legislation  which  is  afforded  by  a  wise  and 
well  managed  minority.  It  is  probable  that,  had  he 
lived,  Douglas's  career  would  have  been  as  signifi 
cant  in  later  American  history  as  it  was  in  the 
critical  decade  of  1850-1860. 

Yet,  in  another  sense  Douglas's  end  was  not  too 
early  to  permit  the  rounding  out  of  a  self-consistent 
and  completed  career.  Douglas  was  distinctly 
characteristic  of  the  phase  of  American  develop 
ment  and  civilization  which  existed  between  1830, 
when  President  Jackson  and  his  followers  came  into 


WITHOUT  A  PARTY  351 

full  control  of  the  national  power,  and  1860,  when 
the  Civil  War  at  last  became  inevitable.  Both 
periods  were  revolutionary ;  they  were  not  simply 
times  of  transition.  Jackson's  incoming  marked 
the  passing  of  a  generation  of  statesmen  who  grew 
out  of  the  Revolution,  and  the  advent  of  a  crude, 
energetic,  self-reliant  race,  much  less  cultivated, 
and  essentially  vulgar,  who  then  took  possession  of 
the  government  and  inaugurated  a  regime  which 
lasted  until  1861.  The  influence  of  this  new  ele 
ment  in  American  politics  was  manifest  throughout 
the  administration  of  Jackson  ;  it  culminated  in  the 
acquisition  of  Texas  and  the  war  with  Mexico  j  and 
developed  to  a  finality  in  the  long  anti-slavery 
struggle  between  1848  and  1861,  leading  directly 
to  the  new  revolution, — for  it  was  nothing  else,— 
which  then  broke  out.  At  least  four  phases  of  po 
litical  life  were  represented  in  that  period.  One 
was  the  New  England  phase,  of  which  Webster, 
Everett,  Winthrop,  and  Charles  Sumner  were  the 
famous  exponents.  A  second  was  that  of  New 
York  and  the  Central  states,  in  which  Marcy,  Bu 
chanan,  and  Seward  were  excellent  types,  retaining 
strongly,  as  they  did,  the  habits  both  of  thought 
and  action  of  the  earlier  post-revolutionary  period, 
although  distinctly  affected  by  the  Jacksonian  in 
road.  The  old  pro-slavery  party,  of  which  Calhoun, 
Toombs,  Stevens  and  Jefferson  Davis  were  good 
representatives,  constituted  a  third  element.  Fi 
nally,  there  was  the  new,  frontier,  free  state  North 
west  ingredient,  typified  by  both  Douglas  and  Lin- 


352  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

coin,  though  in  materially  different  ways.  The 
Northwestern  element,  with  Douglas  for  spokes 
man,  sought  to  gain  possession  of  the  administra 
tion,  as  Jackson  had  attempted  and  succeeded 
before  them.  They  failed  in  the  effort,  and  then 
came  the  deluge.  It  was  of  this  faction  that  Doug 
las  was  probably  the  best  exponent.  He  was  rep 
resentative  of  all  their  virtues  and  all  their  vices,— 
their  energy,  their  individuality,  their  self-asser 
tion,  their  coarseness,  their  semi-education  and  their 
self  confidence.  Every  one  of  these  elements  of 
character  was  reproduced  in  Douglas ; — more  fully 
exemplified  in  him  than  in  any  other  public  man 
then  thrown  to  the  front. 

The  passing  of  Douglas  had  been  anticipated  by 
his  friends  and  should  have  been  expected  by  the 
country.  Although  but  little  past  his  forty-eighth 
birthday,  he  was  prematurely  gray  and  worn.  He 
had  sunk  rapidly  in  health  since  the  presidential 
contest,  but  the  country,  accustomed  to  the  remark 
able  energy  and  robustness  which  he  had  shown  for 
years  past,  did  not  note  the  loss  of  his  old  strength. 
Yet  it  had  been  with  evident  effort  that  he  had 
sustained  the  fatigues  and  excitements  of  the  win 
ter,  and  the  restoration  of  his  popularity  afforded 
him  but  a  passing  exhilaration.  The  suddenness 
of  his  decease  in  what  should  have  been  his  strong 
prime  was  almost  spectacular.  In  many  minds  the 
efforts  of  the  man  during  the  last  year  of  his  life 
had  amply  redeemed  the  mistakes  of  the  past,  and 
the  news  that  he  was  gone  occasioned  a  general  ex- 


WITHOUT  A  PARTY  353 

pressiou  of  sorrow  which  found  its  external  mani 
festation  in  a  solemn  and  elaborate  farewell.  An 
impressive  cortege  bore  him  to  his  appointed  place 
by  the  shore  of  Lake  Michigan,  and  the  flattery 
that  could  not  "soothe  the  dull  cold  ear  of  death" 
was  not  withheld.  Men  of  all  parties  and  from  all 
portions  of  the  country  bore  their  testimony  to  the 
power  of  the  departed  personality,  and  to  the  loss 
that  had  been  suffered  in  the  removal  of  a  potent 
force  for  the  restoration  of  tolerable  conditions 
throughout  the  Union.  There  sprang  up  a  Douglas 
myth, — ignoring,  like  many  others,  the  most  salient 
points  in  the  hero's  career, — which  has  survived  to 
the  present  day.  It  adds  nothing  to  the  accuracy 
of  popular  conceptions  of  American  history  that 
the  legend  has  been  paralleled  by  another  which 
places  Douglas  side  by  side  in  purpose  and  in  effort 
with  the  Southern  leaders — the  pro -slavery  states 
men  who  had  done  their  utmost  to  balk  his  life's 
ambition. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

ADAMS,  JOHN    QUINCY.     Memoirs    edited  by   Charles    Francis 
Adams,  1874-1877. 

BENTON,  THOMAS  H.     Thirty  Years'  View  of  the  United  States 
Senate,  1854-1856. 

BROWN,  W.  G.     Stephen  Arnold  Douglas,  1902. 

CARR,  CLARK  E.     Stephen  A.  Douglas,  1909. 

CONGRESSIONAL  GLOBE,  1840-1860. 

Cox,  J.  D.     Military  Reminiscences  of  the  Civil  War,  1900. 

CUTTS,  J.  MADISON.     Constitutional  and  Party  Questions,  1866. 

DAVIDSON,  ALEXANDER  and  STUVE,  BERNARD.    A  complete  His 
tory  of  Illinois,  1884. 

DIXON,  S.  B.     True  History  of  the  Repeal  of  the  Missouri  Com- 
promise,  1899. 

DODD,  WILLIAM  E.     Jefferson  Davis,  1907. 

FORD,  THOMAS.     History  of  Illinois,  1851. 

FLINT,  HENRY  M.     Stephen  A.  Douglas,  1860. 

FORNEY,  JOHN  W.     Anecdotes  of  Public  Men,  1873. 

GARDNER,  WILLIAM.     Life  of  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  1905. 

GARRISON,  W.  P.  and  F.  J.     Life  of  Garrison,  1904. 

HALSTEAD,  MURAT.     Caucuses  of  1860,  1860. 

HERNDON,  W.  H.  and  WEIK,  J.  W.     Abraham  Lincoln,  1893. 

JOHNSON,  ALLEN.     Stephen  A.  Douglas,  1908. 

LINN,  W.  A.     Story  of  the  Mormons,  1902. 

MESSAGES  AND  PAPERS  of  the  Presidents  of  the  United  States. 

MORSE,  J.  T.     Abraham  Lincoln,  1893. 

MOSES,  JOHN.     Illinois  Historical  and  Statistical,  1889-1892. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  355 

NlCOLA Y,  JOHN  G.  and  JOHN  HAY.     Abraham   Lincoln,  A  His 
tory,  1890. 

OBERHOLTZER,  ELLIS  P.     Abraham  Lincoln,  1904. 

OGDEN,  ROLLO.     Life  and   Letters  of  Edwin  Lawrence  Godkin, 
1907. 

POLITICAL  DEBATES  between  Hon.  Abraham  Lincoln  and  Hon. 
Stephen  A.  Douglas,  1860. 

RAY,  P.  O.     Repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  1909. 

RHODES,  JAMES  FORD.     History  of  the   United  States,  1850-1860 
(3  volumes),  1893. 

RUSSELL,  WILLIAM  HOWARD.     My  Diary  North  and  South,  1863. 

SCAMMON,   F.  YOUNG.     Illinois   Supreme    Court   Reports,  1840- 
1843. 

SCHURZ,  CARL.     Reminiscences,  1907. 

SENATE  DOCUMENTS  AND  REPORTS,  1840-1860. 

SHEAHAN,  JAMES  W.     Stephen  A.  Douglas,  1860. 

SHERMAN,  JOHN.     Recollections  of  Forty  Years,  1895. 

SPRING,  LEVERETT  W.     Kansas,  1885. 

STANWOOD,  EDWARD.     History  of  the  Presidency,  1898. 

American  Tariff  Controversies,  1903. 

STOREY,  MOORFIELD.     Charles  Sumner,  1900. 

TREATIES  IN  FORCE,  1899. 

UNITED  STATES  STATUES  AT  LARGE. 

VILLARD,  HENRY.     Memoirs,  1904. 

WILSON,  HENRY.     Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Slave  Power,  1872-1877. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

BIOGRAPHIES 

SEVERAL  lives  of  Douglas  have  been  written,  two  or  more  of 
them  comparatively  recently.  Probably  the  most  valuable  bi 
ography  is  that  of  Sheahan  which  was  prepared  not  long  before 
Douglas's  death  for  political  circulation.  The  volume  is  of  especial 
use  because  it  contains  long  extracts  from  Douglas's  more  im 
portant  speeches  as  well  as  other  documents  supplied  by  Mr.  Doug 
las  himself,  while  the  facts  were  undoubtedly  obtained,  wherever 
necessary,  from  the  same  source. 

The  most  scholarly  life  of  Douglas  is  that  of  Allen  Johnson 
(published  by  the  Macmillan  Company,  New  York,  1908,  about 
503  pages) .  This  work  is  a  complete  survey  of  Douglas's  life  upon 
a  background  of  contemporary  history  and  in  its  preparation  most  of 
the  available  sources  have  been  consulted.  The  scanty  papers  and 
autobiographical  material  in  unpublished  form  have  also  been 
utilized  and  are  referred  to  by  Mr.  Johnson,  although  they  do  not 
add  materially  to  the  facts  as  known  from  other  sources. 

Clark  E.  Carr's  «« Stephen  A.  Douglas :  His  Life,  Public  Serv 
ices,  Speeches  and  Patriotism  "  (Chicago,  A.  C.  McClurg  &  Co., 
1909,  about  293  pages)  is  the  latest  of  the  Douglas  biographies, 
but  is  very  largely  occupied  with  appendices  which  give  speeches 
and  other  documentary  matter  available  elsewhere.  This  work  is 
to  a  great  extent  a  personal  appraisal  rather  than  a  formal  bi 
ography. 

Henry  Martyn  Flint's  Life  (Derby  &  Jackson,  New  York,  1860, 
about  187  pages)  is  a  contemporary  biography  partly  composed  of 
extracts  from  speeches  but  inferior  to  that  of  Sheahan. 

William  Garrott  Brown's  "  Life  of  Douglas  "  is  a  short  biograph- 
ico-critical  essay,  very  friendly  to  Douglas  and  interestingly  written. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES  357 

William  Gardner's  «  Life  of  Stephen  A.  Douglas "  (Boston, 
Roxburgh  Press,  1905,  about  239  pages)  has  some  value. 

CONTEMPORARY  BIOGRAPHY 

Much  help  may  be  obtained  in  the  study  of  Douglas's  career 
from  an  examination  of  contemporary  biography.  Of  such  bi 
ographies  those  in  the  American  Statesmen  Series  have  distinct 
value,  especially  the  lives  of  Charles  Sumner,  Cass,  Lincoln  and 
others.  The  American  Crisis  Biographies  (George  W.  Jacobs  & 
Co.,  Philadelphia)  supply  material  that  is  not  available  in  the 
American  Statesmen  Series  with  reference  to  various  figures  con 
spicuous  during  the  period  just  before  the  Civil  War.  Special  use 
has  been  made  in  this  volume  of  Oberholtzer's  "  Abraham  Lin 
coln,"  William  E.  Dodd's  rt"  Jefferson  Davis,"  and  one  or  two 
others.  Nicolay  and  Hay's  "  Abraham  Lincoln :  A  History," 
Volumes  I,  II  and  III  (New  York,  The  Century  Co.,  1890),  is 
authoritative  in  tracing  the  later  history  of  Douglas's  life  and  the 
relations  between  him  and  President  Lincoln. 

MEMOIRS  AND  AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 

Of  the  memoirs  and  autobiographies  relating  to  the  period  just 
prior  to  the  Civil  War,  Henry  Villard's  "  Memoirs  "  (Houghton, 
Mifflin  &  Co.,  1904)  furnishes  interesting  personal  observations 
concerning  the  latter  part  of  Douglas's  career,  while  Carl  Schurz's 
"  Reminiscences  "  (The  McClure  Co.,  1907)  is  valuable  in  the 
same  way.  Ogden's  "  Life  and  Letters  of  Godkin  "  throws  some 
light  upon  passages  of  Douglas's  career  in  the  Senate.  Among  the 
autobiographical  works  which  are  incidentally  useful  concerning 
portions  of  Douglas's  political  life,  those  of  Hoar  ("  Autobiog 
raphy "),  Benton  ("  Thirty  Years'  View  of  the  United  States  Sen 
ate  "),  Sherman  ("  Recollections  "),  and  a  few  others  are  of  most 
use.  J.  Q.  Adams'  "  Memoirs  "  furnish  caustic  and  interesting  com 
ment  upon  Douglas's  work  in  the  House.  William  Howard  Rus 
sell's  "  My  Diary  North  and  South "  (New  York,  Harper  & 
Brothers,  1863)  affords  some  personal  impressions  of  Douglas  and 


358  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTES 

a  general  view  of  conditions  at  the  opening  of  the  Civil  War  that 
are  of  value. 

HISTORIES 

Rhodes's  "  History  of  the  United  States,"  Volumes  I,  II  and 
III  (New  York,  Harper  &  Brothers,  1893),  is  °f  vei7  great  value 
in  placing  Douglas  in  his  relation  to  the  public  questions  of  the 
whole  period  1850-1861.  Rhodes's  work  is  of  special  use  because 
of  the  extensive  material  drawn  from  contemporary  newspapers, 
etc.,  of  which  he  has  availed  himself  in  the  preparation  of  the 
volumes.  Schouler's  "  History  of  the  United  States,"  Vols.  IV 
and  V,  is  also  of  use  in  connection  with  the  life  of  Douglas.  For 
local  historical  material  referring  primarily  to  conditions  in  Illinois, 
Ford's  "  History  of  Illinois  "  and  Davidson  and  Stuve's  "  History 
of  Illinois  "  are  the  most  valuable  sources. 

DISCUSSIONS  OF  SLAVERY 

The  extensive  literature  of  slavery  contains  much  material  bear 
ing  upon  Douglas  and  Douglas's  political  doctrines,  but  a  great  deal 
of  it  so  biased  and  partisan  in  statement  or  method  as  to  render  it 
of  little  use.  Among  the  works  that  are  of  some  service  in  con 
nection  with  Douglas  are  Wilson's  "  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Slave 
Power." 

DISCUSSIONS  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  QUESTIONS 
Cutts's  "  Constitutional  and  Party  Questions "  (New  York, 
D.  Appleton  &  Co.,  1886)  gives  the  views  of  Douglas  on  some  of 
the  most  important  public  issues  in  whose  discussion  he  had  shared 
as  taken  down  by  Mr.  J.  Madison  Cutts  in  1859  from  Douglas's 
own  direct  dictation.  The  book  may  be  accepted  as  an  accurate 
analysis  of  Douglas's  ideas  on  the  issues  dealt  with. 

SPEECHES  AND  DOCUMENTS 

The  Congressional  Globe  throughout  Douglas's  legislative  career 
in  Congress  is  of  course  the  ultimate  authority  for  all  statements 
about  action  on  the  floor,  speeches  on  public  questions,  etc.  The 


BIBLIOGEAPHICAL  NOTES  359 

House  and  Senate   documents  and  committee  reports  also  contain 
valuable  material — much  of  it  by  Douglas's  own  hand. 

Douglas's  debates  with  Lincoln  during  the  Illinois  campaign  of 
1858  are  given  in  satisfactory  form  in  "  The  Political  Debates  Be 
tween  Hon.  Abraham  Lincoln  and  Hon.  Stephen  A.  Douglas  " 
(Columbus,  Follett,  Foster  &  Co.,  1860). 

POLITICAL  HISTORY 

Stanwood's  "  History  of  the  Presidency  "  (Houghton,  Mifflin  & 
Co.,  Cambridge,  1898)  furnishes  a  compact  review  of  the  various 
presidential  contests  in  which  Douglas  shared,  including  the 
figures  for  both  popular  and  electoral  votes.  Halstead's  "  Cau 
cuses  of  1860 — A  History  of  the  National  Political  Convention  of 
the  Current  Presidential  Campaign"  (Columbus,  Follett,  Foster  & 
Co.,  1860)  affords  a  fairly  complete  description  of  the  political  con 
ventions  in  the  year  1860. 

CONTEMPORARY  PUBLICATIONS 

The  files  of  the  New  York  Tribune  and  of  the  Washington 
newspapers  are  the  most  useful  sources  of  contemporary  material, 
particularly  for  the  decade  1850-1860.  The  local  Illinois  news 
papers  frequently  referred  to  only  occasionally  contain  material 
that  is  of  value. 


INDEX 


ABOLITION,  movement  in  Illi 
nois,  103 ;  growth  of  senti 
ment  for,  170  ;  attacked  by 
Douglas,  170 ;  methods  of 
propaganda,  210. 

Adams,  C.  F.,  view  of  Doug 
las's  maiden  speech,  73-74  ; 
criticism  of  Douglas's  speech 
on  contested  seats,  77-78 ; 
comment  on  later  activities 
of  Douglas,  79  ;  criticism  on 
Douglas's  annexation  speech, 
83 ;  controversy  with  Doug 
las  about  Texas  boundary, 

94-95- 

"American"  policy,  genesis  of, 
170 ;  tested  by  Clayton  Bul- 
wer  question,  182. 

Appeal  of  Independent  Demo 
crats  prepared,  199. 

Arnold,  Martha,  ancestress  of 
Douglas,  13. 

BALTIMORE,  convention  of 
1852,  176;  Pierce  nominated 
at,  177. 

Bates,  Edward,  encourages 
Douglas  in  legal  study,  17. 

Bell,  John,  nominated  for  presi 
dency,  319. 

Bennett,  John  C.,  employed  by 
Mormons,  55  ;  work  for  sect, 

59- 

Benton,  Thomas  H.,  thinks 
Calhoun's  secession  views 
absurd,  155  ;  desires  sepa 
rate  treatment  of  California 
question,  158;  opposes  omni 
bus  measure,  159. 


Bigler,  Senator,  controversy 
with  Douglas  on  Lecompton 
plan,  248;  hostile  demon 
stration  in  Chicago,  250. 

Black,  Attorney-General,  re 
plies  to  Douglas's  article  in 
Harper's,  303. 

Brandon,  Douglas  enters  acad 
emy  at,  13;  early  study  of 
law  at,  1 6. 

Breckinridge,  John  C.,  nomi 
nated  for  presidency,  317. 

Breese,  Sidney,  senatorial  am 
bitions  of,  50 ;  retired  from 
Senate,  104;  cold  toward 
Illinois  Central  plan,  1 14 ; 
reports  railroad  bills,  1 14. 

Broderick,  Senator,  position  in 
California,  303. 

Brooks,  Preston  S.,  assault  on 
Sumner,  234. 

Brooks,  S.  S.,  description  of 
Douglas,  21  ;  editor  Jackson 
ville  News,  21  ;  coalition 
with  Douglas,  22 ;  aids  in 
developing  convention  sys 
tem,  27  ;  aid  in  congressional 
nomination,  37. 

Brown,  Senator,  attacks  Free- 
port  Doctrine,  296. 

Brown,  John,  early  history, 
304  ;  attacks  Harper's  Ferry, 
304  ;  raid  of,  investigated  by 
Congress,  305  ;  effect  of  raid, 
306. 

Buchanan,  James,  candidate  for 
presidency,  187  ;  nominated 
for  presidency,  1856,  220; 
view  of  slavery,  221  ;  vote 


INDEX 


361 


for,  223 ;  sends  Lecompton 
constitution  to  Congress,  25 1 ; 
attacks  Douglas  in  Illinois, 
259  ;  anti- Douglas  efforts  in 
Illinois  campaign  unfruitful, 
289 ;  attacks  Douglas  in 
national  campaign,  320. 

CALHOUN,  JOHN,  in  legislature 
with  Douglas,  31. 

Calhoun,  John  C.,  relation  to 
Douglas,  1 29 ;  last  service 
of,  149 ;  answers  Clay,  154. 

California,  relation  of  to  Oregon 
question,  101  ;  need  for 
action  regarding,  148 ;  spe 
cial  committee  on,  158;  ter 
ritorial  question  in,  15 1  ;  rela 
tion  to  Monroe  Doctrine,  181. 

Carlin,  Governor,  issues  war 
rant  for  arrest  of  Joseph  H. 
Smith,  61. 

Carr,  C.  E.,  views  on  Kansas- 
Nebraska  act,  207. 

Cass,  Lewis,  vote  for,  105 ;  re 
lation  to  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  182;  candidate  for 
presidency.jiSy. 

Catholic  Church,  attitude  of 
Know-Nothings  toward,  210. 

Charleston  convention,  assem 
bles,  309  ;  character  of,  310  ; 
work  of,  31  iff.;  disinte 
grates,  313;  adjourns,  313. 

Chase,  S.  P.,  relation  to  Douglas, 
129;  aids  in  preparing  pro 
test  against  Nebraska  bill, 
199;  weak  reply  to  Douglas, 
200 ;  seeks  to  amend  Ne 
braska  bill,  20 1. 

Chicago,  real  estate  bought  by 
Douglas,  113;  brought  into 
railroad  scheme,  113;  rela 
tion  to  proposed  lines,  114; 
ovation  to  Douglas,  118. 


Clay,  H.,  relation  to  Douglas, 
129;  last  service  of,  149; 
offers  territorial  compromise, 
1S3>  sPeaks  for  compromise, 
153 ;  answered  by  Calhoun, 
154;  favors  "omnibus" 
measure,  159;  reports  Omni 
bus  Bill,  159 ;  plan  on  terri 
tories  adopted,  162  ;  indebted 
to  Douglas,  162. 

Clayton,  attacked  by  Douglas, 
183  ;  answers  Douglas,  184  ; 
seeks  to  amend  Nebraska 
bill,  202. 

Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  contest 
over,  181. 

Cleveland,  Douglas's  illness  at, 

17- 
Cobb,  Howell,  elected  Speaker, 

*52- 

Collamer,  makes  minority  re 
port  on  Kansas,  251. 

Colorado,  bill  to  organize,  330. 

Compromise  of  1850,  pushed 
forward,  170. 

Constitution,  Douglas's  injunc 
tion  of  obedience  to,  12. 

Constitutional  Union  party, 
nominations  of  for  presidency, 

3*9- 

Convention  system,  Douglas's 
interest  in,  28. 

Cuba,  Douglas's  plan  to  ac 
quire,  173;  Douglas's  visit 
to,  293  ;  position  of  Douglas 
on  annexation,  295  ;  bill  to 
purchase,  295  ;  discussion  de 
ferred,  296. 

Gushing,  Caleb,  chairman  of 
Charleston  convention,  311; 
on  Utah  question,  161  ;  aids 
Douglas  on  Nebraska  bill, 
196. 

DAVIS,      JEFFERSON,     attacks 


362 


INDEX 


Douglas  on  Freeport  Doc 
trine,  298 ;  on  John  Brown 
investigating  committee,  305  ; 
in  control  of  reactionary  group 
at  Charleston  convention, 
311;  resolutions  of  endorsed, 
312;  hampers  Douglas  in 
Senate,  314;  resolutions 
adopted  in  Senate,  315;  re 
grets  secession,  326. 

Debates,  arranged  between 
Lincoln  and  Douglas,  264  ft'. 

Democratic  party,  attitude  on 
Texas,  81  ;  relation  to  slav 
ery,  85-86 ;  platform  of  on 
Texas  question,  91. 

Divorce,  question  in  Illinois 
legislature,  31 ;  Douglas's  at 
titude  on,  32. 

Dixon,  Senator,  amends  Ne 
braska  bill,  194. 

Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  father  of 
Stephen  Arnold  Douglas,  13; 
career,  13. 

Douglas,  Stephen  Arnold,  "  last 
words,"  1 1  ;  early  family  his 
tory,  I2ff. ;  authorities  for 
life  of,  I2n. ;  birth,  13; 
work  at  farm  labor,  1 3  ;  de 
sire  for  education,  14 ;  drift 
to  political  discussion,  15-16; 
journey  westward,  16;  ar 
rival  in  Illinois,  1 8 ;  stay  at 
Jacksonville,  [18;  journey  to 
Winchester,  19 ;  begins 
teaching,  2o ;  studies  law, 
20;  admitted  to  bar,  21; 
alliance  with  S.  S.  Brooks, 
22 ;  early  political  adven 
tures,  23  ;  favorably  received, 
24  ;  drafts  bill  for  choice  of 
states  attorneys,  25  ;  elected 
states  attorney,  25  ;  work  as 
prosecutor,  26;  interest  in 
convention  system,  27 ;  de 


bates  with  Hardin,  28;  con 
solidates  convention  system, 
28 ;  use  of  whiskey,  29 ;  en 
ters  legislature,  30;  work 
on  divorce  question,  32 ;  ad 
vocates  internal  improve 
ments,  32  ;  appointed  register 
of  Land  Office,  34 ;  canvass 
of  Illinois,  36;  nominated 
for  Congress,  37 ;  defeated, 
38 ;  returns  to  practice  of 
law,  39;  controversy  with 
Lincoln,  40;  attacks  Whig 
cause  before  Supreme  Court, 
40;  work  for  Van  Buren, 
41 ;  appointed  Secretary  of 
State,  40;  member  of  Supreme 
Court,  42-44 ;  assigned  to 
fifth  district  as  judge,  45 ; 
work  on  bench,  46;  judicial 
associates,  47  ;  relations  with 
notable  men,  48 ;  judicial 
methods  of,  49;  effort  to 
enter  United  States  Senate, 
50 ;  desire  for  congressional 
nomination,  50 ;  nomination, 
51;  election,  52;  experience 
with  Mormons,  53;  friendly 
to  Mormons  as  judge,  54 ; 
negotiations  with  J.  C.  Ben 
nett,  55 ;  cooperates  with 
Snyder,  55  ;  aids  Mormons 
in  getting  charter,  55-56  ;  as 
signed  to  Mormon  district, 
57  ;  gives  Mormons  judicial 
recognition,  58;  saves  Joseph 
H.  Smith,  58;  important  de 
cision  in  Mormon  case,  59  ; 
seeks  to  conciliate  Mormons, 
62-64;  criticized  by  Ford, 
64;  moves  with  militia 
against  Mormons,  65  ;  goes 
as  envoy  to  Nauvoo,  65 ; 
urges  Mormons  to  leave  Illi 
nois,  66;  speaks  for  Mor- 


INDEX 


363 


mons  in  Congress,  67  ;  turns 
against  Mormons,  67 ;  po 
litical  treatment  of  Mormons, 
68-69  ;  entry  into  Congress, 
70-7 1 ;  looks  for  chance  to 
speak,  71  ;  supports  Jackson, 
72;  work  on  committee  on 
elections,  76-77  ;  drafts  ma 
jority  report  on  contested 
seats,  77  ;  recognizes  need  of 
special  local  appropriations, 
78-79  ;  does  party  drudgery, 
79 ;  attitude  toward  Polk, 
80 ;  convivial  habits,  80  ;  po 
sition  on  Texas,  81  ;  accepts 
leadership  of  Polk,  81  ;  urges 
annexation  of  Texas,  82  ;  at 
tack  on  New  England  men, 
83 ;  supported  by  Southern 
men,  84  ;  gains  no  reputation 
in  first  Texas  controversy, 
84 ;  attitude  toward  slavery, 
85-86;  practical  political  in 
stincts,  86;  sees  good  side  of 
slavery,  86  ff. ;  three  periods 
in  relation  to  slavery,  89 ;  in 
fluence  of  marriage  on,  89  ff.  ; 
calls  for  admission  of  Texas, 
91;  vindicates  Polk,  92; 
represents  administration,  92 ; 
speech  against  Mexico,  92- 

94  ;  controversy  with  Adams 
about   Texas   boundary,  94- 

95  ;  draws  closer  to  Polk,  95- 
96 ;  enters  Senate,  96 ;  speaks 
for  Ten   Regiments  Bill,  97  ; 
attacks   treaty   with    Mexico, 
97  ;  views   on  Oregon  ques 
tion,    98;    attacks    England, 
98;  opposition    to  Polk,  99- 
100 ;  driven   to  accept  com 
promise,    101  ;  circumstances 
surrounding  election  to  Sen 
ate,     102-103;     relation     to 
anti-slavery  movement,   104 ; 


apologizes  to  Polk,  104 ;  op 
ponents'  attack  on,  105  ;  vote 
of  lack  of  confidence  in,  106  ; 
disregarded  by  Douglas,  106  ; 
recovery  of  strength,  107  ;  at 
titude  on  Federal  aid  to  in 
ternal  improvements,  108- 
109 ;  general  policy,  1 10  ; 
urges  grant  of  public  lands 
for  railroad  building,  112; 
views  on  Illinois  Central, 
112;  buys  Chicago  real  es 
tate,  113;  urges  land  sub 
sidy  for  Illinois  Central,  114  ; 
his  plan  defeated,  114  ;  seeks 
alliance  with  Mobile  railroad, 
115;  arranges  for  votes,  115  ; 
drafts  new  bill,  116;  warns 
Holbrook,  117;  traffics  for 
railroad  votes,  117;  forces 
bill  through  Congress,  118; 
profits  from  railroad  deal, 
119;  committed  to  other 
railroad  schemes,  1 19  ;  votes 
for  such  schemes,  120;  atti 
tude  on  Pacific  roads,  121  ; 
speaks  in  favor  of,  121  ;  in 
consistency  on  railroads,  1 24  ; 
advocates  systematic  river 
and  harbor  policy,  124;  pe 
culiar  proposal,  124-125  ; 
strange  record  on  rivers  and 
harbors,  125-126;  ideas  on 
reciprocity,  126;  favors  cut 
in  tariff,  126;  advanced 
views,  127 ;  importance  of 
senatorial  career,  128  ;  char 
acter  of  his  problems,  129  ; 
attitude  toward  public  ques 
tions,  130;  personal  traits, 

131  ;     physical     appearance, 

132  ;  vividness  of  personality, 
133;  lack  of  training,   134; 
family    life,    137 ;    views   of 
Southerners  regarding,   139  ; 


INDEX 


develops  a  type  of  oratory, 
140  ;  good  relations  with  col 
leagues,  141  ;  innocent  of 
Brooks'  attack  on  Simmer, 
142-143 ;  explanation  of  at 
tack,  143;  lack  of  animosity 
toward  politicians,  144  ;  pros 
perous,  145 ;  endows  Chi 
cago  University,  145  ;  free 
from  personal  corruption, 
146 ;  careless  in  business, 
146 ;  extravagant  outlays, 
147;  on  California,  153;  at 
tacks  Webster,  157 ;  on 
slavery  in  California,  157 ; 
reports  territorial  bills,  158 ; 
omitted  from  select  commit 
tee  on  California,  158 ;  op 
poses  omnibus  measure,  159 ; 
aids  Clay,  162;  credited  for 
Omnibus  Bill,  163  ;  assailed 
in  Illinois,  164;  regains  pres 
tige  in  Chicago,  165 ;  presi 
dential  ambitions,  166 ; 
growth  in  national  strength, 
167;  habits  of,  168;  affects 
indifference  to  presidency, 
169;  attacks  Abolition  move 
ment,  170;  embarks  on 
"American  policy,"  171;  at 
tempts  to  discredit  Webster, 
172;  relation  to  Kossuth, 
173 ;  advocates  annexation 
of  Cuba,  174;  political 
tactics  of,  175 ;  defeated  at 
Baltimore  convention,  177 ; 
accepts  defeat  gracefully, 
178  ;  renews  contest  for  Sen 
ate,  179;  on  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  182;  attacks  Clayton, 
183;  visits  Europe,  185; 
suspected  by  South,  188-189; 
frames  Nebraska  bill,  189; 
attitude  to  Missouri  Compro 
mise,  190;  favors  Dixon 


amendment,  194;  accepts 
Dixon  amendment,  195  ;  gets 
aid  of  Pierce  and  Davis,  197  ; 
attacks  the  "  appeal,"  199  ; 
amends  Nebraska  bill,  201  ; 
unpopularity  resulting  from 
Nebraska  bill,  203;  hooted 
at  Chicago  meeting,  204 ; 
how  affected  by  Kansas-Ne 
braska  act,  206  ;  tour  through 
Illinois,  209  ;  attitude  toward 
Know-Nothing  party,  21 1; 
contest  with  Lincoln  in  1854, 
213;  partial  failure  in  elec 
tions,  214;  fully  committed 
to  slavery  cause,  216;  attitude 
toward  Republicans,  217  ; 
loses  nomination  for  presi 
dency,  1856,  220 ;  pledges 
himself  to  Buchanan,  222; 
recognizes  real  import  of 
slavery,  223 ;  difficult  posi 
tion  in  Congress,  225  ;  reports 
on  Kansas  constitution,  230  ; 
theory  of  popular  sovereignty, 
231  ;  debate  with  Seward 
and  Sumner,  233;  attitude 
toward  Dred  Scott  Decision, 
239;  attitude  on  Lecompton 
convention,  243  ;  breach  with 
Buchanan,  245  ;  attacks  Le 
compton  plan,  246;  favors 
revival  of  Toombs  bill,  247  ; 
discussion  with  Mason  and 
Bigler,  248;  speaks  against 
Lecompton  plan,  252;  posi 
tion  in  Illinois,  258;  attacked 
at  home  by  Buchanan,  259 ; 
enters  senatorial  contest  with 
Lincoln,  260;  maps  out  Illi 
nois  campaign,  262;  accepts 
challenge  of  Lincoln  to  de 
bates,  263  ;  debate  with  Lin 
coln  at  Ottawa,  265  ff. ; 
quotes  "  Springfield  resolu- 


INDEX 


365 


tions,"  268-269;  debate  at 
Freeport,  27 1 ;  views  on  ad 
mission  of  Kansas,  273;  on 
Supreme  Court,  274 ;  Free- 
port  Doctrine,  274-275;  on 
"Springfield  resolutions," 
275 ;  third  debate  at  Jones- 
boro,  276;  interpretation  of 
Republican  movement,  277 ; 
view  of  Dred  Scott  case,  277  ; 
on  Republican  attitude 
toward  slavery,  279 ;  fourth 
debate  at  Charleston,  280; 
on  Toombs  bill,  281 ;  attack 
on  Trumbull,  281 ;  fifth  de 
bate  at  Galesburgh,  282 ; 
reviews  Nebraska  bill,  282  ; 
charges  Republican  sectional 
ism,  283;  sixth  debate  at 
Quincy,  283 ;  insists  on 
slavery  as  a  local  issue,  284 ; 
seventh  debate  at  Alton, 
284 ;  constitutional  attack 
on  Lincoln,  285  ;  considers 
slavery  secondary  issue,  287  ; 
gains  advantage  of  Lincoln, 
288 ;  victory  inconclusive, 
289;  position  unsatisfactory, 
291  ;  falls  back  on  personal 
following,  292  ;  South  hostile, 
292 ;  visits  Cuba,  293  ;  ostra 
cized  in  Senate,  294  ;  deposed 
from  committee  chairman 
ship,  294;  defends  Freeport 
Doctrine  in  Senate,  297-298 ; 
considers  Freeport  Doctrine 
crucial,  299;  describes  posi 
tion  in  Harper's,  300 ;  an 
swered  by  Lincoln,  301  ; 
views  on  John  Brown  raid, 
305;  logical  candidate  of 
Democrats  in  1860,  307 ; 
states  slavery  position,  307  ; 
supported  by  North  and 
West,  308  ;  dominates  Union 


Democrats  at  Charleston  con 
vention,  311  ;  defends  posi 
tion  at  Charleston  conven 
tion,  314 ;  recognizes 
strength  of  Lincoln,  316; 
nominated  for  presidency, 
317 ;  letter  of  acceptance, 
318;  instructions  of  as  to 
campaign  of  1860,  320  ;  takes 
stump  in  person,  321 ;  South 
ern  trip,  321  ;  repudiates  se 
cession,  322 ;  reckless  habits 
°fi  323  >  views  on  Lincoln's 
election,  324;  supports  Lin 
coln,  325 ;  new  attitude 
toward  Southerners,  330 ;  at 
titude  on  territorial  question, 
331  ;  isolated,  333;  becomes 
administration  Democrat, 
334 ;  discusses  policies  with 
Lincoln,  336 ;  praises  Lin 
coln's  inaugural,  337 ;  ap 
proves  Lincoln's  policy,  343  ; 
approves  call  for  troops,  344  ; 
supports  administration  at 
Springfield,  346 ;  prestige  re 
established,  347  ;  last  illness 
and  death,  349  ;  effect  of  re 
moval,  350-353. 

Douglas,  Mrs.  (Miss  Martin), 
characteristics  of,  137. 

Douglas,  Mrs.  (Miss  Cutts), 
characteristics  of,  137. 

Dred  Scott  Decision  reviewed, 

237- 

Duncan,  Joseph,  governor  of 
Illinois,  25  ;  calls  special  ses 
sion  of  legislature,  35. 

Dunn  bill  on  Kansas,  passed  by 
House,  236. 


ELECTIONS,  committee  on, 
Douglas  appointed  to,  76; 
drafts  report  of,  77. 


366 


ItfDEX 


Everett,  Senator,  nominated  for 
vice-presidency,  319. 

FIELD,  superseded  as  Secretary 
of  State  by  Douglas,  41. 

Fillmore,  Millard,  nomination 
of  weakens  Fremont,  222 ; 
vote  for,  223. 

Fisk,  Sarah,  mother  of  S.  A. 
Douglas,  13. 

Ford,  Thomas,  on  Illinois  po 
litical  methods,  29  ;  criticizes 
Mormon  charter,  57 ;  esti 
mate  of  Mormons,  59;  war 
rant  for  Smith,  62 ;  elected 
governor  of  Illinois,  63 ; 
criticism  of  Douglas,  64 ; 
thinks  Douglas  unprincipled, 
68. 

Foreign  policy — see  "  American 
policy." 

Forney,  John  W.,  personal 
view  of  Douglas,  132. 

Freeport  Doctrine,  elucidated, 
274 ;  attacked  by  Senator 
Brown,  296 ;  criticized  by 
Davis,  298;  defended  by 
Douglas,  297-298. 

Fremont,  J.  C.,  nominated  by 
Republicans,  222 ;  vote  for, 
223. 

Fugitive  Slave  Law,  passed, 
162 ;  feeling  in  Massachu 
setts  toward,  169. 

GARRISON,  W.  L.,  burns  Con 
stitution,  210. 

Giddings,  Joshua  R.,  aids  in 
protest  against  Nebraska  bill, 
199. 

Godkin,  E.  L.,  on  Douglas's 
personality,  135  ;  view  of 
Douglas's  chance  of  reelec 
tion  as  senator,  255. 


Granger,  G.,  connection  with 
Douglas,  15. 

Great  Britain,  attacked  by 
Douglas  on  Oregon  question, 
98. 

Great  Lakes,  relation  to  Illi 
nois  Central  scheme,  1 14 ; 
to  be  connected  with  Gulf, 
117. 

Greeley,  H.,  relation  to  Doug 
las,  144;  view  of  Douglas's 
death,  349. 

Green,  Senator,  reports  Kansas 
bill,  251  ;  plan  for  admission 
of  Kansas  adopted,  253. 

Grimes,  J.  W.,  chosen  governor 
of  Iowa,  215. 

Gwin,  Senator,  contest  with 
Broderick  in  California,  303. 

HANCOCK  COUNTY,  Mormons 
in»  53 ff-  (see  Mormons); 
number  of  Mormons  in,  59. 

Hardin,  J.  J.,  defeated  by 
Douglas  for  states  attorney- 
ship,  25  ;  debates  with  Doug 
las,  28 ;  elected  to  legisla 
ture,  29 ;  before  Supreme 
Court,  47 ;  commands  anti- 
Mormon  troops,  65  ;  sends 
Douglas  as  envoy  to  Mor 
mons,  65. 

Harper's  Monthly,  Douglas's 
defense  in,  300 ;  attracts  lit 
tle  popular  attention,  301. 

Hoge,  James  P.,  Democratic 
candidate  for  congressman  in 
Mormon  district,  62 ;  on 
power  of  Mormon  courts,  62  ; 
supported  by  Mormons,  63  ; 
elected,  63. 

Holbrook,  scheme  of,  for  rail 
roads,  in;  defeated  in 
plans,  1 1 6 ;  intrigue  with 
Illinois  legislature,  116; 


INDEX 


367 


warned     by    Douglas,    116; 
withdraws  from  contest,  117. 

ILLINOIS,  Douglas's  arrival  in, 
18;  early  slavery  in,  87; 
politics  in  transition,  102- 
IO3 »  growth  of  anti-slavery 
feeling,  103  ;  manipulation 
of  congressional  districts  in, 
104 ;  legislature  shows  want 
of  confidence  in  Douglas,  107  ; 
plan  for  railroads  in,  110- 
114. 

Illinois  Central  Railroad,  plan 
for,  112-114;  scheme  de 
feated,  1 14  ;  provided  for  in 
new  bill,  116;  relation  to 
other  roads,  117;  bill  to  aid 
passed,  118;  favors  to  Doug 
las,  119. 

Internal  Improvements,  ques 
tion  in  Illinois  legislature, 
30 ;  scheme  adopted  for  Illi 
nois,  33 ;  Douglas's  view  of 
Federal  aid  for,  108  ;  scheme 
of  railroad  building,  1 1 1  ;  de 
velops  into  Illinois  Central 
plan,  112. 

JACKSON,  ANDREW,  Douglas's 
early  interest  in,  15  ;  bill  to 
relieve,  in  Congress,  7 1  ; 
Douglas's  eulogy  on,  73; 
visited  by  Douglas,  74;  en 
dorses  Douglas,  75. 

Jacksonville,  Douglas's  stay  in, 
1 8. 

Jenkins,  A.  M.,  lieutenant-gov 
ernor  of  Illinois,  25. 

Johnson,  nominated  to  vice- 
presidency,  318. 

Judiciary  Committee,  Douglas 
appointed  to,  81. 

KANE  COUNTY,  convention  in, 


and  "  Springfield  resolu 
tions,"  272. 

Kansas,  proposal  to  organize, 
197  ;  colonization  of,  226 ; 
Reeder  named  governor,  227  ; 
controlled  by  Missourians, 
228  ;  report  by  Douglas  on, 
230 ;  bill  to  admit  passed  in 
Senate,  235;  adopts  Le- 
compton  constitution,  250. 

Kansas-Nebraska  Act  (see 
"  Nebraska  "),  effect  of,  226 ; 
Douglas's  course  on,  defended 
in  Harper's  Monthly,  300. 

Kansas- Nebraska  issue,  relation 
to  Oregon  question,  101. 

Keitt,  relation  to  attack  on 
Sumner,  143. 

King,  nominated  for  vice-presi 
dency  at  Baltimore,  177. 

Know-Nothings,  origin  of,  209 ; 
later  history  of,  218. 

Kossuth,  issue  raised  by,  172. 

LAMBORN,  JOSIAH,  debate  with 
Douglas,  24. 

Land  Office,  Douglas's  work  in, 
34- 

Lane,  nominated  for  vice- 
presidency,  318. 

Lanphier,  C.  H.,  responsible 
for  "  Springfield  resolutions," 

T  *75' 

Lecompton     convention,    241 ; 

constitution  adopted  by,  242 ; 
effect  of  on  country,  242 ;  at 
tacked  by  Douglas,  246 ;  con 
stitution  of  adopted,  250; 
constitution  sent  to  Congress, 
25 1  ;  plan  adopted  in  Senate, 
254. 

Lee,  R.  E.,  captures  John 
Brown,  304. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  in  legisla 
ture  with  Douglas,  31  ;  early 


368 


INDEX 


debate  with  Douglas,  40; 
before  Supreme  Court,  48 ; 
description  of  Douglas,  79 ; 
compared  with  Douglas,  139  ; 
employed  to  sue  Douglas, 
146 ;  reentry  into  politics, 
212 ;  speaks  against  Douglas, 
213  ;  style  of  argument,  214  ; 
accepts  nomination  for  sen- 
atorship  against  Douglas, 
260 ;  debate  with  Douglas  at 
Ottawa,  265  ff. ;  attacks 
"  Springfield  resolutions," 
269 ;  debate  at  Freeport, 
270  ;  views  on  Fugitive  Slave 
Law,  271  ;  on  Kansas,  271  ; 
attacks  "  Springfield  resolu 
tions,"  272 ;  third  debate  at 
Jonesboro,  276;  on  doctrines 
of  slavery,  278 ;  fourth  debate 
at  Charleston,  280 ;  repudi 
ates  negro  equality,  280 ;  on 
Toombs  bill,  280;  opposes 
negro  citizenship,  282  ;  fifth 
debate  at  Galesburgh,  282; 
repudiates  sectionalism,  283; 
sixth  debate  at  Quincy,  283 ; 
positively  attacks  slavery, 
284 ;  seventh  debate  at 
Alton,  284 ;  constitutional 
argument,  286 ;  defeated 
by  Douglas,  286;  contest 
with  Douglas  in  Ohio,  302; 
on  John  Brown  raid,  306; 
unanimously  nominated  for 
presidency,  316;  election  of, 
324;  feared  by  Southerners, 
326;  position  after  election, 
334;  reaches  Washington 
incognito,  335  ;  uncertain  as 
to  policy,  336 ;  tone  of  inau 
gural,  336;  intent  to  hold 
Southern  forts,  341  ;  asks 
Cabinet  for  advice,  342 ; 
calls  for  troops,  344;  ap 


proves  Douglas's  trip  to  Illi 
nois,  346. 

Linn,  view  of  Mormon  charters, 
60;  attitude  toward  Doug 
las's  Mormon  decision,  61. 

Little,  Senator,  relation  to  Mor 
mons,  55. 

MARCY,  W.  L.,  candidate  for 
presidency,  187. 

Martin,  Miss  Martha  Denny, 
marriage  to  Douglas,  87-88; 
inherits  slaves,  88. 

Mason,  Senator,  on  territorial 
issue,  156;  controversy  with 
Douglas  on  Lecompton  plan, 
248. 

McConnell,  Murray,  aids  Doug 
las  in  law,  20. 

Mexico,  relations  with  United 
States  about  Texas,  91  ;  war 
with  approved  by  Douglas, 
93-94  ;  driven  to  peace,  97. 

Middlebury,  Douglas's  work  in, 
14. 

Middle  West— see  Northwest. 

Missouri,  effort  of  to  control 
Kansas,  227 ;  influence  in 
Kansas  elections,  228. 

Missouri  Compromise,  Doug 
las's  desire  for  extension  of, 
82;  Douglas's  view  of,  189- 
190;  reason  for  attacking, 
191;  proposal  to  "super 
sede,"  197. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  becomes  an 
issue,  181. 

Mormons,  Douglas's  experience 
with,  53 ;  Douglas  sympa 
thetic  with  cause  of,  54 ; 
settled  at  Nauvoo,  54  ;  early 
political  policy,  54 ;  at 
tempt  to  get  charter,  55  ; 
negotiations  with  Douglas, 
55  ;  charter  granted,  55-56  ; 


INDEX 


369 


criticized  by  Ford,  57 ; 
growth  of  sect,  59-60  ;  crimes 
attributed  to,  60  ;  push  views 
before  courts,  61 ;  political 
policy  of,  62-64 ;  hostility 
toward,  64 ;  growth  of  sect, 
64-65  ;  militia  ordered  to 
move  against,  65 ;  urged  to 
leave  Illinois,  66 ;  agree  to 
go,  66;  later  relations  with 
Douglas,  67-69. 

Morse,  view  of  Douglas,  129 
et  seq. 

Mosquito  Coast,  discussion  on, 
181. 

NATIVE  AMERICAN  s — see 
Know-Nothings. 

Nauvoo  Legion,  established,  56. 

Nebraska,  early  history  of, 
189  ;  bill  to  organize  framed, 
189 ;  bill  popular  in  South, 
193 ;  Dixon  amendment  to, 
193  ;  Sumner  amendment  to, 
194 ;  Kansas  to  be  separated 
from,  197  ;  bill  further 
amended,  201  ;  bill  passed, 
203  ;  government  in,  226. 

New  Mexico,  relation  of  to 
Oregon  question,  101 ;  terri 
torial  question  in,  187  ;  bill 
to  organize,  330. 

North,  demands  of  on  slavery 
question,  150;  attitude  as  to 
California  and  New  Mexico, 
151;  supports  Douglas  in 
1860,  308. 

Northwest,  relation  to  Doug 
las's  ambition,  167  ;  effort  to 
get  Douglas  votes  in,  175  ; 
fails  to  aid  Douglas,  179. 

OREGON,  Douglas's  view  of 
question,  98  ;  Douglas's  first 
measure  regarding,  99 ; 


Folk's  view  of,  98-99  ;  ques 
tion  shelved,  100;  slavery 
issue,  100 ;  compromise  pro 
posal,  101. 

PACIFIC  railroads,  supported  by 
Douglas,  121  ;  bill  for,  299. 

Peoria,  debate  between  Douglas 
and  Lincoln  at  in  1854,  214. 

Pierce,  Franklin,  nominated  for 
presidency  at  Baltimore,  176 ; 
position  on  Nebraska  bill, 
196;  in  convention  of  1856, 
220;  messages  on  Kansas, 
229. 

Polk,  Judge,  discharges  Jos.  H. 
Smith,  62. 

Polk,  President,  Douglas's  atti 
tude  toward  nomination,  80 ; 
eulogizes  nominee,  80 ;  atti 
tude  toward  Texas,  82;  an 
nounces  war  with  Mexico, 
92 ;  overtures  to  Douglas, 
95  5  gives  view  of  Mexican 
situation,  95-96 ;  attacked  by 
Douglas,  97  ;  proposed  settle 
ment  with  Oregon,  99 ;  pro 
poses  Oregon  compromise 
measure,  101  ;  apologized  to 
by  Douglas,  104. 

Presidency,  sought  by  Douglas 
from  1850  on,  166;  Douglas's 
affected  indifference  to,  170  ; 
campaign  of  Douglas  for 
nomination  in  1852,  175 ; 
Pierce  nominated  for,  177 ; 
struggle  for  in  1854,  187 ; 
nomination  of  Buchanan  for, 
220 ;  Lincoln  nominated  for 
in  1860,  316;  Douglas  nomi 
nated  for  in  1860,  317. 

RECIPROCITY,     with      Canada 

urged  by  Douglas,  126. 
Reeder,  E.,  named  governor  of 


370 


INDEX 


Kansas,  227 ;  policy  of,  227- 
228 ;  returns  East,  229. 

Republican  party,  origin  of, 
2ii;  recognized,  217;  nomi 
nates  Fremont,  222 ;  nomi 
nates  Lincoln,  316;  elects 
Lincoln,  324 ;  growth  of 
power  in  Congress,  330;  in 
Senate  displeased  at  prom 
inence  of  Douglas,  342. 

Rivers  and  Harbors,  appropria 
tion  plan  suggested  by 
Douglas,  125. 

Russell,  W.  H.,  on  Douglas's 
personality,  136. 

SCHURZ,  CARL,  on  Douglas's 
personality,  134;  spectator  at 
Lincoln-Douglas  debate,  265 ; 
view  of  Lincoln,  267. 

Secession,  repudiated  by  Doug 
las,  322  ;  beginning  of,  325  ; 
becomes  general,  331. 

Seward,  Senator,  relation  to 
Douglas,  129 ;  offers  sub 
stitute  bill  on  Kansas,  230 ; 
debate  with  Douglas,  233. 

Sheahan,  J.,  biographer  of 
Douglas,  12,  13. 

Shields,  James,  in  legislature 
with  Douglas,  31  ;  aids  Doug 
las  in  Illinois  Central  scheme, 

"5- 

Slavery,  question  raised  by 
Douglas  in  connection  with 
Texas,  82  ff. ;  pushed  to  the 
front  by  Southerners,  84 ; 
question  of,  forced  on  Doug 
las,  85  ;  Douglas's  disposition 
toward,  85-87 ;  effect  of 
marriage  of  Douglas  on  his 
relation  to,  88 ;  in  relation  to 
Oregon,  99-100 ;  reopened  in 
Nebraska  bill,  190. 

Slidell,  Senator,  relation   to  at 


tack  on  Sumner,  143  ;  super 
sedes  Douglas,  295. 

Smith,  Gerrit,  aids  in  protest 
against  Nebraska  bill,  199. 

Smith,  Joseph  H.,  head  of 
Mormons,  57  (see  Mormons)  ; 
arrested,  59  ;  praises  Douglas, 
59;  surrenders  himself,  61  ; 
discharged,  62 ;  candidate  for 
presidency,  64. 

Soule,  territorial  plan  of 
adopted,  160. 

South,  urgent  for  slavery  dis 
cussion  in  connection  with 
Texas,  84 ;  demands  of  in 
slavery  question,  150;  atti 
tude  as  to  California  and 
New  Mexico,  151;  suspects 
Douglas,  187;  peculiar  ec 
onomic  status  of,  192;  ap 
proves  Nebraska  bill,  193. 

Southerners,  view  of  Douglas, 
139;  charge  North  with  bad 
faith  on  Fugitive  Slave  Law, 
170. 

Springfield,  Douglas's  second 
law  practice  in,  39 ;  debate 
between  Douglas  and  Lincoln 
at,  in  1854,  213. 

St.  Louis,  Douglas's  early  visit 
to,  17. 

Storey,  M.,  on  Brooks-Sumner 
episode,  143-144;  view  of 
Sumner-Douglas  debate,  234. 

Stowe,  Mrs.,  view  of  Douglas, 
132. 

Stuart,  John  F.,  contest  with 
Douglas,  38. 

Sumner,  Charles,  relation  to 
Douglas,  129;  controversy 
with  Douglas,  142;  attacked 
by  Brooks,  142;  seeks  to 
amend  Nebraska  bill,  194 ; 
asks  delay  on  Nebraska  bill, 
195;  prepares  protest  against 


INDEX 


371 


Nebraska  bill,  199;  debate 
with  Douglas,  234. 

Sumter,  relief  attempted,  332 ; 
Douglas's  view  on,  339 ;  at 
tacked,  343. 

Supreme  Court  (State), reorgan 
ized,  43 ;  Douglas's  relation 
to,  44 ;  Douglas  appointed  to, 
45 ;  assigned  to  fifth  district, 
45 ;  composition  of,  44—45  » 
Douglas's  decisions  as  judge 
of,  45-46  ;  his  life  as  judge 
of,  47-48 ;  modest  equipment 
of,  48. 

Supreme  Court  (Federal),  Dred 
Scott  decision  of,  237. 

TAMMANY,  attitude  of  toward 
Douglas,  316-317. 

Tariff,  Douglas's  attitude  on, 
126;  of  1857  changed  by 
Douglas,  126;  discussion  re 
tarded  by  slavery  debate, 
299. 

Taylor,  Zachary,  vote  for,  105  ; 
relation  to  territorial  question, 
1 60. 

"  Ten  Regiments  Bill,"  speech 
of  Douglas  on,  96. 

Territorial  question,  develop 
ment  of,  148. 

Terry,  controversy  with  Brod- 
erick  in  California,  303. 

Texas,  question  of  in  relation  to 
Mexico,  91  ;  war  concerning 
breaks  out,  92  ;  right  to  enter 
Union,  Douglas's  view  of,  93. 

Tonnage  tax,  for  rivers  and 
harbors  urged  by  Douglas, 
125. 

Toombs,  Robert,  offers  bill  for 
admission  of  Kansas,  231 ; 
passed  by  Senate,  235  ;  later 
history  of,  236. 

Trumbull,    Lyman,   before  Su 


preme  Court,  47 ;  hostile  to 
Douglas,  212;  elected  senator, 
215  ;  hated  by  Douglas,  217  ; 
debate  with  Douglas,  230; 
attacked  by  Douglas,  281. 

UTAH,  bill  to  organize  passed 
in  Senate,  161. 

VAN  BUREN,  Douglas's  work 
for,  41  ;  attitude  toward 
Mormons,  54;  vote  for,  105. 

Villard,  H.,  impressions  of  Mrs. 
Douglas,  138;  spectator  at 
Lincoln- Douglas  debate,  265  ; 
view  of  Lincoln,  267. 

WALKER,  R.  J.,  named  Gov 
ernor  of  Kansas,  239 ;  hostile 
to  Lecompton  plan,  242. 

Walker,  Cyrus,  Whig  candidate 
in  Mormon  district,  62 ;  on 
power  of  Mormon  court,  62. 

Walters,  account  of  Douglas- 
Jackson  interview,  75. 

Webster,  Daniel,  relation  to 
Douglas,  1 29 ;  last  service  of, 
149 ;  answers  Clay  and  Cal- 
houn,  154;  concedes  exist 
ence  of  Southern  grievance, 
156;  accepts  Mason's  bill,  156. 

West,  relation  to  Douglas's  am 
bition,  167  ;  favors  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  181. 

Winchester,  Douglas's  school 
in,  20. 

Winthrop,  R.  C.,  defeated  for 
Speaker,  152. 

Whigs,  opposed  by  Douglas,  23  ; 
attacked  by  Douglas  before 
Supreme  Court,  40;  election 
contest  in  Congress,  76. 

YOUNG,  Douglas's  effort  to  un 
dermine,  50. 


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